Home to 18 million people in the heart of Europe, the Western Balkans have enormous potential to catalyze economic growth through greater market openness. Ongoing regional cooperation efforts aim to address economic challenges such as high rates of unemployment and poverty, issues regarding corruption and upholding the rule of law, and stemming the region’s “brain drain” and resulting labor shortages.

Recent events are also pushing EU leaders to recognize the importance of the Western Balkans to EU security. As a result, there has been a shift towards expediting the enlargement process, including early access to the EU single market and pre-accession funds to support economic reforms and transformative projects.

In this episode, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks to the President of American Chamber of Commerce of Serbia Stefan Lazarevic and President of American Chamber of Commerce of Albania Enio Jaco on the region’s business climate. Are international investors attracted by the potential that the region holds as a common market? What are their main challenges, and why call for more cooperation to remove barriers and decrease political polarization?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Benefits of regional economic integration | A debrief with Stefan Lazarevic and Enio Jaco appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Following snap parliamentary elections on June 11th, Montenegro finds itself in a new phase of political uncertainty. The Europe Now Movement (PES) won a plurality of the vote but failed to secure enough seats to form a government. More alarmingly, voter turnout hit a historic low of 56.4 percent due in part to election fatigue and a lack of political change. Now more than ever, the country needs consensus if it is to continue necessary reforms on its path to EU membership.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare discusses the post-election political landscape in Montenegro with Petar Popovic, associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb.

Will these elections bring the political stability Montenegro requires? Who are potential allies for leading contender PES to form a governing coalition? What factors depressed voter turnout? Finally, what lies in store for former President Djukanovic after dominating Montenegrin political life for over three decades? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Will Montenegro form a new government? | A debrief with Petar Popovic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Will Kosovo and Serbia make the needed concessions towards normalization?

After the recent escalation of tensions in northern Kosovo, Senator Murphy played a crucial role in urging for de-escalation between Kosovo and Serbia. Thanks to broad bipartisan support in the US Senate, both Serbia and Kosovo were called upon to address the fragile security situation in the north and resume the normalization dialogue facilitated by the EU and supported by the United States.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks to Hon. Chris Murphy, United States Senator (D-CT), to discuss his recent trip to the region, the messages he delivered to the leaders in Pristina and Belgrade, and the concessions that Kosovo and Serbia should make in order to progress on their respective paths.

How does he view Kosovo’s concerns about an unbalanced response by the US and the EU, placing the main responsibility on Kosovo for the crisis in the north? What role could the Association of the Serb Majority Municipalities play in achieving a meaningful resolution? How do the protests in Belgrade and the recent reports on his connections with organized hooligans affect the credibility of Serbia’s President Vučić?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Will Kosovo and Serbia make the needed concessions towards normalization? | A debrief with Sen. Chris Murphy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July is an opportunity for leaders to mitigate geoeconomic risk within the Alliance and in southeastern Europe in particular. Specifically, all allies should commit in the communiqué to the prompt adoption of investment screening legislation—particularly the Balkan nations of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, where legislation is largely absent. While the European Union (EU) is Europe’s lead institution on investment and trade issues, its technocratic approach has up to now failed to generate the necessary political will with all members of the Alliance to take investment security issues seriously. Putting the issue of investment screening on the wider transatlantic agenda will increase pressure on lagging allies to elevate investment security and accountability on NATO’s southeastern flank. The Alliance can look to how 5G security was put on the agenda a few years ago as a case study of how it can generate political will among allies to address gaps in national security that are notionally economic in nature.

Because the implementation of economic security regulations carries risks of abuse and corruption, NATO, the EU, and key member states from both organizations should support those nations in the development of inclusive and effective legislation that mitigates against economic risk while protecting the democratic process.

Economic security underpins military security

Members of the EU and NATO face a number of threats from authoritarian corrosive capital and critical economic dependencies. Whether originating from private or state-owned enterprises, unaccountable investments lack transparency, accountability, and market orientation. Corrosive capital largely originates from authoritarian states and exaggerates governance gaps to influence economic, political, and social developments in recipient countries. For example, authoritarian regimes, particularly China, use subsidies and other uncompetitive practices to invest in critical or other digital infrastructure that can have a dual military-civilian purpose, such as in port infrastructure in southeast Europe which could be used to transit military gear in support of NATO operations. Nontransparent investment flows, particularly in Bulgaria and the Western Balkans, undermine transparency and abet corruption. In the higher value-added sectors of the economy such as the thriving information and communications technology sectors in Bulgaria, unaccountable investments threaten the valuable intellectual property of Europe’s established firms and emerging start-ups alike. Last year, China weaponized Europe’s critical trade and supply chain dependency on the huge Chinese market to block Lithuanian imports to China, seeking to punish Vilnius for its foreign policy choices. Europe’s urgent transition in the last year away from Russian natural gas to renewable resources such as solar and wind power, which are dominated by China, risks replacing one set of strategic energy dependencies for another. 

To address these challenges, many European countries have developed new EU-wide investment screening regulations and the European Union has proposed legislation to counter economic coercion. Since 2020, EU member states are required to have an investment screening mechanism in place as part of the EU-wide investment screening coordination framework—but the details are left up to the individual countries, which are responsible for their own national security. 

NATO’s southeastern flank is the most vulnerable and least-prepared region to protect its economies from authoritarian corrosive capital. Montenegro has become famous for its “white elephant” Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Croatia is host to the Chinese Southeast European Business Association and has actively courted Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, including ports and the EU-funded and China-built Peljesac bridge, the first example of subsidized Chinese firms beating out European firms for EU-funded projects in Europe. Bulgaria and North Macedonia have more pronounced links to unaccountable flows of Russian capital, including in the energy sector. 

Among these countries, only Croatia is in the early stages of exploring the development of an investment screening law, and it is doing so at a leisurely pace. Bulgaria is in an even earlier stage than Croatia, but has an opportunity with its new government to make progress. North Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro also lack an investment screening mechanism, leaving NATO’s most vulnerable members and economies open to the risk of corrosive capital and unaccountable investment. These governments have largely failed to put investment security legislation and processes on the table because of a lack of political will. An initiative by key allies to put this issue on the table at NATO would help push lagging governments in southeast Europe to prioritize this issue. Yet, a push by NATO allies to close the investment security gap in southeast Europe should also be coupled with practical assistance to help those allies develop inclusive, transparent legislation on investment screening.

The risks of regulating economic activity in fragile democracies

Emerging markets in NATO’s southeastern flank, including Albania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Croatia, face some of the greatest challenges to equipping themselves with the tools to protect their economies from national security threats. These allies face capacity and governance challenges that will require coordinated support from NATO, the EU, and key bilateral allies to help implement effective investment screening legislation.

First, the economies of southeastern Europe are among the least developed within NATO. As a result, most business leaders in these countries are desperate for any investment they can attract and are instinctively hostile to the idea of screening any investment. Coaxing the private sector into compliance with any relevant legislation will require an intentional and transparent process of policy dialogue between government and business to reassure business that legislation will not meaningfully harm the economy.

Second, these countries largely lack governmental capacity to effectively screen foreign investments, a highly technical process requiring competent bureaucrats armed with both economic and national security data and expertise. A related challenge is the need for the bureaucracy to maintain the confidentiality of proprietary corporate data during the screening process; leaks of government deliberations to tabloids are a pervasive problem in southeast European policymaking.

Third, the democracies of southeastern Europe are by and large low-trust societies with weak public-private dialogue and an often fragile rule of law, making effective and informed policy formulation a challenge. To ensure economic fairness and guard against regulatory abuse, any new tools allowing governments to regulate economic activity will need proper transparency, checks and balances, and oversight.

NATO and the EU face a conundrum in dealing with the geoeconomic challenges to southeastern Europe’s market, particularly in Bulgaria and Croatia, which are already in the European common market. On the one hand, failure to develop screening mechanisms and other tools in these economies leaves both the EU and NATO vulnerable to economic risk that could impact the wider single market. On the other hand, given the governance and capacity challenges in these countries, a rushed or opaque policy process could result in lack of awareness and compliance by the private sector or the emergence of unintended consequences such as barriers to legitimate competition.

What the EU, NATO, and Three Seas Initiative can do

To address these challenges, NATO, the European Union, and individual allies can play complementary roles.

Through its regulatory role, the EU should take the lead in supporting these countries in developing economic security legislation. The European Commission can provide technical support to help governments align their investment screening legislation with EU standards, particularly countries that are candidates for accession, such as Albania and North Macedonia. Meanwhile, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development can provide technical support to member governments such as Croatia to help them understand the likely impact an investment screening law will have on its economy and competitiveness as an investment destination.

Because the EU leads on economic and trade issues, NATO’s role will involve helping allies assess national security implications of investment risk in dual-use economic assets that can have a military or other national security purpose. Here, planning groups within NATO’s Resilience Committee can provide guidance on how to ensure that screening mechanisms meet compliance with NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience. In the interest of building political will, the NATO summit communiqué at Vilnius could set a deadline to have investment screening legislation in place by the seventy-fifth anniversary Washington summit next year.

Finally, select allies can provide bilateral mentorship and support for these southeast European nations on best practices for securing business buy-in and compliance with screening mechanisms. A system modeled after the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States may not align with the needs, economic structure, or capacities of smaller countries in southeast Europe. Smaller allies such as the Czech Republic can advise southeastern European governments on the lessons learned from their experience, perhaps bringing in chambers of commerce and business associations to share their experiences on compliance with the law. 

The Three Seas Initiative, an informal gathering supported by the Atlantic Council and including twelve Central and Eastern European member states focused on north-south infrastructure development, could also help. It could serve as a venue for members to coordinate economic-security regulations to ensure wider harmonization of economic policy. Differences in investment security regulations across countries complicate the kind of cross-border investments that the Three Seas Initiative is designed to attract and finance. The Three Seas business forums in particular can serve as a channel for business associations and chambers from within the Three Seas region and neighboring countries in the Western Balkans. The forums offer a place for parties to share their experiences, challenges, and concerns about complexities caused by differences in screening legislation within the region and to formulate recommendations on how to minimize the impact on the investment environment.

Ultimately, the national governments of Croatia, Bulgaria, Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro will have to do the hard work themselves to adopt these best practices and craft successful legislation. Governments will need to consult with the business sector before legislation is drafted to help promote understanding of these processes, incorporate recommendations to streamline red tape, and raise awareness in the business community of critical threats that can allow them to adapt their internal due diligence. But this will require a balance to ensure that economic security is not traded away for the sake of economic development. Including civil society is also essential to ensure effective transparency and monitoring of review processes to make sure they are not used for corrupt purposes or overlook key threats.

As NATO heads into its seventy-fifth year, its member states and partner institutions need to adapt to new challenges. Robust investment screening across the whole of the Alliance will help strengthen NATO against economic weapons that are increasingly central to today’s conflicts.

Jeffrey Lightfoot is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is the Bratislava-based program director for Europe at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

John Kay is a program manager at the Center for International Private Enterprise and worked previously in the Balkans with the US Agency for International Development.

The post Authoritarian investment in southeastern Europe is a security threat. Here’s what NATO can do. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. How did we get here?

Based on all the information we received from our contacts in civil society, including both Kosovo Serbs and Albanians, the question was not so much “if” but rather “when” the long-lasting crisis would escalate. There were numerous potential triggers for escalation that were plainly evident to those willing to acknowledge them. Many of these triggers stemmed from a series of escalatory decisions made by political leaders on both sides. 

Just to highlight a few examples: the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions, particularly the police force; the deployment of Kosovo special police forces to the streets in the northern region; the expropriation of land in municipalities predominantly inhabited by Serbs; the refusal to participate in the elections; and ultimately, violent clashes between the Serbian minority and NATO soldiers this week triggered by four newly elected Kosovo Albanian mayors taking office in northern Kosovo after April elections that were boycotted by Kosovo Serbs.

—Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the Center in the Western Balkans.

The Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo have long been the flashpoint in the protracted dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. The escalation earlier this week followed a series of tit-for-tat actions on both sides after the most recent tense standoff over license plate enforcement on the Kosovo-Serbia border in late 2022.

