Security

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

Tracking narratives

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

Media policy

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

International response

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17. The bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, connects Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula with Russia’s Krasnodar region. The bridge is used for civilian movement and as an essential logistical route for the Russian army.

Explosions were reported at around 3:00 a.m. local time. Footage of the aftermath indicates that a span of the bridge’s road had collapsed while another suffered damage but remained intact. Traffic reportedly resumed several hours after the explosion, but in the interim, occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes. Russian Telegram channels reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoi area and in the occupied Kherson region towards Melitopol. 

Ukraine defense intelligence spokesperson Andrii Yusov told Suspilne News that damage to the bridge could create logistical difficulties for Russian forces, but said Kyiv would not comment on the cause of the explosion. CNN, citing a source in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), reported that the attack on the bridge was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces. Ukrainian media outlet LIGA also reported that the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces were responsible for the attack, citing sources in the SBU. LIGA also noted that the strike was likely conducted with surface drones. The SBU said that information about the incident would only be revealed once the war ended. Some Russian military bloggers, including former Russian officer and pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, stated that Russian authorities had focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security. Alexander Kots, another prominent blogger and Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council member, also blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on land security.

Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, speculated without evidence that the attack may have been a provocation by Russia amid talks on prolonging the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The grain deal, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in July 2022, has been essential for stemming a global surge in food prices. The agreement, necessitated after the Russian navy blocked all Ukrainian ports, permits Ukraine to export products. It has has been prolonged several times, with the last extension expiring on July 17. The Kremlin announced on July 17 that it had suspended its participation in the initiative but claimed that the decision was unrelated to the bridge attack. 

Meanwhile, about twenty-four hours after the attack on the Kerch Bridge, explosions were heard in Odesa in southern Ukraine. Unconfirmed reports claimed the explosions were a response from Russia. The attack on Odesa continued for a second night on July 19, described by Ukrainian officials as “hellish.” Odesa is an essential port for Ukrainian exports and was allowed to remain open under the conditions of the grain deal.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

The Wagner Group appears to have disbanded its operations in Russia and relocated to Belarus, according to footage reviewed by the DFRLab documenting the movements of Wagner military columns in the days following the mutiny through July 18. Additionally, satellite imagery captured the entry of troops and equipment at the Tsel military camp, located near the Belarusian town of Asipovichy.

On July 17, a video shared on Telegram depicted Wagner soldiers taking down the Russian flag and the Wagner flag at the group’s original military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. In another video published on July 19, Prigozhin addressed Wagner fighters as they left the Molkino base, describing the situation on the front as “a shame.” In addition, he declared that the group is relocating to Belarus and will focus on its activities in Africa. For the time being, he said, Wagner soldiers are no longer participating in Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, although they “will perhaps return to the special military operation at the moment when [they] are sure [they] will not be forced to shame ourselves.”

Shortly after the mutiny ended, Russian authorities conducted raids on Wagner’s accounting divisions in Saint Petersburg, according to information purportedly shared by the wives and mothers of Wagner fighters in an online forum. Additional raids took place on Prigozhin’s residence. The movements of Prigozhin’s private jet also indicate frequent travel to Belarus over the past three weeks.

An investigation by Belarusian opposition media outlet Motolko.help revealed a photograph of a man resembling Prigozhin in his undergarments allegedly at the Tsel military base, where he reportedly spent the night on July 12. According to flight data posted on the online portal Radarbox, Prigozhin’s personal Embraer Legacy 600 jet, registration number RA-02795, completed four round-trip flights between Belarus’ Machulishchy air base and Russia.

Radar imagery acquired on July 17 also shows the tents where Wagner fighters appear to be housed and several places for vehicles parked inside the military base.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

On July 16, several videos emerged on Telegram documenting Wagner vehicles departing Voronezh Oblast along Russia’s M-4 Don highway. Utilizing social media footage, the DFRLab determined the location of the vehicles and identified forty registration plates. At least two-thirds of these vehicles displayed military registration plates from the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic. However, the Belarusian monitoring project Belaruski Hajun reported that many other vehicles used tape to cover their registration plates.

The columns are composed of various buses and trucks, of which only a few could transfer construction equipment. Most of the convoys consist of UAZ Patriot pickup trucks, Ural vans, and Lada cars. No heavy military equipment was observed at the time of writing.

Another video shared on the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU revealed a Wagner convoy of soldiers entering Belarusian territory. According to a post by Belaruski Hajun, at least sixty vehicles entered Belarus through Mogilev Oblast in the early hours of June 15 using the R-43 and M-5 roads. A photograph on Telegram showed the Russian and Wagner Group flags flying at a border outpost.

According to Belaruski Hajun, since July 14, nine distinct military convoys have entered Belarusian territory. They are likely located at the Tsel military camp near Asipovichy. The camp is home to military unit 61732 and was previously identified by Verstka Media as a potential site to accommodate Wagner soldiers. Further, the Belarusian military TV channel VoyenTV posted a video on July 14 showing Wagner soldiers arriving in Belarus and training local forces. According to updated estimates from Belaruski Hajun, as many as 2,500 Wagner members may have relocated to the Tsel military camp since last week.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

In the immediate aftermath of the July 17 attack on the Kerch Bridge, Russian officials and state media were relatively mild in their initial language addressing the incident, referring to it as an “emergency.” However, once Kremlin agencies began referring to the attack as a “terror act,” state media and officials began changing their language to follow the Kremlin.

“Traffic was stopped on the Crimean bridge: an emergency occurred in the area of the 145th support from the Krasnodar territory,” Sergei Aksenov, the Russian-installed head of occupied Crimea, wrote on his Telegram channel at 4:21 a.m. local time. Notably, Aksenov did not use the words “explosion,” “attack,” or “terror” to describe the destruction of the bridge. Two subsequent posts, made at 5:03 a.m. and 6:59 a.m., also avoided these terms. It wasn’t until 1:51 p.m. that Aksenov used the phrase “terror act” to describe the attack.

In between Aksenov’s posts, Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee reported at 10:04 a.m. that they had assessed the Kerch Bridge explosion as a “terror act,” according to Kremlin-owned news agency TASS. Several minutes later at 10:07 a.m., Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that it would open a criminal case investigating the “terror act” on the Kerch Bridge. 

Several Kremlin-owned Russian media outlets, including RIA Novosti and TASS, also used the term “emergency” (“чрезвычайное прошествие” or ЧП) to first describe the bridge explosion before later pivoting to using “terror act.” Neither outlet referred to the destruction of the Kerch Bridge as a “terror act” prior to the official announcements from the Investigative Committee and Antiterrorism Committee. In the case of RIA Novosti, they published a story using the word “emergency” in the headline at 11:41 a.m., more than ninety minutes after the terror investigation announcement, while TASS used the term as late as 7:31 p.m., even though it had already published a report on the investigation. Similarly, many other Kremlin-controlled media outlets, like Komsomolskaya Pravda, Gazeta.ru, RBC, Lenta.ru, and Izvestiya used both “emergency” and “terror act” in their publications throughout the day interchangeably.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

According to Russian media outlet RBC, former Federal Security Service (FSB) Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, the purported administrator of the Telegram channel Kremlevskaya Prachka (“Kremlin Laundress”), was detained for suspected extortion. The press office for the Moscow court released a statement that said Polyakov is “suspected of extorting 40 million rubles [around $440,000] from JSC Lanit, the leader of the Russian industry of information technology.” 

“According to the prosecution, from 2020 to 2023, Polyakov received a large sum of money from a group of IT companies for not publishing information (the so-called ‘negative block’) that could cause significant harm to the rights and legitimate interests of Lanit JSC and the management of Lanit JSC,” the Moscow court continued. The “negative block” is a guarantee that a channel will not mention a particular person or a company in a negative light in exchange for money; this is reportedly a popular practice among Russian Telegram channels.

The independent Russian media outlet Vazhnyye Istorii (“Important Stories”), citing a source close to Russian intelligence services, reported that Polyakov was behind the Kremlevskaya Prachka Telegram channel. According to the outlet, Polyakov supervised an unnamed service at the FSB’s Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. In addition, he reportedly oversaw pro-government Telegram channels and was engaged in promoting the Kremlin’s agenda via media and social networks. According to Important Stories, he worked in coordination with Vladimir Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Sergey Kiriyenko.

Important Stories noted that the Telegram channel 112 also named Polyakov as Kremlevskaya Prachka’s administrator, along with the Telegram channels Siloviki, Nezigar, and Brief, which are not as staunchly pro-govern cited by Kremlin propagandists and proxies.

Kremlevskaya Prachka has not posted since the evening of July 13, corresponding with the reported detainment of Polyakov.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

On July 16, the Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel REVERSE SIDE OF THE MEDAL posted an advertisement offering Wagner’s services to African states. The post included an image from the Prigozhin-funded film, Granite, as well as an email address, seemingly for interested African countries to communicate with Wagner. 

In French, the advertisement reads: “PMC Wagner offers its services to ensure the sovereignty of states and protect the people of African from militants and terrorists.” The fine print emphasizes that “various forms of cooperation are possible,” as long as the cooperation does not “contradict Russia’s interests.” Russia’s interests are not specified.

While the Telegram channel claimed the advertisement was replicated on African social media channels, the DFRLab has not found additional evidence to support this claim.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Alexander Ivanov, director of the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), released a statement on COSI’s Telegram channel regarding the recent arrival of dozens of Wagner operatives in Central African Republic. According to US authorities, COSI is a front company for the Wagner Group in Central African Republic.

In the statement, Ivanov confirmed the Wagner troop rotation while stressing that the new personnel have no contract with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. He reiterated that both in CAR and across the continent, “security work is carried out by private companies that enter into contracts directly with the governments of sovereign states,” and that these private companies have nothing to do with official Russian state entities. Ivanov also indicated that this staff rotation should not impact the activities of Russia in Ukraine, and he claimed to have been in contact with Yevgeny Prigozhin. 

Notably, Ivanov stated that despite the recent changes in the structure of Wagner’s “African business,” Prigozhin “intends not to curtail, but to expand his presence in Africa.” This is somehow consistent with what some analysts are observing: Wagner appears to be trying to expand its presence in West African coastal states increasingly threatened by a spillover of the jihadist insurgency from the Sahel, or possibly taking advantage of upcoming elections in several fragile African countries. 

Although Ivanov has often remarked on Wagner activities in CAR and Africa in the past, this statement, coupled with other recent comments, suggest that the COSI director might be now exercising a wider role as spokesman for all Wagner activity in Africa, as Wagner reorganizes its structure in the wake of last month’s failed mutiny. 

The statement comes as a U-turn in recent communications over Wagner’s presence in CAR. In past weeks both CAR and Russian officials stated that the African republic had an agreement with Russia and not with a private military company. Ivanov seems to be returning to earlier narratives in which Wagner claimed that the CAR government signed an agreement with the PMC and not the Russian government. This narrative seems to confirm DFRLab reporting in the June 30 edition of the Russian War Report, in which we noted that denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa has become more difficult for the Kremlin after recent events damaged the principle of plausible deniability, which had previously been a key aspect of Wagner’s success in Africa. However, Russia does not want to waste the network of influence built by its state proxy forces and is now attempting to reorganize, rebrand and develop a new narrative around Wagner and the Kremlin’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare.

The arrival of dozens of troops from Russia’s Wagner in CAR comes at a critical time as the country prepares to hold a constitutional referendum on July 30 that would eliminate presidential term limits and allow President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to extend his term. The CAR government stated earlier this month that Wagner operatives will help in securing the referendum. This could be seen as a strong signal from Moscow to reiterate the strategic importance of its influence in CAR and reassure local partners of its continued support, while sending a message of continuity and strength to other countries in the region where Wagner operates.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

The Office of South Africa’s Presidency announced on July 19 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would replace President Vladimir Putin at the upcoming Summit of BRICS Nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) “by mutual agreement.”

In Russian media, pro-Kremlin and opposition news outlets alike posted articles claiming that Russia had refused South Africa’s proposal to send Lavrov as head of the country’s delegation on July 14. Quoting an interview with South Africa’s deputy president, the Russian pro-Kremlin news outlet RTVI suggested that “negotiations are still ongoing.”

Putin is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes committed during Russia’s war in Ukraine. A warrant for the arrest of both the Russian president and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova alleges that they were involved in organizing and participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children. As a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, South Africa would have been obligated to arrest Putin had he attended the BRICS Summit in August. 

South Africa’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, took to court in a petition to force the government to arrest Putin if he did attend. In a responding affidavit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that Russia would view South Africa arresting Putin as a “declaration of war.” 

The Kremlin denied claims that Moscow had threatened South African authorities. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on July 19 that “it is clear to everyone in the world what an attempt to encroach on the head of the Russian Federation means.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, London, United Kingdom and Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Russian military chief makes first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny

War crimes and human rights abuses

Russia strikes humanitarian aid delivery point in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

Russian military chief makes first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny

Russian forces continue to conduct offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk, with Ukrainian armed forces reporting thirty combat engagements between July 10 and 11 near Hryhorivka, Syeverne, Marinka, Krasnohorivka, and Novomykhailivka. According to the same report, Russian forces shelled villages and towns in the direction of Zaporizhzhia, Lyman, Kupiansk, and Kherson. Ukrainian Telegram channels also reported explosions on the morning of July 11 in Novooleksiivka, Kherson Oblast.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive advanced slowly amid heavy fighting along well-fortified Russian positions. On July 8, a video posted by RFE/RL’s Ukraine service showed how fighters from the 47th Separate Mechanized “Magura” Brigade, alongside soldiers from the Zaporizhzhia Brigade of the Territorial Defense Forces, occupied elevated Russian army positions in the direction of Zaporizhzhia near Novodarivka. However, Russia’s use of remote-controlled landmines has made it difficult for Ukraine to advance. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced on July 10 that Ukrainian forces had taken control of elevated positions around Bakhmut, allowing them to establish fire control over Bakhmut. Russian military bloggers have expressed fears that Ukrainian forces could encircle Russian forces in Bakhmut.

The Russian Ministry of Defense published footage on July 10 of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, his first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny. In the footage, Gerasimov receives reports about alleged Ukrainian attempts to strike Russian targets in occupied Crimea, Rostov, and Kaluga. The ministry published the footage the same day the Kremlin acknowledged President Vladimir Putin’s June 29 meeting with Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. 

On July 11, the Russian Telegram channel Military Informant reported that Ukraine had used British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles to strike a Russian army post near Berdyansk. The strike killed Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District. On the same day, explosions were reported in occupied Tokmak, Skadovsk, and Berdyansk. Also that day, the Russian army shelled Sofiivka, Kherson Oblast, with Grad multiple rocket launcher systems, killing at least one person and wounding another.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army is increasingly using equipment created by volunteers and local engineers in an attempt to diversify its supplies. On July 9, a team of Ukrainian engineers known as Immaterium reported that a first-person view (FPV) drone destroyed a Russian observation tower located nine kilometers from the departure point. Immaterium also claimed that the drone strike set a distance record for an FPV drone developed and produced locally. 

Elsewhere, Armin Papperger, head of the German defense company Rheinmetall, said on July 10 that an armored vehicle repair plant would open in Ukraine within twelve weeks. Papperger added that he hopes to increase Rheinmetall’s production of shells within one year so the company can provide Ukrainian forces with up to 60 percent of their needs. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Minister for Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin said construction was underway on a new plant to produce Bayraktar drones in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s defense ministry announced on July 8 that five former Azov commanders who fought in the battle over Mariupol were released from Turkey and returning to Ukraine alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Ukraine’s ambassador to Turkey, Vasily Bodnar, said that Turkey did not put any conditions on Ukraine for the return of the Azov commanders. Bodnar added that their release was preceded by months of detailed diplomatic work. The commanders ended up in Turkey as a result of a prisoner swap brokered by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The commanders participated in the Azovstal steelworks plant siege, regarded by Ukrainians as a heroic effort to resist Russian advancements. Russian forces eventually captured the commanders, among the highest-profile fighters to be captured. The commanders have vowed to return to the battlefield. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Ukraine and Turkey had “violated” the prisoner exchange agreement.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia strikes humanitarian aid delivery point in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

On June 9, Ukraine’s interior ministry posted footage on Telegram showing the aftermath of a Russian air strike on a humanitarian aid delivery point in Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The attack reportedly killed at least seven people and injured thirteen. Cross-referencing the shared footage with images posted on Google Maps, the DFRLab determined the location of the incident to be Communal School No. 3, located on the corner of Myru Street and Pokrovska Street. Initial damage analysis, via the images, indicates that the strike destroyed two-thirds of the school’s facilities.

Reports from several Russian-speaking news outlets on Telegram confirmed that the school was converted into a humanitarian aid delivery point. Russian opposition media outlet Doxa indicated that a Russian jet may have dropped two guided bombs to attack the delivery point, though this information is not confirmed. According to the office of the prosecutor-general of Ukraine, the attack occurred around 1:30 pm local time.

The following morning, Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration head Yurii Malashko shared additional photos from the incident, including one featuring what appears to be a damaged canvas sign featuring the logo for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The Zaporizhzhia Regional Prosecutor’s Office has launched an investigation into the “violation of the laws and customs of war, combined with intentional murder.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Russian airstrike hits humanitarian aid station appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

Tracking narratives

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Media policy

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

At least ten people were killed and thirty-seven injured in Russia’s July 6 attack on Lviv, in western Ukraine. Regional Governor Maksym Kozytskyy said that a Russian missile struck a residential building in the city, destroying more than fifty apartments. 

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to launch offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian forces reported thirty-eight combat engagements against Russian troops near Novoselivske, Novohryhorivka, Berkhivka, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka. In the direction of Lyman, Russian forces shelled Nevske, Bilohorivka, Torske, Verkhnokamyanske, and Rozdolivka in Donetsk. Russian aviation conducted an airstrike in Bilohorivka. Russia also attacked villages in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, including Levadne, Olhivske, Malynivka, Huliaipole, and Bilohirka. On July 6, Russian troops shelled Chervonohryhorivka and Nikopol, damaging civilian infrastructure.  

On July 5, reports from Russian military bloggers suggested that Ukrainian forces had advanced southwest of Berkhivka, west of Yahidne, and southwest of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army said it conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut and is moving on Bakhmut’s southern flank. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the Ukrainian army conducted offensive operations near Lyman, Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka front, on the border between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, and in western Zaporizhzhia. 

The Ukrainian army appears to have launched a coordinated attack on Russian army logistical and communications hubs. On July 4, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an ammunition depot in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk. Russian sources claimed without evidence that Ukraine had struck a hospital. Former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov, also known as Igor Girkin, said the attack demonstrates how Ukraine regularly launches missile strikes against Russian rear targets. Other unconfirmed reports from July 5 indicate Ukraine may have struck Russian positions near Debaltseve. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces hit Russian positions near Yakymivka in the Melitopol area and attempted to strike Berdyansk in the Zaporizhzhia region.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Ahead of next week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, allegations that the United States and Ukraine will launch a false flag operation on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant are spreading on various platforms, including Twitter, 4chan, and Instagram. The allegations seemingly aim to create panic and, in the event of a future attack on the plant, establish a narrative the West and Ukraine are to blame. 

On July 3, a post appeared on 4chan from an anonymous user who introduced himself as a US Marine Corps veteran now working for the government in electronic espionage. The user claimed that the Ukrainian and US governments are working together to bomb the Zaporizhzhia power plant. According to the conspiracy theory, after the false flag operation, the United States will be able to use “nuclear warheads” against Russia. At the time of writing, the post had been deleted from 4chan. However, similar posts remain on the platform.

However, the false flag claims did not originate on 4chan. Russian Twitter accounts posted similar claims building the false flag narrative. After the 4chan post, the claim circulated again on Twitter.  

A similar narrative was also shared by Renat Karchaa, an adviser to Rosenergoatom, a subsidiary of the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom. Karchaa claimed on Russian state television channel Russia-24 that on the night of July 5, the Ukrainian army would attempt an attack on the Zaporizhzhia plant. Without evidence, he accused the United States and the West of planning a false flag incident to damage Russia’s reputation. The claims were further amplified by Russian state media outlets.  

The allegations escalated on social media after July 4, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeated Ukraine’s concerns about the status of the nuclear power plant. In an address, Zelenskyy restated that Russia plans to attack the plant and that Russian troops have placed explosive-like objects on the building’s roof. In June, Ukrainian military intelligence made similar claims when it reported that the plant’s cooling pond had been mined by Russian troops.  

On July 5, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that it was aware of reports that mines and other explosives had been placed around the plant. The IAEA said their experts inspected parts of the facility and did not observe any visible indications of mines or explosives. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi added, “The IAEA experts requested additional access that is necessary to confirm the absence of mines or explosives at the site.” On July 7, the IAEA announced that Russia had granted its experts further access, “without – so far – observing any visible indications of mines or explosives.”  

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Several independent Russian media outlets published stories this week interviewing former employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which dissolved on June 30.  

In a video published on Telegram, Yevgeny Zubarev, director of Patriot Media Group’s RIA FAN, said the goal was to “work against the opposition, such as Alexei Navalny and others who wanted to destroy our country.” Zubarev confirmed key details previously reported by independent Russian journalists at Novaya Gazeta in 2013 and the now-Kremlin-controlled RBC in 2017 about the existence of paid commentators and the creation of Prigozhin-affiliated media outlets. Zubarev added that, after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2018 re-election, the group hired “foreign affairs observers.” The timing corresponds with attempts by Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency to meddle in the 2020 US presidential election. 

Further, independent Russian media outlets Sever.Realii, Bumaga, and Novaya Gazeta interviewed former employees of Prigozhin’s media group. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the former employees confirmed that Prigozhin’s “troll factory” and “media factory” conducted coordinated information attacks on opposition leaders, published fabricated or purchased news “exclusives,” praised Putin, and deliberately ignored particular individuals who criticized Wagner Group. Bumaga and Sever.Realii described a smear campaign against Saint Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov. In 2019, Prigozhin’s media group supported and promoted Beglov, but in 2021, Prigozhin reportedly launched a smear campaign, as Beglov allegedly prevented him from developing a waste collection business in the city. Novaya Gazeta’s report also provided evidence that Prigozhin’s troll farm activities extended beyond Russia, with employees portraying skinheads and fascists in the Baltic region, specifically in Lithuania. 

In recent years, additional revelations about Prigozhin’s media group have come to light. For example, Bumaga reported that prospective hires had to pass a “lie detector test” in which “security service specialists” asked candidates about their attitudes toward the opposition and Alexei Navalny in particular. Once hired, employees were closely surveilled. One former employee Bumaga interviewed characterized the atmosphere as being in a “closed military company.” Both Bumaga and Novaya Gazeta’s interviewees said that most of the employees did not believe in the mission. In one example, an employee left after refusing to launch a smear campaign against Ivan Golunov, a journalist at the independent news outlet Meduza who was detained in 2019 under false pretenses. Bumaga, citing an unnamed former employee, also reported that at one point an employee had hacked the system, erased a database, and fled to Poland. The same interviewee claimed they employed two Telegram administrators who also administered pro-Ukraine channels.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan offered to hire employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which reportedly housed his troll factories. In the latest episode of the program Keosayan Daily, Simonyan praised the work of “Wagner’s media empire.” She said their work “was super professional” and that anyone left without a job can join “them,” referring to Russian propaganda outlets. She added, “We know you as professional colleagues of ours.” 

The fate of Patriot’s former employees is being actively discussed in Russia. According to Russian outlet Novie Izverstia, Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin outlet MK.ru, volunteered to help find jobs for former employees of Patriot. In addition, the chairman of the Saint Petersburg branch of the Union of Journalists of Russia stated that the union would contact the heads of media outlets to help find opportunities for dismissed employees and would provide additional informational support.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian conspiracy alleges false flag at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Peterson on the Silicon Curtain: Countering Russian propaganda narratives appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Anyone looking to make sense of recent events in Russia should begin by noting that Prigozhin’s dramatic actions were not aimed at ending the war in Ukraine or steering Russia away from its increasingly totalitarian course. On the contrary, he sought to correct mistakes in the conduct of the invasion by effecting changes in the country’s military leadership.

This should come as no surprise. The vast majority of Prigozhin’s public statements about the invasion of Ukraine align him with prominent ultranationalists, which in the Russian context translates into imperial reactionaries. This group is demanding a fuller commitment to the war against Ukraine which, with Belarus, it sees as the core of Russia’s imperial heartlands. Ideally, this group wants to see full mobilization of Russia’s citizens and the country’s productive capacity for the war effort.

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Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

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Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 29, 2023

Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Taras Kuzio

With the short-lived Wagner mutiny exposing Vladimir Putin’s weakness for all to see, the time has come for Ukraine’s Western partners to provide the country with everything it needs to secure victory, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

Media policy

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

International Response

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia’s loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Russian independent outlet Verstka reported on the construction of camps for Wagner forces near Asipovichi, Mogilev Oblast, located in Belarus approximately two hundred kilometers from the Ukraine border. According to Verstka’s local forestry source, the area will cover 2.4 hectares (5.9 acres) and accommodate eight thousand Wagner fighters. The source also claimed that there will be additional camps constructed. Family members of Wagner fighters also confirmed to Verstka that they were deploying to Belarus. 

Radio Svaboda, the Belarusian-language edition of Radio Liberty, reviewed satellite imagery from Planet Labs that suggested signs of expansion at the Unit 61732 military camp adjacent to the village of Tsel, twenty kilometers northwest of Asipovichi. The outlet interviewed Ukrainian military analyst Oleg Zhdanov, who suggested it was “too early to tell” as to whether the military camp’s expansion is specifically for Wagner forces. “Very little time has passed to start building a camp specifically for the Wagnerites—it’s unreal,” Zhdanov told Radio Svaboda.

On June 27, in his first speech after the Wagner mutiny, Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the deal that ended the rebellion on June 24 in which Yevgeniy Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus. Putin praised those Wagner fighters who did not participate in the revolt and said they could sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense of other services. He added that other mercenaries who do not want to join could go either home or follow Prigozhin to Belarus.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Pro-Kremlin sources denied Russia targeted civilians when a missile struck a crowded pizza restaurant in Kramatorsk, killing at least twelve civilians and injuring more than fifty others. According to this narrative, RIA Pizza was actually a military base hosting US and Ukrainian soldiers. To support the claims, pictures taken after the strike were published on Telegram and Twitter.

To support the claim that soldiers of 101st Airborne Division were located at the pizza “military base,” pro-Kremlin sources circulated grisly footage of the attack aftermath recorded by freelance journalist Arnaud De Decker. The clip shows a man wearing a morale patch of a US flag with the words “Always Be Ready: 5.11 Tactical.” 5.11 Tactical is a military apparel company that sells branded merchandise, including morale patches, worn to offer support to various causes and slogans but not used official unit patches. Various types of 5.11 Tactical’s “Always Be Ready” patches are readily available for purchase online.

Similarly, another post from Aleksandr Simonov’s Telegram channel that a man wearing an 101^st Airborne t-shirt was a member of the US Army division. These t-shirts are also readily available from online retailers.

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

In addition to pro-Kremlin accusations that the Kramatorsk attack targeted a base housing US Army soldiers, Kremlin influencers also targeted citizens of Colombia, three of whom were injured in the attack, for being at the site of the incident. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said the attack targeted “three defenseless Colombian civilians” in violation of the protocols of war and called for the Colombian Foreign Ministry to submit a note of diplomatic protest to Russia. While the Kremlin acknowledged launching the attack, it insisted the assault struck military personnel rather than civilians.

The three Colombian citizens injured in the attack include acclaimed Colombian writer Hector Abad Faciolince; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, who previously led Colombia’s peace negotiations with FARC rebels; and Ukrainian-based journalist Catalina Gomez. According to the New York Times, Abad and Jaramillo were in Kramatorsk “collecting material” in support of their initiative, ¡Aguanta Ucrania! (“Hang On Ukraine!”), which seeks to garner support for Ukraine in Latin America.

Following the attack, Colombian influencers and officials criticized the attack through media outlets and social media accounts in Spanish. Danilo Rueda, Colombia’s current high commissioner for peace, issued a statement expressing support for the victims without mentioning Russia, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its “strongest condemnation of the unacceptable attack by Russian forces on a civilian target.” 

Gomez, who was injured in the attack, broadcast a video for France 24 from the site of the explosion. Meanwhile, Abad and Jaramillo conducted interviews with Colombian media outlets such as El Tiempo in which they described the incident.

Actualidad RT, a Russian media outlets with enormous reach in the Spanish-speaking world, insisted that the victims of the attack were mercenaries and instructors of NATO and Ukraine rather than civilians. Actualidad RT quoted statements from Igor Konashenkov, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Defense,  and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, who said the attack struck “military targets” and that “Russia does not attack civilian infrastructure.” Actualidad RT promoted its claims via Twitter and Facebook multiple times on June 28.

Colombian radio station WRadio interviewed Kremlin foreign policy spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the morning of June 28. Zakharova stated that the restaurant was a Russian military target and called for an investigation into Victoria Amelina, a Ukrainian writer who was gravely injured while purportedly hosting the Colombians at the restaurant, claiming without evidence that Amelina had prior knowledge that the restaurant was a military target. Zakharova reiterated this statement after a WRadio journalist asked her to confirm the accusation. In contrast, Abad stated that it was Gomez who suggested they visit the restaurant, and that she apologized for doing so after the attack.

The Russian embassy in Colombia amplified Zakharova’s narrative later that same afternoon and evening. On Twitter, the embassy insisted that the city was “an operational and logistical-military hub, not a suitable place to enjoy Ukrainian cuisine dishes.” It also seemed to celebrate that the “reckless trip [of the Colombians] did not turn into an irreparable tragedy.”

—Daniel Suárez Pérez, research associate, Bogota, Colombia

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

Over the course of the thirty-six-hour Wagner mutiny, the Kremlin attempted to limit information about Yevgeniy Prigozin on Russian social media and search engines, eventually blocking websites affiliated with Prigozhin. On June 24, the Telegram channel of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet RT reported that several Prigozhin-controlled media outlets including RIA FAN, People’s News, and Patriot Media Group were no longer accessible in parts of Russia. RT added that the reason for their disappearance was unknown. Similar reports appeared in Mediazona and several Telegram channels. 