What is different this time is the series of political miscalculations the government in Pristina seems to have made about its US and European allies’ postures. Having invested significant political capital into the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue led by the European Union (EU) for normalizing relations between both sides, Washington and its allies from Brussels to Paris and Berlin warned Pristina not to escalate the situation further. Instead, US and EU partners wanted to focus on progress in the dialogue. The government’s decision to double down on enforcing the outcome of the April local elections, which the Serb majority boycotted and in which less than 3.5 percent of the population in northern Kosovo participated, added fuel to the fire. With this escalation, Kosovo now risks losing part of what used to be largely unqualified US and European support.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council.

The situation in the north of Kosovo reached its current point due to a combination of factors and events. The lack of implementation of the Ohrid agreement to normalize relations and the failure to deliver on the establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities created a growing frustration in the international community. One crucial factor is the lack of maturity displayed by leaders involved in the dialogue process and their challenges in engaging and moving forward through strong political will. It appears that the incentives for both sides to adhere to the agreements were not strong enough and therefore progress was hindered.

The catalyst for the situation in the north can be traced back to Kosovo Serbs’ deliberate withdrawal from local institutions, including by mayors and police officers. This helped create a vacuum which Kosovo’s government seized upon—by insisting on holding local elections and enforcing the mayors’ taking office to demonstrate that the north exists as a separate political reality outside Kosovo’s institutional framework.

—Ilva Tare is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and was most recently a broadcaster with EuroNews Group.

2. What could tip this into a more serious conflict?

Even if it seems that all sides are trying to lower the temperature in recent days, a combination of factors could further escalate the situation. Russia has long been an opportunist meddler in the region with significant disinformation tools, especially among Serbian media and audiences. A rally-around-the-flag effect among Kosovo’s majority Albanian population could put government decisionmakers in Pristina on the spot. They repeatedly seem to have chosen standing on principle over politically constructive solutions and have doubled down on symbolic actions, despite warnings by Western allies to avoid escalation. That could make it harder for them to back down. And Serbia has influence over gangs that can inflame the situation if they choose—or are instructed—to.

—Jörn Fleck

There are any number of potential flashpoints, but it is important to focus on the region, to recognize what the citizens of the area see as their grievances, and seek, in good faith, long-term solutions. The recent events are clearly a setback to this process.

—Cameron Munter is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Europe Center. He spent three decades in the US Foreign Service, where he served as US ambassador to Serbia during the Kosovo independence crisis.

3. What should EU countries and the US do right now?

First of all, the United States and the EU should stop considering the Western Balkans as a peripheral issue, which they have for the last decade. Some progress has been made, but, for example, the five members of the EU that have not recognized Kosovo (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain) should not be allowed to simply pretend their actions do not make a difference. They, along with their fellow EU members, should make new efforts to seek resolution and not simply wait for someone else to address the issues.

—Cameron Munter

The current status quo in the north is unsustainable, as it is dominated by parallel structures, as the Kosovo government states. Addressing this issue and stopping the violent elements from the north should not distract from the broader political dialogue, which is brokered by the EU and supported by the United States. 

The escalation of events in the north of Kosovo in recent days was an unfortunate distraction for Kosovo and Serbia in their efforts to normalize relations through political dialogue. The situation is back to square one, with the same requests for both sides and the urge for the parties to demonstrate loyalty to their Western allies and show that they can be credible and trustworthy partners in their Euro-Atlantic aspirations—especially for Kosovo, which cannot afford to lose the support of the United States or of key members of the EU. 

—Ilva Tare

The United States and Europe should not reward spoilers of the progress made in the normalization process in recent months, following significant US and EU political investment. The current escalation is helping leaders in Pristina and Belgrade avoid executing on some tough steps toward normalization and dealing with domestic political challenges. Europe and the United States should make clear that the only way out of the current situation ultimately runs through the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.   

—Jörn Fleck

4. Will new elections defuse this situation?

In order to move toward a resolution, new elections should be held with preconditions such as the involvement of Kosovo Serbs, the establishment of working conditions for Kosovo police and mayors, and the complete withdrawal of special police units of the Kosovo government deployed in the north, which is one of Kosovo Serbs’ stated requirements to take part in local elections. Progress with the Association of Serb Municipalities by mid-November is now a concrete condition with a deadline for the Kosovo government to deliver.

—Ilva Tare

It’s worth discussing. Clearly, new elections would have to be conceived and implemented very carefully, to ensure their result would be recognized by all sides as legitimate. Thus, it’s not a guarantee of solving the problem, but it’s one possible way to address it.

—Cameron Munter

5. Are there any more creative solutions for Serbia and Kosovo to get to more stable relations?

In the current atmosphere of deep-seated distrust and personal animosity between the two political leaders, it is challenging, if not impossible, to envision any innovative solutions. This is a harsh reality that the West still appears hesitant to acknowledge, despite the events unfolding over the past two years involving Prime Minister Albin Kurti of Kosovo and President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. It is becoming increasingly clear that, at some point, the West will need to pause and reconsider its approach, asking itself a crucial question: Are the current political leaders genuinely willing and capable of achieving and ensuring a lasting normalization between the Serb and Albanian populations in Kosovo?

—Maja Piscevic

If the context is right, other initiatives, such as those described in the Berlin Process and discussed as part of Open Balkans, might make a difference. They would open the aperture, so to speak, going beyond the tense immediate points of contention to the larger, more substantive solutions to the local problems. But these more strategic and long-term solutions are hard to develop if the situation on the ground remains as tense as it now is.

—Cameron Munter

The post Five questions (and expert answers) about the recent clashes in Kosovo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Violent protests in the north of Kosovo have escalated the situation, leaving 50 KFOR troops wounded when newly elected Albanian mayors entered the municipality buildings in areas with a Serbian majority, protected by an increased presence of Kosovo police. NATO has deployed 700 additional troops to ensure territorial security.

The decision of Kosovo’s Prime Minister to deploy the new mayors in the municipality buildings in the north has led to growing international frustration, causing the Pristina government to alienate strategic allies, including the United States and key members of the European Union. The United States has urged Kosovo’s PM to de-escalate the situation by withdrawing the police and relocating the mayors to alternative buildings.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks to Jovana Radosavljevic, a Kosovo Serb who resides in the north of Kosovo and the Executive Director of the New Social Initiative, and to Agon Maliqi, an analyst from Kosovo.

What steps should be taken to calm the situation and restore the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia? Why are the Kosovo Serbs protesting, and will the establishment of the Association of the Serbs Majority or new elections offer a possible compromise? What potential implications for Kosovo government and its Euro-Atlantic aspiration after the latest stances from the strategic allies?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What’s behind the escalation in Kosovo? | A debrief with Jovana Radosavljevic and Agon Maliqi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a new European security order is being designed. After years of enlargement impasse, Brussels has recognized the pivotal role of the EU membership of the six Western Balkan countries. What future will the region have, and how can the influence of Russia be challenged in the Western Balkans?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare talks to former Prime Minister and former President of Slovenia Borut Pahor, a friend and unrivaled connoisseur of the region about region’s main challenges. What place will the six Western Balkan countries have in the new European security order?

Why is the EU enlargement process vital for the region, and what can be done to boost the confidence of the aspiring countries into the EU membership? Why is Serbia’s decision to remain with the West rather than join Russia crucial for the region? Why is the implementation of the agreement to establish an Association of Serbs Municipalities important, and what impact will this agreement have on the relations between Serbia and Kosovo?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why the European future of the Balkans depends on Serbia? | A Debrief with Borut Pahor appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For the first time since the beginning of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, discussions in Brussels are currently underway as Belgrade and Pristina negotiate the content of draft statute which will create the legal structure for the nascent Association of Serbs Municipalities in Kosovo. Meanwhile, the EU and the US officials remain concerned about the fragile situation in the north of Kosovo, where Kosovo Serbs have yet to return to civic institutions and small incidents could spark political instability.  

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Miodrag Marinkovic, an activist from the north of Kosovo and Director of the Center for Affirmative Social Actions (CASA), as well as Naim Rashiti, Executive Director of the Balkans Policy Research Group in Pristina, to provide on-the-ground insight into the latest developments in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. 

Now that the process of negotiations of the statute of the ASM has started, what are the main challenges ahead? How will the ASM function? What is the potential legal and bureaucratic framework for this structure that will be accepted by both parties? Will the normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia lead to a durable agreement? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What challenges face ASM? | A Debrief with Miodrag Marinkovic and Naim Rashiti appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Anti-Roma Sentiment in the Western Balkans | A Debrief with Sonja Licht and Zeljko Jovanovic

The Roma are Europe’s largest ethnic minority, an estimated 10 to 12 million people, of whom over two thirds live in Central and Eastern Europe according to the World Bank. Despite their many contributions to European society, Roma communities continue to face extreme social, economic, and political exclusion while suffering disproportionately from environmental racism and shorter life expectancies.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare discusses the current challenges and potential changes for Roma communities in the Western Balkans with Sonja Licht, the President of Foundation BFPE for a Responsible Society in Belgrade and Zeljko Jovanovic, the Director of Roma Initiatives Office for the Open Societies Foundation in Berlin. 

Along with a brief overview of the history of the Roma people in the region, Tare poses the following questions to the guest experts in this important discussion: What are the root causes of anti-Roma sentiment and what practical steps can be taken to combat discrimination and promote a more inclusive society? What are the major institutional barriers in the Western Balkans preventing the full integration of Roma communities socially, politically, and economically? How does ending Anti-Roma Sentiment promise critical economic benefits for Western Balkan economies? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Anti-Roma Sentiment in the Western Balkans | A Debrief with Sonja Licht and Zeljko Jovanovic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What’s next after Bulgarian elections? A Debrief with Dimitar Bechev

Bulgaria’s recent parliamentary elections marked a significant moment for the country after a two-year political deadlock, which had resulted in the need for a technocratic government. This election is seen as potentially having a significant impact on Bulgaria’s relationship with the EU, particularly in terms of addressing corruption and upholding the rule of law.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Dimitar Bechev, Lecturer at Oxford School of Global and Area Studies on implications of another caretaker government for Bulgaria’s economic and European outlooks.

What can be expected of the Bulgarian elections? What are the factors that contributed to political instability in Bulgaria? What is the public perception of the political deadlock? Can the outcome of the election impact bilateral dispute with North Macedonia?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What’s next after Bulgarian elections? | A Debrief with Dimitar Bechev appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With a population of just over six hundred thousand, Montenegro plays a crucial role in maintaining stability in the Western Balkans and is a key factor in ensuring NATO’s full control of the Adriatic coast. The country’s accession to NATO in 2017 reinforced the security and stability of the region and signaled to other Western Balkan countries that NATO’s door remains open to them. But beyond that, NATO membership also signaled that Montenegro is ready and able to implement the necessary reforms that would lead to European Union (EU) membership.

While the country enjoyed a long-held status as a regional frontrunner for EU accession, events of the past two years have cast doubt on this prospect. Last summer, the government signed a controversial property agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which does not fully recognize Montenegro’s independence from Serbia or an autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church, triggering an extended period of ethnic tensions and political instability. This resulted in Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic losing a no-confidence vote and a blockade of the constitutional court.

Relations with the Serbian Orthodox Church have long divided Montenegro into two camps, one that seeks close connections between the state and the church and one that advocates for further distance based on the contention that the church embodies an ongoing Serbian influence. As a result, the prospect of Montenegro’s EU membership now seems weak, with the European Commission expressing concern over political volatility, government instability, and lagging reform implementation in its yearly assessment of Montenegro’s progress toward accession benchmarks.

Russian meddling in the upcoming election is of great concern, as well. The Kremlin is no stranger to weaponizing cultural and religious connections in Montenegro. In 2019, fourteen people, including two alleged Russian intelligence agents, were convicted of attempting to overthrow the government in Podgorica and prevent the country from joining NATO.

The US State Department has warned of expected Russian attempts to stir ethnic tensions ahead of the election. Domestic sympathy in Montenegro for Russian aims could provide an opportunity for Russian interference, as some candidates are openly pro-Russian and seek to distance Montenegro from NATO and the European Union. As such, Montenegro risks becoming another victim of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fight against the West.

While the Montenegrin president’s role is chiefly ceremonial, the office does have the power to accept or reject candidates for the prime minister’s job. The current president, Milo Djukanovic, for example has used that power to block a candidate in the past year, demanding instead that a new prime minister be chosen through new parliamentary elections, a move previously encouraged by US officials to break the political deadlock and refocus on delivering key reforms. It took until the prime minister-designate’s three-month constitutional deadline to form a government expired, but Djukanovic dissolved parliament on Thursday and called for extraordinary elections to take place as early as May or June.