The DFRLab used the Internet censorship measurement platform OONI to verify the claim and check the accessibility of RIA FAN within Russia. OONI detected signs that riafan.ru was blocked in the country. 

On June 29, independent Russian outlet The Bell claimed the Kremlin was searching for a new owner for Patriot Media Group, which includes media assets associated with Prigozhin. The following day, multiple Russian outlets reported that Prigozhin had dissolved Patriot Media Group.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

For years, Wagner has acted as Russia’s primary form of influence in Africa—spreading disinformation and propaganda, securing military contracts, and exporting natural resources to support Putin’s war effort. Following Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny, the future of Wagner’s operations on the continent has come into question. While it is highly unlikely the Kremlin would willingly abandon its influence in Africa, if Wagner is retired or its troops absorbed into the Ministry of Defense, it is uncertain who would maintain the group’s operations on the continent.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that Russia’s work in Africa will continue. In a TV interview with Russia Today, Lavrov said, “In addition to relations with this PMC the governments of CAR and Mali have official contacts with our leadership. At their request, several hundred soldiers are working in CAR as instructors.”

A top advisor to Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra appeared unconcerned about the weekend’s events. Speaking of Wagner’s military instructors, Fidèle Gouandjika said, “If Moscow decides to withdraw them and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have them.” In a statement released to its Telegram channel, the Officer’s Union for International Security—a US-sanctioned Wagner front company operating in CAR—claimed CAR’s defense minister had apologized for Gouandjika’s remarks. It quoted Defense Minister Claude Rameaux Bireau as saying, “The people of the CAR are grateful to the Russian instructors of Wagner, ask any Central African on the streets of Bangui or in the village of the CAR—he will confirm my words.”

In Mali, where Wagner forces have taken over responsibility for pushing back jihadists after the departure of French forces, the online outlet Mali Actu reported that the situation could dramatically impact Mali. “This situation raises major concerns about the security, stability and sovereignty of Mali, as well as the impact on the local population and counter-terrorism efforts,” it wrote.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

While Wagner’s future in Africa remains uncertain, it is important to consider that the Wagner Group not just a paramilitary force. It is also a conglomerate of companies active in different sectors, from mining and logistics to political warfare and moviemaking, able to travel the spectrum between private entrepreneurism to state proxy. This flexibility has previously allowed Moscow to deploy Wagner to act as a force multiplier in Africa while simultaneously denying Russia’s direct presence on the continent. In Africa, Russia has used Wagner multiple times as part of a strategy to help authoritarian leaders stay in power and gain a pro-Russian military presence on the ground, all while maintaining plausible deniability. Until now, the positive outcomes of this strategy have far exceeded the costs for the Kremlin, as Russia has built a strong network of African influence with relatively little effort, securing concessions in strategic extractive industries, and expanding military-to-military relations on the continent.

However, this principle of plausible deniability, which made Wagner so successful and so useful for Moscow as an extension of its foreign policy and influence, is now damaged. As previously noted, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Putin, publicly confirmed direct links between Wagner and the Russian state apparatus.

Africa is intimately linked to Wagner: In the wake of Wagner’s involvement in Syria, Africa became the scene of the group’s expansion. Engaging in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mali, Wagner employed an opportunistic strategy of supplying security while taking concessions to mine natural resources. While its forces were in most cases invited to stabilize fragile states, its actions actively invited further instability, creating more opportunities and a greater demand signal for its services, ultimately granting renewing opportunities to Moscow to reinforce its footprint in the continent.

While denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa might have become more difficult for the Kremlin, Russia is unlikely to waste the network of influence built by the group in recent years. Instead, Moscow will likely continue to deploy hybrid tools such as Wagner, although organized in different shapes and forms, so Russia can continue displacing Western influence, exploiting natural resources, and evading sanctions through dozens of front companies.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

On June 20, the Organized Crime and Corruption reporting project (OCCRP) published a series of investigations titled “The Rotenberg Files” that shed light on the business dealings and alleged sanctions evasion attempts of Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, close friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The report is based on fifty thousand leaked emails and documents, examined by journalists from seventeen outlets. The OCCRP said the leak came from a source who worked for the brothers at a Russian management firm. The OCCRP investigation was conducted in partnership with the Times of London, Le Monde, and Forbes, among others.

Boris and Arkady Rotenberg are childhood friends of Putin. The billionaire brothers faced Western sanctions amid Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, but their lavish lifestyles do not appear to have been impacted. 

According to the OCCRP, the leaked documents demonstrate how the Rotenberg brothers allegedly used Western lawyers, bankers, corporate service providers, and proxies to evade sanctions. 

One of the report’s findings also alleges the brothers maintain business links to Prince Michael of Kent, a cousin of the late Queen Elizabeth II who was previously accused by the Sunday Times and Channel 4 of profiting off close access to the Kremlin. According to the latest investigation, “Prince Michael distanced himself from earlier ties to the Putin regime in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But leaked emails and corporate records show he co-owns a company with two Russian businessmen who helped billionaire oligarch and Putin ally Boris Rotenberg dodge Western sanctions.” 

Another investigation from the Rotenberg files reported that Putin’s eldest daughter regularly visited a holiday property financed by Arkady Rotenberg in an exclusive Austrian skiing destination. Documents reviewed by the OCCRP suggest that the house was purchased by a Cypriot company in 2013 with a loan from a bank then owned by Arkady, using funds invested by another company he owned. Other records suggested that the former romantic partner of Putin’s daughter is connected to the company that owns the Austrian property. Residents claim to have seen Putin himself at the Kitzbühel residence, though this has not been confirmed. 

The Rotenberg brothers and Prince Michael declined to comment to the OCCRP investigative consortium.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tracking narratives

How Prigozhin used Telegram to declare war on the Russian Ministry of Defense – and then suddenly pull back

Putin calls Prigozhin’s “criminal adventure” an “armed mutiny” and “treason”

Security

Wagner forces enter Rostov, occupy Russian Southern Military District headquarters

Wagner forces emerge south of Moscow in Lipetsk

Explosion at oil depot in Russian city of Voronezh

Media policy

Amid chaos in the Russian information space the Kremlin attempts to limit information on Prigozhin

How Prigozhin used Telegram to declare war on the Russian Ministry of Defense – and then suddenly pull back

The Russian-founded messaging platform Telegram, which became a primary tool circulating pro-Kremlin narratives throughout Russia’s war in Ukraine, achieved an unprecedented level of influence on June 23, with Prigozhin wielding it to vent his rage at the Russian defense establishment and launch a mercenary mutiny. For months, Prigozhin has engaged in rhetorical warfare against his rivals in the Kremlin, in particular Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov. The Wagner founder blamed them for ineptitude over the course of the war in Ukraine, including a months-long public argument about supplying his forces with adequate munitions during its siege of Bakhmut. 

Prigozhin’s one-man war against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reached new heights in a series of Telegram posts that began on Friday, June 23, and continued into Saturday. At 10:50 am Moscow time, he posted a thirty-minute video to his Prigozhin Press Service Telegram channel excoriating the MoD, accusing its leadership of deceiving Putin and the Russian public in early 2022 into believing that Ukrainian aggression was imminent, and that Russia had no choice but to invade Ukraine. 

Sitting in a chair in front of a Wagner Group flag pinned to an otherwise blank wall, Prigozhin proceeded to make his case against the MoD and its entire war effort. “Right now, the [MoD] is trying to deceive society and the president and tell a story that there was insane aggression from the Ukrainian side and they were going to attack us together with the whole NATO bloc,” Prigozhin said effectively undermining the Kremlin’s entire case for war. “Therefore, on February 24, the so-called special operation was launched for completely different reasons.” He described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a “monstrous shame show” and an “incompetently planned operation” conducted by “a bunch of creatures” and “mentally ill scum” who “don’t have the balls” to fight aggressively with the necessary decisiveness to win the war, including their unwillingness to use tactical nuclear weapons. “The grandfathers are rather weak. They cannot get out of their comfort zone,” he added.

“A handful of dipshits decided for some reason that they were so cunning that no one would realize what they were doing with their military exercises, and nobody would stop them when they went to Kyiv,” Prigozhin said. He went on to blame Shoigu for killing thousands of capable Russian soldiers, and he directed his ire at Russian oligarchs enriching themselves on the war while seeking to return former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to power. “Our sacred war against those who wrong the Russian people has turned into racketeering, into theft,” he said.  

Prigozhin later added that he would follow up the video with a second “interview,” but this would turn out to be a gross understatement, as the initial video was merely the first of more than a dozen messages he would post to his Prigozhin Press Service Telegram channel over the next thirty-six hours. 

Later in the day at 5:10 pm Moscow time, Prigozhin amped up his criticism of the MoD even further with a Telegram audio post in which he accused it of committing “genocide” against Russians. Calling out Shoigu and Gerasimov directly, Prigozhin said “they should be held responsible for the genocide of the Russian people, the murder of tens of thousands of Russian citizens, and the transfer of Russian territories to the enemy.” 

As angry audio clips of Prigozhin continued to appear into the evening, multiple pro-Wagner Telegram channels circulated a video around 9:00 pm Moscow time purporting to document the aftermath of a Russian airstrike on a Wagner encampment. The video shows scenes of a wooded area lined with stone paths subjected to a moderate amount debris and several fires burning in trenches; a body is briefly seen towards the end of the clip. It is unclear where or when the footage was filmed, and it brought to mind similar suspicious footage contextually devoid footage circulated prior to the February 2022 invasion accusing Ukraine of engaging in sabotage and other aggression against Russia.

Within ten minutes, Prigozhin posted another angry statement, this time accusing the MoD of attacking his forces at the camp. “Today, seeing that we aren’t broken, they decided to launch rocket attacks on our rear camps,” he exclaimed. “A huge number of fighters were killed, our comrades in arms. We’ll decide how to respond to this atrocity. The ball’s in our court.”  

Approximately fifteen minutes later, Prigozhin effectively declared war against the MoD in another Telegram audio clip. “The Wagner Group commanders’ council has made a decision,” he announced. “The evil that the country’s military leadership is carrying out must be stopped. They neglect soldiers’ lives. They’ve forgotten the word ‘justice’ and we’re bringing it back. Those who destroyed our guys today, those who destroyed many tens of thousands of Russian soldiers’ lives will be punished.” Later, he described his forces as “25,000 strong,” adding, “We’re going to get to the bottom of the lawlessness in this country.” 

As Prigozhin continued posting additional threats and taunts on Telegram, the MoD described the alleged footage circulated on pro-Wagner channels as fake, while Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee announced that the Federal Security Service, or FSB, would initiate a criminal case against Prigozhin “on the fact of calling for an armed rebellion.”

Prigozhin continued posting on and off throughout Saturday as his forces advanced north in the direction of Moscow. Then just before 8:30pm local time, he uploaded another message, stating he would return Wagner forces to their camps. It remains unclear whether he intends to keep that promise.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Putin calls Prigozhin’s “criminal adventure” an “armed mutiny” and “treason”

After spending Friday night away from cameras, Putin released a televised statement late Saturday morning. Addressing the Russian public as well as the armed forces and security personnel “who are now fighting in their combat positions, repulsing enemy attacks,” Putin described Prigozhin’s actions as a “criminal adventure” and an “armed mutiny.”  

“Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons,” he stated. “The entire military, economic, and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history.” 

“This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces,” Putin continued. “It requires unity, consolidation, and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded. Therefore, any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people.” 

Comparing the mutiny to 1917, when “Russians were killing Russians and brothers were killing brothers,” Putin declared, “We will not allow this to happen again. We will protect our people and our statehood from any threats, including from internal betrayal…. Inflated ambitions and personal interests have led to treason—treason against our country, our people and the common cause which Wagner Group soldiers, and commanders were fighting and dying for.” 

“Once again, any internal revolt is a deadly threat to our statehood and our nation. It is a blow to Russia, to our people,” he continued. “Our actions to defend the fatherland from this threat will be harsh. All those who have consciously chosen the path of betrayal, planned an armed mutiny, and taken the path of blackmail and terrorism, will inevitably be punished and will answer before the law and our people…. Those who staged the mutiny and took up arms against their comrades—they have betrayed Russia and will be brought to account. I urge those who are being dragged into this crime not to make a fatal and tragic mistake but make the only right choice: to stop taking part in criminal actions.” 

“I am certain that we will preserve and defend what we hold dear and sacred, and together with our motherland we will overcome any hardships and become even stronger,” Putin concluded. 

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Wagner forces enter Rostov, occupy Russian Southern Military District headquarters

Over the course of Prigozhin’s Telegram posts, he boasted that his “25,000 strong” Wagner forces had marched across the border from Ukraine into Russia before claiming they had shot down a Russian armed forces helicopter before entering the city of Rostov. For many hours overnight, he provided no evidence to back his claims. This finally began to change as footage emerged on Russian Telegram, ultimately confirming that Prigozhin had indeed occupied Rostov. 

At 3:47 am Moscow time, the pro-Wagner channel VChK-OGPU posted a video in which a helicopter can be heard circling over Rostov at night. The channel noted, however, “No one has yet seen the video of the Wagner PMC column and the battles with the Ministry of Defense.” Two minutes later, the channel changed its tune by sharing a second video appearing to show rocket fire and bursts of assault rifles, describing it as the “first video reportedly showing fighting between PMC Wagner and Ministry of Defense units.” The footage circulated widely on Telegram but remained unverified. 

Less than twenty minutes later, at 4:09 am, VChK-OGPU shared a third clip showing what appeared to be a convoy of Wagner tanks, trucks, and other vehicles crossing a checkpoint without any opposition. Unlike the previous clips, however, the footage was easily visible, as it appeared to have been recorded during the pre-dawn twilight. According to open-source sun-tracking data, the sun rose in Rostov this morning at 4:25 am, with twilight commencing at 3:50 am, putting the video’s release squarely in the middle of pre-dawn twilight. The exact location of the footage is still under review and cannot be confirmed. 

At 5:01 am, not long after sunrise, the Verum Regnum Telegram channel circulated video clips of what appeared to show Wagner forces arriving in central Rostov, just outside the MoD’s Southern Military District headquarters at the intersection of Pushkinskaya Ulitsa and Budonnovskiy Prospekt. One of the videos appeared to show forces beginning to set up a perimeter around the MoD building.

A second clip showed how that presence had expanded with the placement of additional armored vehicles blocking the entire intersection from vehicle traffic.

Around 7:30 am Moscow time, a pair of videos appeared on the WAGNER Z GROUP/Z PMC WAGNER’Z Telegram channel and Prigozhin’s press channel respectively. The first video showed Prigozhin and his entourage entering the inner courtyard of the Southern Military District building. Prigozhin is later seen bragging about his successes with Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov while demanding that Yevkurov speak to him respectfully. In the second video, he addressed the camera and bragged that he had captured Rostov without firing a single shot.

Later, prior to 2:00 pm Moscow time, new footage emerged showing people running from the neighborhood of the MoD building. Initial reports suggested it was a Russian Armed Forces attack within the vicinity, but this has not been confirmed.

The many civilians running from the sound of an explosion were likely due to the crowds that came out to observe Wagner’s occupation of the MoD building. In one video, people can be seen chatting with Wagner soldiers and thanking them.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Wagner forces emerge south of Moscow in Lipetsk

The governor of Lipetsk, Igor Artamonov, announced Saturday afternoon that Wagner forces had entered the region, approximately 400 km south of Moscow. The Associated Press noted that the governor added, “The situation is under control.” Meanwhile, footage emerged that appeared to show excavators destroying the highway between Lipetsk and Moscow. 

At the time of writing there were conflicting reports as to whether the Wagner convoy had traveled from Rostov or was comprised of defectors from the Russian Armed Forces. 

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Explosion at oil depot in Russian city of Voronezh

On June 24, videos depicting an explosion at an oil depot in the region of Voronezh were widely circulated online. The DFRLab identified the precise location of the explosion and confirmed the videos as authentic. 

The video published online was captured from buildings in close proximity to the Leroy Merlin store in Voronezh, as clearly observed in the footage. The DFRLab also corroborated the location of the oil depot Red Flag Oil Combine (Комбинат Красное знамя) and identified approximate coordinates for the area where the video was recorded. Below, the screenshot on the left is extracted from the video, while the image on the right is from Google Maps, illustrating the precise positions of the oil depot, store, and the recorded video.

Additional footage documented the shelling of a residential area in Voronezh. The footage reveals visible damage to cars. In order to verify the location of the building, the DFRLab utilized reverse image search via Google and Yandex, then cross-referenced the results with Google Maps, verifying the location of the shelling.

—Sayyara Mammadova, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Amid chaos in the Russian information space the Kremlin attempts to limit information on Prigozhin

According to TASS, Russian social network VKontakte (VK) and search engine Yandex are blocking content related to Prigozhin. Reportedly, instead of Prigozhin’s statement that was published on June 23 at 9:52 pm Moscow time, a VK page for Prigozhin’s Concord company displayed a message that the material was blocked on the territory of Russia on the basis of the decision of the Prosecutor General’s Office. At the time of the writing, Prigozhin’s posts on Concord VK page were available, though none of them correspond to 9:52 pm Moscow time. TASS added that the Yandex search results for Prigozhin notifies a reader that some of the search results are hidden in accordance with federal law. Using a virtual private network (VPN), the DFRLab replicated the search of the content mentioned by TASS and found that they are accessible from other locations. The restrictions seem to be geofenced to Russia. 

Separately, TASS reported that there are Telegram-access disruptions detected in various Russian cities, including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Voronezh, and Volgograd Oblasts. 

Russia’s internet regulator Roskomnadzor warned that the government can place internet performance restrictions in locations where counter-terrorist operations might take place, such as Moscow, Voronezh, or Rostov. Roskomnadzor also added that the use of Telegram is not limited for now.  

Meanwhile, the Telegram channel Faridaily reported that residents of Moscow and the surrounding region are receiving calls from unknown mobile numbers with messages from Wagner. According to the Telegram post, one person received a call on their Viber messenger with a recording of Prigozhin’s appeal about “restoring justice.” Another person received a call on behalf of Wagner with an automated voice encouraging them to join Wagner when their units move toward Moscow.

Meanwhile, footage from Russian state media Rossiya 24 surfaced online showing a confused news anchor. Apparently lacking instructions from the Kremlin on how to report about the armed insurrection in Russia, they said, “Next we are going for short commercial and then… commercial.”

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report Special Edition: Prigozhin and Wagner forces mutiny against Moscow appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Ukrainian counteroffensive sees advances in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine

Wagner attempts to draft gamers as UAV pilots

Tracking narratives

Deripaska blames hackers after his website briefly takes credit for potential war crime

Rumors of alleged death of popular pro-Kremlin war correspondent gain traction on Twitter

Ukrainian counteroffensive sees advances in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine

On June 19, Ukrainian forces launched counteroffensive actions in at least three areas and appear to have made gains in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine. The Telegram channel of Russian military blogger WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces continued attacks northwest, northeast, and southwest of Bakhmut and advanced near Krasnopolivka. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced that over the past week Ukrainian troops advanced up to seven kilometers in the direction of Zaporizhzhia and retook 113 square kilometers of territory. Russian Telegram channels also reported that fighting was ongoing south and southwest of Orikhiv on June 19. Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts continue to be the most active areas of the frontline, as the Ukrainian army attempts to advance in the directions of Novodarivka, Pryutne, Makarivka, Rivnopil, Novodanylivka, and Robotyne.

On June 17, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks west and south of Kreminna. It also stated that the Russian army had repelled Ukrainian attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk sector. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continued operations around Velyka Novosilka near the border between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. 

According to Ukrainian forces, Russian forces conducted offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Ukrainian military reported forty-five combat engagements with Russian forces near Yampolivka, Torske, Hryhorivka, Spirne, Avdiyivka, Krasnohorivka, Marinka, Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, and Donetsk’s Dibrova and Orikhovo-Vasylivka. According to Ukraine, the Russian army continued to shell villages in the direction of Marinka, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Lyman, and Kupiansk. Ukraine also alleged that Russian forces launched Kalibr cruise missiles from a submarine in the Black Sea and Shahed drones from the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov.

On June 20, Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, alleged that Russian troops mined the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant’s cooling pond, which is necessary for the safe operation of the plant. According to Budanov, if Russia triggers an explosion, there is a “high probability that there will be significant problems.” Budanov did not provide any evidence to support the allegation, and the statement cannot be independently verified at this time. If true, however, it would put the nuclear plant at greater risk of a significant accident. The power plant complex, Europe’s largest, has been under occupation since February 2022.

On January 22, the governor of Russian-occupied Crimea accused Ukraine of targeting a bridge that connects the peninsula to Kherson Oblast, near the village of Chonhar. In a Telegram post, Vladimir Sal’do alleged that Ukraine struck the bridge with “British Storm Shadow missiles,” creating a hole in the middle of the bridge.

As fierce hostilities continue in eastern and southern Ukraine, there are signs of a new wave of arrests in Russia, including of people with ties to Ukraine. On June 20, Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti announced that a woman of Ukrainian origin was detained in Saransk and charged with treason.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner attempts to draft gamers as UAV pilots

A June 19 Telegram post from Russian opposition news outlet Verstka claimed that Wagner Group is encouraging gamers to apply to serve as unmanned aerial vehicle pilots in the war against Ukraine. The media outlet reported that no prior military experience was required to apply for the position. Posts from Wagner emerged on Vkontakte the same day, inviting gamers with experience in “manipulating joysticks in flight simulators” to enroll.

Verstka, which contacted a Wagner recruiter as part of its reporting, stated that the campaign aims to recruit soldiers to pilot “copters and more serious machines.” In this particular context, “copters” (коптеры) is a reference to commercial drones that are sold to the public and have been widely used in the war against Ukraine. A May 19 investigation published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project found that Chinese manufacturers have reportedly continued to provide Russian armed forces with DJI drones through third parties in Kazakhstan. 

Verstka also noted that in 2022, the Russian defense ministry attempted to recruit gamers with a targeted ad campaign that invited them to play “with real rules, with no cheat codes or saves.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Deripaska blames hackers after his website briefly takes credit for potential war crime

The Russian-language website of Russian industrialist and US-sanctioned oligarch Oleg Deripaska briefly displayed an article appearing to take credit for deporting Ukrainian children to Russian-occupied Crimea in partnership with Kremlin official Maria Lvova-Belova, who is already facing an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for allegedly deporting children. 

Yaroslav Trofimov, chief foreign affairs correspondent at the Wall Street Journal, noted the article’s appearance and disappearance in a June 15 tweet. Trofimov shared screengrabs of the article, which by that time had already been deleted from Deripaska’s Russian-language website, deripaska.ru. A complete copy of the article can be found at the Internet Archive.

Later in the article, it added, “Separately, the Fund and personally Oleg Vladimirovich [Deripaska] express their gratitude to Maria Lvova-Belova and her project ‘In Hands to Children,’ which not only provided methodological materials, but also found an opportunity to send employees for psychological work with affected babies.” In March 2023, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Lvova-Belova and Russian President Vladimir Putin, alleging they are responsible for unlawful deportation and transport of children from Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

In a response to Russian independent news outlet Meduza, which also covered the incident, a team of representatives for Deripaska called the article a “gross fake press-release” and blamed hackers for the article’s appearance. “The team added that Deripaska ‘unequivocally condemns the separation of children from their parents’ and that he is ‘one of the very few prominent Russian industrialists who openly criticizes the fratricidal war and consistently advocates for peace in Ukraine, as well as a reduction in global military spending,’” Meduza noted.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Rumors of alleged death of popular pro-Kremlin war correspondent gain traction on Twitter

Rumors are spreading online that claim Ukrainian forces killed pro-Kremlin war correspondent Semyon Pegov, who operates an influential group of social media accounts under the name Wargonzo. The rumor first spread on Twitter on June 19 following the release of a graphic video from the 73rd Naval Center of Operations documenting how Ukrainian special forces unit had shot Russian soldiers in trenches. On June 19, Pegov’s Twitter account disregarded the allegations as fake. Wargonzo’s Telegram account has continued to operate as usual.

DFRLab analysis conducted with the social media monitoring software Meltwater Explore revealed that the most retweeted tweet came from the pro-Ukraine Twitter account @GloOouD, which stated, “LOOKS LIKE RUSSIAN TERRORISTS AND WAR REPORTER SEMEN PEGOV WAS KILLED BY UKRAINIAN SPECIAL FORCES.” The account shared a screenshot of a low-quality video frame depicting a red-bearded man that bears resemblance to Pegov.

The DFRLab confirmed that the video frame depicting Pegov’s look-alike was extracted from the graphic video posted posted by the 73rd Naval Center of Operations. The video’s metadata indicates the clip was created on June 18, 2023, at 22:16:07 GMT+0300. However, the video shows events occurring in daylight.

Pegov’s most recent public appearance was on June 13 during a meeting between Putin and Russian war correspondents. The Kremlin-controlled Channel One Russia broadcast the meeting on June 18.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Wagner attempts to draft gamers as drone pilots appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Zelenskyy’s comments reflect frustration in Kyiv over reports in the mainstream international media and widespread claims on social media platforms suggesting Ukraine’s counteroffensive is already floundering. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak was one of many Ukrainian commentators to suggest this trend is part of a coordinated Kremlin disinformation operation. In a June 20 post, he accused Moscow of fueling media hysteria about the alleged failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in order to secure a ceasefire and “freeze the conflict at any cost.”

Kremlin-tied or Russia-friendly sources are likely to be behind at least some of the recent criticism over the initial pace of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. At the same time, negative assessments are also a consequence of the unrealistically high expectations that built up in the half-year period prior to the start of the campaign.

In the final months of 2022, the Ukrainian military stunned the watching world by liberating large areas of the country from Russian occupation. A lightning September offensive saw most of northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region de-occupied, while a more methodical push in the south eventually resulted in the liberation of Kherson. These successes encouraged many to expect similarly rapid progress during the current campaign. In reality, Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive represents a far greater challenge in almost every sense.

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Ukraine must overcome a vast Russian invasion force strengthened by 300,000 mobilized troops that is dug in behind successive lines of sophisticated defensive fortifications stretching for over one thousand kilometers. They must do so without air superiority and while outgunned by Russian artillery at many points along the front. Nor can they count on the element of surprise. This incredibly ambitious task would challenge the world’s most powerful militaries. Understandably, Ukrainian commanders are adopting a methodical approach to the campaign.

Progress so far has been very slow but steady. During the first few weeks of the counteroffensive, Ukraine claims to have liberated at least eight settlements. While most represent sparsely populated frontline villages with little strategic value, the sight of the Ukrainian flag raised in liberated communities provides all Ukrainians with a massive morale boost. Meanwhile, the big battles still lie ahead.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

For now, the Ukrainian military is focusing on probing attacks at numerous points along the front in order to identify weaknesses and thin out Russian defenses. Ukraine is also carrying out a comprehensive campaign of airstrikes against Russian military and logistical targets deep inside occupied territory. Britain’s May 2023 decision to provide Ukraine with long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles is playing an important role in these air attacks, making it possible to hit targets virtually anywhere in occupied Ukraine. For example, Storm Shadow missiles are believed to have been used in the June 22 attack on a strategically important bridge connecting Crimea with Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.

These tactics are reminiscent of the early stages of last year’s ultimately triumphant Ukrainian campaign to liberate Kherson. At the beginning of August 2022, Ukraine very publicly signaled the start of a counteroffensive to free the southern port city and surrounding region. Progress was initially slow, leading to widespread criticism and pessimistic forecasts. However, Ukraine’s strategy of systematically targeting key bridges across the Dnipro River which Russian troops relied upon for resupply eventually paid off. Hemmed in and cut off, Russian commanders ordered a humiliating retreat in early November. 

While the Kherson counteroffensive was on a far smaller scale than the current operation, it offers perhaps the best guide to Ukraine’s current objectives and envisioned timeline. The campaign to liberate Kherson involved tens of thousands of troops and took approximately three months to complete. Today’s counteroffensive involves hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides, with an area equal to a medium-sized European country at stake. It may be months before Ukraine’s commanders feel the conditions are right to attempt a major push to achieve a comprehensive breakthrough.

Ukraine’s international partners seem to appreciate the need for patience and are now emphasizing a long-term commitment to Ukraine that goes far beyond the current counteroffensive. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London on June 21, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak reiterated his promise to “stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.” Other Western leaders have made similar pledges in recent weeks.

These statements are particularly important at a time when Russian hopes of rescuing their faltering invasion increasingly hinge on a weakening of Western resolve and a reduction in support for Ukraine. Despite the many setbacks of the past sixteen months, Putin and other senior regime figures in Moscow are apparently still convinced they can ultimately outlast the democratic world in Ukraine. European and American leaders are attempting to dampen such expectations by signaling the strength of their commitment to Ukrainian victory.

As international anxiety grows over the perceived lack of progress in Ukraine’s big summer counteroffensive, it is vital that this message of Western unity and resolution remains clear and unambiguous. The campaign to defeat Russia’s invasion is a marathon not a blitzkrieg, but it has every chance of success as long as Ukraine and the country’s partners are unwavering in their commitment.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

Fast Thinking Jun 7, 2023

Has Ukraine’s counteroffensive really begun?

By Atlantic Council

Atlantic Council experts share their insights on the intensifying war in Ukraine.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s counteroffensive is a marathon not a blitzkrieg appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The obstacles to successful reintegration should not be underestimated. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, Moscow has prioritized control of the information space and has subjected the population in occupied regions of Ukraine to relentless propaganda. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the communities living in occupied Ukraine can be successfully reintegrated following liberation if the right policies are adopted.

Much to the Kremlin’s disbelief, Ukrainian national identity has proven far stronger than anyone in Moscow anticipated in 2014. Similarly, it should now be abundantly clear that the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who speak Russian in their daily lives or embrace aspects of Russian popular culture is in no way indicative of political loyalty to the Kremlin.

Even in regions of Ukraine where the Russian language remained dominant in everyday life following the Soviet collapse, and where cultural connections to post-Soviet Russia appeared strongest, there has also been significant exposure to Ukrainian culture, language, and national identity since the 1990s. For many years, everything from TV advertising to movies have been broadcast in Ukrainian, while education has predominantly been in Ukrainian as the official state language. An entire generation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians grew up and reached adulthood with an awareness of their Ukrainian identity prior to the initial Russian invasion of 2014.

Policymakers in the Kremlin appear to have bet that historic ties to Russia would trump any emerging sense of Ukrainian identity. This confidence was no doubt reinforced by Russia’s prominence in Ukrainian popular culture, with Russian pop singers, film stars, comedians, and literary figures all enjoying widespread popularity. However, the rapid decline since 2014 of Russian cultural influence in parts of Ukraine not subject to direct Kremlin control has illustrated the fragility of Russia’s informal empire.

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Since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Ukraine has consistently stated that it will settle for nothing less than the liberation of the entire country within the international borders recognized in 1991. This is a massive military undertaking that will involve defeating a Russian invasion force numbering in excess of 300,000 soldiers. Beyond that, Ukraine must also reintegrate perhaps five million people who have spent an extended period living under Russian occupation.

While millions of Ukrainians fled Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion of 2022, many more remained behind. They have been fed a diet of Kremlin propaganda portraying Ukraine as both a Nazi state and a puppet of the West. Russia has focused particular attention on indoctrinating young Ukrainians to convince them that their future lies with Moscow.

Despite these challenges, there is reason to believe that Russia’s efforts will ultimately fail. Ukrainians as a whole have been subjected to many decades of russification but have demonstrated in recent years that they are not convinced by the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian messaging. Indeed, the past nine years of Russian aggression have sparked a sharp rise in Ukrainian patriotism across the country, particularly in regions previously regarded as being highly russified. The shared sense of Ukrainian identity forged since 1991 has proven far stronger than the Kremlin had anticipated, while Russian aggression has had a powerful unifying impact on Ukrainian society.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Crucially, none of the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine has been fully cut off from the rest of Ukraine since 2014. Until the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, regular interaction across the front lines in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the norm. Even the intensification of hostilities over the past 16 months has not led to a complete breakdown in communication.

Victims of Russian aggression will have a key role to play in the reintegration process. In every region liberated from Russian occupation, Ukrainian officials have uncovered evidence of widespread war crimes including summary executions, torture, sexual violence, abductions, and mass deportations. It is vital that survivors share their experiences with their wider communities to underline the horrors of the Russian occupation. Local residents will be seen as far more credible than government officials.

It will also be important to communicate in Russian as well as Ukrainian. While growing numbers of Ukrainians are embracing the Ukrainian language, many communities in southern and eastern Ukraine remain predominantly Russian-speaking and have been cut off from the Ukrainian language by Russia’s invasion. They will likely be far more receptive to Russian-language messaging, especially during the initial period following de-occupation, regardless of their personal attitudes toward issues of national identity.

It goes without saying that Ukraine’s top priority is to win the war. At the same time, military victories will prove hollow if the Kyiv authorities are unable to successfully reintegrate millions of Ukrainian citizens who have spent extended periods living under Russian occupation. In order to win hearts and minds, it is vital to underline to liberated communities that they are coming home to a nation that values and embraces them.

Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian analyst and journalist. Her articles have appeared in the Financial Times, Politico Europe, New Eastern Europe, and the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 6, 2023

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is a key moment but long-term resolve remains crucial

By Tennyson Dearing

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is an important moment in the war with Russia but it is critical to maintain a sense of perspective and underline the need for long-term Western backing, writes Tennyson Dearing.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Jun 7, 2023

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive will aim to keep the Russians guessing

By Peter Dickinson

Speculation is mounting that Ukraine’s hotly anticipated summer counteroffensive may be underway but initial stages are likely to feature probes and diversionary attacks rather than a big push, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Jun 8, 2023

Could Russia be held accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam?

By Danielle Johnson

Initial analysis indicates that Russia deliberately destroyed the Kakhovka dam in what would qualify as one of Moscow’s worst war crimes in Ukraine, but holding the Kremlin accountable will prove extremely difficult, writes Danielle Johnson.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely create new reintegration challenges appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Nova Kakhovka dam rupture floods acres of civilian settlements in Kherson Oblast

Fighting between Russian volunteers and Russian army escalates in Belgorod Oblast

Interference on satellite imagery points to enhanced military activity on the border between Belgorod and Kharkiv prior to saboteur raid

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources contradict each other in laying blame for Nova Kakhovka dam destruction

Deepfake impersonating Putin ‘declares’ martial law in Russian regions bordering Ukraine

Russia recycles false narrative that Ukraine plans to use a ‘dirty bomb’

Nova Kakhovka dam rupture floods acres of civilian settlements in Kherson Oblast

On June 6, satellite imagery published by Maxar confirmed the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam in Ukraine. The dam is located downstream of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and upstream of the city of Kherson, in southeast Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia continue to blame each other for its destruction.

For months, Russian and Ukrainian armed forces have been facing each other on either side of the riverbank, as Ukraine retook the city of Kherson after Russia claimed to have evacuated the city as “a gesture of good will.” The contents of the Kakhovka reservoir have been flowing downstream into the Kherson region ever since the dam’s rupture, resulting in the flooding of acres of civilian settlements stretching from near the dam down to the mouth of the river along the Black Sea.

The DFRLab collected data from MapZen using Sentinel’s EOBrowser platform. The imagery notably contains a digital elevation model enabling the DFRLab to model high risk areas subject to floods. Using geographic analysis relying on raster calculations, a technique for mapping individual pixels to altitude data, the DFRLab assessed two scenarios of potential flooding downstream of Nova Kakhovka. This information was cross-referenced with other data posted by Russian opposition Telegram channel Agentstvo to assess the extent of the flood.

Agentstvo geolocated footage taken by civilians on either side of the river. The DFRLab added these locations to the above map in an attempt to compare the modeled area to the actual reported locations of flooding. As of June 6, the mapped locations are consistent with areas that would flood if the river rose by just two meters. Footage shows parts of Kherson also subjected to inundation.

Additionally, security concerns are growing as mines located on both sides of the riverbank are at risk of exploding as a result of the rising water level. The Ukrainian Independent Information Agency reported that some Russian mines had already detonated. Villagers and inhabitants on alluvial islands and in Kherson were forced to leave their homes. Furthermore, Russia and Ukraine are blaming one another for the destruction of the dam. While Ukrainian officials accused Russia of bombing the Kakhovka dam to undermine Ukraine’s counteroffensive efforts, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Ukraine committed a “terrorist attack” to “prevent a Russian attack.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, security, Brussels, Belgium

Fighting between Russian volunteers and Russian army escalates in Belgorod Oblast

The fighting continues in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, a short distance from Ukraine’s northeastern border, but details about the situation remain murky. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, and the Freedom of Russia Legion said they carried out a number of attacks in the region, while Moscow claims to have repelled several attacks.

The Freedom of Russia Legion announced it had destroyed two Russian army tanks, one BMP infantry fighting vehicle, and one BRDM armored vehicle near the Shebekino border crossing in Belgorod on the night of June 4. The veracity of the claim has not been independently verified, however. On June 4, another unconfirmed report appeared on the Telegram channel of Ukrainian journalist Andrii Tsaplienko, citing an unnamed military officer, claiming the Russian army shelled a settlement in the Belgorod region. There have been signs of fighters from the Russian Volunteer Corps being active in Belgorod, so shelling the region could signal an escalation. In addition, the Russian Telegram channel Brief reported that the Ukrainian army shelled Novaya Tavolzhanka in Belgorod Oblast on June 5; this too has not been confirmed. Another Russian Telegram channel reported explosions in Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast that same day. 

One day earlier, the Russian Volunteer Corps said on Telegram that a Polish volunteer unit has been fighting “shoulder-to-shoulder for the freedom and independence of Ukraine for several months.” According to the statement, Russian and Polish fighters jointly carried out “a number of operations” in the areas of Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Bakhmut. The Polish unit, known as the Polish Volunteer Corps (Polski Korpus Ochotniczy), has published videos of its operations in Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia on their Telegram channel, which was created in February 2023. According to the Russian Volunteer Corps, the Polish fighters are providing military and medical logistics only within the state borders of Ukraine. The information published by the two military units on Telegram have not been verified independently. 

The Polish government has denied it has any involvement with Polish volunteer units. Stanisław Żaryn, the secretary of state for the chancellery of the prime minister of Poland, said on Twitter that the Polish Volunteer Corps are “in no way associated with the Polish Armed Forces or any Polish institution.” According to Polish media outlet Defence 24, the Polish Volunteer Corps was created in February 2023 and operates as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Polish Volunteer Corps reportedly posted on its Telegram channel that they participated in the combat mission in Belgorod alongside the Russian Volunteer Corps. The Telegram post reportedly argued that “all returned from the mission safely. The task was completed successfully.” However, it appears that the post was later removed, as there are currently no posts in the Telegram channel containing information about the participation of Polish units in the Belgorod raid. 

Russian Volunteer Corps fighters also claimed to be holding captive Russian soldiers who were handed over to Ukrainian forces because authorities in Belgorod had shown no desire to retrieve them. At the 1:26 mark in a video posted on June 4 to the Telegram channel of the Russian Volunteer Corps, a dozen men in Russian uniforms are seen. It is possible the men were captured during fighting between the militants and the Russian army in the village of Novaya Tavolzhanka in Belgorod Oblast, though this is unconfirmed. According to The New Voice of Ukraine, the volunteer fighters reached out to Belgorod Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov with an offer to return the captured soldiers as a goodwill gesture. In return, they asked for a private audience with the governor to discuss the present state of the region. The governor has reportedly not responded to the request. Previously, Gladkov described the fighters as “those fascists,” and said they were responsible for “daily civilian deaths.” The Freedom of Russia Legion also claimed to be holding Russian soldiers captive in a video published on their Telegram channel on June 5.

Meanwhile, the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated that Russian forces on June 4 and 5 conducted offensive actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, with the Ukrainian military fighting the Russian army near Novoselivske and Bilohorivka in Luhansk and Ivanivske and Marinka in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces also alleged that a Russian saboteur group attempted to infiltrate the border near Zelene in Kharkiv Oblast. Ukraine added that settlements in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson were shelled by Russia, including a building belonging to Kherson State University. 

Meanwhile, Sky News obtained a purported arms contract detailing a purchase agreement between Russia and Iran. According to the contract, Iran supplies Russia with tank and artillery ammunition, as well as barrels for T-72 tanks and howitzers. The sixteen-page document, which has not been independently verified, is dated September 14, 2022, and presents samples of variously sized artillery and tank shells and rockets worth just more than one million dollars.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Givi Gigitashivili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Interference on satellite imagery points to enhanced military activity on the border between Belgorod and Kharkiv prior to saboteur raid

Satellite Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery from May 18 released by the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1 satellite shows massive levels of interference in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. The DFRLab previously reported on similar interference patterns observed in the Black Sea and in Belgorod throughout April 2023. The May 18 imagery indicates that more prominent interference activity took place in Belgorod Oblast, with patterns stretching several hundred kilometers. The imagery was obtained just after midnight local time that morning as the satellite was flying over the border with Kharkiv. 

Simultaneously, consistent reports of aerial activity in Belgorod, including missile launches, emerged on Telegram. These patterns were observed nearly one week prior to the Russian Volunteer Corps’ raids in Russia’s border outposts of Shebekino and Grayvoron.

Several smaller interference patterns also stretch east of Kharkiv in Ukraine. These could also be consistent with reports from the Telegram channel Kharkiv Live which indicated Russian aviation raids and artillery rocket launches between 11:58 pm and 12:31 am local time. Local authorities issued an air raid alert between 12:31 and 1:01 am.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Pro-Kremlin sources contradict each other in laying blame for Nova Kakhovka dam destruction

Pro-Russian Telegram channels, sometimes referred to as “Z channels,” began reporting on the Nova Kakhovka dam around 3:00 am Moscow time, stating that the shelling of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant occurred at 2:35 am. Initially, Vladimir Leontev, the Russian-installed mayor of occupied Novaya Kahovka, denied any explosion, shelling, or damage to the dam. In an interview with Kremlin-owned RIA Novosti, Leontev said, “That’s bullshit! Everything is fine, everything is fine everywhere; I just got on the [police] radio. Everywhere everything is normal in the city; everything is quiet and calm.” Further, Kremlin-owned TASS quoted an unnamed source from the Russian authorities as saying, “It was quiet at night. There was no shelling. The dam could not stand, one support collapsed, and flooding began.”

Later, the narrative changed. In a video, Leontev said, “At about 2:00 am there was shelling on Kahovka dam and its valves were destroyed.” RIA Novosti blamed the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the damage that caused the “unregulated discharge of water.” The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Swodki commented, “Russian positions are located on the lower Dnipro riverbank. The flow of water can erode the line of [Russian] defense on the coast and prevent and repel a potential boat landing of an aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” In addition, former Russian commander Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, who played a crucial role in forming the separatist movement in the Donbas, suggested that the dam’s destruction helped Ukrainian forces advance militarily. 

The exact cause of its destruction remains unknown. The New York Times reported that some experts believe it was “probably breached” by an “internal blast,” but acknowledged this assessment should be treated “cautiously.” Pro-Ukraine social media pointed fingers at Russia causing the breach, but at times the debate was muddled due to sharing of old footage capturing the explosion of a bridge adjacent to the facility in November 2022. 

Meanwhile, some social media posts from pro-Kremlin fighters suggested the dam’s destruction benefits Russia. For example, Russian solider Yegor Guzenko suggested on his Telegram channel Separ13_13 that the destruction of the dam was in Russia’s favor. In one video, he said, “Whoever did it, it is good if no Russian Army soldier suffers. Then it does not matter who did it even if it were [Ukrainians] themselves.” Later, he posted about why the destruction might have been in Ukraine’s favor.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Deepfake impersonating Putin ‘declares’ martial law in Russian regions bordering Ukraine

On June 5, Russian television and radio stations broadcast a clip featuring a deepfake of President Vladimir Putin. In the fabricated “emergency address,” the impersonated Russian president reportedly declared, “Ukrainian troops, armed by the NATO bloc with the consent and support of Washington, invaded the territories of the Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk regions.” The Putin deepfake then “announced” martial law in these regions and said that he plans to sign an executive order declaring a general mobilization throughout the country. 

The incident was reported in the Russian oblasts of Voronezh, Bryansk, and Belgorod. These regions sit along the border with Ukraine, where frequent drone attacks are reported and armed group incursions forced some to evacuate in May. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declared that Putin did not address the nation and confirmed that “a hack occurred in several regions.” According to Peskov and information posted on the Telegram channel Ukraine Informer, radio stations also broadcast the same message.

Russian State Duma members of parliament have set out to draft a law enforcing the labeling of content created by neural networks.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russia recycles false narrative that Ukraine plans to use a ‘dirty bomb’

On June 6, the same day the Novo Kakhovka dam was destroyed, Russia shared a new iteration of its narrative that accuses Ukraine of planning to use a “dirty bomb” against Russia.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) published a statement in which the agency claimed to have “received additional information on the involvement of the Ukrainian special services in the planning and preparation of acts of international terrorism.” The FSB claimed that Ukraine created an air unit to supply “sabotage and reconnaissance groups on Russian territory” with “dirty bombs.” The statement alleged that Ukraine planned to place dirty bombs in various places, detonate them simultaneously, and “make areas [in Russia] unsuitable for human habitation.”

The DFRLab has previously covered Russian attempts to spread similar disinformation in order to prime audiences for the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and justify the war. Since then, the DFRLab have observed multiple instances of Russian officials accusing Kyiv of plotting to use a “dirty bomb.”

— Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Satellite imagery analysis captures flood threat after dam’s destruction appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tracking narratives

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

International response

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Drone imagery from a burning border control outpost in the Russian region of Belgorod sparked a frenzy on social media this week. According to Riga-based Russian news outlet Meduza, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps and other Russian nationals crossed from Ukraine into Belgorod Oblast and attacked a border outpost in Grayvoron. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, claimed responsibility for the attack; the Free Russia Legion also claimed responsibility.

An assessment by Russian news outlet RBC regarding the broader situation in Belgorod indicated an armed incursion, with shelling and artillery fire reported. On the evening of May 22, Russian government declared a state of counterterrorist emergency in Belgorod Oblast. Although the governor of the oblast did not officially issue an order to evacuate the civilian population immediately, footage and photographs posted on social media indicated that at least some residents evacuated to other areas in the region. Meduza also reported several drone strikes on the city of Belgorod itself.

Conflicting reports emerged on May 23 after Russian officials lifted the counterterrorist alert. While the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have “liquidated” around seventy “saboteurs,” reporting from the news outlet Mash indicated the deployment of additional Russian law enforcement in nearby Bryansk Oblast. In an effort to support their assertions of having eliminated the insurgency, Russian news outlets also released photos of military-class vehicles allegedly used by the insurgents stuck in the mud; some open-source analysts, however, questioned the authenticity of the photos. Russian media chased these reports with claims of destroyed Ukrainian tanks, while the Russian Volunteer Corps posted footage to Telegram seemingly showing intact military equipment.

Shortly after the news broke out, footage of a drone attack on the local Russian border outpost, APP Grayvoron, appeared on the outpost’s Google Maps profile, though it was later deleted. At the time of writing, it had been replaced with footage showing a convoy of vehicles, one flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps.

Simultaneously, trolling reviews appeared on the border outpost’s Google Maps profile, calling the border guards “friendly” and the facilities “understaffed.” These too have been deleted, though not before they were documented by the Saint Javelin Twitter account and other Twitter users.

Other trolls took to Twitter, where members of the NAFO meme movement, a pro-NATO and pro-Ukrainian community on the platform, renamed their account to “Government of The Bilhorod’s Peoples Republic” as a joking reference to the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics. “Bilhorod” is the Ukrainian name for Belgorod.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Following the apparent border incursion into Belgorod Oblast and subsequent attacks on the region, pro-war military bloggers condemned Moscow’s handling of the war in Ukraine, including its border defenses.

Telegram channel Vоенкор Котенок Z (“Milblogger Kitten Z”) criticized the Kremlin for being late in declaring a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod and not knowing how to fight “for real.” “There is a war, and in Russia … they are afraid to call the war a war,” stated the Telegram post.

The channel ДШРГ Русич (“DShRG Rusich”) questioned “commanders of all levels” on how the incursion happened. It also blamed Russia’s intelligence services for failing to reveal “plans of an enemy.” The channel added that as long as there is no photographic evidence of corpses or burned equipment, “the enemy has no losses, and the [Russian] propagandists crapped themselves a little, saying that everything is fine.”

The Kotsnews Telegram channel addressed pro-Kremlin pundits who dismissed military blogger concerns as “hysteria” by insisting that the threat to Russian territory is real and that there are uncomfortable questions around Russia’s defensive capabilities that nobody wants to ask. “What is happening with our technical equipment at the border, surveillance systems, tracking, motion detection?” the channel asked. “What about the mining of potentially dangerous areas? What about anti-tank weapons? Why did the enemy armored group calmly penetrate deep into our territory?”

As Russia’s war against Ukraine has dragged on, the frequency and intensity of pro-war military bloggers’ criticism have increased and become bolder. The DFRLab has previously covered how Russian military bloggers criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Ministry of Defense.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

On May 20, a series of so-called “World Wide Freedom Rallies” took place in many cities around the world. The Telegram account for Simeon Boikov, a pro-Kremlin activist and blogger in Australia, claimed to have organized the Sydney edition of the rally, part of a decentralized movement that originated in 2021 to express dissatisfaction with COVID security measures. Boikov promoted a poster for the event on April 6, a day before the event announcement on the movement’s official Telegram channel. 

The rally ostensibly focused on demanding the release of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who is currently being held in London facing potential extradition to the United States. After the event, however, Boikov highlighted a speech by Assange’s father, John Shipton, in a video showing scenes from the rally and emphasized that Shipton was wearing a “double headed eagle and St George’s ribbons,” both of which are Russian symbols. Additional videos and images from the rally showed many people carrying Russian flags and wearing pro-Kremlin symbols. 

Kremlin-controlled media outlets emphasized in their headlines not just the pro-Russia nature of the event, but also claims of anti-NATO sentiment, which appear to have been exaggerated. Reviewing footage from the event, the DFRLab identified only one instance of someone sporting anti-NATO messaging. Nonetheless, Russian media embraced the event as specifically anti-NATO, including state outlets Gazeta.ru, TASS, RIA Novosti, and Komsomolyskaya Pravda, and pro-Kremlin media such as News Front, Inforeactor, Ekonomika Segodnya. Additionally, The Eastern Herald, an Indian media outlet, and Belarus state-controlled television both framed the event as anti-NATO in their English-language publications.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

On May 22, the US Department of Commerce announced that it had amended its list of sanctioned entities and individuals by adding seventy-one entities that the US government had determined to be acting “contrary to [US] national security or foreign policy interests.” Alongside Russian companies, one Kyrgyz company, Tro.Ya LLC, and one Armenian company, Medisar LLC, were included in the amended list. According to the Department of Commerce, both companies engaged in conduct that “prevented the successful accomplishment of an end-use check.” In other words, the Department of Commerce suspected that the final destination for the products was Russia but the companies themselves had obfuscated this information.

Medisar LLC, which was registered in Armenia in 2001, is an importer of chemicals and laboratory equipment. The company is one of the thousand largest taxpayers in Armenia, paying about one million dollars in taxes in 2022. It also has a longstanding trade history with Russian companies. On its website, Medisar indicates that one of its trading partners, dating back to 2011, is Russian company Minimed.

On May 20, Armenian investigative website Hetq reported that data obtained from the country’s customs service showed that in 2022, Medisar exported equipment from Armenia to Russia, including electronic integrated circuits, diodes, transistors, and similar semiconductor devices.

A company executive who did not want to be identified acknowledged to RFE/RL that Medisar imported chemicals and laboratory equipment from the United States and the European Union and re-exported them to Russia.

Medisar is the second-largest company registered in Armenia to be sanctioned by the United States. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the other firm, TAKO, in April. The company is in the wholesale of electronic and telecommunications equipment and parts. TAKO, spelled TACO in Armenia’s legal entities register, was registered in May 2022 in Armenia and is fully owned by a Russian citizen, according to public registry records.

On April 18, the New York Times reported that in 2022, Armenia imported 515 percent more chips and processors from the United States and 212 percent more from the European Union than in 2021, and that Armenia exported 97 percent of those same products to Russia.

During a May 22 press conference, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that despite Armenia’s “strategic” relationship with Russia and membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, the country “cannot afford to come under Western sanctions.” Pashinyan underscored that if Armenia faced sanctions, “it wouldn’t be good for any of our allies, while we would ruin our relations with our Western partners.”

A joint “compliance note” issued on March 2 by the US Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, titled “Cracking Down on Third-Party Intermediaries Used to Evade Russia-Related Sanctions and Export Controls,” mentioned Armenia, along with China, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, as “transshipment points commonly used to illegally redirect restricted items to Russia or Belarus.”

According to the Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, Russian-Armenian trade soared in 2022, including exports to Russia, which nearly tripled to $2.4 billion.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Belgorod incursion brings deluge of online mockery of Russia’s defenses appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As he pondered the course of the war, Henri-Lévy came to the conclusion that the best way to combat the West’s mounting impatience with the 15-month war and counter the push for preliminary negotiations was to show rather than tell. Instead of writing an essay, the 74-year-old French filmmaker and philosopher took to the road to illuminate the bravery of ordinary Ukrainians against what he calls the “master terrorist” in the Kremlin.

The film, which carefully traces Henri-Lévy’s journey across Ukraine, is about far more than jerky shots of the Frenchman and his crew dodging bullets and drone attacks. It is about Ukraine’s defiance of Putin’s attempt not simply to wage a war of territorial conquest, but to efface the idea of Ukrainian nationhood itself. “If I dare to give a certain logic to this crazy war, it is in the logic of the denial of Ukrainian identity,” he says. “This barbarity matches the logic of denying the very existence of Ukraine.”

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As he journeys from Ukraine’s capital to the east, Henri-Lévy captures the dignity of the Ukrainian people through short vignettes that remain with you long after the credits roll. The Frenchman focuses on ordinary Ukrainians like the elderly woman who appears in the documentary engaged in the quotidian task of stirring a steaming pot of borscht and pleads for an end to the constant violence that has upended her life. She hopes to make it to her seventieth birthday, she says.

In Kyiv, after another Russian air strike hits a woman’s apartment, she apologizes profusely to Henri-Lévy for wearing a dirty black coat. Her kitchen is unusable after the bombing and her crockery is battered, but she’s more focused on the state of her appearance. She takes the French filmmaker to her makeshift bed, a chair inside a bathroom tub where she waited out the aerial assault, and smiles with pride at her ability to snatch a few hours of sleep.

Another scene captures everyday life for those who couldn’t leave cities and towns that Russia has pounded relentlessly in the east. A man who appears to be approaching pension age tries to chop wood with an axe, complaining that it’s warmer outside than inside.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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In Pavlograd, the French filmmaker dons a hard helmet and overalls to cover his black designer suit and spotless white shirt as he descends below ground to watch Ukrainian miners drill iron ore. The precious ore is eventually made into bullet-proof vests for soldiers at the front. After the steel miners are done for the day, they carry on packing care boxes of food and medicine for displaced families.

Henri-Lévy observes that every steelworker is a hero, just like the brave men and women on the front lines. In one of his characteristic meditative asides, he observes that the Greeks and Romans admired heroes in part because they were so rare. “In Ukraine, heroes are everywhere,” he says. The Frenchman confesses that he keeps coming back to Ukraine because it is rare in history to see so many people embody heroism in one place.

The documentary also features moments of exhilaration. Henri-Lévy captures joyous scenes from recently liberated Kherson, where hundreds mill in the main square, some searching for power to recharge their phones and tell their loved ones they are still alive. Perhaps the hardest and most powerful scene comes when Henri-Lévy visits a torture cell that still has fresh blood on the floor. The Russians never actually appear on film, but their depraved conduct casts a dark shadow over the documentary.

This film is anything but neutral and Henri-Lévy makes no attempt to disguise his sympathies. “I am partisan. I don’t give five minutes to the Jews and five minutes to the Nazis,” he says.

The Frenchman has consistently refused to engage in bogus moral hand-wringing when it comes to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, he is clear about which side he’s on, as viewers of “Slava Ukraini” will no doubt recognize. “I want the Ukrainians to win,” he commented on May 11 at a screening of the documentary at the E Street Cinema in Washington, DC.

Melinda Haring is director of stakeholder relations and social impact at the Superhumans Center. Jacob Heilbrunn is Editor of the National Interest. Haring and Heilbrunn are both non-resident senior fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. “Slava Ukraini” was shown at a series of screenings in May organized with the Ukrainian American charity Razom. It can be viewed on Apple TV and YouTube.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 8, 2023

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan but he still hopes to win a long war of attrition. However, Russia’s reliance on human wave tactics risks undermining morale within his invading army, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Apr 6, 2023

NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s passive acceptance of neighboring Finland’s NATO membership raises serious questions over the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a response to NATO expansion, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 12, 2023

Andriy Yermak: Italy is defending common European values in Ukraine

By Andriy Yermak

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is right to say that helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian invasion is about freedom, justice, and common values, writes the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President, Andriy Yermak.

Conflict Economy & Business

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post New Bernard Henri-Lévy documentary challenges Ukraine fatigue appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In one of his most recent rants, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin mocked Russian Defense Ministry claims of a “redeployment to defensive positions” near to the hotly contested city of Bakhmut and warned that in reality, the front was in danger of collapsing. “The Defense Ministry’s attempts to cover up the situation will lead to a global tragedy for Russia,” he stated on May 12. “They must stop lying immediately.”

This was the latest in a series of public statements by Prigozhin accusing the Russian army and defense ministry of failing to provide his Wagner troops with sufficient front line support. He had earlier threatened to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut altogether due to alleged ammunition shortages.

In his many video addresses, Prigozhin has sought to burnish his own credentials as a straight-talking military man while attacking members of the Russian military establishment. Speaking in the wake of recent Russian retreats from the flanks around Bakhmut, he declared: “Soldiers should not die because of the absolute stupidity of their leadership.”

He also raised eyebrows last week by referring mockingly to a “happy grandpa,” which many assumed was a reference to Putin himself. This was clearly too much even for Prigozhin, who quickly released a new statement clarifying that the “grandpa” in question may have been a number of military leaders including chief of the Russian general staff Valery Gerasimov, but was most certainly not Putin.

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Prigozhin’s public attacks on Russia’s military leadership reflect his rising profile and growing swagger. The Wagner mercenary group he leads first came into being nine years ago during the initial stages of Russia’s military invasion of eastern Ukraine, at a time when the Kremlin was eager to maintain a degree of plausible deniability. Subsequent roles in Syria and Africa allowed Wagner to expand significantly, but it was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that transformed the fortunes of the mercenary force and thrust it into the international limelight.

Over the past fifteen months of the Ukraine invasion, Wagner has emerged as the only group within the Russian military to meet or surpass expectations. While units of the regular army have been decimated and forced into a series of humiliating retreats, Wagner has achieved numerous grinding advances in eastern Ukraine. This has given Prigozhin the confidence and the clout to name and shame his superiors for their alleged shortcomings. Such attacks have only added to his popularity among Russian audiences.

Prigozhin’s criticisms are in a sense hypocritical, given the notoriously high casualty rates among his own soldiers. Indeed, the brutal tactics adopted by Wagner forces in the Battle of Bakhmut have led many to describe the battle as a “meat grinder.” According to US officials, around half of the estimated 20,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine since December 2022 have been Wagner troops fighting in and around Bakhmut.