Key candidates running for president of Montenegro:

• Milo Djukanovic is the incumbent who has served as Montenegrin prime minister six times and as the country’s president twice. He is the longest-running European leader. Djukanovic and his party are pro-EU but he is associated with a range of corruption scandals.
• Andrija Mandić, a main challenger to Djukanovic, is a leader of Democratic Front, a pro-Russian party and pro-Serbian party with close ties to Belgrade.
• Aleksa Bečić comes from the Democratic Montenegro party. He labels himself a civic politician, but his politics and those of his party are largely seen as pro-Serbian.
• Jakov Milatović, a political newcomer from the Europe Now party, is trying to prove his pro-EU credentials. He previously served as the minister of economy under a government with strong ties to the Serbian Orthodox Church.
• The other three candidates do not appear to stand a realistic chance of getting to a second round.

This high-stakes election will help determine whether Montenegro and the region will fall further under Russian influence or if the prospect of EU membership provides a strong enough incentive for voters to remain committed to a European perspective. The international community should closely watch Montenegro to see whether Russian influence is on the rise in the Western Balkans or whether a heartening political trend will continue. 

Luka Ignac is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Kevin Morris is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

The post Montenegro’s presidential election is a litmus test of Russian influence in the Western Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Mediated by the European Union and supported by the United States, the Ohrid summit between Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is a historic opportunity to resolve a long-standing dispute between Serbia and Kosovo and accelerate the Euro-Atlantic integration process for both countries.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Jovana Radosavljevic, Executive Director of the New Social Initiative based in Mitrovica, in the north of Kosovo, and Visar Ymeri, Executive Director of the Institute for Social Policy “Musine Kokalari,” to discuss the challenges of implementing a proposed agreement for normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia and the expectations for the upcoming Ohrid Summit on March 19.

Why is a deal on normalizaiton of relations between Belgrade and Pristina important for the future of citizens in both countries? How should the Association of Majority-Serb Municipalities (ASM) in Kosovo function? What will the successful implementation of an agreement mean for Kosovo, Kosovo Serbs, and Serbia? How should the everyday needs of citizens be prioritized in the implementation process?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What challenges faces the Kosovo/Serbia agreement | Debrief with Jovana Radosavljevic and Visar Ymeri  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 27th, Serbia and Kosovo agreed that no further discussion are needed on the EU proposal for normalization of relations, which could potentially pave the way for the resolution of an unfinished conflict. The agreement was a step forward in normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo with focus on guarantees and protection of legitimate rights of the Serbian community across the territory of Kosovo. 

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks with Miroslav Lajčák, EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues, on this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the latest meeting in Brussels, details of the EU brokered plan, implementation of any future agreement, and the path forward.

What is expected from Serbia and Kosovo? Will these negotiations normalize the relations between the two countries? What are the main stumbling blocks? Is the establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities based on any European model? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Is a deal on normalization between Kosovo & Serbia possible? | A debrief with Miroslav Lajčák  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Wed, February 22, 2023 • 9:15 am ET

A conversation with Prime Minister of Croatia Andrej Plenković

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Plenković joined the Atlantic Council to share his perspective on the implications of Russia’s war in Ukraine for Europe and the Western Balkans, Croatia’s foreign-policy objectives, its entry into the eurozone and the Schengen area, and how his country’s Euro-Atlantic journey can serve as a source of inspiration for the Western Balkan countries and Ukraine.

Europe & Eurasia Eurozone Politics & Diplomacy Southern & Southeastern Europe

As Ukraine fights to maintain its national autonomy while pushing for European integration, it has found an ally in Croatia, which has faced similar challenges since achieving independence just three decades ago.

“There are many parallels from Croatia to Ukraine today, from Vukovar to Mariupol for instance,” said Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on February 22, naming two cities that were the target of significant siege and urban warfare.

Despite intense periods of conflict that devastated its economy and its citizens, Croatia has proven itself a success story—and can now serve as a beacon for other nations that, like Ukraine, will continue to navigate the tricky process of European integration and nation building.

Plenković noted how on January 1, Croatia became the first country to simultaneously join the eurozone currency union and visa-free Schengen area, and it’s now one of only fifteen members of those two groupings plus NATO. “In the span of three decades, from a country which was not even recognized, we managed to enter this core group,” he said. 

Plenković is the longest-serving prime minister in Croatia’s history, with more than six years in office, a time that has seen the ongoing migrant crisis, stalled European Union (EU) enlargement, and now the invasion of Ukraine. The latter, he said, should serve as a “lesson” for Western leaders “about recognizing the threats as they are for international law, for international security, for the global system of governance. And also to completely abandon the politics of naïveté.”

Read on for more highlights from his remarks and conversation with Paula J. Dobriansky, vice chair of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

The newest member of the club

• Plenković acknowledged his country’s relatively fortunate position within the EU right now. It is, alongside Slovenia, the only former Yugoslavian country to be accepted into the EU and has joined the eurozone and Schengen area faster than Bulgaria and Romania—even though they joined the EU before Croatia did.

• Plenković noted that Croatia is “a net beneficiary country” that brings in more EU funds than it contributes. It “enables the government to invest in areas that need to catch up,” he said, such as infrastructure, environmental protections, and “elevating the living standards of our people.”

• But Plenković acknowledged that European integration has been a difficult thing for some Croatians to grapple with. “People who are living in Croatia today knew how it was not to have our state,” he said. “Some of them are wary of the impact of other actors into what we decide what to do. My point was that by joining NATO and the EU, we have only become stronger. Some people appreciate [it], others less.”

A model for the rest

• Plenković envisioned Croatia’s speedy integration as a model for other countries that want to join the club. “No one has more knowledge of the most recent accession process than we do.”

• Plenković confirmed that Croatia is supportive of Ukraine’s efforts to join the EU going forward: “There is strong political pressure coming, especially from Poland and Baltic countries, to move forward with Ukraine.”

• As for Serbia’s EU candidacy, Plenković was a little more careful with his words. “When it comes to Serbia, our relationship has been burdened by the events of thirty years ago,” he said. “After our session now, I will even go and visit an area near Vukovar where we are still looking for the remnants of missing persons who died thirty years ago, so there are many sensitivities. But we are determined to normalize our relations.” Plenković has continued to meet with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, including at Davos, and the nation’s foreign ministers have met on multiple occasions as well. 

• Plenković was steadfast in his belief that current candidate countries will benefit from EU membership. “EU membership is the only attraction, the only real source of transformative power and the political will to change in many of the polities which are not yet in the EU.” 

A shared history of conflict

• Plenković is a firm supporter of ongoing efforts to bolster Ukraine’s defenses and economy. “My government was swift and articulate in condemning Russian aggression and in extending solidarity to Ukraine in all potential ways,” he said. Plenković summed up his vision of aiding Ukraine with one word: sustainability. “Sustainability of Ukrainians to resist, sustainability of Western assistance of Ukraine, and sustainability of the Western governments to live up to the challenges that we are faced with, which are prices of energy, inflation, food, and keeping the social cohesion in our countries.”

• Plenković also noted Croatia’s role in housing Ukrainian refugees. “We are hosting around twenty-two thousand refugees from Ukraine, and they are well integrated. Children are going to our schools. Due to the proximity of Slavic languages, it is even easier in a Slavic country than somewhere else.”

• Plenković saw some glimmers of hope in the situation, too, particularly in the way that Russian aggression has spurred increased European unity. “The unity of the EU is really unprecedented. This unity is unique in international affairs for the last three decades. I can’t recall of any remotely similar scenario where international support was so strong.”

Nick Fouriezos is a writer with more than a decade of journalism experience around the globe.

Watch the full event

The post Croatia’s prime minister: There should be fewer roadblocks for EU enlargement to the Balkans—and Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the wake of vigorous shuttle diplomacy meant to jumpstart the adoption of an EU-designed proposal to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo, the United States is pushing Prishtina to fulfill its prior commitment to create the Association of ethnic Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM).  

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Tatjana Lazarevic, the Editor-in-Chief of the KoSSev news portal and a resident of the Kosovo Serb-majority city of Mitrovica in the north of Kosovo. 

Lazarevic addresses the challenges faced by the Kosovo Serb community in the northern part of Kosovo, explaining why more families and young intellectuals are moving to cities across the border in Serbia.   

Ilva Tare poses key questions on the debate surrounding inter-communal relations and local government autonomy in Kosovo. Do Kosovo Serbs want the ASM? What is the role of Belgrade and Prishtina in the daily lives of Kosovo Serbs? Will the creation of the ASM result in an entity in Kosovo akin to a Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What is the future for Kosovo Serbs in the north? | A Debrief with Tatjana Lazarevic  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

North Macedonia’s accession to the European Union has been delayed in the last two years due to disagreements with Bulgaria. The dispute centers around the identity of the Slavs in Macedonia and whether there is a istinctly Macedonian ethnicity and language.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Petar Todorov a historian and a member of the Bilateral Multidisciplinary Expert Commission for Historical and Educational questions between Republic of North Macedonia and Republic of Bulgaria.

After 22 meetings of the joint Commission is a final agreement close? What are the chances of finding a “common ground” on historical narratives? Is it possible to adopt a pluralist view of history for north Macedonia and Bulgaria while maintaining the political legitimacy and national sovereignty? Why is the distinction between language and dialect so controversial between the two countries?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – How can Bulgaria and North Macedonia overcome their differences? | A debrief with Petar Todorov appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Even though the situation between Serbia and Kosovo is more tense than in recent memory, with the war in Ukraine as a backdrop, the broader situation in the region remains unchanged. As EU enlargement remains stalled, the best prospect for improving the lives of citizens in the region appears to be the private sector investment in economic development.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Diana Gligorijevic, the co-founder of Telegroup Solutions, an IT Provider and telecommunication company in Serbia, and Mergim Cahani, the co-founder and the CEO of Gjirafa, US-registered company operating across Southeast Europe. 

In this episode, Tare poses key questions on the regional investment climate, economic development, and the critical role of the private sector. What are main weaknesses and strengths of investing in the region, especially with unresolved bilateral issues? How do politics play a role in the investment climate? Have their businesses felt any impact from the heated political rhetoric? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – How can investment drive regional prosperity? | A debrief with Diana Gligorijevic and Mergim Cahani appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Another end-of-year flare-up in the north of Kosovo was just the latest in a cycle of crisis that repeats itself every time a deadline for normalization is approaching or a new agreement is about to take effect between Kosovo and Serbia.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare interviews Tim Judah, a journalist and author, in this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the role played by the Serbian President and the Prime Minister of Kosovo in reaching a normalization agreement acceptable to both parties. Tim Judah recently wrote an article titled “Will Kosovo war ever end?”, analyzing the cycle of instability and the role of regional leader’s in perpetuating it. 

With the West appearing to pressure Prishtina to implement the Association of Serbian Municipalities, will Kosovar government agreed to the Western demands? What is the likelihood that parties agree to the Franco-German proposal? Beyond the Serbia-Kosovo standoff, what is the biggest challenge that the Western Balkans are currently facing?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Will relations between Kosovo and Serbia normalize?| A debrief with Tim Judah appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Eser Özdil joins TRT World to the Turkey-Bulgaria gas interconnector appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What are some of the Europe Center’s key takeaways for Europe and transatlantic relations in 2022? Looking back at this year, what were some of our favorite debrief episodes and speakers? As the Euro-Atlantic faces crises on multiple fronts, what predictions can we make for 2023?

On this year-end episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Atlantic Debrief co-host Damir Marusic, Britain Debrief host Ben Judah, and Balkans Debrief host Ilva Tare, all Senior Fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, for a review of 2022 and a look ahead to 2023.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

Fellow

Rachel Rizzo

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Economy & Business English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What happened this year? | A Debrief from the Debrief hosts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Will the regional crises turn into opportunities? A debrief with Maja Piscevic and Damir Marusic

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has largely defined the year with the crises across the Western Balkans shaping against this grim backdrop. Even though the year-end leaves the region in an uncertain place, with tensions between Serbia and Kosovo at an all-time high, some positive developments ought to be noted.

Ilva Tare, Atlantic Council Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow, speaks with Maja Piscevic, Nonresident Fellow, and Damir Marusic, Senior Fellow, at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, in this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the high and low points of the year and the challenges ahead for the region.