Ukrainian sources have also questioned the credibility of Prigozhin’s efforts to praise the valor of his Wagner forces while accusing regular Russian troops of abandoning their positions. “The first soldiers to flee were Wagner,” a Ukrainian commander who took part in early May engagements near Bakhmut told CNN. This and other similar accounts may indicate that Prigozhin is lashing out at the army high command from a position of weakness as Wagner’s earlier exploits risk being overshadowed by more recent setbacks.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Why has Putin not intervened to end the increasingly bitter public feud between Prigozhin and Russia’s military leadership? Some see it as a sign of the Russian dictator’s own growing weakness, while others argue that it may be a deliberate ploy to position the likes of Defense Minister Shoigu and army chief Gerasimov as scapegoats for a coming defeat. At the very least, Prigozhin’s attacks on military commanders serve to deflect the blame for the failing invasion away from Putin himself.

While Prigozhin’s headline-grabbing rants may help to protect Putin from criticism on the domestic front, they also risk further undermining morale among Russian forces in Ukraine. The issue of demoralization is already posing major challenges for Russian commanders, with more cases of desertion recorded in Russian military courts in the first four months of the current year than during the whole of 2022. Recent months have also seen a sharp rise in video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal “human wave” tactics and catastrophic battlefield losses.

With Ukraine expected to launch a major counteroffensive in the coming weeks, Russian military morale will likely soon face its stiffest test since the invasion began in February 2022. Major question marks remain over the ability of Russian troops to stand their ground, particularly given the Kremlin’s growing reliance on poorly trained conscripts drafted into the military late last year as part of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

These mobilized troops proved highly ineffective during Russia’s failed winter offensive, suffering high casualties while making almost no progress. They must now prepare for defensive operations against a Ukrainian force that has been training for the coming offensive for the past six months. Russia has also been digging in and preparing sophisticated defenses, but morale will be a huge factor during what many observers predict will be some of the most intense battles of the entire war. Prigozhin’s frequent public criticism of Russian troops and commanders is unlikely to boost fighting spirit at this critical moment for Putin’s invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 8, 2023

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan but he still hopes to win a long war of attrition. However, Russia’s reliance on human wave tactics risks undermining morale within his invading army, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert May 12, 2023

Andriy Yermak: Italy is defending common European values in Ukraine

By Andriy Yermak

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is right to say that helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian invasion is about freedom, justice, and common values, writes the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President, Andriy Yermak.

Conflict Economy & Business

UkraineAlert May 9, 2023

Putin’s embarrassing one-tank parade hints at catastrophic losses in Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Putin has transformed Victory Day into a celebration of Russia’s resurgence as a military superpower, but this year’s embarrassing one-tank parade underlined the catastrophic scale of Russian losses in Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Wagner chief’s rants highlight Russian infighting ahead of Ukraine offensive appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Polling data remains the most commonly cited evidence of widespread Russian support for the invasion of Ukraine. However, such indicators must be treated with a high degree of skepticism due to the obvious risks inherent in expressing anti-regime opinions in an authoritarian state such as modern Russia. Over the past year, various polls have identified strong levels of public support ranging from 55% to 75%, with relatively little fluctuation. The Levada Center, which is regarded by many international observers as Russia’s only legitimate independent pollster, has conducted monthly polls since the beginning of the invasion that have consistently indicated public backing of over 70%.

While opinion polls indicating pro-war sentiment must be treated with caution, there is very little evidence of any active opposition to the invasion within Russian society. In the weeks following the outbreak of hostilities, relatively small protests took place in a number of Russian cities, but this trend failed to gain momentum. Despite awareness of the atrocities taking place in Ukraine and the Russian military’s unprecedented losses, there remains no real anti-war protest movement in Russia.

This absence of anti-war activity is perhaps unsurprising. The Kremlin has adopted a series of draconian laws in the wake of the invasion that criminalize any criticism while outlawing use of the word “war” in favor of the euphemistic “Special Military Operation.” As a result of these legislative changes, numerous high-profile opposition figures have been given long prison sentences for their anti-war stances. At the same time, it is important to note that although more than one million Russians have fled the country in response to the invasion of Ukraine, very few have taken advantage of their newfound freedoms to stage anti-war rallies outside Russia.

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Public support for the invasion can be seen in the many examples of ordinary Russians mobilizing to back the war effort. Across the country, large numbers of fundraising initiatives have emerged to help supply Russian soldiers with everything from drones and radios to food and warm clothing. These grassroots efforts are entirely voluntary and point to high levels of public sympathy for the Russian soldiers currently serving in Ukraine.

A further indication of pro-war sentiment within Russia is the revival of Stalin-era denunciations targeting anyone seen as critical of the war. There have been numerous high-profile instances of colleagues, teachers, and even family members reporting people to the authorities for voicing anti-war opinions. During the first half of 2022 alone, Russian media and information space regulator Roskomnadzor reportedly received 144,835 individual denunciations.

Social media remains comparatively free in today’s Russia and provides important insights into the public mood. Young supporters of the war have largely congregated on TikTok, where they often form pro-war groups and post messages celebrating the Russian army.

Telegram has emerged as a key platform for Russian audiences seeking to follow the invasion. There are a substantial number of military-themed accounts offering some of the most credible coverage of the war, often including remarkably frank criticism of the Russian establishment. These pro-war accounts have gained considerably in status since February 2022 and have attracted millions of followers.

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Research conducted by Ukraine’s Open Minds Institute has identified widespread pro-war sentiment on Russian social media. While it is important to acknowledge that the Kremlin is believed to invest heavily in bot farms and troll armies, the vast majority of the accounts studied by the Open Minds think tank appear to represent real people with their own wide-ranging interests and long histories of posting on different topics.

Support for the war on Russian social media tends to be expressed in abstract terms relating to national pride rather than any concrete benefits deriving from the invasion. Accounts based in Moscow demonstrate the lowest levels of interest in the war, while regions closest to Ukraine are the most negative. Meanwhile, areas of Russia furthest from the conflict tend to be more positive. Posts and comments closely mirror changing events on the ground and typically reflect the latest developments in Ukraine, indicating high levels of awareness regarding the current status of the invasion.

While it is impossible to determine exact levels of pro-war sentiment within Russian society, it is clear that the invasion of Ukraine enjoys considerable backing. What is fueling these positive attitudes toward a war that has horrified global audiences?

A combination of factors have shaped Russian public opinion in favor of the invasion. Propaganda has played a central role in this process, with Russian audiences subjected to years of relentless messaging throughout the Kremlin-controlled mainstream media preparing the population for war with Ukraine.

Many Russians appear to be driven by feelings of faith and obedience toward the authorities. Other factors include notions of national identity rooted in the imperial past and a strong desire to belong. Many Russians may be choosing to adopt pro-war positions in order to associate with like-minded people and demonstrate their own patriotism. Others may be motivated primarily by a desire to avoid accusations of disloyalty.

Unfortunately, such conformity often comes at the expense of critical thinking or moral constraints. This has made it possible for millions of otherwise unremarkable people to support the largest European war of aggression since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Some observers speculate that much of this support is insincere and would soon evaporate if circumstances within Russia changed. Nevertheless, the currently available evidence indicates overwhelming acceptance of the invasion, at the very least.

Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi is founder and CEO of the Kyiv-based Open Minds Institute.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 8, 2023

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan but he still hopes to win a long war of attrition. However, Russia’s reliance on human wave tactics risks undermining morale within his invading army, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Apr 6, 2023

NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s passive acceptance of neighboring Finland’s NATO membership raises serious questions over the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a response to NATO expansion, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post How strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The priority for Ukraine’s cyber forces is defense. This is something they have long been training for and are excelling at. Indeed, Estonian PM Kaja Kallas recently published an article in The Economist claiming that Ukraine is “giving the free world a masterclass on cyber defense.”

When Russian aggression against Ukraine began in 2014 with the invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, Russia also began launching cyber attacks. One of the first attacks was an attempt to falsify the results of Ukraine’s spring 2014 presidential election. The following year, an attempt was made to hack into Ukraine’s electricity grid. In 2017, Russia launched a far larger malware attack against Ukraine known as NotPetya that Western governments rated as the most destructive cyber attack ever conducted.

In preparation for the full-scale invasion of 2022, Russia sought to access Ukraine’s government IT platforms. One of the goals was to obtain the personal information of Ukrainians, particularly those working in military and law enforcement. These efforts, which peaked in January 2022 in the weeks prior to the invasion, failed to seriously disrupt Ukraine’s state institutions but provided the country’s cyber security specialists with further important experience. “With their nonstop attacks, Russia has effectively been training us since 2014. So by February 2022, we were ready and knew everything about their capabilities,” commented one Ukrainian cyber security specialist involved in defending critical infrastructure who was speaking anonymously as they were not authorized to discuss details.

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Ukrainian specialists say that while Russian hackers previously tried to disguise their origins, many now no longer even attempt to hide their IP addresses. Instead, attacks have become far larger in scale and more indiscriminate in nature, with the apparent goal of seeking to infiltrate as many systems as possible. However, the defenders of Ukraine’s cyberspace claim Russia’s reliance on the same malware and tactics makes it easier to detect them.

The growing importance of digital technologies within the Ukrainian military has presented Russia with a expanding range of high-value targets. However, efforts to access platforms like Ukraine’s Delta situational awareness system have so far proved unsuccessful. Speaking off the record, Ukrainian specialists charged with protecting Delta say Russian hackers have used a variety of different methods. “They tried phishing attacks, but this only resulted in our colleagues having to work two extra hours to block them. They have also created fake interfaces to gain passwords and login details.”

Ukrainian security measures that immediately detect and block unauthorized users requesting information have proved effective for the Delta system and similar platforms. Russian hackers have had more success targeting the messaging platforms and situation reports of various individual Ukrainian military units. However, due to the fast-changing nature of the situation along the front lines, this information tends to become outdated very quickly and therefore is not regarded as a major security threat.

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Ukraine’s cyber efforts are not exclusively focused on defending the country against Russian attack. Ukrainians have also been conducting counterattacks of their own against Russian targets. One of the challenges they have encountered is the comparatively low level of digitalization in modern Russian society compared to Ukraine. “We could hack into Russia’s railway IT systems, for example, but what information would this give us? We would be able to access train timetables and that’s all. Everything else is still done with paper and pens,” notes one Ukrainian hacker.

This has limited the scope of Ukrainian cyber attacks. Targets have included the financial data of Russian military personnel via Russian banks, while hackers have penetrated cartographic and geographic information systems that serve as important infrastructure elements of the Ukraine invasion. Ukrainian cyber attacks have also played a role in psychological warfare efforts, with Russian television and radio broadcasts hacked and replaced with content revealing suppressed details of the invasion including Russian military casualties and war crimes against Ukrainian civilians.

While Ukraine’s partners throughout the democratic world have provided the country with significant military aid, the international community has also played a role on the cyber front. Many individual foreign volunteers have joined the IT Army of Ukraine initiative, which counts more than 200,000 participants. Foreign hacker groups are credited with conducting a number of offensive operations against Russian targets. However, the large number of people involved also poses significant security challenges. Some critics argue that the practice of making Russian targets public globally provides advance warning and undermines the effectiveness of cyber attacks.

Russia has attempted to replicate Ukraine’s IT Army initiative with what they have called the Cyber Army of Russia, but this is believed to have attracted fewer international recruits. Nevertheless, Russia’s volunteer cyber force is thought to have been behind a number of attacks on diverse targets including Ukrainian government platforms and sites representing the country’s sexual minorities and cultural institutions.

The cyber front of the Russo-Ukrainian War is highly dynamic and continues to evolve. With a combination of state and non-state actors, it is a vast and complex battlefield full of gray zones and new frontiers. Both combatant countries have powerful domestic IT industries and strong reputations as hacker hubs, making the cyber front a particularly fascinating aspect of the wider war. The lessons learned are already informing our knowledge of cyber warfare and are likely to remain a key subject of study in the coming decades for anyone interested in cyber security.

Vera Mironova is an associate fellow at Harvard University’s Davis Center and author of Conflict Field Notes. You can follow her on Twitter at @vera_mironov.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 8, 2023

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan but he still hopes to win a long war of attrition. However, Russia’s reliance on human wave tactics risks undermining morale within his invading army, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Apr 6, 2023

NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s passive acceptance of neighboring Finland’s NATO membership raises serious questions over the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a response to NATO expansion, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is also being fought in cyberspace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This may be easier said than done. While Russia enjoys significant demographic, industrial, and economic advantages over Ukraine, questions remain over the ability of the once-vaunted Russian military to achieve the Kremlin’s goals. Crucially, an apparent reliance on human wave tactics during Russia’s recent winter offensive has led to catastrophic losses which threaten to undermine morale within the ranks of Putin’s invading army.

There is currently no confirmed data regarding losses on either side of the Russo-Ukrainian War. At the same time, most independent sources agree that fighting in recent months has resulted in some of the worst carnage of the entire war. In mid-February, Britain’s Ministry of Defence reported that during the previous two weeks, Russia had likely suffered its highest rate of casualties since the initial stages of the invasion almost one year earlier.

Russia’s heaviest losses in recent months are believed to have occurred in battles for control over strategic towns in eastern Ukraine such as Bakhmut and Vuhledar, with Ukraine claiming to have killed or wounded tens of thousands of Russian soldiers. While unconfirmed, these figures are supported by extensive battlefield footage, much of which appears to show Russian troops engaged in reckless frontal assaults on entrenched defensive positions.

The human wave tactics on display in eastern Ukraine reflect Russia’s narrowing military options following a year of embarrassing battlefield setbacks. The Russian military entered the current war with a reputation as the world’s number two army, but has performed remarkably poorly in Ukraine. With many of his most experienced units and elite regiments decimated, Putin now hopes to grind down Ukraine’s resources and outlast the country’s Western backers by relying on superior numbers. In the final months of 2022, he bolstered his invasion force with an additional 300,000 troops via Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

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Human wave tactics are not new and typically involve soldiers conducting direct attacks in large numbers with the objective of overwhelming an opposing force. Such troops are often regarded as “single-use soldiers,” with each wave suffering heavy casualties as it attempts to move the front lines further forward. This is not the first time Russian troops have been called upon to conduct such attacks. During WWII, Soviet commanders often ordered Red Army soldiers into frontal assaults that resulted in exceptionally high death tolls.

In the present war against Ukraine, the Kremlin may see human wave tactics as an effective way of overcoming determined Ukrainian resistance. It allows Russia to wear down Ukraine’s numerically fewer but battle-hardened troops, and can be implemented using a combination of easily replaced forces including recently mobilized soldiers and former convicts serving in the Wagner private military company.

This approach allows Russia’s more experienced soldiers to be held in reserve and used to exploit emerging weak points in the Ukrainian defenses. So-called “blocking units” are also reportedly being deployed behind the front lines to ensure Russian troops do not try to flee. According to numerous battlefield accounts, any Russian soldier who attempts to retreat from a human wave attack faces the prospect of being shot by their own side.

Although grisly, Russia’s human wave tactics are producing results. However, any advances during the past three months in Bakhmut and at other points along the 600-mile front line have been modest in scale and have come at a high cost. In an interview with Current Time on the front lines of Bakhmut, one Ukrainian soldier described the horrors of Russia’s frontal assaults. “The Russian soldiers face certain death in these attacks, but they are not retreating,” he commented. “You can shoot his head off, but his comrade will keep coming. Their own commanders will kill them if they don’t attack.”

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The brutality of Russia’s human wave attacks is leading to growing signs of demoralization among front line troops. Since the beginning of 2023, dozens of video appeals have been posted to social media featuring Russian soldiers in Ukraine complaining to Putin or other state officials about human wave tactics and high death tolls. Russian media outlet Verstka reported that since early February, Russian soldiers from at least 16 different regions of the country have recorded video messages in which they criticize their military commanders for using them as cannon fodder.

Footage has also emerged of Russian soldiers refusing to follow orders after suffering heavy losses during the recent winter offensive in eastern Ukraine. While details remain unconfirmed, most of these incidents appear to have involved recently mobilized Russian troops who found themselves rushed into battle, often after having received minimal training.

In a further worrying sign for the Kremlin, Ukrainian officials have reported a record number of calls in March 2023 to the country’s “I Want to Live” initiative, which helps Russian troops surrender to the Ukrainian military. All this points to the conclusion that human wave attacks could be compounding Russian morale issues and further accelerating the buckling of front line offensives.

At this stage, there appears to be little prospect of a sudden collapse throughout the Russian military comparable to the disintegration of Afghanistan’s security forces during the 2021 US withdrawal. While the demoralization issues facing the Russian army appear significant, recent steps to introduce draconian penalties for Russian soldiers found guilty of disobedience, desertion, or surrender represent a powerful deterrent. The continued domestic strength of the Putin regime and its control over the information space also serve to hold Russia’s army together in Ukraine.

The Kremlin may now have recognized that it must address widespread anger and alarm over the military’s use of human waves. In early April, Russian General Rustam Muradov was reportedly dismissed from his post as commander of the Eastern Group of Forces in Ukraine following his disastrous handling of the recent failed assault on Vuhledar, which resulted in “exceptionally heavy casualties.” Muradov had been widely criticized by his own troops along with many members of Russia’s vocal pro-war blogger community, making him an unofficial symbol of the army’s human wave tactics.

If confirmed, Muradov’s departure may indicate a coming change in tactics. This would arguably be long overdue. If Russia is hoping to outlast Ukraine in a war of attrition, Putin’s generals will need to move beyond a reliance on costly human waves and demoralizing frontal assaults.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 6, 2023

NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s passive acceptance of neighboring Finland’s NATO membership raises serious questions over the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a response to NATO expansion, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Apr 3, 2023

Pressuring Ukraine into a premature peace would only encourage Putin

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

Efforts to pressure Ukraine into accepting a land-for-peace deal in order to end the war misunderstand Putin’s imperial ambitions and will only encourage further Russian aggression, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Mar 30, 2023

Russia faces long economic decline as isolated Putin turns to China

By Diane Francis

With most avenues for Western partnership indefinitely closed and Russian economic dependency on China growing rapidly, Putin’s talk of “economic sovereignty” is starting to sound very hollow, writes Diane Francis.

China Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Meanwhile, a ruthless clampdown has made it increasingly difficult and dangerous for dissenting voices to be heard. Nevertheless, opposition figures continue to question the true levels of public backing for the invasion, while insisting that large numbers of Russians are either opposed or indifferent. The real situation within Russian society is certainly far more complex than the Kremlin would like us to believe, but today’s suffocating atmosphere means there is little reason to expect an increase in visible anti-war activity any time soon.

Officially at least, Putin’s approval rating has increased significantly since the start of the full-scale invasion just over one year ago. According to Russia’s only internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, the Russian President’s rating rose from 71% on the eve of the invasion to 82% in March 2023. The same source indicates consistently high levels of support for the invasion of Ukraine, with over 70% of respondents expressing their approval in every single survey conducted throughout the past thirteen months.

These figures point to strong levels of public support for the war but they must be viewed in context. Critics question the validity of any public opinion polling in a dictatorship such as Putin’s Russia, where people are legally obliged to call the invasion a “Special Military Operation” and can face criminal prosecution for social media posts. This is worth keeping in mind when analyzing surveys of Russian opinion.

Many poll respondents may be inclined to demonstrate their patriotism and their support for the Russian military while being less enthusiastic about the invasion itself or the Kremlin’s war aims. Others may have become swept up in the relentless flow of pro-war propaganda or cut off from alternative sources of information. It is also important to acknowledge that a large majority of people refuse to participate in polling of this nature. They may choose to decline for a wide range of reasons, but it is possible that many simply prefer not to share anti-war opinions with strangers.

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What evidence is there of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia? When the invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, efforts to claim strong public backing for the war were hampered by a series of protests in cities across the country involving mainly young Russians. However, these public demonstrations failed to reach any kind of critical mass and were fairly rapidly suppressed by the authorities with large numbers of detentions.

Other Russians have voted with their feet. A mass exodus of Russian nationals began during the first weeks of the war, with a second wave starting in September 2022 in the wake of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Hundreds of thousands of military-age Russian men fled to neighboring countries in the last four months of the year, leading in some cases to massive queues at border crossings.

This outflow of people has had a considerable negative demographic impact on Russia, but it would not be accurate to claim that everyone who has left the country during the past year holds anti-war views. Many chose to leave in order to avoid military service, while others feared the inconvenience of wartime conditions. Thousands of wealthy Russians have relocated to destinations like Dubai, where they can manage their Russian businesses while distancing themselves physically and psychologically from the war.

For those who remain in Russia, it is still possible to live a fairly normal life despite the imposition of sanctions and the departure of many high-profile Western brands. Meanwhile, some members of Russia’s billionaire elite are believed to oppose the war, but most see their fortunes as tied to Putin and are fearful of the consequences if they break with the regime publicly.

There are indications that the war is becoming less and less popular among the very troops charged with leading the invasion. The refusal of many contract soldiers to extend their service has forced the Russian authorities to introduce legislative changes, while in recent months there has been a sharp increase in video addresses on social media featuring mobilized Russian soldiers complaining about suicidal tactics and high death tolls. At the same time, there is little indication yet that mounting demoralization on the front lines is shaping the public mood back in Russia itself.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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What of Russia’s beleaguered political opposition? For more than twenty years, the Putin regime has sought to silence any genuine opposition forces via increasingly direct means. These efforts have intensified since the onset of the Ukraine invasion, with independent media outlets shut down and many of the country’s relatively few remaining opposition figures either jailed or forced to flee. Some have attempted to speak out against the war while in exile, with others who left Russia in previous years such as Gary Kasparov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky serving as vocal opponents of the invasion.

The most prominent opposition figure in today’s Russia, Alexei Navalny, remains in prison. Navalny has managed to issue a number of statements from jail condemning the war. In February 2023, he published a fifteen-point plan calling for the Russian military to withdraw completely from Ukraine and arguing that Russia must accept Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. While many have welcomed Navalny’s unambiguous opposition to the invasion, others remain wary due to his ties to Russian nationalism and earlier reluctance to back the return of Crimea to Ukraine.

At this point, extreme Russian nationalism appears to pose a far greater threat to the Putin regime than liberal anti-war sentiment. A new class of pro-war bloggers has emerged over the past year and has become a powerful force within the more active segments of Russian society. Hardliners such as Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have gained in stature thanks to their prominent roles in the invasion and have engaged in rare public criticism of key establishment figures.

The authoritarian nature of the Putin regime makes it almost impossible to accurately gauge levels of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia. It may take a decisive military defeat before many of those who oppose the war dare to speak up and demand change. In a sense, this is exactly what Putin is fighting against. He invaded Ukraine primarily because he feared Ukrainian democracy would serve as a catalyst for similar demands inside Russia itself. So far, he has managed to prevent anti-war or pro-democracy movements from gaining momentum. However, if his invading army’s battlefield fortunes continue to deteriorate in Ukraine, those who dream of a different Russia may finally find their voices.

Christopher Isajiw is an international relations commentator and business development consultant to private, governmental, and non-governmental organizations.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Mar 19, 2023

Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation

By Anders Åslund

The ICC decision to indict Putin for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad, writes Anders Åslund.

Conflict Human Rights

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Anti-war Russians struggle to be heard appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Russia escalates attacks in Avdiivka as new private-military-company unit launches in Crimea

Tracking narratives

Russia and its political allies in Moldova continue to inflame information space around Transnistria

Putin and Lukashenka announce plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus after news of UK uranium-depleted ammo transfer

Secretary of Kremlin Security Council accuses NATO of being “party to the conflict” in Ukraine

Documenting dissent

New audio allegedly documents Russian elites criticizing Putin for war in Ukraine

Russia escalates attacks in Avdiivka as new private-military-company unit launches in Crimea

Russian forces continue their attempts to break through Ukrainian army defenses in several directions. Russian units attacked Ukrainian positions in Pervomaisk, and conducted strikes on Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv. On March 30, at least ten Iranian-made Shahed drones targeted Ukrainian territory as Russian aviation dropped guided bombs on Lvove village in Kherson Oblast.

The Russian army continues to pressure Ukrainian forces in the direction of Avdiivka, where fighting has recently escalated. Ukraine’s 36th Marine Brigade, active in Avdiivka, has been successful in countering Russian attacks. However, Russian Telegram channels claimed that incendiary shells struck Ukrainian positions around the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant.

On March 29, Russia claimed that Ukraine had struck a railway depot in the Russian-occupied city of Melitopol, located deep behind the front line, knocking out power. Ukraine’s exiled mayor of the city also confirmed the explosions. Footage published online shows explosions lighting up the night sky. Melitopol is located on the edge of the range of Ukraine’s HIMARS multiple rocket launchers but is within reach of newer weapons, including air-launched joint direct attack munitions and ground-launched small-diameter bombs (GLSDB). The strike could disturb Moscow’s logistics at a time when Kyiv has suggested it could soon launch a counterattack.

On March 28, Russia reported for the first time that it had shot down a GLSDB. The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed that air defenses had shot down a new Ukrainian Hrim-2 ballistic missile in the area of Novoandriivka, Donetsk Oblast.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin-installed head of occupied Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, has created his own Wagner-like military unit. To lead the group, dubbed “Convoy” (Конвой), Aksyonov has recruited Konstantin Pikalov, a former Wagner commander who served in Africa. The mercenary unit is said to be composed of three hundred fighters and has reportedly already deployed to occupied parts of Kherson Oblast. On March 16, Aksyonov spoke about the “professional military unit” on Crimean television. “The guys who have gone through everything that is possible,” he said, discussing military honors they had received. “The leaders have several Orders of Courage; the chief of staff is a Hero of Russia.”

A video published on the Convoy Telegram channel showed Aksyonov inspecting the positions of the new unit. The channel was created last November and heavily features Russian Orthodox imagery and icons. It also refers to Ukrainians as “satanists.”

Vladimir Osechkin, the founder of the Russian human-rights organization Gulagu, said the new private military contractors are designed to replace Wagner units on the frontlines. He said the new unit could be expected to operate alongside the Russian army in Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and areas just north of Crimea.

Convoy’s training grounds are located in the village of Perevalne, southeast of Simferopol, according to the independent Russian news outlet Important Stories. This village has existing military infrastructure from the Cold War era, including the 165th Training Center, used for the training of foreign military personnel. A January 2023 Convoy ad recruiting snipers on Telegram offered room and board at the training center, as well as clothing, equipment, and a scholarship worth 100,000 rubles ($1,286).

The ad included a contact email address with the domain conwoy.org; according to a WHOIS search, the domain was registered on June 15, 2022, by “’Military Security Company Convoy’ Limited Liability Company” in Leningrad Oblast.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia and its political allies in Moldova continue to inflame information space around Transnistria

In an interview with the Russian state-owned news outlet TASS, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov alleged Ukrainian interference in the unrecognized breakaway region of Transnistria, saying Ukrainian leadership “[demonstrates] in every way its readiness to interfere in this process, including with the use of force.” Lavrov accused Ukraine of playing an “extremely negative, subversive role” in the “5+2” negotiation format, a diplomatic platform designed to settle the Transnistria conflict. The minister said that by clearly siding with Chisinau, “Kyiv authorities support its belligerent, destructive policy towards Transnistria.” Lavrov also emphasized Russia’s responsibility for the security of Transnistria, which according to him, is “in full accordance” with the mandate of Russian troops.

Earlier, Marina Tauber, vice president of the pro-Russian Moldovan opposition party Sor, claimed that Moldovan authorities were preparing a military provocation near the border of Transnistria, scheduled for April 17, after the Easter holidays. “[Moldovan President] Maia Sandu and [Moldovan Prime Minister] Dorin Recean are preparing a military provocation on the border with Transnistria,” Tauber claimed, citing “international intelligence services.” Tauber further asserted that Moldova had sent ten thousand uniforms to Romania for the Romanian security forces, with the goal of involving them in a military conflict. She also claimed that authorities had ordered three thousand coffins.

Moldovan government spokesperson Daniel Voda dismissed Tauber’s claims, saying, “Tauber’s statements are false and are part of a constant discourse promoting fear and division in society.”

The Russian Defense Ministry had previously alleged that Kyiv was preparing an armed provocation against Transnistria, which Kyiv and Moldova have denied.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Chisinau, Moldova

Putin and Lukashenka announce plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus after news of UK uranium-depleted ammo transfer

The Kremlin may be exploiting a March 20 announcement by the United Kingdom concerning the transfer of depleted uranium armor-piercing rounds to Ukraine, using it as an excuse to allegedly deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus.

Despite the fact that depleted uranium rounds do not actually contact radioactive elements, state-owned Russian news outlets claimed the ammunition could indeed contain radioactive uranium, which fueled a Kremlin-led narrative advocating for deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus as retaliation. Putin said the transfer of weapons by the West containing “nuclear components” called for “an adequate answer.” State-owned news outlet TASS reported that Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the transfer of these rounds a further escalation of the conflict, and claimed without evidence that the use of them would contaminate Ukraine’s food supply.

In a March 23 video on the Russian military TV station Zvezda News, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka said that if Russian forces are targeted by Ukrainian depleted rounds, “the response will be terrifying, it will be a lesson for the whole planet.” On his personal Telegram channel, Lukashenka noted that discussions about the transfer of nuclear weapons took place in November 2021.

In a March 25 interview on Rossiya 1, Putin announced plans to relocate tactical nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory. He said that Belarus was already equipped with ten bomber aircrafts as well as Iskander systems compatible with nuclear-class weapons. The Russian president insisted the weapons would be deployed to Belarusian “territory.” Using this wording indicates that Putin is trying to avoid being accused of nuclear proliferation to a neighboring country.

According to a report by the Belarusian website Motolko Help citing Putin’s interview, Russia will reportedly build storage facilities for tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus by June 1. Citing a video posted on the Belarusian YouTube channel ONT, Motolko also assessed that the 465th Missile Brigade in Osipovichi district—the only missile brigade in Belarus—was likely already equipped with Iskander missile systems. This claim has not been independently verified.