How significant is the EU’s renewed commitment to the region’s enlargement perspective? Is there a way out of the deadlock between Kosovo and Serbia? How can the United States and the EU work together in region? What are the chances for the Common Regional Market to be realized? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Will the regional crises turn into opportunities? | A debrief with Maja Piscevic and Damir Marusic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why should the EU speed up the integration process in the Western Balkans? A debrief with Paul Taylor

The recent EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana, Albania, was seen as a step in the right direction for reinvigorating the EU enlargement process. Is there a new political will for enlargement among the EU member states? How did the new geopolitical momentum following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine affect the membership prospects of the Western Balkan countries?

Ilva Tare, Atlantic Council Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow, speaks with Paul Taylor, Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe, in this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the outcomes of the EU-Western Balkans summit.

Is the EU able to give the region a clear and realistic timeline for enlargement? Why is the region lacking developments funds? How can investments be used as a tool to encourage reform? What are the prospects for normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why should the EU speed up the integration process in the Western Balkans? | A debrief with Paul Taylor appeared first on Atlantic Council.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has promised to put the EU enlargement process back on track, vowing to make the Western Balkans’ future a foreign-policy priority for his government. “The stability and prosperity of your region cannot be detached from the stability and prosperity of Europe as a whole,” Scholz said at the summit.

Enlargement hit a roadblock in 2019, when France blocked opening negotiations for Albania and North Macedonia, with President Emmanuel Macron demanding reform of the enlargement process before considering new members. This occurred just after North Macedonia had settled its long-running name dispute with Greece, expecting to have these compromises unlock its EU path. As soon as new EU procedures were drawn up and adopted and Macron dropped his objections, Bulgaria blocked the opening of North Macedonia’s candidacy for arcane reasons related to language and history—only to relent this past May when France finally brokered a compromise. Thursday’s summit was a serious attempt to build on this breakthrough.

The EU enlargement agenda needs all the help it can get. Though there has been a lot written about how the EU is stepping up to the moment by granting Ukraine and Moldova candidate status in the shadow of Russia’s aggression, the reality is much less sunny. Many countries in the EU have long been committed to slow-rolling the process. And in private conversations with political and civil-society leaders across Europe this year, we have heard concerns voiced about how little has really changed. Indeed, there is a sense that with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU is making promises it has no ability to keep.

The Western Balkans countries’ unmet promise of EU membership was first extended at Thessaloniki in 2003. While it’s true that necessary democratic reforms, including on media freedoms and the rule of law, have stalled across the region, it’s also true that EU member states have shown a real political hesitancy on enlargement—and people on the ground in the Balkans can feel it. “They pretend that they want to let us in, and we pretend to reform,” is a frequent refrain from dispirited activists across the region. Many enlargement advocates across the EU fret that a similar mistake was made earlier this year in raising unrealistic hopes in Kyiv and Chișinău.

Berlin’s lead role

In this context, renewed German engagement in the Western Balkans is to be applauded and welcomed. Given that actual accession is still many years away even in the most optimistic scenarios, Scholz has focused his energies on reviving efforts at establishing a Common Regional Market (CRM) to implement the “four freedoms”—the freedom of movement for goods, capital, services, and people—across the region’s economies, firmly based on EU standards. Doing so will go a long way toward preparing the region for full membership, the thinking goes. It will also provide tangible benefits to the region’s citizens by creating a more attractive destination for Western capital, especially as global supply chains struggle to adapt to political imperatives for near- and friend-shoring. The agreements signed this week represent a meaningful step in re-establishing the initiative, which had foundered over disputes between Serbia and Kosovo at a Berlin Process summit in Sofia in 2020.

The Berlin Process was launched by then German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2014 at a time when hopes for enlargement had first started to fade. It has been criticized for talking big but delivering little. Early efforts at establishing the CRM yielded an agreement guaranteeing free cellular roaming across the region—and little else. Transformative infrastructure investments, an important plank of the initiative, failed to meaningfully materialize and suffered from delays in matching funds to projects.

But the Berlin Process’s annual summit schedule did generate a previously scarce commodity: a shared political consciousness and familiarity among the region’s leaders. When tensions and disputes halted progress on CRM in Sofia (with Kosovo refusing to sign agreements that allow Serbia to persist in not recognizing its statehood) three of the region’s six countries—Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania—forged ahead on realizing the four freedoms among themselves.

In launching the Open Balkan initiative last year, the three have made progress in signing several agreements. Implementation of measures that would allow citizens the freedom to work in any of the three participating countries is currently held up in North Macedonia’s parliament. But expedited customs “green lanes” for the transportation of goods among the three have been opened, and tourism and cultural exchange has increased. The thaw between Serbia and Albania has been most pronounced, but relations between Serbia and North Macedonia have also markedly warmed.

A cottage industry sprung up among think tanks and civil society, with people arguing over whether Open Balkan represented a dangerous alternative to European-mediated efforts such as the Berlin Process, or whether it was a healthy sign that the region was maturing and taking initiative on its own. In their efforts to reboot the Berlin Process, the Germans have admirably steered clear of this ultimately academic debate. They have renewed their efforts at using the institutional weight of the EU to make progress with all six countries. If a subset of the countries gets ahead of the pack on their own initiative, all the better—as long as their integration efforts are fully in line with European standards.

Politics at the fore

In our conversations in Berlin this autumn, we were told that the big lesson learned from previous rounds has been the importance of political engagement, especially on the European side. No longer can progress on European integration be treated as a dry technocratic problem, a question of sequencing reforms in just the right way. Political commitment from the region’s leaders will be met, and tested, by reciprocal political goodwill at the highest levels on the European side. Getting things done will depend on both sides doing their part. The personal engagement by Scholz, both in the run-up and at the summit, is a testament to this new approach.

And that level of engagement will be necessary for tackling issues on the horizon. The coming winter’s privations will likely strain the impoverished region’s economies. EU leaders, aware of how poorly the Balkans were integrated into the continent’s COVID-19 response (and the residual bitterness that experience has engendered), are keen not to repeat the mistake. Immediate food and energy needs were discussed in Berlin this week, as were ambitious plans for financing the region’s transition to a more sustainable, greener energy mix.

The agreements signed this week are a long-overdue and important step in the right direction. Follow-through will be very important. The next Berlin Process summit will be held in Tirana, and the 2024 edition in Vienna. And progress will not just be measured in how well the region is integrating, but also on resolving outstanding disputes, especially between Serbia and Kosovo. “It is high time to overcome regional conflicts that have continued for far too long—conflicts that divide you and hold your countries back on your European path,” Scholz said on Thursday. Serbia’s reluctance to fully align itself with the EU’s common foreign policy on Russia is another bone of contention. Expect political pressure to pile on Belgrade even as Europe opens its coffers to help the region through a difficult time.

The most hopeful sign is that Europe seems to have embraced political engagement. The Berlin Process will succeed if it is used as a problem-solving and action-forcing tool in the region. The changes must be seen to be happening, not just felt after the fact. Visible summitry is an important component of success, but it alone is not a magic formula. Much work remains to be done.

Damir Marusic is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center who works on the Council’s Balkans Forward Initiative.

Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center and representative of the Council in the Western Balkans.

Jörn Fleck is the acting director of the Europe Center.

The post Germany steps up in the Western Balkans. Will the EU follow its lead?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What challenges do the Western Balkans face after the Berlin Process? A debrief with Milan Nič

With the Berlin Process summit in sight, the first headlines coming from Germany indicate that Berlin will deliver agreements signed by all six Western Balkans countries. Will these new regional dynamics produce long-term meaningful changes?

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks with Milan Nič, Senior Fellow at the German Council on the Foreign Relations, in this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the next steps for the Balkan countries following the implementation of these agreements.

Can we expect an update on the Common Regional Market? Can the Open Balkan initiative work in tandem with the Berlin process, even though some countries oppose it? Is there a role for the US in the Berlin process?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What challenges do the Western Balkans face after the Berlin Process? | A debrief with Milan Nič appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What is the problem with democracies representing people’s interests? | A Debrief with Lea Ypi

The quest for freedom has long been the interest of political scholars and philosophers. Yet an 11-year-old girl in Albania began debating the issue with her parents while the streets of Tirana erupted with protests demanding freedom. That girl is Lea Ypi, a political theory professor at the London School of Economics and the author of the internationally acclaimed novel, “Free, coming of age at the end of Communism.”

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare talks with Lea Ypi in this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the meaning of democracy and why some democracies backslide into autocracies. How did people in Eastern Europe deal with the challenges of representation and democracy in the 1990s?

What can history reveal about how post-communist countries dealt with the issue of memory? How can the recent rise of nationalism and populism in so-called established democracies be explained?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What is the problem with democracies representing people’s interests? | A Debrief with Lea Ypi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What will the Berlin process bring to the Western Balkans? A Debrief with Manuel Sarrazin 

When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz broke the news of a Berlin Process 2.0, the Western Balkans’ hopes for a revival of European enlargement were revived. The Common Regional Market and the ‘four freedoms’ are at the heart of Berlin process, but previous negotiations broke down in Sofia due to differences between Serbia and Kosovo. 

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks with Manuel Sarrazin, the German Special Representative for the Western Balkans, about a potential breakthrough in November’s summit in the hopes of seeing concrete results and signed agreements between the six countries. 

What are the challenges if there is a Common Regional Market deal? How will implementation work? Does the Open Balkan initiative have any role if Common Regional Market is adopted? Will the Berlin Process 2.0 provide support for youth and professionals from the region who are leaving the Balkans? Learn more on this episode of #BalkansDebrief with Ilva Tare. 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What will the Berlin process bring to the Western Balkans? | A Debrief with Manuel Sarrazin  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Russia escalates war by targeting cities across Ukraine

Tracking narratives

Russian deepfake attempt targeting Bayraktar drones CEO disrupted

Russia blames Ukrainian military intelligence for Kerch bridge explosion 

Bulgaria investigates claims of involvement in Kerch bridge blast

Media policy

Russia adds Meta to its ‘terrorist’ organizations list, blocks EUvsDisinfo website

Russia escalates war by targeting cities across Ukraine

Russia escalated its war against Ukraine this week with missile attacks and airstrikes on cities across the country, including the first serious attack in the capital Kyiv in months. The Russian army reportedly launched at least ten missile strikes, nineteen airstrikes, and ninety artillery attacks targeting more than thirty settlements across Ukraine, including Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Odesa, Sloviansk, Novobakhmutivka, Sieversk, Bilohorivka, Nikopol, and Blahodativka, according a Facebook post from the Ukrainian General Staff. Russia shelled twenty-five settlements in the direction of the Pivdennyi Buh river, across the frontline, they added. In the direction of Novopavlivka and Zaporizhzhia, the Russian army shelled twenty villages, including Vuhledar, Novopil, Shakhtarske, Mali Scherbaky, Velyka Novosilka, Malynivka, and Mala Tokmachka. As a direct result of the strikes, five regions were left without power for days, while elsewhere the power supply was partially damaged, according to the Ukrainian state emergency service. It specified that Lviv, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Ternopil regions were completely deprived of electricity. 

According to a United Nations assesment, “Explosions were reportedly heard, and missiles and drones were reportedly intercepted in the western Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, and Rivne regions, in the northern Kyiv region, and in the southern Mykolaiv and Odesa regions, as well as in the central Dnipropetrovsk region.”  

In the central Vinnytsia region, the Ladyzhyn thermal power plant was reportedly hit with Iranian-made Shahed drones. Soon after, the Ukrainian energy ministry stated that it was halting its electricity exports in order to stabilize its energy systems. This halt has a significant impact on Moldova, which purchases approximately one-third of its electricity from Ukraine, including twenty percent from Ukrhydroenergo and ten percent from Energoatom. 

According to Serhiy Bratchuk,  spokesperson for the Odesa military administration, Russian forces brought Iranian instructors to Dzankoi in Crimea, as well as Zaliznyy and Lanivtsi in Kherson, to train Russian forces on how to use the Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. This claim has not been independently confirmed. 

In yet another signal of a broader escalation by Russia, on October 8 the Ukrainian ambassador in Belarus received a note accusing Ukraine of “preparing an attack on Belarus.” The letter can be interpreted as providing a pretext for attacks on Ukraine from Belarusian territory. On October 10, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka announced Russia and Belarus had agreed to deploy a “joint regional group of forces.” This raises concerns about whether the northern fronts in the regions of Chernihiv and Kyiv would be reactivated.  