Motolko also reported that Lukashenka recently announced that additional SU-25 fighter jets would undergo “reequipment” to adapt their technical capabilities to carry nuclear payloads. However, the Belarusian president also made similar claims in June and August 2022.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, security, Brussels, Belgium

Secretary of Kremlin Security Council accuses NATO of being “party to the conflict” in Ukraine

On March 27, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Kremlin Security Council, said that NATO is a party to the war in Ukraine. The government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta quoted Patrushev saying, “in fact, NATO countries are a party to the conflict. They made Ukraine one big military camp. They send weapons and ammunition to the Ukrainian troops, provide them with intelligence.”

On March 21, at a meeting in Ulyanovsk, Russia, Patrushev said that foreign intelligence agencies are trying to “stir up protest and separatist sentiments in Russia,” with the support of “pseudo-political structures” located abroad and foreign nongovernmental organizations. The remarks were made amid ongoing military setbacks by the Russian military in eastern Ukraine and internal problems within the officer corps fueled by a power struggle in the Kremlin that has been on display since the early months of the full-scale invasion.

Patrushev, a close ally of Putin, previously served as the head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He has served in the powerful role of secretary of the Kremlin Security Council since 2008. The anti-NATO remarks are the latest in an ongoing campaign of narratives that the Kremlin has utilized to justify its war on Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New audio allegedly documents Russian elites criticizing Putin for war in Ukraine

On March 7, audio emerged online purporting to capture a phone call between Russian music producer Iosif Prigozhin and Farhad Akhmedov, the Azerbaijan-born billionaire and former Russian senator, in which they criticized Putin for the war in Ukraine. The audio did not gain traction until March 24, when Ukraine’s Channel 5 published the conversation.

During the alleged call, Prigozhin seems to refer to Kremlin leaders as “criminals.” He then appears to claim that former Russian Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and National Guard Director Viktor Zolotov are “united” and “blame everything” on Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. “Putin is pinning everyone against each other to save himself,” Prigozhin allegedly added. Akhmedov, in turn, appears to say that Putin would not be able to save himself and would be held accountable for his actions.

The independent Russian media outlet Important Stories reported that the audio was genuine, citing an anonymous source in Russian intelligence services. According to the source, “the leadership of the FSB recently held a meeting and instructed subordinates to take action.”

When the audio first gained attention, Prigozhin shared a video on his Telegram channel insisting the audio was fake. “This recording is a symbiosis of spoken phrases and those that were generated, they were never spoken,” he insisted.

Wagner Group founder Yevgenzy Prigozhin, who bears no relation to the music producer, called Iosef Prigozhin “impudent, aggressive, and quick-tempered.” He speculated that whoever recorded the call may have thought that they had been recording the Wagner Group leader instead of the music producer.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: A new private military company emerges in Crimea appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Allegedly produced by Putin’s Presidential Administration with input from the Russian intelligence services and armed forces, the 17-page internal strategy paper was made public in early 2023 by an international consortium of journalists. It serves as a comprehensive guide to the unofficial annexation of Belarus via a combination of economic, military, political, and social measures, with the objective of full absorption into a so-called “Union State” with Russia by 2030.

The Russian takeover of Belarus as outlined in the document appears to closely mirror Moscow’s plans for Ukraine, albeit by less direct means. “Russia’s goals with regard to Belarus are the same as with Ukraine. Only in Belarus, Russia relies on coercion rather than war. Its end goal is still wholesale incorporation,” commented Michael Carpenter, the US Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, following publication of the leaked document.

The strategy document for Belarus envisions the comprehensive russification of Belarusian society along with a sharp reduction in the influence of nationalist and pro-Western forces, which are viewed by Russia as virtually indistinguishable in relation to both Belarus and Ukraine. The Belarusian political, financial, business, and education systems would be fully integrated into Russia, with a network of pro-Russian media, NGOs, and cultural institutions established to aid this integration process.

In the military sphere, the Belarusian army would become de facto part of the Russian military, with Belarus increasing the number of Russian bases in the country and allowing Moscow to dramatically expand its military presence. Putin’s recently announced intention to base Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus are an indication that this plan is already advancing.

The publication date of this alleged Russian blueprint for the takeover of Belarus is particularly interesting. It was reportedly produced in summer 2021 at a time when Putin’s mind seems to have been turning toward grand visions of imperial conquest. Increasingly isolated due to the Covid pandemic and surrounded by a shrinking circle of imperial hardliners and sycophants, Putin appears to have made the fateful decision in mid 2021 to extinguish Belarusian and Ukrainian independence once and for all.

Efforts to unofficially annex Belarus were well underway by this point. Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was already heavily reliant on Russia following a Kremlin intervention to prop up his tottering regime in the wake of nationwide protests over the country’s rigged August 2020 presidential election.

As Kremlin officials were busy drawing up plans to incorporate Belarus, Putin himself was penning a 6000-word treatise outlining his denial of Ukraine’s right to statehood and his insistence that Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). Putin’s July 2021 essay was widely seen as a declaration of war against Ukrainian independence. His lengthy article laid the ideological foundations for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began seven months later.

Putin’s plans for a subjugated Ukraine share many common features with his vision for the takeover of Belarus. Following the anticipated military conquest of Ukraine, Russia intended to install a puppet ruler in Kyiv who would replace Zelenskyy and play the same role as Lukashenka in Belarus. For both countries, Moscow’s ultimate goal is the same: Complete absorption into a new Russian Empire.

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Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire have been evident since his first term in office but became more obvious following his formal return to the presidency in 2012. From this point onward, Putin began to openly embrace an imperialistic brand of nationalism that positioned him as the latest in a long line of Kremlin rulers celebrated as “gatherers of Russian lands.” In the contemporary context, this meant incorporating fellow East Slavic states Belarus and Ukraine into a new Russia-led union.

The idea of a union between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine was not new and first gained prominence during the collapse of the USSR when promoted by Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. East Slavic unity had both ideological and practical appeal for Putin. It would secure his place in Russian history while also creating a solid basis for the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Putin’s alternative to the EU.

Initially, Putin hoped to absorb Ukraine without a fight. Indeed, in 2012 and 2013, the Kremlin adopted many of the same tactics later used in Belarus to strengthen Russia’s grip on the country. However, post-Soviet Ukraine had a far stronger sense of national identity than Belarus, with a majority of Ukrainians seeing themselves as Europeans and embracing the country’s fledgling democratic traditions. This was to prove a major obstacle for Putin’s imperial project.

As Ukraine prepared to sign a long-anticipated Association Agreement with the European Union in last 2013, Moscow unleashed a trade war and began pressuring Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych to reject Brussels in favor of Moscow. When Yanukovych attempted to do so, mass protests erupted in Ukraine that escalated into a full-scale revolution in support of democracy and European integration. Within three months, Yanukovych found himself deserted by his allies and escaped to Russia.

Russia responded to the success of the Euromaidan Revolution by occupying Crimea and attempting to orchestrate uprisings throughout southern and eastern Ukraine. Targeted regions of Ukraine were rebranded by the Kremlin using the old Czarist-era imperial term of “Novorossiya” or “New Russia.” This strategy was only partially successful, with Kremlin-backed uprisings defeated in most major Ukrainian cities except for Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, where Kremlin control was secured with the assistance of the invading Russian army.

Over the next eight years, Putin attempted to rebuild Russia’s political influence inside Ukraine while pressuring the country to accept a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the February 2015 Minsk Accords, which had brought the worst of the fighting to an end in eastern Ukraine without establishing a durable peace. Moscow’s vision for the implementation of the Minsk Accords would have transformed Ukraine into a dysfunctional Russian satellite, but this outcome met with resistance from successive Ukrainian presidents.

By early 2021, Putin had come to the conclusion that his strategy was failing and appears to have recognized that Ukraine was slipping irreparably out of the Russian orbit. At this point, he and other Kremlin leaders began referring to Ukraine as an “anti-Russia” and portraying the country as an intolerable outpost of NATO and US interests on Russia’s borders. The available evidence suggests that by the time Putin published his notorious essay in summer 2021, he was already fully committed to crushing Ukrainian independence by military means.

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In a clear echo of the strategy adopted for Belarus, Russia’s FSB security service was tasked in 2021 with preparing plans for the military occupation and pacification of Ukraine. However, a combination of FSB corruption, wishful thinking, and misplaced stereotypes about modern Ukraine resulted in a series of disastrous miscalculations.

Collaborators within the Ukrainian government told FSB agents what they wanted to hear with no regard for the realities on the ground, while the Kremlin’s networks of Ukrainian informants, NGOs, and other “experts” assured their Russian colleagues that the invading Russian army would be welcomed. Meanwhile, FSB officers confidently predicted that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would soon be captured or forced to flee, with organized Ukrainian resistance unlikely to last longer than a few days.

These intelligence failures persuaded Putin to embark on the biggest gamble of his presidency with a wholly inadequate force of less than 200,000 troops. This was regarded as sufficient to install a pro-Russian regime and place Ukraine on the same path as Belarus toward absorption into the Russian Federation.

Captured documents, prisoner accounts, and the actions of the Russian occupation forces in regions of Ukraine under Kremlin control now make it possible to produce a comprehensive picture of Russia’s plans for the subjugation of the country. These plans share many features with Moscow’s approach to the creeping annexation of Belarus, while employing infinitely more direct and brutal methods.

The events of the past year make clear that Russia’s stated invasion objective of “de-Nazification” actually means the execution, imprisonment, deportation, or otherwise silencing of anyone deemed to be a Ukrainian patriot. Those targeted since the invasion began in February 2022 have included elected officials, civil society activists, educators, journalists, army veterans, and cultural figures.

The systematic suppression of Ukrainian national identity has been undertaken alongside intensive russification efforts, including the introduction of a Kremlin-approved Russian school curriculum and the promotion of an imperial identity. In parallel, local businesses have been forced to integrate into the Russian economy, with the wider population in occupied Ukraine obliged to accept Russian citizenship.

The obvious similarities between the Kremlin’s long-term Belarus strategy and the tactics being employed in occupied Ukraine undermine Russian efforts to portray the ongoing invasion as a defensive measure driven by valid security concerns. Instead, a picture emerges of Vladimir Putin’s overriding ambition to absorb both countries and secure his place in history as a “gatherer of Russian lands.”

While his approach to each country may currently differ in the details, Putin clearly aims to bring both Ukrainian and Belarusian independence to an end, and has placed these imperial ambitions at the heart of his entire reign. This makes a mockery of calls for a compromise with the Kremlin. Instead, Western leaders must recognize that peace in Europe will remain elusive until the Russian dictator is forced to abandon his dreams of empire.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the newly published “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Mar 19, 2023

Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation

By Anders Åslund

The ICC decision to indict Putin for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad, writes Anders Åslund.

Conflict Human Rights

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Putin’s plan for a new Russian Empire includes both Ukraine and Belarus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Ukraine likely preparing counteroffensive as Russia diverts forces from Bakhmut

Missile strike on residential building in Zaporizhzhia caught on camera

Tracking narratives

Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Russian ministry reports 5,000 offenses related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army

New poll suggests support for the war in Ukraine remains high among Russians

International response

Armenia ratifies Rome Statute in the wake of Putin’s ICC arrest warrant

Ukraine likely preparing counteroffensive as Russia diverts forces from Bakhmut

After months of heavy fighting in which Russian forces failed to fully capture Bakhmut, the Ukrainian army is likely preparing its counteroffensive. Ukrainian ground forces commander Oleksandr Syrskyi said on his Telegram channel that Russian forces “are losing considerable strength and are running out of steam” and “very soon we will take advantage of this opportunity.” The DFRLab has observed indications of a Ukrainian counterattack and is closely monitoring the developments.  

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to exert pressure on Ukraine. Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian troops will likely focus on targets of military importance in their next missile strikes. Particular attention is being paid to areas with troop concentration, oil depots, airfields, supply routes for military equipment from allied countries, and other logistical facilities. In addition, the possibility of repeated attacks against energy infrastructure or other objects of significant economic importance for Ukraine cannot be ruled out. 

A Russian slowdown in Bakhmut could mean that Moscow is diverting its troops and resources to other regions. Russian troops have made gains further north, partially regaining control over the axis to the town of Kreminna. Intense battles have also been underway in the south. Further, Russian forces have become more active in the regions of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Russian troops are conducting offensives in the direction of Avdiivka with the aim of establishing control over Avdiivka and Marinka.  

In the occupied Crimean town of Dzhankoi, an explosion reportedly destroyed cruise missiles utilized by Russia’s Black Sea navy to target Ukraine, according to a March 21 statement from Ukrainian military intelligence. The strike appeared to have originated from a drone. A video of the explosion published on March 20 shows the blast was immediately preceded by a loudly buzzing engine which bears audio similarities to the sound made by Iranian-made drones. The DFRLab cannot confirm whether an Iranian drone caused the blast.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Missile strike on residential building in Zaporizhzhia caught on camera

Video footage of a missile strike against a nine-story residential building in the center of Zaporizhzhia emerged on Telegram on March 29. The DFRLab identified the location of the missile strike and the apartment complex it struck using geolocation and geospatial analysis. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described in a tweet, the strike occurred near a residential area near a mall. 

A photograph shared online indicates that an S-300 missile system fired the missile from the Russian-occupied southern bank of the Dnipro River. This location was corroborated by other open-source investigators, including the GeoConfirmed project, which reported that the missile likely came from the southeast direction. Reports claimed the attack caused the death of seven people. 

Later that same day, counternarratives emerged on the pro-Kremlin English-language Telegram channel Slavyangrad and spread to a French-language channel. The narrative claimed that the strike resulted from a Ukrainian S-300 system failure while attempting to intercept a Russian missile. Russian news outlets and pro-Kremlin amplification channels have repeatedly used similar narratives to obfuscate Russian culpability in incidents involving civilians.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Following the International Criminal Court issuing an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin leader paid a defiant visit to the occupied Ukrainian city of Mariupol. The Kremlin shared a thirty-minute video of the visit, which reportedly took place on March 18. During the visit, Putin reportedly examined restoration work under way in the city. Approximately twenty minutes into the footage, Putin has a short conversation with individuals described as residents of Mariupol.  

Footage of the visit published by state-owned news outlet RIA included frames cut out of the Kremlin video. The RIA footage includes an extended version of Putin’s interactions with alleged residents. During the filmed conversation, an unidentified female voice can be heard in the background shouting at Putin, approximately eighteen seconds into the clip. Meduza reported that the woman yelled, “This all is not true! It’s all for a show!” While the women’s comments do sound similar to Meduza’s interpretation, the voice is muffled and difficult to interpret with certainty. Immediately after the woman shouts, the officials accompanying Putin react and begin to look around the streets. The Kremlin version of the video cuts away approximately four seconds earlier, switching to another woman speaking with Putin.

According to Meduza, a Russian journalist described the district visited by Putin as “virtually the only one rebuilt” in the city destroyed by Russia. 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian ministry reports 5,000 offenses related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army

On March 20, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, the head of Russia’s interior ministry, said that in 2022, “Particular attention was paid to preventing the discreditation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” The ministry reported that last year police documented five thousand offenses and forty-one crimes related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army. In addition, they documented almost ninety cases of “deliberate false publications” about the Russian military.  

“In cooperation with Roskomnadzor, the dissemination of about 160,000 false and other prohibited information was stopped,” Kolokoltsev added. 

The DFRLab has previously reported on Russian attempts to tighten control of the internet in order to prevent the spread of content the Kremlin considers undesirable.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

New poll suggests support for the war in Ukraine remains high among Russians

According to independent Russian pollster Levada, 77 percent of Russians supported the war in February 2023, the highest level of public support since March 2022. Only 17 percent of Russians currently disapprove the war, Levada reported.  

The number of people supporting the continuation of hostilities has steadily increased since October 2022 “as the shock of the announcement of partial mobilization passed,” Levada concluded.  

Seventy-one percent of Russians perceive the return of Luhansk and Donetsk to Ukraine as unacceptable conditions for a peace treaty, while 67 percent see the return of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions as unacceptable. In addition, 76 percent of respondents perceive Ukraine’s accession to NATO as unacceptable.  

Since November 2022, the share of respondents who believe that the “special military operation” is advancing successfully increased from 54 to 65 percent.  

The Levada research center, labeled a foreign agent by Russia, published its assessment on March 13. Russia has cracked down on public dissent since the start of the war; it remains unclear whether this crackdown impacted Levada’s poll results. 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Armenia ratifies Rome Statute in the wake of Putin’s ICC arrest warrant

On March 24, the Armenian Constitutional Court gave its blessing to the parliament’s ratification of the Rome Statute, noting that the country’s obligations to the International Criminal Court do not contradict the national constitution. The decision is final and went into effect immediately. 

Armenia’s plans to ratify the Rome Statute had been complicated by the International Criminal Court’s recent decision to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. On December 29, 2022, Armenian parliament approved the draft law, “On Ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” which then made its way to the constitutional court. Armenia signed the statute in 1999 but did not ratify it at the time.  

Armenia’s recent push to ratify the ICC charter appears motivated by the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia initiated the ratification to take Azerbaijan to the ICC over alleged war crimes committed by Azerbaijani troops during the September 2022 invasion, but some observers thought the constitutional court would rule against it due to the Putin arrest warrant. 

Human rights defender Artur Sakunts told Caucasus news outlet Jam News that Armenia would end up in a “miserable position” if it did not continue on course to ratify the statute. “We will remain in the status of an ally of a fascist regime – where Belarus is now,”  Sakunts added. “And such regimes have no allies, they only have subordinates, colonies, zones of influence.” 

Armenia’s Speaker of Parliament, Alen Simonyan, told reporters on March 20 that Armenia had begun the ratification process months before the ICC decision. When asked about the possibility of arresting Putin on a visit to Armenia, Simonyan said, “First, let’s ratify the Rome Statute for now, and then we’ll decide what to do next. I wonder what they will do in other countries in case of his arrival. I just physically can’t imagine it [the arrest].”

—Ani Mejlumyan, Research Assistant, Yerevan, Armenia 

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Security

DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Battle for Vuhledar highlights tensions between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Tracking narratives

Russian channels amplify Quran desecration video

International response

European allies train Ukrainian forces on tank operation

DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Russian armed forces continue their offensive inside the contested city of Bakhmut. At the time of writing, the western part of Bakhmut remained under Ukrainian control, with the Bakhmutka River acting as a buffer zone between the artillery and infantry forces deployed on either side of the waterway. Russian missile and aerial strikes targeted intermediary positions to push back Ukrainian armed forces, from Yahidne in the north towards Bakhmut industrial plants. 

The DFRLab collected open-source satellite imagery dating back to the first two weeks of March to document missile strikes on an industrial plant in the north of Bakhmut. The imagery was collected from the European Space Agency’s Sentinel hub using images provided by satellite constellation Sentinel-2. 

Analysis of the damage inflicted on buildings in the area reveals that potential missiles struck buildings belonging to two different industrial plants. The easternmost plant is the Bakhmut non-ferrous metals factory.  

Satellite imagery showed the factory’s main building was destroyed, with a second building damaged. Traces of burns on the roof of the building can be seen from an explosion. This building belongs to the Makiivka metal construction plant.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Battle for Vuhledar highlights tensions between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Eastern Ukraine continues to be a key arena for clashes as Russian forces attempt to advance in the directions of Vuhledar and Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces are using remote mining near Vuhledar, according to a March 16 report from UK defense intelligence. The remote anti-armor mine system (RAAMS) makes it possible to create an anti-tank minefield up to seventeen kilometers away from the firing unit. The United Kingdom reported that Ukraine was also firing the mines behind advancing Russian forces, leading to additional losses in the event of a retreat. The United Kingdom also reported that there is a “realistic possibility” that Russia’s push for Vuhledar is driven by the Russian defense ministry’s desire to produce better results than Wagner, who are driving Russia’s tactical progress towards Bakhmut.  

The UK report supports the DFRLab’s analysis that the ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are provoking a competition between the different military units, particularly Wagner and the Russian defense ministry. In the direction of Bakhmut, Wagner’s forces continue to be the primary units fighting within the city. However, the combat has been difficult, and the urban environment makes progress challenging. In addition, Chechen forces in Bakhmut continue to fight alongside the Ukrainian army against Russian positions.  

Russian forces are also having issues restoring tanks, according to a report published by Ukrainian outlet Defense Express. The 103rd armored repair plant in Russia has reportedly not been able to restore T-62 tanks under the terms originally contracted, which would have required the plant to restore twenty-two to twenty-three tanks per month. According to Defense Express, however, the real capacity of the plant is likely around seven tanks per month. On March 6, UK defense intelligence reported that Russia was deploying outdated T-62 tanks to the battlefield due to major losses in armored equipment.  

Acts of sabotage against occupying Russian forces continue in the direction of Kherson. On March 11, the Telegram channel of the pro-Ukraine resistance movement Atesh reported that its members blew up a railway line in the Kherson region, between Radensk and Abrykosivka. This appears to be an attempt by Atesh partisans to impede logistics for the Russian troops deployed in the area.  

Ukraine has also reported new arrests of alleged Russian infiltrators. On March 16, the Security Service of Ukraine reported the detention of two women accused of tracking the movement of Ukrainian equipment in the interest of Russian intelligence. The women also allegedly photographed the results of attacks on Ukrainian facilities. One of the women reportedly worked as a nurse in Ukraine’s territorial defense combat unit. 

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian channels amplify Quran desecration video

Footage emerged online on March 15 showing the burning of the Islamic holy book, the Quran. Russian social media channels shared the one minute and six second video, accusing Ukrainian soldiers of being behind the desecration. The video sparked a wave of reactions on social media, particularly on Twitter, where a TikTok version of the video went viral. The TikTok video has since been removed.  

The video is difficult to analyze and cannot be verified. It does not show the faces of the alleged Ukrainian soldiers. The people in the video are speaking broken Ukrainian and use a Russian military knife, said Oleg Nikolenko, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s foreign ministry.

The video was denounced as a provocation by Said Imagilov, Mufti of the Spiritual Administration of Ukraine’s Muslims, as well as the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian officials. 

Ukraine’s army has Muslim soldiers in its ranks, and Imagilov is an active participant on the frontlines defending Kyiv. The Ukrainian army is also supported by several Chechen units, the most well-known of which are the two volunteer battalions, the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion and the Sheikh Mansur Battalion. Chechens are among the most active defenders of Bakhmut, with their Adam special unit operating behind Russian army defense lines.  

The provenance of the video remains unknown.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

European allies train Ukrainian forces on tank operation

Ukraine’s Western allies are continuing to help strengthen Kyiv’s defense against Russia by training Ukrainian troops on tank operation and trench warfare. Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for Internal Market, is visiting EU countries in a bid to shore up more ammunition for Ukraine. His first visit was to Bulgaria. This visit came as the  Slovak news outlet Pravda published data on March 15 showing that, in the year since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Slovakia has doubled its ammunition production and plans to double it again from current levels.  

Meanwhile, Greece and the United States agreed to a deal that will see the US transfer 300 M2 Bradley fighting vehicles to the Greek army as part of a modernization program, according to Greek media reports on March 10. Greece is expected to send Ukraine BMP-1 vehicles and M113 armored carriers in exchange for the purchase of the Bradleys. 

On March 13, Spain’s Ministry of Defense announced that ten Ukrainian crews completed training in Spain on operating Leopard 2 tanks. Along with fifty-five servicemen, fifteen Ukrainian technicians also received training. According to El Periódico, “These fifty-five soldiers – some professionals and other reservists – were already on the front line, and their four-week training lasted twelve hours a day.”  

In addition, the German army announced it was training Ukrainian troops on the Leopard 2 tanks in Germany. “Training on the weapon systems is not just about how to use it, but also about tactics so that the Ukrainians can achieve the greatest possible effect against their opponents,” said Colonel Heiko Diehl. 

Ukrainian servicemen in the United Kingdom also completed training in conducting trench combat in realistic conditions. The program was led by the 5th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment of the 1st Brigade of the Australian Defense Forces.  

Earlier this week, Polish President Andrzej Duda announced that his country would send Ukraine thirty MiG 29 fighter jets. These are essential as Russia strives to achieve air dominance and has increased its aerial strikes throughout Ukraine. On March 14, a video emerged on Twitter showing Ukrainian soldiers taking part in trainings in the French military camp of Canjuers in the south of the country. The soldiers were reportedly training with the AMX-10RC armored personnel carriers. Minister of the Armed Forces of France Sebastien Lecornu confirmed during a defense commission hearing on March 15 that the carriers are already being delivered to Ukraine. 

On March 15, the Israeli government approved licenses to export electronic warfare equipment to Ukraine that will help counter Iranian drones.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

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This is not just a matter of winning UN votes and scoring political points at international forums. The reluctance of countries throughout the Global South to join Western sanctions significantly undermines efforts to isolate Russia, while providing Moscow with the financial and material lifelines to maintain the war in Ukraine indefinitely.

Attitudes in the Global South toward Russia’s Ukraine invasion are being shaped by a range of factors including economic and geopolitical interests along with widespread suspicion of American foreign policy and historic anti-Western sentiment dating back to the colonial era. Russia has skillfully exploited this post-colonial perspective by framing the invasion of Ukraine as a reaction to what it terms as yet more expansionist Western interference. As the war enters its second year, Ukraine should be doing much more to engage these non-Western audiences and make its voice heard.

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Ukraine has limited experience of rallying international support and has previously focused its efforts almost exclusively on the West. In the three decades since the country regained independence, Ukrainian politicians, activists, and journalists have spent comparatively little time communicating with people in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where awareness of Ukraine is still often minimal. Ukraine now needs to develop a strategy that can rally the nations of the non-Western world to its side.

First of all, it is absolutely crucial to keep Ukraine at the heart of the debate. Across the Global South, it is common to witness public discussions about the Russian invasion that barely address Ukraine at all. Instead, the focus is frequently on Western colonialism, globalization, and other broad geopolitical themes. Ukrainians should not hesitate to insist that conversations about their country’s plight not get sidetracked by extraneous historical grievances.

Over the past year, Ukraine’s limited efforts to influence opinion in the Global South have concentrated on highlighting the imperial ambitions underpinning Putin’s current invasion while raising awareness of Russia’s own long history of colonialism as a major European empire. This approach certainly makes some sense, but too much emphasis on Russia’s colonial past risks shifting the conversation away from today’s Ukraine.

Another important ingredient shaping the debate in the Global South is the role played by the Soviet Union as a supporter of anti-colonial liberation movements during the second half of the twentieth century. Putin’s Russia has made much use of this favorable Soviet legacy, using it to garner goodwill and to emphasize its own anti-Western credentials. This ignores the obvious imperialism of the USSR itself, and overlooks the fact that Soviet-era Ukraine also contributed significantly to liberation movements throughout Africa and Asia.

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While it is essential for Ukrainians to correct the historical record regarding Russian imperialism, it is also vital to stress Ukraine’s current importance for the Global South. First and foremost, this means highlighting Ukraine’s status as one of the world’s emerging agricultural superpowers and a major prewar contributor to global food security.

As Ukraine seeks to influence opinion among non-Western audiences, the country must make maximum use of its limited resources. For example, officials in Kyiv should be doing much more to engage with the thousands of professionals throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America who studied at Ukrainian universities before going on to have careers in their homelands. This pool of alumni is a potentially significant but largely untapped resource that could bring a degree of authenticity to the debate due to their personal experience of Ukraine.

Ukrainian nationals with family ties to the Global South can also contribute to greater international understanding of the issues at stake in today’s Ukraine. As one of the most prominent members of the Afro-Ukrainian community, politician and Olympic champion wrestler Zhan Beleniuk traveled to Africa in late 2022 as part of Ukraine’s fledgling outreach efforts. Others with similar backgrounds should be encouraged to speak up on behalf of Ukraine.

Ukraine’s success in shaping opinion throughout the Global South will hinge largely on the country’s ability to engage with the media. This is one area where the Kremlin enjoys overwhelming advantages. While Russia’s RT and Sputnik platforms have limited reach and minimal credibility among Western audiences, they enjoy considerable prominence and are often well-received in much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Ukraine cannot hope to compete with the Kremlin’s billion dollar media budgets and must instead build relationships with existing local mainstream media. Brazil’s TV Globo is the second-largest commercial TV network in the world and can bring Ukrainian perspectives to huge domestic Brazilian audiences. Likewise, engagement with Spanish-language channels can help reach millions across Latin America. A comprehensive media strategy is needed in order to close the information gap and counter the current dominance of Russia’s narratives in the non-Western information space.

Ultimately, the truth is on Ukraine’s side. The good news it that there is very little evidence of actively anti-Ukrainian sentiment in today’s Global South. It should be entirely possible to persuade far more people that Ukraine’s cause is righteous and worthy of support. However, this will require a concerted effort that is currently lacking. Simply telling non-Western audiences that the Russians are also imperialists may be satisfying, but it is not nearly enough.

Mitchell Polman is a public diplomacy and international relations commentator.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Jan 28, 2023

Poland is leading Europe’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

By Diane Francis

Poland was the unsung hero of the recent landmark decision by Berlin and Washington to provide Ukraine with tanks as Polish leadership continues to shape the European response to Russia’s genocidal invasion.

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UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine must do more to counter Russian narratives in the Global South appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These developments come amid ongoing instability in the country, with the former prime minister continuing to criticize retired army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who Khan argues played a role in ousting him from power in April 2022. Khan has stated a desire to engage with Pakistan’s current military chief General Asim Munir “for the betterment of the country.” 

This is not the first time that television channels have been barred from airing speeches made by Khan or other political leaders: a similar order banning his speeches was issued in November 2022; former prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s speeches were banned in October 2020; and former president Asif Ali Zardari’s interview was taken off air in July 2019.

Growing polarization and instability in the country have increased the likelihood that as elections draw near, curbs on speech, largely limited thus far to television channels, may extend to internet platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

For example, on September 6, 2022, YouTube encountered disruptions across Pakistan ahead of Khan’s speech at a rally. This was not the first such disruption—NetBlocks confirmed that a similar disruption also occurred on August 21, 2022, when Imran Khan was making another public speech. In addition, Wikipedia was blocked (and subsequently unblocked) by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) a few weeks ago for its failure to “remove or block allegedly sacrilegious content.” 