Meanwhile, Moldova said Russian missiles that targeted Ukraine crossed Moldovan airspace, prompting the Foreign Ministry of Moldova to summon the Russian ambassador. Moldova also announced that it is considering the possibility of declaring a partial mobilization. Moldovan Minister of Defense Anatolie Nosatîi said that Moldova would have to close its airspace due to the launch of Russian missiles. Later in the day, however, the Moldovan Ministry of Defense denied that a Russian missile had entered the country’s airspace. 

The Russian army continues to experience difficulties with new recruits and the mobilization process. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Mark Krutov, more than one hundred Russian conscripts from Bryansk allegedly refused to go to Ukraine, stating that they lacked training and new equipment. “One of the soldiers reached out to journalists with his complaints,” Krutov reported. “He says commanders told them they will be sent in a few days ‘to retake Lyman’, while only one man from the previous group of 100 mobilized soldiers sent to Ukraine returned.” 

According to a report by Middle East Eye, “Money and menace are being used to recruit Muslims in the Caucasus….Parents in the deprived region are encouraging their sons to fight out of fear that local authorities could retaliate if they refuse.” The report stated that around one thousand Chechen fighters have lost their lives in Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian deepfake attempt targeting Bayraktar drones CEO disrupted

The Ukrainian defense ministry’s intelligence department (GUR) has claimed that Russian operatives used deepfake technology in an attempt to discredit Ukraine’s partnership with Turkey.  

According to a GUR Telegram post from October 9, Russian intelligence services attempted to use deepfake technology to call Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of of Baykar Defense, the Turkish defense company providing Bayraktar drones to Ukraine. The GUR claimed that Russian intelligence services tried to impersonate Ukraine’s Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal in the video call with Bayraktar. However, instead of speaking with the Bayraktar executive, GUR said the Russian intelligence service was connected to an “equally fake” individual impersonating a Bayraktar employee. The GUR added that the Russian intelligence service made pronunciation errors when speaking in the Ukrainian language. Specifically, the speaker used the Ukrainian expression babyne lito (бабине літо, “Grandmother’s summer” or “Indian summer”), but used the Russian pronunciation bab’ye lyeto (бабьє лєто) instead.

The GUR stated that the purpose of the operation was to discredit the cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey. “At the end of the conversation, the Russian operatives were informed that they had been exposed and would be prosecuted,” it said. 

There have been several instances of deepfakes used since the beginning of the Russian invasion. In the early days of the war, Kremlin supporters circulated a deepfake of Zelenskyy urging the Ukrainian military to surrender. The latest incident demonstrates how pro-Russian deepfakes have moved beyond recorded footage to livestream deepfakes, in which a synthetic face can overlay an individual’s face in real time, creating an additional illusion of authenticity.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia blames Ukrainian military intelligence for Kerch bridge explosion

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that a truck with explosive materials caused the detonation on the Kerch bridge on October 8, and accused Ukrainian military intelligence of carrying out what it called a “terrorist attack.” The blast resulted in two road spans partially collapsing and seven fuel tanks catching fire. The FSB said that four people were killed as a result of the explosion. On October 12, the FSB said it had detained eight people in connection with the incident, including five Russian citizens as well as three Ukrainian and Armenian nationals. 

According to the FSB, explosives weighing 22.7 tons were camouflaged in plastic film rolls and sent from the Ukrainian port of Odesa to Bulgaria’s Ryse port in early August. They allege the cargo was sent to a Georgian port in Poti; from there it traveled to Yerevan and cleared customs at the Trans Alliance terminal. According to Russia’s version of events, the cargo left Yerevan on a Georgian registered DAF truck and crossed the Russia-Georgia border via the Upper Lars checkpoint on October 4. The FSB claimed that the truck was unloaded at the Armavir wholesale base in the Krasnodar region of Russia on October 6. The next day, the cargo was allegedly loaded on to a different vehicle, owned by a Russian citizen, and left for Simferpol. The explosion took place at 6:03am Moscow time on October 8.

On October 12, Kremlin-controlled media outlet Ria Novosti published a CCTV video on Telegram allegedly depicting Russian police inspecting the truck. The Telegram post included x-ray style photos from the customs checkpoint showing the contents of the truck. However, the truck seen in the CCTV video has at least two elements that are not visible in the x-ray image. The truck in the CCTV video has two front wheels, whereas the truck in the x-ray image does not. In addition, the truck seen on the CCTV camera has a spare wheel, and while the x-ray photo shows a holder for a spare wheel, it appears to be empty. This indicates that the CCTV video and x-ray photo depict different trucks, which Ria Novosti did not acknowledge. 

On October 12, the Russian Telegram channel Baza published two x-ray photos of a truck, alongside another photo showing the contents of the truck. The photos were reportedly taken in Armenia. The DFRLab used Google reverse image search and found that both photos were first published in an article by Armenpress, which stated that according to Armenian customs control, the truck went through the customs clearance procedure “duly and legally and no risk factors were detected.” The article contained photos taken during the inspection, stating that the x-ray examination of the truck “did not reveal any risk factors”. The x-ray photos published by Ria Novosti and Baza appear to be similar, based on the placement of plastic rolls inside the truck. It is possible that Ria Novosti’s photo is also from Armenian customs control. 

On October 10, the Baza Telegram channel also published a photo of a DAF truck with a Georgian license plate. The post claimed that the pictured truck was used to transport the explosives to Russia. On a same day, the Russian Telegram channel Mash Gor published another photo of a similar truck and claimed that Russian police were searching red DAF trucks with Georgian license plates and found the vehicle in Vladikavkaz, Russia. The post said there was no driver in the vehicle when police arrived, but soon after a driver appeared and was arrested. According to Armenpress, the arrested driver is Artur Terjanyan, a dual citizen of Armenia and Georgia.

Georgian and Bulgarian authorities have denied Russia’s accusation that the truck traveled through their territories.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Bulgaria investigates claims of involvement in Kerch bridge blast

Russian media outlets claimed that Bulgaria was complicit in the October 8 explosion targeting the Kerch bridge. While many details about the explosion are still unknown, and speculation is rife, pro-Kremlin media exploited the incident to spread rumors about the role of Bulgaria, a NATO member, in the attack. Bulgaria’s main intelligence agency DANS launched an investigation into Russian claims that the truck that blew up on the bridge came from Bulgaria. Investigations began immediately after the Kremlin released the claim, following an order by acting Prime Minister Galab Donev. The agency has also notified the Bulgarian prosecutor’s office.  

Ukrainian analysts previously proposed three possible explanations for what happened, including mines detonating on the bridge, a truck bomb, or a rocket attack. While the cause of the blast has not been confirmed, a truck bomb is believed to be the most likely explanation. 

In a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Russian Investigative Committee, announced that the route of the truck that allegedly blew up the Crimean bridge started in Bulgaria and then passed through Georgia, Armenia, North Ossetia, and Krasnodar. The European Commission spokesperson Peter Stano said Bastrykin’s words were unreliable. Kiril Petkov, former Bulgarian prime minister and leader of the We Continue the Change party, called on the caretaker government to reject the Kremlin’s suggestion that there was a Bulgarian connection to the bridge bombing. Meanwhile, Bulgaria’s pro-Russian political parties insisted on an investigation, prompting angry reactions in the media. This is not the first attempt by Russia to discredit Bulgaria. 

Sofia is in a difficult position because of political differences over the provision of military aid to Ukraine; there is already evidence of Bulgarian weapons in Ukraine. However, the topic has become a major dividing line between political parties in the country, as pro-Kremlin politicians insist that Bulgaria should not be drawn into a war with Russia by providing weapons to Ukraine. In this context, the pro-Kremlin military channel Rybar alleged that Bulgaria had delivered a new shipment of weapons to Ukraine. The channel shared blurry photos, reportedly taken on October 9, of an Antonov An-124 aircraft at an airfield in the city of Burgas. Just one day earlier, the far-right Russian paramilitary group Rusich, which is accused of carrying out executions and war crimes in Ukraine, shared on its Telegram channel a photo of a Bulgarian and Polish passport with the text, “Different people, different countries, one goal.” 

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia adds Meta to its ‘terrorist’ organizations list, blocks EUvsDisinfo website

On October 11, Russia added Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, to its list of terrorist and extremist organizations. While Facebook and Instagram are blocked in Russia, WhatsApp remains available.  

The latest designation by Russia’s financial monitoring agency means that Russian citizens and companies who buy advertisements on Facebook or Instagram could face imprisonment on charges of “sponsoring extremism” or “terrorism.” According to the pro-Kremlin outlet Interfax, Russian law requires banks to freeze funds and stop serving citizens and organizations on the list. 

Russian human rights lawyer Pavel Chikov reported that a Russian prosecutor’s office is already sending letters to Facebook and Instagram users “threatening administrative and criminal liability for posting posts on social networks.”  

Russia declared Meta an extremist organization in March 2022. Following the Kremlin’s crackdown on Western social media platforms, Russian citizens have been using virtual private networks (VPNs) to bypass official bans and access the platforms. In light of the latest designation, it is possible that Russian citizens could face criminal charges for accessing Meta’s products through a VPN. 

In addition, on October 8, Russian internet censor Roskomnadzor blocked the website of EUvsDisinfo, a counter-disinformation project of the European Union. For years, EUvsDisinfo has exposed the Kremlin disinformation campaigns. Roskomnadzor’s move is a continuation of the Russian policy to restrict Western online media and social networks in an attempt to suppress factual information about Russia’s war in Ukraine. 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

The post Russian War Report: Russia escalates war by targeting cities across Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Atlantic Council’s Regional Clean Energy Outlook Conference covered by Anadolu Agency appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How can US bipartisan legislation help the Western Balkans? A debrief with Senator Jeanne Shaheen 

While the United States is expected to bolster its political commitment to the Western Balkans through economic support, a bipartisan bill introduced in Congress aims to enhance those efforts by providing increased funding and technical assistance.  

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to Senator Jeanne Shaheen, U.S. Senator for New Hampshire, who is leading this bipartisan effort to bolster American leadership in the region, all the while  keeping a close eye on events in the Western Balkans. The Senator addresses concerns about Bosnia’s future, questionable extension of the EUFOR mandate, and shares her impressions of the region after returning to the Western Balkans for the second time this year.  

What is the view in the Senate on Serbia now that Serbia and Russia have agreed to align their foreign policies? How can the United States ensure Serbian alignment with the West? What is the United States doing to ensure renewal of the EUFOR mission. What role will the United States play in assisting Albania following the cyber-attacks launched in retaliation for the Iranian MEK’s presence in the country?  

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – How can US bipartisan legislation help the Western Balkans? | A debrief with Senator Jeanne Shaheen   appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Arslan joins TRT World to discuss the themes of the Atlantic Council’s Regional Clean Energy Outlook Conference appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What to expect in Bosnia following the elections? A debrief with Damir Marusic

Bosnian citizens voted for new representatives on October 2. Immediately after the polls closed the Office of the High Representative, led by Christian Schmidt, imposed a new election law requiring immediate implementation.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to Damir Marusic, Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, about the main takeaways of the elections.

What is next for Bosnia? Are the Dayton’s accords still relevant? Can Bosnia become a liberal non-ethnic democracy? Why is the West backing the OHR’s decision, seen by critics as giving more power to the nationalists?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What to expect in Bosnia following the elections? | A debrief with Damir Marusic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What are the four most likely scenarios for Kosovo-Serbia relations by 2027? A debrief with Milica Andric Rakic and Agon Maliqi.

After a decade of attempts to reach an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, the EU and the US appear to have joined forces to find solutions for a long-lasting deal for the future of both countries. Thirteen policy experts from Serbia and Pristina authored a document proposing four likely scenarios.

Two political analysts who took part in the working group “Kosovo and Serbia by 2027” are interviewed by Ilva Tare in this edition of #BalkansDebrief. 

Should we expect Prime Minister Kurti to settle for anything less than a full recognition of Kosovo? Will President Vucic give up the claim that Kosovo is Serbia? Can the West still act as a guarantor of a final deal between the two?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What are the four most likely scenarios for Kosovo-Serbia relations by 2027? | A debrief with Milica Andric Rakic and Agon Maliqi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Will Montenegro hold a general election or find a new majority? A Debrief with Zeljko Pantelic

What is the likelihood that a new government will be formed in Montenegro following the vote of no-confidence? Why did Prime Minister Abazovic lose the parliamentary support? Did President of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic play a role in the country’s recent political unrest?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks with Zeljko Pantelic, a Montenegrin foreign policy expert about the current political developments in Montenegro, country’s EU path, and the Open Balkan Initiative.

Can the EU’s negotiations be completed by 2025? Is there political will to fight organized crime and corruption? Is Russia a destabilizing force in Montenegro?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Will Montenegro hold a general election or find a new majority? | A Debrief with Zeljko Pantelic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What is the outlook for normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia? A Debrief with Ambassador Christopher Hill

Another crisis between Kosovo and Serbia was averted following close involvement of the EU and the US officials in facilitating reciprocal recognition of ID cards. Conversation now moves forward under the auspices of the EU-facilitated Dialogue.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to the US Ambassador to Serbia Christopher Hill, about Serbia’s EU path, issues affecting the EU-facilitated dialogue, Serbia’s choice between the West and the East & the US support for the Open Balkan initiative.

Will the United States push Serbia to fully align with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in particular, its stance on Ukraine? What is the sentiment in Belgrade about the recognition of Kosovo’s independence? How can the Open Balkan initiative facilitate regional cooperation and attract those skeptical countries in the regions to join?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What is the future of Kosovo-Serbia relations? | A Debrief with Ambassador Christopher Hill appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why does Russia want instability in the Western Balkans?

Increased Russian intelligence activity and security threats over the last few weeks across the Western Balkans have troubled some NATO allied countries. Has Russia increased its activity in the region as a result of the war in Ukraine?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to Fabian Zhilla, a Senior Fellow of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, about the national security threats posed by Russian intelligence activities and cyber attacks.

Are the Balkans prepared to fend off a hybrid war? Should the visa regime for the Russian citizens be revisited across the Balkans?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why does Russia want instability in the Western Balkans?| A debrief with Fabian Zhilla appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Another round of discussions between Serbia and Kosovo ended inconclusively Thursday in Brussels, even as tensions between the two countries continue to spiral. The stakes are high: Violence almost erupted two weeks ago in the north of Kosovo, with local Serbs raising barricades and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić warning that open conflict was imminent. 

The failure of the dialogue has ominous implications not just for the region, but for Europe’s longstanding approach to peacemaking. The war in Ukraine has ushered in a new era on the continent and emboldened local leaders to test the limits of brinksmanship. Merely facilitating dialogue between the two sides may no longer be sufficient.

The cause of recent tensions was Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s move to implement requirements that anyone entering Kosovo with Serbian identification documents needs to be provided a declaration sheet at the border crossing to temporarily replace the Serbian documents, and that cars bearing Serbian license plates for cities in Kosovo be replaced by plates issued by Prishtina. Belgrade continues to claim that Kosovo is a part of Serbia, so it sees acquiescing to Prishtina’s move as de facto recognizing Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo sees the move as reciprocal and fair, as Kosovars traveling to Serbia need to have Belgrade-issued documents on hand at all times.

Western leaders, with the United States in the lead, temporarily defused this most recent crisis by convincing Kurti to postpone implementing the reciprocity measures. The meeting Thursday in Brussels was supposed to make progress toward a solution that would head off a renewed standoff next month. But there was little pragmatism to be found, and European Union (EU) foreign policy chief Josep Borrell gave a curt statement, saying discussions will continue even though the summit failed to deliver a breakthrough.

Heading into Thursday’s talks, neither Kurti nor Vučić signaled any flexibility. The former insisted that pressure be applied to Serbia by Europe and the West. Belgrade has thus far failed to align itself with Western policy on Russia, refusing to fully implement sanctions tied to the war in Ukraine. Kurti says the measures being proposed are only fair, and that nationalist and pro-Russian rhetoric rampant in Serbia’s unfree media shows the true face of the Vučić regime—one that must not be propitiated and appeased.

Vučić, meanwhile, demanded that his Kosovar counterpart grant a measure of autonomy to Serbian communities in Kosovo—to bring into being the so-called Association of Serbian Municipalities. These were agreed upon in previous rounds of negotiations by Kurti’s predecessors, but Kurti ruled out implementing them once he was elected. Prishtina has also recently walked back another one of its previous commitments by disallowing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to facilitate Kosovar Serbs voting in Serbian elections. Vučić claims that all this shows Kurti is acting in bad faith. He insists that Serbia is committed to a peaceful resolution to the crisis and calls the move on license plates and ID papers a senseless, destabilizing provocation.

For ten years, EU officials have been tasked with mediating the conflict and trying to achieve “a comprehensive legally-binding normalization agreement” through the EU-facilitated dialogue. The EU sees itself as playing a neutral pacifying role in the region every time tensions emerge, working as an honest broker and providing the two sides a forum in which to work out their differences. That role may no longer be sustainable. 

Russia’s war in Ukraine has changed dynamics in the Western Balkans. The Kremlin is actively inflaming Serbian voters’ anti-Western grievances and pro-Russian sentiment so that a compromise becomes exceedingly difficult for Belgrade. This constrains Vučić’s room for maneuvering. His time in office has been marked by successfully balancing between the West and revisionist anti-Western powers—but that, too, may no longer be sustainable. Kurti sees all this and is moving ahead precisely to force Vučić, and by extension the EU, into choosing sides. 

Diplomatic successes often come at the very moment that tensions rise to unbearable levels. Those levels could, unfortunately, involve localized violence after September 1, when Kosovo is set to implement its measures for local Serbs. Though a wider war appears unlikely at this juncture—the NATO peacekeeping contingent in Kosovo is prepared to step in forcefully and increase troop numbers—riots and bloodshed are not out of the question.

Crisis, they say, breeds opportunity—and amid such a scenario, there may be a path forward. But it will involve the EU abandoning its neutral position as a facilitator and instead working hard to come up with creative solutions—and forcing them on both Serbia and Kosovo to an extent that it has never tried to do before. A grand bargain probably involves some sort of meaningful autonomy for Serbian minorities in Kosovo, granted in exchange for full and unconditional recognition by Serbia of Kosovo’s statehood. 

None of these are new ideas. But we are in new times that require new vigor in pursuing ambitious statesmanship. Obviously, both Kurti and Vučić will ultimately need to make painful concessions. But the time for dialogue just for the sake of dialogue is behind us. The West must try to break the impasse. Doing anything less may prove disastrous.

Damir Marusic is a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Luka Ignac is a program assistant at the Europe Center.

This article was updated to more accurately reflect the nature of the Kosovo authorities’ requirements.

The post The Western Balkans need a problem-solver, not a facilitator appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why did the proposed amendment of the electoral law in Bosnia set off protests and heated political rhetoric? 

With general elections set to take place in October, the Bosnian political spectrum still has to reach an agreement to revise the electoral law. Why did the Office of High Representative’s proposed changes to the electoral law start protests in Sarajevo?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to Adnan Huskic, President of the Center for Election Studies, who says that implementing changes to the election law so late in the game would be a mistake, as the campaign has already started.

Is Bosnia facing a crisis again? Will the EUFOR mandate be extended in November? Are the US and the UK sanctions against Bosnian officials having an effect?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What set off protests and heated political rhetoric in Bosnia? | A debrief with Adnan Huskic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What happened on the border between Kosovo and Serbia?

Another escalation of tensions on the border between Kosovo and Serbia raised concerns in Europe and in the US about a potential spillover to the rest of the Balkans.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to Petrit Selimi, Former Foreign Minister of Kosovo, who says that the crisis has not been averted but only postponed for a month.

Will the involvement of EU Commission Vice President Borrell ensure continued dialogue between President Vucic and Prime Minister Kurti? Has Russian support for Serbia made the dialogue more difficult? How can regional cooperation in the Western Balkans be unlocked?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – What triggered tensions on the border between Kosovo and Serbia? | A debrief with Petrit Selimi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For Western governments already jittery over the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine, fresh Balkan violence was the last thing they needed. Through quick-action diplomacy, they seemed to have averted the worst—but shouldn’t keep their eyes off what could still grow into a serious issue.

The fact that a spat over official documentation—requiring local Serbs to obtain Kosovan IDs and car registrations—sparked such tensions is a testament to the fragility of the situation.

The issue has been discussed for more than a decade as part of the ongoing dialogue facilitated by the European Union (EU). Moreover, the recent decision by the Kosovo government to require new documentation was fully reciprocal to what the Serbian government has been doing to Kosovars for fifteen years. But as the deadline for the implementation of these decisions loomed Sunday, Russia-friendly Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his allies—backed up by state media—accused Kosovars of preparing attacks on the north and hunting Serbs.

Things quickly began spiraling out of control. As local Serbian militants erected barricades with heavy machinery and trucks, Kosovan police and NATO troops reinforced their positions at the border crossings. Officials confirmed shootings and attacks against police and Albanian civilians. Serbia’s interior minister has even been spotted wearing the notorious “Z” insignia synonymous with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Journalists, experts, and Ukrainian lawmakers scrambled to react to what appeared to be an attempt by Belgrade to purposely inflame tensions. That fear was not baseless: For months, Western officials and Balkan leaders have worried that the region might become fertile ground for Russian meddling. 

In the end, both the EU and United States pressured Kosovo to postpone the “reciprocity decision” for a month. But while an immediate crisis was averted, a lasting solution has not been found. In the medium to long term, it’s clear that something must immediately change in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, which is facilitated by the EU but also supported by the United States. US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Karen Donfried recently stated: “The status quo is unsustainable; not only does it hinder Kosovo and Serbia’s European futures, but it benefits the Kremlin.”

Kosovo can’t expect recognition by the remaining five EU countries that don’t recognize its statehood without a comprehensive normalization of relations with Serbia. Spain, for one, has already indicated this would unlock its recognition—which would in turn allow for Kosovo to become a signatory of the Partnership for Peace and pave the way for its eventual membership in NATO (which Washington supports). Bringing investments, tourism, and much-needed integration into the Council of Europe, NATO, and other bodies where Russia does not have a veto is contingent on this normalization.

Meanwhile, Serbia must stop its belligerent actions toward Kosovo. Its media landscape, under full control of the government in Belgrade, has been spewing hate speech against my country for far too long. For their part, the EU and the United States must be more forceful in compelling Serbia to once and for all choose its geopolitical orientation rather than attempting to play both sides. There are some indications that this has already begun; but dancing around the thorniest problems in the Balkans won’t suffice to prevent crisis and bloodshed.

Brussels and Washington must change their formula of ineffective, last-minute shuttle diplomacy to solve crises. The pay-off—lasting peace in the Balkans—is far greater than the political capital needed to finally close this fractious chapter between Kosovo and Serbia. 

Petrit Selimi is the former foreign minister of the Republic of Kosovo.

The post Former Kosovo foreign minister: How to stop Serbia spat from spiraling out of control appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How will the new EU enlargement methodology affect the Balkans?

The start of membership talks with Albania and North Macedonia marked a milestone in the EU enlargement process in the Western Balkans after many years of disappointment.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare interviews Pierre Mirel, Honorary Director General of the European Commission, on the impact of the new EU methodology in the accession talks. Has the EU’s credibility been restored? Will the reversibility of the enlargement process work in practice? What is the staged accession approach, proposed by Mirel?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

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Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Will the new EU enlargement methodology facilitate the Balkans accession to the EU? | A debrief with Pierre Mirel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How can the West support the Balkans to shape their European future?

Russia’s war in Ukraine has caused a tectonic shift in Europe and its periphery. It is time for decisive action from EU leaders to engage strategically in the Western Balkans. Ilva Tare interviews Damon Wilson, President and CEO of the National Endowment for Democracy, on the opportunity for Western support in the region.

Can the United States engage more actively in the region? What role can the United States play in encouraging reforms in the Western Balkans? How can the next generation of young politicians and entrepreneurs committed to democratic values in the region be supported and encouraged by EU and US partners?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – How can the West support the Western Balkans to shape their European future? | A debrief with Damon Wilson appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Is a compromise possible in the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia?

While Sofia accepted the French proposal to find a solution between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, protests erupted after the Skopje government decided to consider approving the demands before beginning EU accession talks.