Other notable examples in the recent past include TikTok, which has been banned and unbanned on numerous occasions, and YouTube, which was blocked in the country back in 2012 and was only unblocked by the PTA more than three years later.

These developments make clear that the PTA indeed has the capability to disrupt internet services across Pakistan on a whim, something that journalist Abid Hussain pointed out as far back as April 2021 on Twitter. To further control access to the internet, the PTA has also been seeking to limit the use of virtual private networks in the country.

As the conflict between the current government, the military establishment, and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf party sharpens ahead of elections—Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province, is expected to go to elections on April 30—further curbs on expression and disruptions to the internet, especially platforms like YouTube, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Facebook, cannot be ruled out.

In recent months, US companies and US government stakeholders have often chosen not to react to these developments, preferring to adopt a wait-and-watch approach. In addition, they have followed a strategy to engage privately and discreetly, hoping to positively influence government stakeholders through private conversations.

As the crisis in Pakistan deepens, it is time for diplomatic and business stakeholders with an interest in strengthening its democracy and maintaining a largely open internet in the country to shift their approach. 

Given the evolving situation, these stakeholders should consider the following steps to proactively deter further curbs on expression on the internet in Pakistan:

1. Enhance level of engagement with domestic civil society: Recent weeks have seen a flurry of concerning developments in Pakistan, with the recent PEMRA order being the key development. US companies and diplomats must deepen conversations with civil society stakeholders, especially the digital rights community that has been voicing these concerns for years.

2. Proactively communicate concerns to Pakistani government officials: Ongoing diplomatic conversations between Islamabad and Washington have focused on the potential for deepening investment in the country’s technology sector. The PTA’s recent and past actions, however, undermine confidence in Pakistan’s internet economy and it is important that the negative economic impact of arbitrary bans and disruptions to the internet is clearly communicated to Pakistani stakeholders.

3. Build new alliances with the technology and content creator ecosystem: In private conversations, members of Pakistan’s burgeoning technology and content creation ecosystem continue to express growing concern over curbs on freedom of expression. These stakeholders are domestic allies for companies like Meta, Google, and Twitter. However, limited interactions and collaboration with these stakeholders mean that more often than not, a united front is not presented to deter Pakistani government stakeholders from taking adverse actions that curb expression, undermine democracy, and hurt confidence in the country’s digital economy.

The coming months will be a challenging period for Pakistan’s flawed and floundering democracy. This challenge will be compounded by the state’s own capabilities and predilections to curb expression both in the traditional  media and the internet. 

With the PTI and Imran Khan possessing a strong advantage in their ability to digitally percolate party messaging through Pakistani society, the government and its institutions may be incentivized to take drastic measures to disrupt internet services and platforms that allow Khan to bypass television channels who may not air his speeches. As elections draw near, the likelihood of such actions is increasing. For this reason, it is important for US stakeholders—including private sector companies—to proactively monitor the evolving situation and develop strategies to deter such actions. 

Doing so may perhaps safeguard Pakistan’s internet economy, its democracy, and the global reputation of internet platforms that are vital to public discourse within and outside Pakistan.

Uzair Younus is director of the Pakistan Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He also is the Vice President at The Asia Group.

The South Asia Center serves as the Atlantic Council’s focal point for work on the region as well as relations between these countries, neighboring regions, Europe, and the United States.

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One year on, I can now look back with slightly less emotion and a sense of cautious optimism that is rooted in the remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian nation. Ukraine has not only survived, but has actually achieved a number of landmark battlefield victories over Putin’s invading army and has proven to international audiences that Russia can be beaten.

On the personal front, I have been back in Kyiv since May 2022, although my wife and two children remain among the millions of Ukrainians currently living in exile. Thankfully, they are able to visit.

Life in wartime Ukraine can be extremely stressful but Ukrainians have proven themselves far tougher and more resourceful than almost anyone could have imagined. For those living in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities far from the front lines, the greatest threat has come from frequent Russian missile and drone attacks. This airstrike campaign began on October 10 and has since become a feature of daily life.

During those initial October air raids, I found myself in our makeshift neighborhood bomb shelter for the first time, huddled in an underground car park together with 100 other people and their assorted pets. More recently, if I am at home when an attack takes place, I can often see explosions from my apartment window and feel the impact of incoming missiles through the shaking walls of the building.

Russia’s air campaign brought the war closer for millions of Ukrainians, creating a sense of heightened physical danger along with frequent blackouts. The whole of Ukraine spent the winter season with severely limited access to light, electricity, heating, water, and internet. I often had to walk up 20 flights of stairs just to reach my apartment. For people with mobility issues or families with small children, that is simply not an option.

Despite these hardships, Russia’s air attacks have failed to break Ukraine’s spirit. While everyone inevitably talks about the many inconveniences these attacks bring, nobody really complains. Instead, there is an understanding that this is part of the price we must pay for finally saying goodbye to Russia, and a determination to get on with our lives. After the first major attacks, people were shocked and discussed the implications for days on end. But after a few weeks, cafes and restaurants would fill up again within hours of each new bombardment.

Over the past five months, Ukrainians have acquired vast quantities of generators to provide power for businesses, homes, and public services. Each time a blackout begins, an orchestra of generators starts to play. This rumbling of engines has served as the background soundtrack to the winter season in wartime Ukraine. Meanwhile, we have all learned to keep our gadgets fully charged and to have power banks at the ready, just in case. Life goes on.

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Winter is now coming to an end and Ukrainians have not been frozen into submission. Indeed, there have been very few blackouts in recent weeks as Ukraine’s heroic air defense forces and power sector professionals continue to perform miracles. Putin’s bombing campaign is the latest in a long line of unsuccessful Russian efforts to undermine Ukrainian morale.

Surprisingly, the Kremlin-controlled Russian media openly boasted of targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Prior to the onset of the air attacks in late 2022, Kremlin propagandists had consistently insisted that the Russian army only struck military targets. However, it seems that a series of embarrassing military defeats in Ukraine left the Putin regime in desperate need of victories. It says much about the state of Russia’s war effort that the only victory Moscow could hope to deliver was news that Ukrainian civilians were being plunged into freezing darkness in the depths of winter.

The defiant Ukrainian response to Moscow’s terror-bombing tactics reflects the mood in the country as the war enters its second year. It also underlines the counter-productive nature of Putin’s invasion. The Russian dictator wanted to wipe out Ukrainian identity entirely. Instead, he has achieved the exact opposite.

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Throughout the country, Ukrainian national identity is visibly strengthening. Many people are switching from Russian to the Ukrainian language in their everyday lives. Monuments to Soviet figures are being removed from public spaces, and streets honoring Russian writers are being renamed. After decades of domestic geopolitical divisions, Ukrainian support for EU and NATO membership has rocketed to over 80% and is backed by strong majorities in every part of the country.

Whereas Ukrainian public anger following the initial Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was largely directed against the Russian political leadership in the Kremlin, we are now witnessing demands for the wholesale de-russification of Ukraine. Most Ukrainians have been sickened by the atrocities of the Russian army and horrified by the obvious popularity of the war among the Russian public. They no longer wish to have anything in common with a nation that destroys entire cities and commits countless war crimes.

Ukrainians also understand perfectly well that when Russians talk about “Ukrainian Nazis” and call for the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine, they actually mean the de-Ukrainianization of Ukraine and the permanent return of the country to Russian control. The atrocities committed by Russian forces in occupied areas of Ukraine have brought home the horrors that would await the rest of the country if Ukrainian resistance were to crumble.

This has helped fuel a national outpouring of volunteerism as everyone has sought to contribute to victory. Ordinary Ukrainians have donated billions of dollars to help fund the country’s defense. People give whatever they can, with some contributing large sums and others handing over their last pennies. One day recently, three young boys approached my car selling home-made bracelets to raise funds for the army. Similar scenes can be encountered in towns and cities across Ukraine every day.

I recently attended a press conference in Kyiv to mark US President Joe Biden’s surprise visit to the Ukrainian capital. Biden made a point of expressing his admiration for Ukraine’s astounding resilience. The reason is simple: we know that our country is currently engaged in an existential fight for survival. If we stop fighting, we will simply disappear. If the Russians stop fighting, the war will end.

As things currently stand, the invasion is far from over. The military situation is complex and unpredictable. Ukraine enjoys strong morale following a series of battlefield successes and is also benefiting from a steady flow of modern weapons from the country’s Western partners. Meanwhile, Russia has strength in numbers thanks to the country’s first mobilization since World War II, while Putin appears to be preparing domestic audiences and the Russian economy for a long war. Ukrainians remain confident of ultimate victory, but there is also widespread recognition that the journey will be long and difficult.

Despite this uncertainty, there are reasons to look ahead with a sense of confidence. One year ago, Kyiv was supposed to fall within a matter of days. Instead, the Ukrainian capital has become a global symbol of courage and freedom. Over the past year, Ukraine has earned the respect of the watching world. Indeed, no country has ever undergone such a complete image transformation in such a short space of time. Once known primarily for corruption and poverty, Ukraine is now a byword for bravery.

For the first time in my life, I firmly believe Ukraine has a realistic change of joining the European Union. When this finally happens, it will confirm a civilizational shift that has been underway for the past few decades as Ukraine has struggled to shake off the shackles of empire and shed the country’s post-Soviet legacy. Despite the horrors of Russia’s ongoing invasion, I am convinced Ukraine is now moving toward better times. Most of all, I am absolutely sure this bright future is thoroughly deserved.

Vitaly Sych is Chief Editor of NV media house which includes a weekly magazine, national talk radio station, and news site NV.ua.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 23, 2023

Invasion anniversary: Does Putin still have a pathway to victory in Ukraine?

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine is widely seen as one of the biggest geopolitical blunders of the modern era, but as the war enters its second year, could the Russian dictator still have a pathway to potential victory?

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jan 28, 2023

Poland is leading Europe’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

By Diane Francis

Poland was the unsung hero of the recent landmark decision by Berlin and Washington to provide Ukraine with tanks as Polish leadership continues to shape the European response to Russia’s genocidal invasion.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Feb 1, 2023

Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity

By Botakoz Kassymbekova

Vladimir Putin’s genocidal invasion of Ukraine has exposed modern Russia’s unapologetically imperial identity but could yet lead to the collapse of the Kremlin’s broader imperial ambitions, writes Botakoz Kassymbekova.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russia’s invasion one year on: Ukraine is stronger than ever appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tracking narratives

DFRLab releases investigations on Russian information operations before and after the invasion

Putin reshares narratives used to justify war of aggression in anniversary speech

Russia accuses Ukraine of plotting an invasion on Transnistria

Security

Ukraine prepares for Russian offensive on Vuhledar as Prigozhin accuses Russian command of lying

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DFRLab releases investigations on Russian information operations before and after the invasion

This week, our team at the DFRLab released two investigative reports on how Russia employed information operations before and after its invasion of Ukraine one year ago today. The first report, Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine, examines how the Kremlin and its media proxies employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Collectively, these narratives served as Vladimir Putin’s casus belli to engage in a war of aggression against Ukraine. 

To research this report, we reviewed more than 350 fact-checks of pro-Kremlin disinformation published from 2014 to 2021 to identify recurring anti-Ukraine rhetoric, then collected more than ten thousand examples of false and misleading narratives published by fourteen pro-Kremlin outlets in the ten weeks leading up to the invasion. This allowed us to produce a timeline showing how Russia weaponized these narratives as its actions on the ground escalated toward war. When Vladimir Putin announced the invasion one year ago today, these narratives effectively served as his talking points, recurring more than 200 times during his remarks.

The second report, Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine, compiles some of our most important findings on Russian information operations identified over the last year in our Russian War Report. Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its information strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America. 

We will continue marking the first anniversary of the war next week with the publication of the DFRLab Cyber Statecraft Initiative report, A Parallel Terrain: Public-Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment. A Parallel Terrain analyzes Russia’s continuous assaults against the Ukrainian information environment, not only striking though but attempting to contest and claim this environment in parallel with its conventional invasion. It examines how Russian offensives and Ukrainian defense move through this largely privately owned and operated environment, and how this war has highlighted the growing role that private companies play in conflict. This report will be published February 27. 

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington, DC

Putin reshares narratives used to justify war of aggression in anniversary speech

On February 21, Vladimir Putin delivered an address to the Russian parliament that regurgitated many of the same narratives previously used to justify the invasion of Ukraine, which we explored in our Narrative Warfare report. The speech attempted to depict Putin as innocent of the bloodshed he started one year ago today. Putin spoke of a self-sufficient Russia and urged entrepreneurs to give up investments from overseas. Putin also urged Russian parents to protect their children from the “degradation and degeneration” of the West, one of the recurring themes we documented in Undermining Ukraine. Putin also said that the Sea of Azov “again became Russia’s landlocked sea” and added that Russia would develop the ports and cities in the area; he did not provide a timeline for this endeavor, however.  

Putin also announced the creation of a special fund to compensate and assist those involved in the war and the relatives of the dead and wounded, as well as an additional fourteen days of annual leave for combatants to be with family and loved ones.  

Putin delivered his speech just hours before US President Joe Biden delivered an address in Warsaw.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia accuses Ukraine of plotting an invasion on Transnistria

On February 23, the Russian defense ministry claimed that Ukrainian armed forces were planning a provocation against the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria “with the involvement of the nationalist Azov battalion.” The ministry added that Ukraine plans to stage an attack by Russian forces in Transnistria as a “pretext to invade.” To accomplish this, Ukrainian soldiers would allegedly dress in Russian military uniforms. Several pro-Russian Telegram channels circulated pictures alleged to show military equipment along the border of Transnistria. These accusations are eerily similar to ones made by leaders the breakaway Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which Putin used as a pretext for Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. 

In light of these allegations, the Moldovan government issued a statement on February 23 denying the Russian defense ministry’s claims and urged the population to remain calm and follow credible sources. 

Later that evening, the Russian defense ministry released another statement claiming there was “a significant accumulation of personnel and military equipment of Ukrainian units near the Ukrainian-Pridnestrovian border, the deployment of artillery at firing positions, as well as an unprecedented increase in flights of unmanned aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the territory of the PMR [Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic].” These claims were shared without any evidence. According to the statement, these purported plans represent a direct threat to the “Russian peacekeeping contingent legally deployed in Transnistria,” and Russia will “adequately respond to the impending provocation of the Ukrainian side.” 

It should be noted that both statements referred to the unrecognized Transnistria region as the “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic,” the pro-Russia separatist name for Transnistria. Russian authorities previously referred to the area as Pridnestrov’ye, the Russian word for Transnistria, which tacitly acknowledged it was a part of Moldova, while “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic” implies it is an independent entity. 

On February 22, Putin revoked a 2012 decree that contained a clause stipulating Russia’s commitment to search for ways to settle the Transnistrian conflict “with respect to Moldova’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutral status.” The Kremlin warned that relations between Russia and Moldova are “extremely tense,” accusing the Moldovan government of having an anti-Russian agenda. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov recommended that Moldovan authorities “be cautious” in their assessments of the Transnistrian settlement.

—Victoria Olari, Research Assistant, Moldova

Ukraine prepares for Russian offensive on Vuhledar as Prigozhin accuses Russian command of lying

Ukrainian intelligence reported on the movement of Russian convoys not bearing identification marks headed toward the Chernihiv region. The troops reportedly wore uniforms resembling those of the Ukrainian army. Ukrainian military bloggers also reported that a Russian reconnaissance drone was detected in the Sumy region. Low-res satellite imagery indicates there may be renewed activity at the Zyabrovka airfield in Belarus, located north of Chernihiv, as movement was detected on February 18. In February 2022, before the invasion, Zyabrovka served as the site of joint air drills with Russia. Poland-based Rochan Consulting also reported that S-300 systems facing Chernihiv were deployed last month. 

On February 21, Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, said that Russia intensified its operations earlier this month in the directions of Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia. Skibitsky said Russia is concentrating military efforts on capturing Kupyansk, Lyman, Bakhmut, Marinka, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar. On February 23, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense also reported on heavy fighting near Bakhmut, but said Ukrainian forces have managed to keep a key supply route in the western direction open despite Russia’s attempts at encirclement over the last six weeks. The UK ministry confirmed Vuhledar is under heavy shelling and said there is a “real possibility that Russia is preparing for another offensive in this area.” 

On February 17, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced new commander roles, with Andrey Mordvichev leading the Central Military District (TsVO), Sergey Kuzovlev leading the Southern District (YuVO), Yevgeny Nikiforov leading the Western District (ZVO), and Rustam Muradov maintaining command of the Eastern District (VVO), which is responsible for operations in Vuhledar. Muradov is the commander who ordered the frontal assault on Vuhledar from February 8 to 10, which resulted in the defeat of the 155th Marine Corps of the Russian Navy. On February 20, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu presented epaulets to senior officers at the National Center of Defense Management in Moscow.  

Meanwhile, the internal power struggle between Russian defense officials and Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin continues. In a series of audio clips, he accused the Russian defense ministry of lying about supplying Wagner troops with requested artillery munitions, claiming soldiers received only twenty percent of the artillery ammunition promised to them. Prigozhin urged the ministry to fulfill its promises instead of “lying” to the Russian public. Russian military bloggers defended and amplified Prigozhin’s claims, accusing the defense ministry of failing to support Russia’s most effective forces. 

On February 23, the Russian army shelled Liubotyn in Kharkiv oblast with a Tornado-S multiple-launch rocket system, resulting in damaged buildings. Damage was also reported in Lemishchyne and Morozova Dolyna, also in Kharkiv oblast, due to Russian artillery shelling. In Kupiansk, two people were reportedly buried under rubble after a Russian S-300 missile strike. Observers also reported explosions in Kramatorsk. 

That same day, Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak announced the “preventive expansion of security measures” along the country’s borders with Belarus and the Russian territory of Kaliningrad, where the first fortifications are already underway. 

According to a Reuters report, the European Union will develop and implement a program for the joint purchase of artillery shells for Ukraine. This will enhance coordination and facilitate investment in new production facilities. 

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Prigozhin’s verbal attacks on Russian army leadership shed light on how Russian authorities supported Wagner Group

As previously noted, Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin published multiple audio recordings lashing out at Russian military leadership for not adequately supplying a Wagner Group division with artillery munitions. The audio recordings revealed the model of collaboration between the Wagner Group and Russian Army according to Prigozhin. 

On February 20, in reply to a media inquiry by RT correspondent Konstantin Pridybaylo about insufficient ammunition supplies, Prigozhin said that “there is ammunition in the country” and “the industry is producing as much as needed, even with oversupply,” but “no decisions are made” to supply the Wagner Group. “No one understands where alleged limits are coming from, where procedures to receive [ammunition] are coming from, no one knows the ways one or the other documents are signed,” he added. “Everyone is showing me upwards saying: ‘You know, Yevgeny Viktorovich, you have complicated relationships up there….You need to go, apologize, and obey. Then your fighters will receive ammunition.’”  
 
In another audio recording on February 21, Prigozhin went further, stating “The Chief of General Staff [Valery Gerasimov] and the Minister of Defense [Sergei Shoigu] are handing out commands to the right and left not only to not give ammunition to the Wagner Group, but also to not provide help via air transport….This is direct opposition that is nothing short of an attempt to destroy the Wagner Group. It can be equated to treason.” In another audio recording that day, Prigozhin said that “other divisions are in constant undersupply of ammunition.” He claimed that “a bunch of near-the-war functionaries” are “trying to twist intrigues” by “calling Telegram channels and telling them, ‘Do not publish Prigozhin. Write that he – I don’t know – eats ammunition or sells it to Americans.'” By the end of the day, the Russian Ministry of Defense denied that it was blocking ammunition supply to “voluntary assault squads.” In return, Prigozhin accused the ministry of lying about ammunition supplies to Wagner Group forces fighting near Bahkmut.  
 
The next day, on February 22, Prigozin continued to pressure defense ministry decisionmakers to supply Wagner Group with ammunition by forwarding a graphic image showing dozens of dead men lying on the snowy ground, as well as a screenshot of an ammunition request dated February 17 addressed to Chief of Staff Gerasimov. In an audio recording posted around the same time, Prigozhin stated, “The final signature needs to be made by either Gerasimov or Shoigu. None of them want to make the decision. I’ll explain. The Wagner Group allegedly does not exist. Previously, we received ammunition via some military divisions that are allegedly taking Bakhmut instead of us. But there is no one else and everyone knows about it by now.”  
 
He also mentioned that a call to “give shells to the Wagners” (“Дайте снаряды Вагнерам”) had been “launched on social media.”  Wagner accounts on VKontakte and pro-war Telegram channels amplified variants of the slogan.

The DFRLab also identified a petition on Change.org with the slogan; it was deleted by February 24.

Finally, in an audio recording on February 23, Prigozhin announced, “Ammunition shipment begins…on paper for now, but the most relevant papers are already signed.”

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

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Wagner forces attempt to encircle Bakhmut and cut off vital Ukrainian supply routes

After gaining control over Soledar in mid-January, Wagner Group soldiers are attempting to encircle Bakhmut. The DFRLab confirmed the progression of a bloc of forces that includes Wagner, the People’s Militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic, and Russian armed forces. At the end of January, Wagner shared a photo of its soldiers standing in front of a sign reading “Blahodatne” as evidence they had seized the village of the same name. On February 7, the Russian MoD also stated that it had seized Blahodatne. The small village is strategically located on the key Ukrainian E40 highway, which serves as a supply route to Krasna Hora and Bakhmut. A photo of a burning Russian tank geolocated by OSINT researcher @Neonhandrail suggests that attempts to cut off the supply route have thus far been unsuccessful. 

Meanwhile on the southern flank, Russian armed forces are trying to consolidate their progression towards Ivanivske. Only one division of the Ukrainian army, the 30th Mechanized Brigade, has had to repel a Russian incursion on the road between Bakhmut and Sloviansk.

On Telegram, a post by WarDonbass speculated that Wagner could have gained control over two southern supply routes to Bakhmut. However, there is no evidence to support this claim. Inside the city of Bakhmut, footage released by the Georgian legion of the Ukrainian army indicates that Ukraine is strengthening its defensive positions.

Further south, the DFRLab geolocated footage published by the Telegram channel ColonelCassad, which was then reposted on Wagner’s own Telegram channel. Videos of drone strikes on the northern and eastern part of Marinka indicate a violent escalation on the southern flank. The footage also shows rubble where a hospital once stood. 

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Alleged Russian agent captured as Moscow restarts offensives on the Kreminna-Svatove line

Ukrainian military intelligence announced on February 6 the capture of a Russian agent who allegedly leaked information about Ukrainian military operations in “a strategically important sector of the front.” The suspect was an official in a Ukrainian military unit. He was allegedly recruited by Russia after the start of the invasion.

Elsewhere, the Russian army launched limited offensives on February 7 along the Kreminna-Svatove line. Russian forces have made gains in the Dvorichna area, northwest of Svatove. Units that have been spotted on this front include regular units, special intelligence units, regiments from the 144th and 3rd Motor Rifle Division, a regiment from the 90th Tank Division, and the 76th Airborne Division. On February 9, Ukrainian forces appear to have destroyed a Russian BMPT Terminator armored vehicle near Kreminna, according to a visual report published by the UNIAN Telegram channel. If confirmed, this would be the first documented loss of such a vehicle, which is only available in limited supply. Days earlier, on February 6, Russian pro-government media published footage showing how Russian units in the area used these vehicles in a local counter-offensive in Kreminna.

Russian forces continue to attack towns across Ukraine, with Russian channels reporting missile attacks in Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. On February 9, Ukrainian media reported that drones over Dnipro were downed. 

Ukrainian parliament voted in favor of bills N8360 and N8361-d, which provide an exemption from taxes and duties for drones, thermal imagers, collimators, walkie-talkies, and night vision devices. Yaroslav Zhelezniak, deputy head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Tax and Customs Policy, clarified on his Telegram channel that radios were added to the bills after appeals from volunteer organizations. The adopted bills will remove import restrictions, allowing for the express shipment of some military equipment.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia claims ‘panicked West’ sent tanks to Ukraine

Following the decision from Western allies to provide armored tanks to Ukraine, there has been an increase in Russian narratives opposing the decision. The state-owned news outlet RIA Novosti published an article aimed at ridiculing Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov. The article’s banner photo depicts Reznikov holding a model tank with the accompanying headline, “Germany handed over toy Leopard 2 to Ukraine.” The narrative appears aimed at casting doubt on the efficacy of Germany’s Leopard 2 tanks.

Along with the heightened focus from Russian media on the transfer of tanks, other narratives presented the latest military aid package as a reaction from a panicked West due to the successes of the Russian “special military operation.” The pro-Kremlin journal International Affairs referred to Germany’s decision to send in tanks as capitulation to external pressure and a rash political decision arising from the tensions caused by Russia’s military successes. In addition, Ukraine’s latest round of anti-corruption measures resulted in speculation about the possible resignation or dismissal of Defense Minister Reznikov. Major Kremlin-backed publications, including TASS, have directly followed the developments, highlighting corruption problems in Kyiv. Other narratives have outlined Reznikov’s alleged refusal to resign amid the corruption charges as a result of his purported blackmail capabilities against the top echelons of the Ukrainian military and defense leadership, while also casting into doubt Ukraine’s entire leadership and ability to function as a government.

—Kateryna Halstead, Research Assistant, Bologna, Italy

New Russian maps redraw borders to include eastern Ukraine

The Kremlin-approved media outlet RBC reported on February 8 that Russian bookstores are selling new maps that include Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of Russia. The DFRLab found a version of this map for sale on the website of the Russian publishing company Atlas Print. 

Atlas Print Director Yuri Sukhanov spoke to RBC about how a bill in the Russian Duma “on countering extremist activity” prevented retailers from selling previous maps. The bill, which passed its first reading on December 20, 2022, stipulated that “extremist materials will include cartographic and other documents and images intended for distribution and public demonstration that dispute the territorial integrity of Russia.” The new maps appear to have been printed in response to the bill. According to Sukhanov, “There are large retail chains that are ready to sell only updated maps with the new borders of Russia.”

On September 23, 2022, Russia launched rigged referendums in Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Russian President Vladimir Putin then signed decrees to recognize Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as independent and held a ceremony to incorporate all four oblasts into Russian territory. The newly printed maps do not correspond with the reality on the ground. On November 12, 2022, Ukraine forced Russian troops out of Kherson as it regained control over the area.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Research Fellow, Riga, Latvia

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Shuja Nawaz was honored with the Columbia Journalism school’s 2023 alumni award. He is the founding director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center in Washington, D.C. He now serves as a Distinguished Fellow at the Center.

Mr. Nawaz has worked with leading think tanks on projects dealing with Pakistan and the Middle East. He has also advised or briefed senior government and military officials and parliamentarians in the US, Europe, and Pakistan.

Mr. Nawaz was a newscaster and news and current affairs producer for Pakistan Television from 1967 to 1972 and covered the western front of the 1971 war between Pakistan and India. He has worked for The New York Times, the World Health Organization, and has headed three separate divisions at the International Monetary Fund. He was also a director at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna 1999-2001, while on leave from the IMF.

He is the author of a new book The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood (Penguin Random House, and Liberty Books, Pakistan 2019 and Rowman & Littlefield 2020), and Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press 2008 and 2018).

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Speaking on January 18, Lavrov claimed a coalition of Western countries led by the United States was following in the footsteps of Napoleon and Hitler with the goal of destroying Russia. “They are waging war against our country with the same task: the final solution of the Russian question,” he said in direct reference to Hitler’s infamous “final solution” of the Jewish question.

Lavrov’s Holocaust comparison was met with widespread international criticism. In a strongly worded statement, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said his Russian counterpart’s comments were “entirely misplaced, disrespectful, and trample on the memory of the six million Jewish people, and other victims, who were systematically murdered in the Holocaust. The Russian regime’s manipulation of the truth to justify their illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has reached another unacceptable and despicable low point.”

The Israeli Foreign Ministry branded Lavrov’s remarks “unacceptable,” while French diplomats said the Russian foreign minister’s attempt to compare international opposition to the invasion of Ukraine with the Holocaust was “outrageous and disgraceful.” Meanwhile, UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly called Lavrov’s comments “totally abhorrent” while noting, “Russia is not the victim. Russia is the aggressor.”

In the US, national security spokesperson John Kirby expressed indignation at Lavrov’s attempt to draw parallels between the Nazi genocide and the response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. “How dare he compare anything to the Holocaust, let alone a war that they started,” he told reporters at the White House. “It’s almost so absurd that it’s not worth responding to, other than the truly offensive manner in which he tried to cast us in terms of Hitler and the Holocaust.”

This was not Lavrov’s first flirtation with anti-Semitic historical distortions. During an appearance on Italian TV in spring 2022, Russia’s top diplomat sparked outrage by repeating the notorious anti-Semitic trope that Hitler was Jewish. When asked why Russia insists on calling Ukraine a “Nazi state” despite the fact that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is Jewish, Lavrov replied that Nazi leader Adolf Hitler “also had Jewish blood.”

The fallout from Lavrov’s very public descent into the squalid world of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories was predictably severe. Following a chorus of international condemnation led by Israel, Vladimir Putin was eventually obliged to intervene. In early May, the Russian dictator called the Israeli Prime Minister to personally apologize on behalf of his foreign minister.

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The international backlash over Lavrov’s blunders illustrates the limitations of the propaganda narratives developed by Moscow to justify the invasion of Ukraine. While captive audiences inside Russia have been largely convinced by attempts to blame hostilities on “Ukrainian Nazis” and the “Russophobic West,” these unsubstantiated arguments have proven far less persuasive internationally and have served to further undermine the Kremlin’s dwindling credibility.

Russian attempts to portray Ukrainians as Nazis are nothing new and can be traced back to Soviet wartime propaganda. The tactic has been enthusiastically revived by the Kremlin in recent years to dehumanize Ukrainians and legitimize attempts to extinguish Ukrainian independence. This plays well in modern Russia, where the Putin regime has fostered a cult-like reverence for the Soviet role in World War II that includes the demonizing of all opponents as “fascists.” However, the lack of any actual evidence to support these poisonous allegations has left outside observers deeply skeptical.