Ilva Tare discusses the origins of this dispute and the path forward for both countries with Dimitar Bechev, lecturer at Oxford’s School of Global & Area Studies. Is it possible for Bulgaria and North Macedonia to create a model for non-provocative national identity expression? Is the current crisis setting a precedent for future rounds of regional enlargement? Can the EU act as a guarantee for bilateral talks?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

Europe Center

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Europe Center promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

The post #BalkansDebrief – Is a compromise possible in the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia? | A Debrief from Dimitar Bechev appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Western support for the Southern Corridor and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline has long been an important element of European gas diversification efforts. Although a very minor consumer of Russian natural gas, the Western Balkans is an area in which Russia has sought to oppose NATO and EU expansion and counter Western gas diversification efforts. The West needs to maintain a strong and supportive posture in this important southern flank of NATO.

Russia’s role in the Western Balkans

During the Ukraine war, Russia has continued its efforts to destabilize the Western Balkans using its pro-Russian allies, especially in Serbia and the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose governments have not joined the Western sanctions process against Russia.

Gazprom exports natural gas to Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Bulgaria. As part of its strategy to bypass Ukraine and discontinue use of the Trans-Balkan pipeline through Ukraine and Moldova, Russia built with Turkey the two-line TurkStream pipeline with one line a 15.75 billion-cubic-meter (bcm) pipeline to Bulgaria with onward links to Serbia, North Macedonia, and Hungary. Gazprom began shipping gas through TurkStream to Bulgaria, Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in early January 2020, and Hungary is now importing Russian gas from Serbia through a pipeline with a capacity of 8.5 bcm per year.

Serbia is the cornerstone of Russia’s strategic interests in the region and Russia has supported Serbia in its non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence as well. Serbia has also expanded its imports of Russian military equipment, including MiG fighters, tanks, air defense, and missiles, a strategy of growing concern to the six NATO members that neighbor Serbia.

Gas diversification and transit

Western Europe’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian gas have important implications for the Western Balkans. First, they enhance the importance of the Trans Adriatic (TAP) gas pipeline that brings Azerbaijani gas from Turkey’s TANAP pipeline through Greece and Albania to Italy, which was 40 percent dependent on Russian gas in 2021 and is currently being driven by Gazprom reductions to find alternative supplies. TAP began operating in 2021 and is expected to operate at its full capacity of 10 bcm per year in 2022 and 2023. The potential expansion of TAP is being considered by Azerbaijan’s SOCAR and other companies and may be put on a fast track.

A second prong of Western Europe’s gas diversification initiative, involving the completion of the IGB (a Greece-Bulgaria interconnector expected to be operational in July 2022) as well as the construction of a new $378 million liquefied natural gas (LNG) receiving terminal at Alexandropoulos by 2023 linked with both IGB and TAP, would break the Russian hold on gas supplies to Bulgaria and North Macedonia. Thirdly, the Croatian government is pursuing the expansion of the Krk Island floating storage regasification unit (FSRU) LNG import terminal, built with EU funding. This facility is especially significant in that it has allowed Hungary to diversify its gas imports and receive 1 million bcm per year despite Hungary’s conclusion at the end of 2021 of a long-term contract with Gazprom for up to 4 million bcm of gas supplies per year. Slovenia is also interested in reducing its Russian gas dependence by drawing from the Krk terminal.

Gas substitution and the energy transition

Gas consumption in the Western Balkans currently stands at about 4 bcm per year, mainly in heating and combined heat and power (CHP) systems in major towns and a few industries in Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The power sectors of these countries currently have different mixes of hydropower and thermal power, including significant coal and lignite use.

Although the six Western Balkan countries are working to expand renewable energy and have set targets under the Energy Community framework, they are pursuing the expansion or introduction of gas supply in parallel.  Such development can be useful in improving system flexibility, substituting for coal and lignite, and complementing varying seasonal and annual hydro generation and intermittent solar and wind production.

For the three countries without domestic gas connections, Albania is moving to build a gas exit point off the TAP pipeline near the Fier compressor and considering supplying gas to the dormant Vlore thermal plant. Montenegro may be able to obtain gas if the Ionian-Adriatic gas pipeline (a spur off TAP that would extend to Montenegro and on to Croatia) proceeds, and a feasibility study of a possible FSRU LNG import project at the Port of Bar is being conducted. Gas would be especially helpful to reduce Kosovo’s heavy dependence on power from the Kosovo A and B lignite units.  A line from Albania to Kosovo is under consideration and feasibility work for this project, called ALKOGAP, is being financed by the Balkan Investment Framework.

Of three current Russian gas importers, North Macedonia has been the most focused on phasing out coal with an initial target of 2027. With gas consumption and demand growing rapidly, the government seeks to expand the natural gas network beyond Skopje, and a direct 160km Greece-North Macedonia interconnector is planned. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a 187 km Croatia-Bosnia gas interconnector, planned under an agreement between BH-Gas and Plinacro of Croatia for operation in 2024, will help expand and diversify gas supplies. Serbia is the largest gas consumer in the Western Balkans, with over 2.7 bcm annual consumption. It is mainly dependent on coal for power, and gas use is limited to CHPs and district heating systems. In an effort to reduce coal use through renewables and gas, Serbia signed a new 3-year agreement with Gazprom in May; thus, despite EU and German pressure, it is unlikely they will impose sanctions or pursue meaningful gas diversification.

The future of gas in the Western Balkans

The Western Balkans, as part of NATO’s southern flank, is becoming increasingly important to the diversification of Europe’s gas supply and increasing South-North flows and options. The future of gas will depend significantly on the pivotal position of Greece and Turkey with respect to both their transit role and the potential to import more LNG. However, both countries face a major challenge in reducing their high domestic dependence on Russia gas (30 and 43 percent of gas supply in 2021, respectively). Despite Turkey’s past reliability as a transit state for Azerbaijani gas, its controversial purchase of a surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia, its reliance on Russia for the large $20 billion Akkuyu nuclear power complex (which is being negatively affected by the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia), and strained diplomatic relations between Turkey and Greece are of concern, especially with calls increasing to expand Trans-Adriatic and TANAP volumes and to import gas from Israel and Egypt. Turkey’s agreement at the recent NATO Summit to remove its opposition to the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO, though, is a positive sign.

Though there are innumerable threats emanating from the war in Ukraine that jeopardize European and global security, it is vital that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union give concrete, specific attention to the Western Balkans and support investment in projects to increase gas diversification, develop renewable energy generation, and enhance the integration of regional gas and electricity infrastructure. It is especially important to work with Serbia and help them understand that their future does not lie with Russia. The path forward is thorny and will require crafty and careful diplomacy, but it could prove a pivotal part of the success of Europe’s move to get out from under its dependence on Russian energy.

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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The impact of the European Council’s decision on the Western Balkans

What will happen in the Western Balkans following the European Council’s decision?

As Balkan leaders expressed their frustration with the enlargement impasse, they emphasized the importance of strengthening regional cooperation. Ilva Tare, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, speaks with Maja Piscevic and Damir Marusic, Senior Fellows at the Europe Center with firsthand knowledge of the situation in the region.

Will the path forward for the six Balkan countries towards EU integration be via the Berlin Process 2.0 or the Open Balkan initiative? Can the concept of a European Geopolitical Community help to advance enlargement? If so, how?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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This sounds exactly like Ukraine’s current experience, but it is actually the story of Croatia in the early 1990s.

In 1991, Europe’s biggest conflict since WWII erupted in the Balkans when the Yugoslavian military invaded Croatia after it declared independence. Serbia opposed the secession and sought to claim Croatian lands populated by ethnic Serbs. After an initial attempt to occupy Croatia failed, a self-proclaimed Serbia-backed entity was established within Croatia occupying 26% of the country.

In 1995, Croatia launched two major offensives and regained control over the occupied regions of the country. Despite this success, the cost of the conflict was huge. From a pre-war population of four million, around 15,000 civilians and soldiers were killed or missing. More than half a million people were displaced. Economic losses were equally severe, with GDP falling by half during the first year of the conflict alone. Meanwhile, infrastructure damaged was estimated at approximately EUR 250 billion, or five times Croatia’s annual GDP.

In every single category, these figures are strikingly similar to the costs inflicted on Ukraine during the first four months of today’s ongoing Russian invasion. 

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Since the end of the Balkan Wars, Croatia has made huge progress. It has undergone a transformation from war-torn country to a high-income EU member state and, after Slovenia, is now the most developed country in the region.

The celebration of Croatia’s Statehood Day this year coincided with a historic milestone for Croatia; the European Commission (EC) and the ECB published a Convergence Report which concluded that Croatia is the only non-euro EU country ready to implement the EURO from 2023. The EC also concluded that Croatia no longer suffers from macroeconomic imbalances and can be excluded from the Macro Imbalances Procedure (MIP). Croatia is now expected to join the Schengen zone and become an OECD member in the near future.   

Reaching this point was not easy. For a quarter of a century, Croatian governments have had to tackle challenges including rebuilding the country, establishing a sensible monetary regime, and handling successive economic crises. Through it all, Croatia’s strong commitment to EU integration has served as a guiding light that has helped steer the country toward more prosperous times.

The parallels between Croatia’s earlier predicament and Ukraine’s current plight are immediately apparent. Both countries were forced to fight for their freedom, identity and independence against a more powerful neighbor. Thankfully, today’s Ukraine also shares the same sense of national unity and solidarity that proved so crucial in Croatia’s earlier success.

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Croatians have enormous empathy for Ukraine’s suffering because it is so painfully familiar. Indeed, this emotional bond has been evident ever since Russian aggression against Ukraine first began with the seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Croatia has provided humanitarian and military aid, with individual Croatians volunteering to help defend Ukraine.

While Ukrainians are very grateful for all this material and moral support, we believe Croatia offers something even more precious: hope. Croatia’s national journey is a source of inspiration for all Ukrainians. It tells us that victory over a far stronger adversary is possible. It gives us reason to believe that occupied lands can be liberated and reintegrated. And it allows us to look with growing confidence toward a future within the European family of nations.

Ukrainians expect to receive EU candidate nation status in the coming days, but nobody in Ukraine is under any illusions over the difficulties that lie ahead. The war with Russia is far from over. Ukraine is fighting not only for its independence but for its very existence. Once this existential threat is overcome, Ukraine must then meet the demanding criteria for EU membership. This historic process may take time, but the journey made by Croatia gives us hope and inspiration.

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Part II: What is the path forward for the stalled Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue?

As the dialogue between the two countries is stalled and the region expects anxiously the EU Council decision on accession talks, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare interviews Ivan Vejvoda, Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences and a seasoned observer of the Western Balkans to continue the conversation on the future of the dialogue and EU enlargement. 

This episode broadens the aperture on these issues: What is the sentiment of Serbian citizens on the recognition of the independent state of Kosovo? Does Serbia have the political will and leadership to make a final deal between Belgrade and Pristina? Will the EU make a bold decision on EU enlargement for the region?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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What can be done to change the status quo and start a productive dialogue? Should Kurti’s government participate in regional and European initiatives? What should Kosovo do to make the most of the Berlin Process 2.0?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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What are the regional ramifications of Serbia’s gas agreement with Russia?

The three-year agreement announced by Serbian President Vučić with Russia’s Gazprom is a sharp contrast to other EU and candidate countries that have joined the sanctions against Putin for his war in Ukraine. The Atlantic Council Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare interviews the Global Energy Center’s Olga Khakova on the ramifications of this agreement to Serbia, the region, and beyond.

What are the implications of this decision for Europe and the Balkans? What does Vučić’s gas deal with Putin signify for Serbia’s relationship with Russia? Is the EU’s oil-import ban enough to affect Putin’s revenues which he uses to fund his war in Ukraine?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – What are the regional ramifications of Serbia’s gas agreement with Russia? | A debrief with Olga Khakova appeared first on Atlantic Council.

EU enlargement: a process that is lacking political fuel?

As the June European Council meeting is approaching, Bulgaria continues to block North Macedonia’s opening of accession negotiations with the EU. The Atlantic Council Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare interviews former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of North Macedonia Nikola Dimitrov on his expectations for this meeting.

Will the EU begin accession negotiations with North Macedonia after a 17 year wait for the country? Will Bulgaria’s decision on North Macedonia have an impact on the Balkans’ European dream? What are the different scenarios for moving forward European enlargement and is a two-staged accession a realistic idea?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – EU enlargement: a process that is lacking political fuel? | A debrief from Nikola Dimitrov appeared first on Atlantic Council.