As Lavrov himself discovered during last year’s disastrous Italian TV interview, most people living beyond the suffocating confines of the Kremlin propaganda bubble regard the election of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking Jewish President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as convincing proof that Ukraine is anything but a Nazi state. Likewise, the consistent failure of Ukraine’s far right parties to secure more than 2% of the vote in national ballots makes a mockery of Moscow’s entire “Nazi Ukraine” narrative. In the eleven months since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, Russia has yet to identify any of the “Nazis” it claims to be fighting or define exactly what the stated war aim of “de-Nazification” means in practice.

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Lavrov’s lurid allegations of anti-Russian plots suffer from similar problems. While domestic audiences in Russia have been conditioned for decades to view their country as a blameless victim of irrational Western Russophobia, there is a growing consensus in the wider world that the international community has actually been much too slow to react to the mounting threats posed by Putin’s Russia.

Far from pursuing the destruction of Russia, the West responded to Moscow’s wars of aggression in Georgia and Ukraine with a series of misguided resets and endless policies of appeasement. Indeed, it was not until Putin launched the biggest European conflict since World War II last February that Western leaders finally and reluctantly acknowledged the necessity of countering the Kremlin. Even now, as Russia’s invasion approaches the one-year mark, the debate over Western support for Ukraine remains dominated by excessive caution and a debilitating desire to avoid escalation. These are self-evidently not the actions of an international coalition seeking “the final solution to the Russian question,” as Lavrov so absurdly claims.

It is still far too early for Ukraine to declare victory in the information war. Russian disinformation narratives continue to resonate on the vocal fringes of Western society while also appealing to widespread anti-Western sentiment in much of Asia, Africa, and South America. Nevertheless, the wholesale revulsion over Lavrov’s recent Holocaust remarks is a timely reminder of the increasingly unbridgeable gap separating Russia’s alternative reality from the real world.

Almost one year since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, only a handful of fellow pariah states are still prepared to stand with Russia on the global stage as international audiences reject Kremlin claims of phantom fascists and anti-Russian conspiracies. Instead, there is growing recognition that the war in Ukraine is an act of naked imperial aggression that threatens to destabilize the wider world.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine has been built on an unprecedented web of deceit and distortion. As these lies lose their power and the reality of Putin’s genocidal agenda becomes impossible to ignore, a consensus is emerging that the war in Ukraine will only end when Russia is decisively defeated.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 26, 2022

Eight reasons for Ukrainian optimism in 2023

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Ukrainians have experienced an incredibly traumatic year but the country enters 2023 with reason for cautious optimism that Vladimir Putin’s criminal invasion can be decisively defeated, writes Brian Mefford.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Security

Russian forces claim control of strategic Soledar

Tracking narratives

Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize

Frenzy befalls French company accused of feeding Russian forces on New Year’s Eve

Former head of Russian space agency injured in Donetsk, mails shell fragment to French ambassador

Sputnik Lithuania’s former chief editor arrested

International response

New year brings new military aid for Ukraine

Ukrainian envoy to Georgia discusses deteriorating relations between nations

Russian forces claim control of strategic Soledar

Russia said on January 13 that its forces had taken control of the contested city of Soledar. Recent fighting has been concentrated in Soledar and Bakhmut, two cities in the Donetsk region that are strategically important to Ukrainian and Russian forces. Moscow has been trying to take control of the two cities since last summer. Over the past week, Russia has increased its presence on the fronts with the support of Wagner units. Russia wants control of the Soledar-Bakhmut axis to cut supply lines to the Ukrainian armed forces.  

On January 10, Russian sources claimed that Wagner forces had advanced into Soledar. Interestingly, Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied the claim and said the forces were still engaged in fighting. Wagner’s presence was established in a camp near Bakhmut. Soldiers from the Wagner Group and other special forces deployed to Bakhmut after other military units had failed to break through the Ukrainian defense.  

On January 11, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Anna Malyar said that heavy fighting was taking place in Soledar and that Russian forces had replaced the unit operating in the city with fresh troops and increased the number of Wagner soldiers among them. The same day, Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces had taken control of Soledar. The Ukrainian defense ministry denied the allegation. On January 12, Ukrainian sources shared unconfirmed footage of soldiers driving on the main road connecting Bakhmut and Soledar with Sloviansk and Kostyantynivka to as evidence that the area remained under Ukrainian control.  

Elsewhere, on January 11, the Kremlin announced that Valery Gerasimov would replace Sergei Surovikin as commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. The unexpected move could be interpreted as evidence of a struggle for influence in Russian military circles. Surovikin is considered close to Prigozhin’s entourage, which has criticized senior officers recently, including Gerasimov. Some analysts believe that the change signals a possible military escalation from Russia. 

Furthermore, on January 8, Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian offensive the vicinity of Makiyivka and Stelmakhivka. Further north of Lysychansk, on January 11, Ukraine also repelled an attack on the city of Kreminna. In the neighboring Kharkiv region, aerial threats remain high. On the southern front, the city of Kherson and several cities across the Zaporizhzhia region remain targets of Russian attacks.  

Lastly, a new Maxar satellite image from nearby Bakhmut exemplifies the brutality of war on the frontline in Donetsk. The image shows thousands of craters, indicating the intensity of the artillery shelling and exchange of fire between Ukrainian and Russian forces.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize

In December 2022, the Wagner Group organized a hackathon at its recently opened headquarters in St. Petersburg, for students, developers, analysts, and IT professionals. Wagner announced the hackathon on social media earlier that month. Organizers created the promotional website hakaton.wagnercentr.ru, but the website went offline soon after. A December 8 archive of the website, accessed via the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, revealed that the objective of the hackathon was to “create UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] positioning systems using video recognition, searching for waypoints by landmarks in the absence of satellite navigation systems and external control.” Hackathon participants were asked to complete the following tasks: display the position of the UAV on the map at any time during the flight; direct the UAV to a point on the map indicated by the operator; provide a search for landmarks, in case of loss of visual reference points during the flight and returning the UAV to the point of departure, in case of a complete loss of communication with the operator.   

On December 9, Ukrainian programmers noticed that hakaton.wagnercentr.ru was hosted by Amazon Web Services and asked users to report the website to Amazon. Calls to report the channel also spread on Telegram, where the channel Empire Burns asked subscribers to report the website and provided instructions on how to do so. Empire Burns claims hakaton.wagnercentr.ru first went offline on December 9, which tallies with archival posts. However, there is no evidence that reporting the website to Amazon resulted in it being taken offline.   

Snapshots of hakaton.wagnercentr.ru from the Wayback Machine show the website was created in a Bitrix24 online workspace. A snapshot captured on December 13 shows an HTTP 301 status, which redirects visitors to Wagner’s main website, wagnercentr.ru. The Wagner website appears to be geo-restricted for visitors outside Russia. 

On December 23, a Wagner Telegram channel posted about the hackathon, claiming more than 100 people applied. In the end, forty-three people divided into twelve teams attended. The two-person team GrAILab Development won first place, the team SR Data-Iskander won second place, and a team from the company Artistrazh received third place. Notably, one of Artistrazh’s co-founders is Igor Turashev, who is wanted by the FBI for his connection to computer malware that the bureau claims infected “tens of thousands of computers, in both North America and Europe, resulting in financial losses in the tens of millions of dollars.” Artistrazh’s team comprised four people who won 200,000 Russian rubles (USD $3,000). OSINT investigators at Molfar confirmed that the Igor Turashev who works at Artistrazh is the same one wanted by the FBI.  

Wagner said that one of the key objectives of the hackathon was the development of IT projects to protect the interests of the Russian army, adding that the knowledge gained during the hackathon could already be applied to clear mines. Wagner said it had also invited some participants to collaborate further. The Wagner Center opened in St. Petersburg in early November 2022; the center’s mission is “to provide a comfortable environment for generating new ideas in order to improve Russia’s defense capability, including information.”

– Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Frenzy befalls French company accused of feeding Russian forces on New Year’s Eve

A VKontakte post showing baskets of canned goods produced by the French company Bonduelle being distributed to Russian soldiers on New Year’s Eve has sparked a media frenzy in France. The post alleges that Bonduelle sent Russian soldiers a congratulatory package, telling them to “come back with a win.” The post quotes Ekaterina Eliseeva, the head of Bonduelle’s EurAsia markets. According to a 2019 Forbes article, Eliseeva studied interpretation at an Russian state security academy.  

Bonduelle has issued several statements denying the social media post and calling it fake. However, Bonduelle does maintain operations in Russia “to ensure that the population has access to essential foodstuff.”  

French broadcaster TV 5 Monde discovered that Bonduelle’s Russia division participated in a non-profit effort called Basket of Kindness, sponsored by the Fund of Presidential Grants of Russia. Food and supplies were gathered by food banks to be delivered to vulnerable segments of the population. However, during the collection drive, Dmitry Zharikov, governor of the Russian city of Podolsk, posted on Telegram that the collections would also serve military families.   

The story was shared on national television in France and across several international outlets. The Ukrainian embassy in France criticized Bonduelle for continuing to operate in Russia, claiming it was “making profits in a terrorist country which kills Ukrainians.”

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Former head of Russian space agency injured in Donetsk, mails shell fragment to French ambassador

Dmitry Rogozin, former head of the Russian space agency Roscosmos, said he was wounded in Ukrainian shelling on December 21, 2022, at the Shesh hotel in Donetsk while “celebrating his birthday.” In response, Rogozin sent a letter to Pierre Lévy, the French ambassador to Russia, with a fragment of the shell.   

In the letter, Rogozin accused the French government of “betraying [Charles] De Gaulle’s cause and becoming a bloodthirsty state in Europe.” The shell fragment was extracted from Rogozin’s spine during surgery and allegedly came from a French CAESAR howitzer. Rogozin requested the fragment be sent to French President Emmanuel Macron. His message was relayed by Russian news agencies, and on Telegram by pro-Russian and French-speaking conspiracy channels.  

At the time of the attack, Rogozin was accompanied by two members of his voluntary unit, “Tsar’s wolves,” who were killed in the attack, according to reporting from RT, RIA Novosti, and others.  

– Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Sputnik Lithuania’s former chief editor arrested

On January 6, Marat Kasem, the former chief editor of Sputnik Lithuania, was arrested in Riga, Latvia, on suspicion of “providing economic resources” to a Kremlin propaganda resource under EU sanctions.  

The following day, pro-Kremlin journalists held a small demonstration in support of Kasem in front of the Latvian embassy in Moscow. Russian journalist Dmitry Kiselyov and politician Maria Butina attended the event. 

The demonstration was filmed by Sputnik and amplified with the Russian hashtag  #свободуМаратуКасему (#freedomForMaratKasem) on Telegram channels operating in the Baltic states, including the pro-Russian BALTNEWS, Своих не бросаем! | Свободная Балтика!, and on Butina’s personal channel. The news of Kasem’s arrest also reached the Russian Duma’s Telegram channel, which re-shared Butina’s post. 

– Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

New year brings new military aid for Ukraine

International efforts in support of Ukraine are continuing in full force in 2023. On January 4, Norway announced it had sent Ukraine another 10,000 155mm artillery shells. These shells can be used in several types of artillery units, including the M109 self-propelled howitzer. On January 5, Germany confirmed it would provide Ukraine with Marder fighting vehicles and a Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery. German news outlet Spiegel also reported that talks are underway to supply Ukraine with additional Gepard anti-aircraft guns and ammunition. 

In addition, UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly said the British government would supply Ukraine with military equipment capable of delivering a “decisive” strike from a distance. At the end of 2022, UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace discussed the possibility of transferring Storm Shadow cruise missiles, with a range of up to 250 kilometers. Finland also reported that it is preparing its twelfth package of military assistance to Ukraine.  

US aid to Ukraine is also being reaffirmed with a $2.85 billion package on top of weapon deliveries. Additionally, the US plans to deliver fourteen vehicles equipped with anti-drone systems as part of its security assistance package. The company L3Harris is part of the Pentagon’s contract to develop anti-drone kits. This equipment would help protect Ukrainian civil infrastructure, which has been a frequent Russian target since October 2022.  

On January 6, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would supply Ukraine with units of the light AMX-10RC armored reconnaissance vehicle. These vehicles were produced in 1970 and have been used in Afghanistan, the Gulf War, Mali, Kosovo, and Ivory Coast. The French defense ministry also announced that the country was to deliver twenty units of ACMAT Bastion armored personnel carriers. 

On January 11, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Presidents Andrzej Duda of Poland and Gitanas Nauseda of Lithuania in Lviv. During the visit, Duda announced that Poland would deliver fourteen units of the much-awaited German Leopard combat tanks, and Nauseda announced that his country would provide Ukraine with Zenit anti-aircraft systems. 

Meanwhile, the largest manufacturer of containers for the transport of liquified natural gas has ceased operations in Russia. French engineering group Gaztransport & Technigaz (GTT) said it ended operations in Russia after reviewing the latest European sanctions package, which included a ban on engineering services for Russian firms. The group said its contract with Russian shipbuilding company Zvezda to supply fifteen icebreakers to transport liquefied natural gas was suspended effective January 8.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Ukrainian envoy to Georgia discusses deteriorating relations between nations

On January 9, Andrii Kasianov, the Ukrainian Chargé d’Affaires in Georgia, published an article discussing the deteriorating relationship between the two countries. The article stated that the top issues affecting relations were military aid to Ukraine, bilateral sanctions against Russia, visa policies for fleeing Russians, and the legal rights of Mikheil Saakashvili, the imprisoned third president of Georgia, who is also a Ukrainian citizen. 

Kasianov noted that Tbilisi declined Kyiv’s request for military help, specifically for BUK missile systems, which were given to Georgia by Ukraine during Russia’s 2008 invasion. The diplomat said that the weapons request also included Javelin anti-tank systems supplied to Georgia by the United States.  

“Despite the fact that the Georgian government categorically refused to provide military aid, Ukraine opposes the use of this issue in internal political disputes and rejects any accusations of attempts to draw Georgia into a war with the Russian Federation,” Kasianov said. 

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Georgian Dream-led government has accused Ukraine, the US, and the EU of attempting to drag Georgia into a war with Russia.  

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

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The scale of the miscalculations that led to the invasion was laid bare in a recent New York Times article entitled: “How Putin’s war in Ukraine became a catastrophe for Russia.” This lengthy report featured details of the often wildly unrealistic objectives set for the invading Russian army, with specific units expected to advance hundreds of kilometers through hostile country and occupy towns deep inside Ukraine within a matter of days.

The orders handed out on the eve of the invasion confirm that Russian military planners dangerously underestimated Ukraine’s ability to fight back. At first glance, this makes little sense. By early 2022, Ukraine had already been at war with Russia for eight years and boasted a battle-hardened army of more than 200,000 personnel along with hundreds of thousands of highly motivated reservists with combat experience. This force was also relatively well-armed and led by an emerging generation of generals who had absorbed the lessons of the simmering conflict in eastern Ukraine.

And yet we now know from leaked and captured documents that Russia’s military and political elite anticipated only minimal organized resistance in Ukraine. Rather than preparing for a major war, they genuinely believed a large proportion of the Ukrainian population would greet them as liberators. Strikingly, they also doubted whether the country’s military had the stomach for a serious fight.

These absurd expectations were shaped by decades of misleading Kremlin propaganda. For generations, the Russian state has denied Ukraine’s right to exist and questioned the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity. Putin has been a particularly prominent advocate of such arguments and has frequently claimed that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”). In the years between the 2014 occupation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of February 2022, he repeatedly branded Ukraine an artificial country that had been unjustly separated from its rightful place as part of historical Russia.

Russian state propagandists have also long sought to discredit Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition toward Euro-Atlantic integration by dismissing it as a foreign plot. Rather than acknowledge the Ukrainian people’s right to determine their own future, the Kremlin has consistently insisted that the vast majority of Ukrainians see themselves as Russians but are victims of an extremist fringe acting in the interests of outsiders.   

Such delusions seem to have penetrated the upper echelons of the Russian leadership. At no point in the lead-up to the war does anyone in the Kremlin appear to have taken the idea of Ukrainian agency seriously. Instead, they assumed the 2022 invasion would be a repeat of the spring 2014 takeover of Crimea, which saw Russian troops rapidly seize the Ukrainian peninsula amid post-revolutionary political paralysis in Kyiv. This was to prove an extremely costly mistake.

From the very first hours of the invasion, Russian troops ran into fierce Ukrainian resistance and began suffering heavy losses. Just over a month after the first columns of Russian tanks had crossed the border, Putin was forced to admit defeat in the Battle of Kyiv and withdraw from northern Ukraine entirely. His army has yet to regain the initiative, and has since retreated from Kharkiv region in eastern Ukraine and Right Bank Kherson in the south.

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As well as fatally underestimating Ukraine’s military capabilities, Putin also wildly overestimated the strength of his own army. Like many senior figures in Moscow, he took Russia’s military superpower status for granted and did not seriously consider the possibility of defeat at the hands of a minor state such as Ukraine. This confidence was shared by most Russians, who have traditionally embraced notions of their country’s military might with the zeal of religious dogma.

Despite a series of embarrassing setbacks in Ukraine, large numbers of Russians remain in denial and cling to the hope that Russia has yet to deploy its full military potential. Putin himself has fueled such wishful thinking by declaring that he has “not yet begun” to wage a real war in Ukraine. However, this bravado cannot disguise the significantly less imposing reality of a depleted and demoralized Russian army that is increasingly dependent on mobilized troops, outdated armor, and Iranian drones.

Putin has recently adopted a somewhat strange war strategy that appears primarily designed to appease domestic audiences. Since early October, Russia has been focusing on the mass aerial bombardment of Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. This air war is hugely expensive and offers minimal military advantages. However, it is psychologically effective in convincing Russian audiences that their cause is not yet lost.

The Kremlin’s carefully curated propaganda machine works hard to amplify the impact of these airstrikes while exaggerating the hardships experienced by the Ukrainian civilian population. Likewise, state media also trumpets every minor gain achieved by Russian troops on the ground in eastern Ukraine, even when these advances are measured in meters. This creates the impression that Russia has stopped trying to win the war and is merely attempting to demonstrate that it is not losing.

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The war is far from over, of course. In September 2022, Putin demonstrated his resolve by ordering Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Many international observers expect him to mobilize a further 500,000 troops in the coming weeks. This massive increase in Russian military manpower is already reducing Ukraine’s ability to advance and could allow Moscow to regain the initiative in the months ahead.

At the same time, the damage to Russia’s reputation has already been done. Russia’s global standing has always relied heavily on international perceptions of the country as a major military power. This myth has now been ruthlessly exposed on the battlefields of Ukraine. Countries which had earlier felt obliged to remain on good terms with Russia now understandably feel they have little to fear, while those who previously saw Moscow as a powerful partner have been forced to rethink this relationship.

Domestically, the consequences may be even more critical for Putin. Belief in Russia’s military strength served as the foundation stone of the country’s modern national identity. It was a source of patriotic pride that helped justify the often harsh living conditions and limited individual rights that all Russian citizens are forced to accept. This entire facade is now in danger of collapsing.

The failing invasion of Ukraine is not only exposing the relative weakness of the Russian military; it is revealing the rot at the heart of the Russian state and the emptiness of the Kremlin’s imperial posturing. This raises a number of grave questions about the future of the Russian Federation that Putin is unable to answer. For the past 22 years, he has succeeded in creating a parallel propaganda universe, but reality is now rapidly closing in. 

Victor Tregubov is a Ukrainian political activist and commentator.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 26, 2022

Eight reasons for Ukrainian optimism in 2023

By Brian Mefford

Ukrainians have experienced an incredibly traumatic year but the country enters 2023 with reason for cautious optimism that Vladimir Putin’s criminal invasion can be decisively defeated, writes Brian Mefford.

European Union NATO

UkraineAlert Dec 25, 2022

Bakhmut: Fortress of freedom

By Andriy Yermak

Western support for Ukraine must remain strong in 2023 to prevent a Russian victory that would fuel a global authoritarian revival, warns the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President, Andriy Yermak.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Dec 22, 2022

Russia’s defeat is the top global priority for 2023

By Oleksii Reznikov

Ensuring that the Russian invasion of Ukraine ends in defeat is vital for the international security system and must be the strategic priority for 2023, writes Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin’s faltering Ukraine invasion exposes limits of Russian propaganda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Russia admits losses in Makiivka attack, retaliates by striking empty Ukrainian ice rink

Russian military bloggers criticize Putin’s Orthodox Christmas ceasefire announcement

Russia admits losses in Makiivka attack, retaliates by striking empty Ukrainian ice rink

Ukraine’s first days of 2023 saw Russian shelling of civilian infrastructure and Ukrainian precision attacks on Russian positions. 

Just prior to the new year, Russian forces launched sixty-nine cruise missiles and twenty-three drones, of which Ukrainian air defenses reportedly shot down fifty-four missiles and at least eleven drones. The attacks primarily struck infrastructure facilities in Lviv, Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Donetsk, causing widespread disruptions to energy, heating, and water supplies. Russian forces also hit targets across Ukraine, including Sumy, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia. The Ukrainian Air Force Command claimed that Russian forces launched sixteen Shahed-131 and -136 drones on the night of December 29. 

On New Year’s Eve, Ukraine’s army attacked Russian army headquarters in the occupied village of Makiivka, Donetsk. In a rare admission of casualties, the Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed eighty-nine soldiers were killed in the strike. Ukrainian armed forces, in contrast, reported 400 killed and 300 wounded. Ukrainian forces also shared a graphic video showing the aftermath of the shelling. On the evening of January 1, pro-Russia military blogger Vladimir Romanov reported that Ukraine had struck nineteen vocational schools, which commanders had “compactly populated” with recruits mobilized from the Saratov region. Romanov claimed 200 soldiers died in the attacks. On January 4, the Russian defense ministry stated, “It is already obvious that the main reason for what happened was the inclusion and massive use, contrary to the ban, by personnel of mobile phones in the reach of enemy weapons.” British intelligence assessed that someone placed ammunition inside the building, the detonation of which led to destruction and deaths.

In the Donetsk region, the Russian military is fighting for the ground between Bakhmut and Soledar, with Russian forces positioned to possibly encircle Soledar. A Wagner Group unit remains heavily active in the fighting across the zone around the Bakhmut frontline. To the northeast of the city, their forces advanced along the Svitlodarsk-Sloviansk highway and reached the southern outskirts of Pidhorodne. Ukrainian officers and British military intelligence stated that Russia is no longer hitting Bakhmut with the same ferocity as it had during the previous month, instead repositioning armored vehicles and artillery fire toward the nearby town of Soledar. Meanwhile in Bakhmut, Russian sources claim that units including Wagner detachments are advancing simultaneously in several directions. 

To curb the backlash after Ukraine’s strike on Makiivka, Russia claimed it had killed “many” soldiers and foreign mercenaries “from Ukraine and NATO” in a January 3 strike on an ice rink in Druzhkivka, Donetsk. A French journalist witnessed the attack during a live report. The Ice Hockey Federation of Ukraine later stated the facility “was completely empty.”

On January 2, the village of Vyazovoe in the Belgorod region of Russia came under fire. On January 4, the Ukrainian army targeted the military commandant’s building in Vasylivka, Zaporizhzhia, used by the Russian armed forces to house personnel. Five people were killed and fifteen injured, according to Yevgeny Balitsky, acting governor of the occupied territory. 

Against this background, Russia is trying to fill the losses in its arsenal. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia can produce about thirty Kh-101 cruise missiles and about twenty Kalibr missiles per month. Russian stockpiles of these missiles are extremely depleted, so in subsequent strikes, the Russian military may try to combine attacks using precision cruise missiles, S-300 anti-aircraft missiles against ground targets, Iranian kamikaze drones, and Soviet Kh-22 missiles. According to some estimates, Russian forces have about 160 Kh-22 missiles, but their range is only 350 kilometers. Russia has already used about 660 of the 1,750 Shahed drones ordered from Iran, but Iran is expected to send another batch of 250 to 300 units, along with improved drones and ballistic missiles.

According to Ukrainian military intelligence, six sabotage actions against Russian railways caused logistical problems in the first four days of 2023. In 2022, there were about forty railway sabotage actions reported in Russia. 

On January 4, a fire was reported in a tent camp for mobilized units in the Siberian region of Tomsk. The Russian army uses tents to accommodate mobilized soldiers in an area of Siberia where, at this time of year, the temperature is between -10 and -20 degrees Celsius. Many units use heaters that can be dangerous and unstable in such conditions.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian military bloggers criticize Putin’s Orthodox Christmas ceasefire announcement

On January 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for a thirty-six-hour ceasefire in Ukraine to observe Orthodox Christmas. Kyiv rejected Putin’s proposal, stating that Moscow’s aim was to stop Ukrainian advances in the Donbas. Putin’s ceasefire announcement was met with criticism from Russian military bloggers, with some even calling the proposal “madness.”

The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Rybar called Putin’s suggestion “a beautiful political gesture” that “nobody cares about” and said that Russians want to rapidly end the war “with at least some logical conclusion.” Another military blog, Военный Осведомитель (“Military Informant”), called the decision “madness,” adding that Ukraine would not accept the offer.

Boris Rozhin, a pro-war military blogger, accused Russian officials of not learning any lessons from eight years of Minsk agreements “that nobody was fulfilling.” Rozhin added, “The decision is obviously unlikely to be very popular, even despite the efforts of official propaganda on this matter.” The post was amplified by multiple pro-war Telegram channels.

Igor Girkin, a former Russian Colonel turned ultranationalist, sarcastically stated on his Telegram channel that Putin took “a bold and decisive step towards defeat and surrender.” He added, “The Hague applauds and begins to prepare the camera.”

Criticism from pro-war military bloggers has increased in recent months in both scale and boldness. Military bloggers slammed the Kremlin for military failures, incompetence, and for rejoining the Ukraine grain deal.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian military bloggers criticize Putin’s Orthodox Christmas ceasefire announcement appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This symbolism matters. In modern Russia, the head of state’s New Year speech is an important tradition that seeks to set the tone for the coming year. On this occasion, the mood Putin sought to convey was of a country facing the prospect of a long and difficult war. After months spent downplaying the invasion of Ukraine as a “Special Military Operation,” he was now belatedly acknowledging the severity of the situation.

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Back on December 31, 2021, Putin had been far more upbeat. “We are united in the hope that changes for the better lie ahead,” he said. “As we ring in the New Year, we hope that it will bring new opportunities for us. Of course, we hope luck will be on our side, but we understand that making our dreams reality primarily depends on us.” The final line of his address was downright soppy: “May love fill every heart and inspire us all to achieve our goals and scale the greatest heights. For the sake of our loved ones and for the sake of our only country, our great Motherland.”

Could this really have been the same Vladimir Putin who was already planning to unleash a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and plunge Europe into its largest conflict since World War II? In fact, despite the massive Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s borders in late 2021 and Moscow’s visibly worsening relations with the West, neither of these important developments was mentioned at all.

What a difference a year makes. In a nine-minute New Year speech that was reportedly the longest of his 22-year reign, Putin marked the arrival of 2023 by lashing out at the Western world and warning that the fate of Russia was at stake. “The West lied about peace,” Putin declared. “It was preparing for aggression, and now they are cynically using Ukraine and its people to weaken and split Russia. We have never allowed this, and never will allow anybody to do this to us.”

Domestic opponents were also targeted. In an apparent reference to the large numbers of military-age Russian men who chose to flee the country in the second half of 2022 rather than join the invasion, he noted that the past twelve months had “put a lot of things in their place, clearly separating courage and heroism from betrayal and cowardice.”

The speech concluded on a defiant and ominous note, with Putin indicating that Russia’s survival as an independent state was now under threat. “Together, we will overcome all difficulties and preserve our country’s greatness and independence,” he said. “We will triumph, for our families and for Russia.”

There was no frivolous talk of love, trust, and hope as in December 2021. No dreamy wishes, no hopeful expectations. This time, Putin was sounding the alarm bell. Naturally, the West was at fault and the Russian dictator himself bore absolutely no responsibility for the mess his country currently finds itself in.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Putin seems to believe, or at least wants the Russian public to believe, that Russia is tottering on the edge of a precipice with its very existence as a coherent state now in danger. In his address, he spoke several times of the need to defend and preserve Russia’s independence. This was new and noteworthy.

For many years, Putin has consistently expressed his commitment to maintaining Russia’s Great Power status and its prominent role in the international arena. He has frequently accused the West of wanting to subvert Russia. But fear of losing independence was a problem for Ukrainians, Balts, and Russia’s other neighbors. It was not something for Russians to worry about.

Can Putin be serious? Of course, he may simply be trying to terrify his domestic audience and thereby prepare the Russian public for further sacrifices in the futile and unwinnable war against Ukraine. Alternatively, he and his colleagues in the Kremlin may really sense that, their publicly expressed bravado notwithstanding, the writing is on the wall for Russia.

More than ten months since the invasion of Ukraine began, very few analysts still see a clear path to victory for Russia. On the contrary, there is broad agreement that Putin’s options are narrowing as his military fortunes decline. Russia has already been noticeably weakened by the failing invasion. Defeat in Ukraine could lead to the break-up of the Russian Federation itself, or turn the country into a vassal state of China or the West.

Putin’s speech was an unambiguous attempt to mobilize Russian society and place the whole country on a war footing. It is not yet clear whether this was successful. One thing is for sure: if the coming year turns out to be anything like 2022 for Russia, there is little chance that Putin will still be around to deliver another New Year address on December 31, 2023.

Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 26, 2022

Eight reasons for Ukrainian optimism in 2023

By Brian Mefford

Ukrainians have experienced an incredibly traumatic year but the country enters 2023 with reason for cautious optimism that Vladimir Putin’s criminal invasion can be decisively defeated, writes Brian Mefford.

European Union NATO

UkraineAlert Dec 25, 2022

Bakhmut: Fortress of freedom

By Andriy Yermak

Western support for Ukraine must remain strong in 2023 to prevent a Russian victory that would fuel a global authoritarian revival, warns the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President, Andriy Yermak.

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UkraineAlert Dec 22, 2022

Russia’s defeat is the top global priority for 2023

By Oleksii Reznikov

Ensuring that the Russian invasion of Ukraine ends in defeat is vital for the international security system and must be the strategic priority for 2023, writes Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin is preparing for a long war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Such thinking can be traced back to Russia, which has long promoted the idea of modern Ukraine as an artificial state with a large ethnic Russian minority in need of Moscow’s protection. For years, Vladimir Putin denied Ukraine’s right to statehood while insisting Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). He openly accused Ukrainians of occupying historically Russian lands and declared Ukraine to be “an inalienable part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

These distorted perceptions of Ukraine’s history and national character meant that few expected the country to survive against the full might of the Russian military. On the eve of this year’s invasion, there was general agreement in Moscow and most Western capitals that Ukraine would be defeated within a matter of days. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not seen as a credible wartime leader and was widely expected to abandon Kyiv. Likewise, the military prowess of the Ukrainian army and fighting spirit of the Ukrainian nation were also underestimated.

Inside the Kremlin, it appears that Putin’s decision to invade was influenced by a combination of faulty intelligence and over-consumption of his own anti-Ukrainian propaganda. The Russian dictator seems to have genuinely believed myths about an oppressed pro-Russian minority in Ukraine who would welcome his invasion and rise up in support of the advancing Russian army. Rarely in international affairs has anyone ever been so mistaken.

In fact, no Ukrainian region welcomed Putin’s invading army. While instances of collaboration have been recorded throughout the occupied regions of southern and eastern Ukraine, these have proved to be the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, the number of people prepared to collaborate has been dwarfed by the sheer scale of Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian occupation. Russian troops who were told they would be treated as liberators have been shocked and distressed to find themselves acting as occupiers in hostile territory. Meanwhile, Ukrainians from all regions have been brought together by the common cause of defeating Russia. An invasion that was meant to extinguish Ukrainian statehood has inadvertently united the country.

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Ukraine’s nation-building journey did not begin overnight with the advent of this year’s Russian invasion, of course. A modern Ukrainian national identity has been gradually evolving throughout the three decades following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Key milestones in this journey include the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, and the shock waves caused by the subsequent Russian invasions of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, the significance of the changes that have taken place within Ukrainian society since February 24 cannot be overstated. Crucially, attitudes toward key issues of national identity and foreign policy have become aligned throughout the country.

The biggest changes have taken place among Russian-speaking Ukrainians living in regions of southern and eastern Ukraine that have suffered most from Russian aggression. It is one of the bitter ironies of the invasion that the devastation inflicted by Putin’s troops has fallen disproportionately on the regions of Ukraine that Moscow claims to be protecting. The Russian army has reduced dozens of towns and cities throughout southern and eastern Ukraine to rubble and killed thousands of civilians. Millions more have been subjected to a brutal occupation regime marked by executions, abductions, terror tactics, and forced deportations.

Until 2022, these Ukrainian regions had traditionally been more sympathetic to the Soviet past and tended to favor pro-Russian politicians. Many openly embraced Soviet myths of Russians and Ukrainians as “brotherly peoples.” However, the horrors of the invasion have forced a radical rethink and led to the widespread rejection of Russia.

The rift caused by the current invasion has moved beyond far politics. Following the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, most Ukrainians expressed negative views of Russia’s leadership while remaining largely positive toward the Russian people. This is no longer the case. Ukrainians have noted that the vast majority of ordinary Russians appear to support the war or at least refrain from criticizing it. Millions of Ukrainians with Russian relatives have experienced this phenomenon for themselves in painful telephone conversations.

As a consequence, most Ukrainians no longer draw any meaningful distinction between the Russian state and the Russian people. An August 2022 poll conducted by Ukraine’s Rating Agency found that only 3% of Ukrainians held positive views of Russians while 81% regarded Russians negatively. This negative rating was almost double the 41% recorded just four months earlier. Ukrainian antipathy towards Russians will only deepen as the war takes a greater toll in civilian lives, military casualties, and physical destruction.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Ukraine’s fundamental break with Russia has impacted every aspect of the country’s social, cultural, and religious life. The Russian language is now noticeably in decline among Ukrainians because it is negatively viewed as the language of military aggression. Many Ukrainians who grew up predominantly speaking Russian are becoming bilingual or switching to speaking Ukrainian.

There is growing public support across the country for policies of de-Russification. Almost three-quarters of Ukrainians (73%) back the idea of renaming streets and public places commemorating Russian historical figures and events, including two-thirds of respondents in eastern Ukraine. By weaponizing Russian history and using it to justify the invasion of Ukraine, Putin has convinced millions of previously sympathetic Ukrainians to view symbols of the Russian imperial past as part of the Kremlin’s ongoing attack on Ukrainian statehood.

Support for the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine has also plummeted, with recent polling indicating that only 4% of Ukrainians currently identify as adherents. This is hardly surprising, given the role of the Russian Orthodox Church as one of the principal cheerleaders of Putin’s invasion. Recent searches of Russian Orthodox Church premises in Ukraine have netted an array of Russian passports, imperial symbols, and literature denying the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Converging Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia are immediately apparent in relation to the peace process and foreign policy. A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey conducted in July 2022 found almost no difference of opinion between Ukrainians who identified as Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking on the issue of a potential land-for-peace deal to end the war, with 85% of Russian speakers opposed compared to 90% of Ukrainian speakers. Likewise, there was no longer any evidence of a significant regional split, with 83% in eastern Ukraine and 85% in the south opposing any territorial compromises with the Kremlin.

The same shift toward greater national consensus is evident on foreign policy matters. Regional differences over the country’s future geopolitical direction were long seen as the most obvious indication of a divided Ukraine. However, since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, successive surveys have found that clear majorities in all regions of Ukraine now support Ukrainian membership of NATO and the European Union. Meanwhile, enthusiasm for deeper integration with Russia or membership of the Moscow-led Eurasian Union has evaporated.

By invading Ukraine, Putin hoped to reverse the verdict of 1991 and bring Ukrainian independence to an end. Instead, Russia’s attack has backfired disastrously. The full-scale invasion which began on February 24 has served to accelerate Ukraine’s nation-building progress and unite the country in ways that would have been difficult to image just one year ago. The trauma and sacrifices of the past ten months mean that these changes are in all likelihood irreversible and will continue to shape Ukraine’s development for decades to come as the country strengthens its sovereignty and moves further away from Russia.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 10, 2022

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The war is still far from over, but Ukraine’s victory in the Battle of Kherson may eventually come to be seen as one of the key turning points in the defeat of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

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UkraineAlert Dec 19, 2022

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Vladimir Putin hoped his invasion of Ukraine would result in a quick and historic victory. Instead, he ends 2022 with Russia’s reputation as a military superpower in tatters. Why has the invasion of Ukraine gone so badly wrong?

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post 2022 REVIEW: Russia’s invasion has united Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Supporters of a land-for-peace deal tend to portray themselves as foreign policy realists but the policies they promote amount to an unsustainable partition of Ukraine that would almost certainly lead to more war. Such concessions would also risk empowering Putin’s vision of a return to the eighteenth and nineteenth century diplomacy of Great Power imperialism.

A brief look at the history of Russia’s imperial expansion in Ukraine and the surrounding neighborhood is enough to demonstrate that offering the Kremlin land in exchange for peace is unlikely to work. For hundreds of years, Russia has expanded its territory by waging wars to weaken without necessarily overwhelming or annexing its neighbors. Slowly but surely, these neighbors would be reduced to vassal status or incorporated entirely into the empire.

The eighteenth century Partition of Poland in particular should give pause to those currently advocating a twenty-first century partition of Ukraine. This gradual destruction of the Polish state was achieved in partnership with a number of leading European powers and allowed Russia to significantly expand its presence in Europe.

The Russian Empire’s conquest of Ukraine followed a similar pattern. The territories of modern-day Ukraine were gradually seized from Poland and the Ottoman Empire over a period of many decades. The bulk of Ukrainian lands were annexed between the 1650s and 1790s, but it was not until 1945 that all of today’s Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin makes no secret of the fact that he sees the current invasion of Ukraine as a modern continuation of the wars of imperial expansion waged by Russian rulers Peter the Great and Catherine the Great hundreds of years ago. Indeed, he appears to relish such comparisons. The Kremlin has made this link explicit by resurrecting the Czarist-era name of “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”) for the territories of Ukraine it seeks to incorporate into the Russian Federation.

When he launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Putin’s ultimate objective was to return the whole of Ukraine to the Russian sphere of influence. However, that does not mean that anything less would be considered a defeat. Indeed, the kind of peace plans currently being proposed by those championing concessions to the Kremlin would be regarded as anything but defeat in Moscow. If Russia is allowed to legitimize its control over even a small part of Ukraine’s sovereign territory, this would be interpreted as a major victory and seen as a green light to push further.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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A compromise peace that ceded land to Russia would vindicate Putin’s policies of imperial aggression in the eyes of the Russian public and among international audiences. It would place Russia in a strong position to plot its next invasion while condemning an entire generation of Ukrainians to live either under Russian occupation or in the shadow of war.

Nor would other countries be safe. If Putin is able to achieve his imperial goals in Ukraine, there is every reason to assume he would then proceed with new campaigns of conquest elsewhere against nations in Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, and Central Asia that were formerly part of the Russian and Soviet empires. A peace deal that allows Putin to position himself as the heir to Peter the Great will certainly not discourage him from such ambitions.

Clearly, all efforts to end the war in Ukraine are welcome. However, talk of compromising with the Kremlin is dangerous because it risks validating Putin’s imperial delusions while encouraging Moscow to believe Western resolve may be faltering. At this critical stage in the war, Ukraine’s international partners must not pressure the country to accept peace on Russian terms. Instead, they should continue to make clear that the decision to enter into negotiations can only be made in Kyiv.

Rather than fueling speculation over possible concessions, Western commentators and policymakers should focus on making sure Ukraine is supplied with all the weapons it needs to defend its territory. A sufficiently armed Ukraine with the unwavering support of a formidable international coalition will be able to negotiate on its own terms from a position of strength. This is the only route to a settlement that will be truly sustainable. In order to secure peace in Europe, Putin must be decisively defeated. Without such a defeat, the centuries-long pattern of malign Russian imperial influence will continue and other European countries will face the fate of Ukraine.

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 10, 2022

Battle of Kherson: Russian retreat confirms Putin is losing the war

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

The war is still far from over, but Ukraine’s victory in the Battle of Kherson may eventually come to be seen as one of the key turning points in the defeat of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

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UkraineAlert Dec 13, 2022

Vladimir Putin: 2022 Loser of the Year

By Peter Dickinson

Russian leader Vladimir Putin is the biggest loser of 2022. His disastrous decision to invade Ukraine has left Russia internationally isolated and shattered the country’s reputation as a military superpower.

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UkraineAlert Oct 17, 2022

Putin’s blackout blitz: Russia aims to freeze Ukrainians into surrender

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Russia is seeking to plunge Ukraine into darkness ahead of the winter heating season by destroying the country’s energy infrastructure. Ukraine’s partners must step in to make sure Ukrainians are not frozen into surrender.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post The partition of Ukraine would only encourage Putin’s imperial ambitions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the run-up to the February 2022 invasion, Moscow sought to frame the coming offensive as a rational response to decades of NATO expansion into regions of Central and Eastern Europe formerly dominated by Russia. Kremlin officials declared that Russia felt threatened by NATO and demanded far-reaching security guarantees from the West. These protestations of innocence have continued since the invasion began, with Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials claiming that the growing NATO presence in their neighborhood left Russia with no choice but to respond militarily.

The NATO expansion narrative has been widely embraced by self-styled foreign policy realists and Western apologists for the Putin regime, who have used it to argue that the United States and other NATO members must accept their share of the blame for the carnage in Ukraine. They typically claim that Western encroachment into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence was unnecessarily provocative and inevitably led to a violent reaction.

This argument is superficially persuasive but does not stand up to serious scrutiny. Its most obvious flaw is the assumption that NATO poses any kind of security threat to Russia itself. Far from being a plot to encircle Russia, NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement was driven by defensive considerations on the part of new member states in Central and Eastern Europe, who scrambled voluntarily to join the military alliance in order to protect themselves from the imperial ambitions of a resurgent Russia. In other words, the key factor behind the expansion of NATO was fear of renewed Russian aggression among countries that had only recently gained independence from the Kremlin. Their membership bids required no prompting from Washington, London, or Berlin.

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Opponents of NATO enlargement tend to assume the alliance seeks some kind of military confrontation with Russia. However, this is not supported by the facts, to put it mildly. Indeed, beyond the dark fantasies of the Kremlin propaganda bubble, the entire notion of a NATO attack on Russia is widely recognized as absurd.

Since 1991, NATO officials have sought to build trust with Moscow and have created numerous bodies to promote bilateral dialogue. In the early 2000s, Putin himself even expressed an interest in exploring possible Russian membership. Until this year’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the alliance had adopted a highly conservative approach toward the deployment of troops and armor in new member states located closer to Russia, and had made significant efforts to maintain transparency. These are not the actions of an army preparing to attack.

The ultimate proof that NATO poses no military threat to Russia can be found in Putin’s own actions. During summer 2022, Finland announced its decision to end decades of neutrality and join the military alliance. With a shared border of over 1000 kilometers, news of Finnish NATO membership should have sparked a major security crisis in Russia and led to a rapid military build-up to counter this emerging threat. Instead, Putin actually withdrew most Russian troops from the Finnish border zone and redeployed them to Ukraine. Clearly, he understands perfectly well that NATO has no intention whatsoever of invading Russia.

Russian protests over allegedly mounting NATO involvement in Ukraine are similarly unfounded. The alliance famously refused to grant Ukraine a Membership Action Plan in 2008, opting instead for deliberately vague promises of future membership. Since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO has made no effort to change its cautious stance on Ukrainian membership. On the eve of the current invasion, it was obvious to advocates and opponents alike that potential Ukrainian NATO membership was still decades away.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

If NATO has no intention of invading Russia or offering Ukraine membership, what is all the fuss about? Russia’s displeasure over NATO expansion is genuine enough, but it is not based on any sense of insecurity. Instead, Moscow objects to the fact that it is no longer able to openly intimidate its NATO neighbors. With virtually no soft power tools at its disposal, Russia has traditionally used its military might to project influence throughout the wider region. NATO membership makes this impossible and is therefore bitterly resented.

Russian complaints over NATO enlargement are not only a reflection of Moscow’s frustration. Crucially, these complaints also serve as a highly effective smokescreen for imperial aggression. While Kremlin efforts to portray the attack on Ukraine as an anti-Nazi crusade or a war on Satanism have invited ridicule, attempts to blame NATO have proven far more effective. International audiences conditioned by decades of Western geopolitical dominance have been all too willing to believe that the West must also be somehow responsible for Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine.

While it is perhaps more convenient to point the finger at NATO and the West, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is in fact the most brazen act of unprovoked international aggression in Europe since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Putin himself has repeatedly denied Ukraine’s right to exist and has compared his war to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great. He has attempted to annex four Ukrainian provinces and has declared that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”).

This helps to explain why so many people were upset by President Macron’s talk of security guarantees for Russia. For years, the Kremlin has cynically exploited imaginary security threats as a means of justifying its own acts of international aggression. With his recent comments, the French President risked validating these fake concerns. In reality, of course, it is Ukraine and not Russia that is in desperate need of security guarantees. Echoing the Kremlin’s deliberate disinformation merely serves to embolden Russia and prolong the war.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 1, 2022

Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion proves Russia is no superpower

By Taras Kuzio

Vladimir Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion has dramatically undermined the credibility of modern Russia’s Great Power pretensions and exposed the dysfunctional reality behind the Kremlin’s claims to superpower status.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Dec 13, 2022

Vladimir Putin: 2022 Loser of the Year

By Peter Dickinson

Russian leader Vladimir Putin is the biggest loser of 2022. His disastrous decision to invade Ukraine has left Russia internationally isolated and shattered the country’s reputation as a military superpower.

Belarus Central Asia

UkraineAlert Nov 10, 2022

Battle of Kherson: Russian retreat confirms Putin is losing the war

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

The war is still far from over, but Ukraine’s victory in the Battle of Kherson may eventually come to be seen as one of the key turning points in the defeat of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Memo to Macron: Russia doesn’t need security guarantees but Ukraine does appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Like many dictators throughout history, Putin believed he could strengthen his position at home by waging a small, victorious war. However, he is now learning a painful lesson: if you stake your position as dictator on a quick victory but fail to deliver, you may suffer the fate of Khrushchev after the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Argentinian junta after their disastrous invasion of the Falklands. Losing a conflict that you are expected to win is so thoroughly demoralizing that it puts your entire reign at risk.

Many people now question why Putin embarked on such a reckless invasion at all. In fact, the Russian dictator has always been a betting man. His entire career has been marked by gambles that have paid off handsomely. However, with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, his luck may finally have run out.

US President Joe Biden describes Putin as a rational actor who has miscalculated. This is probably true, but it is also important to recognize Putin’s miscalculation as a symptom of a flawed worldview that is disconnected from reality. In short, Putin fell into the same trap that eventually catches out many long-serving dictators; he drank his own Kool-Aid.

In a military context, believing in one’s own inflated prowess is catastrophically dangerous. Thanks to decades of propaganda, Russians take it for granted that their country is a military superpower. This myth has been shattered in Ukraine. Despite having less than one-third of Russia’s population, a far smaller economy, and being an emerging democracy rather than a militarized dictatorship, Ukraine has more than held its own for almost a year against the invading Russian army.

While the West has provided Ukraine with significant military aid, the extent of Western involvement in the war should not be overstated. So far, only about one percent of the relevant available Western weaponry has actually been sent to Ukraine. Key partners such as the US, UK, France, and Germany have resisted Ukrainian pleas for tanks, jets, and long-range missiles. Instead, they have provided anti-tank weapons, limited quantities of artillery, and shorter range missile systems. Nevertheless, this has proved sufficient to stop Russia’s offensive and liberate about half of the territory occupied by Putin’s troops during the initial stages of the invasion.

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Faced with mounting setbacks in Ukraine, Putin has become increasingly delusional. Rather than acknowledge Russia’s embarrassing defeats and catastrophic losses, he insists everything is going according to plan. This is creating opportunities for Russia’s far right forces, which do not suffer from the same limitations. While Kremlin officials absurdly attempt to portray retreats as “goodwill gestures,” the far right wins over the Russian public by speaking frankly about the country’s military disasters in Ukraine.

Until the invasion began in February 2022, the only political opposition in Russia was represented by jailed anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny, who had attempted to play broadly by Western democratic rules. When the war started, the remnants of Russian civil society were ruthlessly stamped out. Prominent opposition figures were jailed or forced into exile, while new laws criminalized all forms of public dissent. These trends have intensified over the intervening nine months, extinguishing any lingering hopes of a serious democratic opposition to the Putin regime.

Instead, the most serious challenge to Putinism may come from a newly emerging political movement that is even further to the right on the political spectrum than Putin himself. At present, this is a disorganized but vocal movement that has found its voice in the many unofficial Russian “war correspondents” and social media accounts reporting on the invasion while bypassing the Russia’s Kremlin-controlled mainstream information space. Most write from a Russian nationalist perspective while employing ethnic slurs for Ukrainians. They are unambiguously pro-war and often apparently pro-Putin. However, their content is frequently at odds with Russia’s official propaganda and highly critical of the military officials leading the invasion.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, July 20, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

While there is currently no single nationalist leader, the most prominent figure among Russian ultra-nationalists is Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group paramilitary force. Prigozhin once sought to distance himself from Wagner but has recently made his connection very public. He has released footage of his recruitment speeches and has opened a swanky head office in Saint Petersburg. This reflects the rising profile of Wagner itself. Formerly seen as a shadowy mercenary group used by the Kremlin in hybrid war hot spots such as Ukraine, Syria, and Africa to create a veneer of plausible deniability, Wagner has been one of the few Russian military units to perform credibly during the initial stages of the Ukraine invasion and has visibly grown in stature.

With his own public profile on the rise, Prigozhin has begun testing the boundaries by publicly deriding senior figures within the Russian military hierarchy. Meanwhile, his Wagner troops operate in Ukraine as an army-within-an-army, pursuing their own clearly defined battlefield objectives and openly positioning themselves as a military elite in contrast to the under-performing regular Russian army.

Wagner fighters have become the poster boys of the ultra-nationalists, who are themselves less prone to official delusions and more interested in the realities of hard power. Freedom from the constraints of the Kremlin propaganda machine is a major asset in their struggle for credibility among Russian audiences. This makes the far right a potentially formidable opponent in a future internal power struggle against the Putin regime.

It is hard to predict what the world could expect from a post-Putin Russia ruled by far right forces, but there is clearly little room for optimism. An ultra-nationalist successor regime would likely be even more inclined to wage war against Russia’s neighbors while ruthlessly targeting civilians. This extremism would be driven in part by the growing conviction within nationalist circles that Putin is failing in Ukraine precisely because he has not been ruthless enough in his leadership of the war.

Putin’s domestic position is not yet sufficiently weak to talk of an imminent fall from power, but it is already apparent that he is far weaker today than he was just one year ago. At the same time, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has catapulted a wide range of formerly fringe nationalist figures into the Russian mainstream and transformed Yevgeny Prigozhin into a political heavyweight. This swing to the right has not yet been fully appreciated by many Western observers, but it offers alarming indications of where Russia may be heading politically and must be watched carefully in the months ahead.

Stanislav Shalunov is founder and CEO of NewNode and creator of FireChat.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 10, 2022

Battle of Kherson: Russian retreat confirms Putin is losing the war

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

The war is still far from over, but Ukraine’s victory in the Battle of Kherson may eventually come to be seen as one of the key turning points in the defeat of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Dec 13, 2022

Vladimir Putin: 2022 Loser of the Year

By Peter Dickinson

Russian leader Vladimir Putin is the biggest loser of 2022. His disastrous decision to invade Ukraine has left Russia internationally isolated and shattered the country’s reputation as a military superpower.

Belarus Central Asia

UkraineAlert Oct 17, 2022

Putin’s blackout blitz: Russia aims to freeze Ukrainians into surrender

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

Russia is seeking to plunge Ukraine into darkness ahead of the winter heating season by destroying the country’s energy infrastructure. Ukraine’s partners must step in to make sure Ukrainians are not frozen into surrender.

Conflict Energy Markets & Governance

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Vladimir Putin’s failing invasion is fueling the rise of Russia’s far right appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Russia targets Ukraine infrastructure as explosions hit Russian bases

Serbian group denies Wagner Group partnership despite announcement

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels promote news of TV Rain losing broadcasting license in Latvia

Russia targets Ukraine infrastructure as explosions hit Russian bases

On December 5, Russian forces conducted missile strikes targeting Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Odesa, Vinnytsia, and Zaporizhzhia. Russian strikes also damaged a power supply line in the Sumy region. On the same day, the Ukrainian armed forces reported that air defenses shot down sixty of the more than seventy missiles launched by Russia. However, new data suggests that Russia is not striking Ukraine with the same intensity as it did at the beginning of the invasion. The United Kingdom’s Defense Ministry reported on December 5 that the number of sorties conducted by Russian tactical combat aircraft over Ukraine had reduced significantly. “Russian aircraft now probably conducts tens of missions per day, compared to a high of up to 300 per day in March 2022,” it stated.

The Russian military continues to attack critical Ukrainian infrastructure, with reports of recent missile launches coming from the Caspian Sea. Moscow has previously used the Caspian Sea area to launch attacks on Ukraine. Russia will likely continue to use the Caspian region for future attacks as the possibility of Ukrainian attacks reaching critical Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea or Russia increases. 

Serhii Cherevatyi, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian Armed Forces Eastern Group, said that the frozen ground is enabling heavy vehicles to advance and that Ukrainian forces are preparing for winter operations. Last month, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Volodymyr Havrylov said that Ukraine would continue its offensive during the winter months because slowing down would allow Russian forces to replenish and bring in reinforcements.

Earlier this week, several people were killed in explosions at two Russian military airfields. Russia accused Ukraine of using a drone to strike Russian targets hundreds of kilometers from the border – at Engels Airport in the Saratov region and Dyagilevo Airbase in Ryazan. The Russian Defense Ministry stated that drone attacks had killed three people, adding that the drones were “shot down as they flew in at low altitude,” and the resulting explosions led to some superficial aircraft damage. The Kremlin-owned RIA Novosti news agency also reported a fuel explosion at an airfield outside Ryazan. According to the report, three people were killed and six injured in the incident, with one aircraft damaged. Visegrad 24 reported that the blast occurred at the Dyagilevo Airbase, which is also a strategic bomber base. 

Elsewhere, surveillance footage showed a large explosion occurring at the Engels airbase at around 6am local time on December 5. The independent Russian Telegram channel Astra cited unidentified sources as saying a drone crashed into the airbase, damaging two long-range Tu-95 bombers and wounding two military personnel. Long-range Russian strategic bombers are believed to be based at this base in the Saratov region. Such bombers were previously used to launch attacks on Ukraine’s energy system. Saratov Governor Roman Busargin issued a statement calling for residents to remain calm amid the reports. While Ukraine says it has developed a drone that can fly more than 1,000 kilometers, we cannot confirm Ukraine’s involvement in the incident. 

Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin Telegram channels criticized Russian officials for failing to anticipate and prevent the drone strikes at the Engels and Dyagilevo airbases. Some Russian channels speculated that Ukraine launched the strike against Engels Airbase from inside Russian territory, asserting that Ukrainian sabotage groups are active inside Russia. One channel called on the Russian military to authorize retaliation strikes against Ukraine and intensify counterterrorism measures within Russia. 

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Serbian group denies Wagner Group partnership despite announcement

On December 2, the Wagner Group said they are now present in Serbia, as they announced a collaboration with Orly, the “Russian-Serbian Cultural and Information Center of Friendship and Cooperation.” The announcement was widely reported by Serbian media on December 7. After receiving media attention, Orly published a statement the following day denying cooperation with Wagner. However, on December 6, Orly reshared the original announcement, published on the Wagner Telegram channel.

The Orly center’s leader is Aleksander Lisov, who is banned from entering Kosovo. According to Wagner’s statement, one of the goals of the partnership is to “deal with the information confrontation with Russian liberals” who have gone to Serbia and are trying to “carry out anti-Russian activities there with the aim of discrediting Russia.”

According to data from Serbia’s Interior Ministry, obtained by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), nearly 45,000 Russian citizens have entered Serbia since February. The influx provoked both anti-Russian and anti-Ukrainian sentiments, however. Serbia also saw anti-war protests from Russians living in Belgrade, with some even burning their Russian passports. 

Russia is accelerating its presence in Serbia with the help of local groups, some of which are promoting their ties to Wagner. At the end of November, Damjan Knežević, leader of the right-wing People’s Patrol organization, boasted on Telegram about his visit to Wagner’s new center in Saint Petersburg. Knežević recently said that connections to Wagner could help if there is a “conflict in Kosovo.”

Wagner’s potential development in Serbia remains a matter of speculation, as its presence has been limited to public statements. However, links between local Serbian groups and Wagner are expected to expand in the context of Kosovo tensions and the broader issue of the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Serbian government recently appointed a pro-Russian politician, Aleksandar Vulin, to be the director of BIA, Serbia’s intelligence agency.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels promote news of TV Rain losing broadcasting license in Latvia

On December 6, the Latvian National Electronic Media Council (NEPLP) revoked the broadcasting license of TV Rain (Dozhd), an independent Russian television channel, citing threats to Latvian national security. The decision was prompted by multiple instances of TV Rain not complying with Latvian law. Specifically, the channel did not provide Latvian translation; it broadcast a map of Russia that included Crimea on more than one occasion; and it referred to the Russian army as “our army.” Most recently, anchor Alexey Korostelev implied that the channel supported the Russian army. “We hope that we were able to help many of the servicemen, including with equipment and even the most basic of conveniences at the frontline,” he said. TV Rain denied any activity in support of the Russian army and fired Korostelev on December 2. The firing came after Edvins Snore, a Latvian politician, tweeted about Korostelev’s call for Russian army support. The license cancelation can be appealed in the legal system.

The decision to cancel TV Rain’s license provoked many reactions. Many Latvian politicians, like Ivars Ijabs, a member of the European Parliament, supported the NEPLP’s decision as it enforced Latvian law. However, the Latvian Journalists Association issued a statement calling the decision “disproportionate.” Other independent Russian media outlets like Meduza, also based in Latvia, created a petition supporting TV Rain.

On December 6, Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published a compilation on Telegram of statements by Western politicians condemning Russia for preventing TV Rain’s operations. She then suggested readers substitute the word “Russia” with “Latvia.”

Zakharova’s statement garnered 613,536 views, 1,365 forwards, and 306 comments at the time of publishing, according to TGStat, a Telegram analysis tool. Out of 1,675 Telegram posts mentioning the keywords Дождь (TV Rain) and прекратит (“will stop”) between November 30 and December 7, Zakharova’s post received the highest number of views and forwards, according to TGStat.

Twenty-six pro-Kremlin Telegram channels amplified Zakharova’s post. Some channels had a high subscriber count, like @SolovievLive, the channel of Vladimir Solovyov, which has 1.3 million followers. But other channels had few subscribers, like @yat_2020, a channel with two subscribers that amplifies pro-Kremlin content. These forwards generated 437,935 views, which accounted for 71.38 percent of all post views.

TV Rain, the only opposition TV channel in Russia, was founded in 2010. In 2014, Russian authorities disconnected the channel from broadcasting. In 2017, Ukraine banned the channel. On March 3, 2022, TV Rain was forced to halt its operations. In June 2022, TV Rain resumed its operations in Riga.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels promote news of TV Rain losing broadcasting license in Latvia appeared first on Atlantic Council.