And Kosovo deserves its place in that conversation, says Prime Minister Albin Kurti, whose country is seeking swift membership in both NATO and the EU. “Kosovo is the democratic success story of the region,” Kurti said Wednesday in Washington at an Atlantic Council Front Page event. “Make no mistake: Undoing our progress in Kosovo would be the single greatest victory despotic President [Vladimir] Putin could wish for.”

In a conversation with Damir Marusic, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, Kurti made the case for the power of the EU, debunked Putin’s use of NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo as justification for the Ukraine invasion, and addressed his country’s path forward with Serbia. Find more highlights from the discussion below.

Watch the full event

Eye on Moscow

• Kosovo is key to the Russian messaging battle around Ukraine. Kurti said Putin’s “irrational fixation” on Kosovo was a result of his desire to discredit Western intervention. “Kosovo is the only country which is left as a success story,” Kurti said, after US and NATO failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. “We must not allow Putin to frame this debate as to whether or not it is acceptable to him to have NATO members on the border of Russia or her proxies but, rather, whether we can tolerate autocracy on the borders of peaceful democratic nations.”

• Kurti is pushing for Kosovo to join the Council of Europe at its meetings this week. Like most of Kosovo’s efforts to join international bodies, this move is opposed by Serbia, which—along with about half of the world’s governments—still does not recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state. But the timing is right, Kurti said, given that the Council of Europe recently booted Russia: “If you really are on the side of peace and democracy, this is the right thing to do: Kick out the Russian Federation, bring in the Republic of Kosovo.”
  
• As for the EU, Kurti noted that admitting the six Western Balkan nations would ease trade and logistics by reducing the bloc’s borders by some 2,000 miles while making sure “our families get united” because so many Balkan citizens live in Western Europe. A stalled EU expansion, he said, would be “an invitation for foreign malign actors that threaten the security of Europe.” 

• Kurti had harsh criticism for Serbia, but said it was still Kosovo’s goal to normalize relations, adding that US President Joe Biden is pushing for “a legally binding agreement centered on mutual recognition.” Kurti also said he hopes Biden and the EU will condemn Serbia’s decision to not join Western sanctions: “You cannot be neutral between [a] firefighter and fire.”

Juicing the economy

• As Kosovo applies for EU membership alongside other Balkan and Eastern European nations, Kurti said the EU should relaunch the “Berlin Process 2.0” policy: “No EU funds without EU values,” he said, highlighting democratization, rule of law, freedom of the press, and human rights. He pointed to the inclusion of Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein in the European Free Trade Association before some of them joined the EU as a possible pathway for Balkan nations. 

• Short of a full recognition deal with Serbia, Kurti pointed out that non-recognizer countries such as Greece, Slovakia, and Romania accept Kosovo’s documents even without recognizing its independence—a half-measure that could pave the way for stronger economic ties. “There is a space in which the President of Serbia can walk, but he refuses to do so.” 

• Kurti is wrapping up a US trip that has taken him from San Francisco, Dallas, and Chicago to Iowa, Michigan, and Washington—with New York and Boston up next. Aside from the typical diplomatic stops, many of his meetings have been to promote investment from business leaders within the Kosovo diaspora. “This time I’m not calling them to sacrifice,” Kurti said, “but to come and profit and join us in the unprecedented development we’ve been having since the end of the war.” 

• Amid concerns about the Balkan region’s reliance on electricity and other resources from Russia, Kurti signed an agreement with the US Millennium Challenge Corporation that gives Kosovo $234 million for battery storage and energy workforce training, particularly women, with an eye toward self-sufficiency. “A harsh winter is ahead of us, and we must make sure that we cover the peak with our generation,” he said. 

Nick Fouriezos is an Atlanta-based writer with bylines from every US state and six continents. Follow him on Twitter @nick4iezos.

The post Kosovo prime minister: Europe can help defend this ‘democratic success story’ amid Russian aggression appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What is the future of EU enlargement?

While the EU enlargement process is stalled because of one country’s refusal to initiate accession talks with potential new members, old proposals for breaking the impasse are gaining popularity. The Atlantic Council Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare interviews the European Stability Initiative’s Gerald Knaus on the two-stage EU accession idea.

What would it mean for Western Balkan countries to first join the EU’s single market before becoming full EU member states? In which ways can candidate countries benefit from the EU’s unified economic policies? Will EU leaders agree to reform the Union in a way that makes the accession process

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

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Milorad Dodik, the Serb member of the three-person presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and de facto leader of the country’s Serb-majority entity, Republika Srpska (RS), has announced RS’s effective secession, threatening to withdraw it from Bosnia’s central government, armed forces, judiciary, tax and customs agencies, and other state bodies, as well as to establish an independent Bosnian Serb army. These moves, in violation of the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnian war, would establish the RS as a rogue state similar to Moldova’s Transnistria and effectively partition the country.

Dodik has been clear about his wish to see the end of Bosnia and Herzegovina since he became prime minister of the RS in 2006. But today, his threats seem more realistic than ever, particularly since he enjoys support from Russia—with the latter having threatened earlier this month to block the annual renewal of EUFOR, the EU’s peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia has helped train the RS’s police force, which is now armed with military-grade weapons, potentially enabling it to act as a military for the entity. Such moves are part of Serbia and Russia’s wider assault on the international order in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, which also involve threats to Kosovo, the destabilization of Montenegro, calls to unite Serbs across the Balkans via the “Serb World” (Srpski svet), and an escalating Russian presence on the border of Ukraine.

Further, Dodik wants to see the closure of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR), a body tasked with implementing the Dayton Accords and which has traditionally restrained Serb and Croat separatism in the country—even though the office, under incumbent Christian Schmidt (who’s widely seen as soft on Russia) has never seemed more ineffectual. Meanwhile, increasingly vocal right-wing populists in Europe, including Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, are sympathetic to RS separatism. Nearby Croatia has also supported the Croat Democratic Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which supports Dodik’s goal of dismantling the country.

That’s why the international balance is more likely to tilt in favor of those seeking Bosnia and Herzegovina’s break-up more than at any time since the war ended. This means that no broad multilateral effort to resolve the crisis on a consensual basis is likely to succeed. Anyway, Dodik regularly threatens to scuttle the Dayton Accords in order to extract concessions from the international community. Western leaders regularly appease him, superficially averting immediate crises by fueling the RS’s secessionist drive in the long term.

Naturally, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s international supporters are tempted to call for bolstering the existing international structures—the OHR and EUFOR—to prop up the crumbling Dayton system. But that overlooks the fact that those accords are unworkable because they attempt to reconcile the existence of a multinational Bosnia and Herzegovina with the presence of a Serb sectarian entity that was established on the basis of a genocidal attempt to destroy multinational Bosnia and Herzegovina. This contradiction will always fuel RS separatism. Even Dodik is not an aberration, but instead the inevitable product of the system; he began as a moderate but evolved into a radical separatist. And without a strong international administration—such as through the powerful and proactive OHR that existed under High Representative Paddy Ashdown in the mid-2000s, which took coercive action against troublemakers among the country’s elites and was backed with a strong international troop presence—the RS will inevitably revert to separatism in the future.

Propping up the current crumbling order leaves Bosnia and Herzegovina indefinitely as a powder-keg waiting to explode as soon as the international balance of power is sufficiently upset. Given the current international climate, this may happen sooner rather than later.

It’s time to accept that the Dayton system—which was a stopgap measure to end the war and was never intended to be permanent—has failed to bring stable peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dodik’s moves, including his rejection of international-court verdicts that establish the Srebrenica massacre as genocide, amount to a repudiation of Dayton. With the Serb side so roundly rejecting it, neither Bosnia and Herzegovina nor any other member of the international community is obliged to abide by the terms of the agreement.

That’s why it’s time for the United States, the United Kingdom, and other willing members of NATO to serve the RS leadership notice that, unless it abandons its separatist policies, disarms, and accepts the immediate restoration of a functional Bosnian state, the allies will work with the other members of the Bosnian presidency to introduce a wholly new constitutional order in which the RS would be dissolved. Not only would this send a strong signal to Dodik’s supporters that their leader is leading them off a cliff, but it would also demonstrate to Russia a renewed resolve to confront broader security threats in the region.

The Bosnian question has jeopardized the stability of Europe for nearly three decades. It is time finally to resolve it.

Marko Attila Hoare is an associate professor and head of research for the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology.

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The decision on whom to invite into the pro-democracy camp was always going to stir controversy. Biden has to balance admission based on the quality of a country’s democracy against more realist geopolitical considerations. Last week, the Western Balkans exposed this tension for all to see.

According to a preliminary list published by Politico, Belarus, Hungary, Serbia, Turkey, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were not invited to the summit. Kosovo wasn’t either, and its exclusion was surprising because it is both an increasingly vibrant democracy and a US ally. In response, leading Kosovo-based pro-democracy non-governmental organizations applied pressure. Kosovo’s President Vjosa Osmani also traveled to Washington along with Kosovo’s informal ambassador, pop star Dua Lipa, who spoke of a peaceful and democratic country before an influential crowd at the Atlantic Council’s Distinguished Leadership Awards. The US government course corrected soon after: Both Kosovo and Serbia, its longtime foe, received invitations.

In Kosovo’s case, the reversal made sense. While the rule of law and ethnic relations remain a challenge there, the country has bucked the authoritarian trends of recent years. It has held several free and fair elections, followed by smooth transitions of power. There is a vibrant and pluralistic media scene, although political influence remains a concern. Civil society is vibrant, and youth and women have become a key voting bloc. With that power, they are promoting change by advocating for rights and freedoms. From a foreign-policy perspective, Kosovars remain overwhelmingly staunch supporters of the transatlantic alliance, despite Russian and Chinese influence in the Western Balkans.

By failing to recognize Kosovo’s democratic performance with its initial snub, the United States was undermining its own goals to incentivize democratization across the Western Balkans as a means of advancing the region’s Euro-Atlantic integration. One of the reasons why the European Union (EU) accession process has stalled is that many in the EU are reluctant to admit new members on a similar trajectory as Hungary. But the current Western policy of embracing authoritarians in the Western Balkans for stability reasons has helped entrench exactly that type of illiberalism across the region.

The Biden administration is rightfully worried that the region—overflowing with disputes like the one between Kosovo and Serbia that has simmered since Kosovo’s independence in 2008—is becoming more vulnerable to Russian disruption efforts and Chinese corrosive capital. Recent escalations in Kosovo’s north and threats of a new conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina have raised serious alarms.

Hoping to contain a deterioration, the Biden administration is deploying more high-level diplomats to the Western Balkans; expanding the scope of sanctionable offenses in the region; continuing to prioritize the reduction of dependence on Russian energy sources; and encouraging regional cooperation, including through the Open Balkan initiative. But this approach also treats Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić as a valuable, if not always reliable, partner in striving for US goals, despite his role in facilitating Chinese and Russian influence in the region.

Osmani and Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti came to power this year promising to fight corruption and to reject compromises with Serbia. They are perceived as being uncomfortable with the current US approach to the region, viewing it as too accommodating to Serbia at the expense of US allies. As a result, they have adopted a more assertive sovereigntist posture, undertaking several actions that conflict with US priorities, perhaps to force a change in course. This includes being uncooperative in the dialogue with Serbia and snubs like rejecting a proposed US-financed gas pipeline from Greece.

Many in Kosovo disagree with the leadership’s foreign-policy approach. It does not appreciate Kosovo’s overall weak hand, critics say, and it fails to see that the United States is ultimately on Kosovo’s side. Washington is trying to consolidate Kosovo’s statehood even as it addresses a web of other complications threatening regional peace. This disagreement is feeding into wider public discontent that is already having political consequences: In last month’s local elections, Kurti’s party suffered setbacks.

So is the drama over? Maybe for the time being, but the issues raised by the episode are not going away. By correcting its first slight, the Biden administration has only further highlighted the difficult question that runs through the entire summit: Is this all about geopolitics or is it all about democratic values? Inviting both Serbia and Kosovo does not change the fact that the two countries are on different democratic trajectories. Indeed, the about-face opens new questions on criteria. It is arguably harder to justify keeping Bosnia and Hungary out now.

Still, the administration’s reversal on Kosovo is a welcome development that (among other things) will empower its civil society. With the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Biden signaled a more realistic posture rather than a return to the liberal internationalism of the 1990s. That doesn’t mean he shouldn’t showcase the achievements of that era. Kosovo, with all its flaws, is one of the rare successful cases of US intervention and state-building, and its participation in the summit is a good thing. The summit will help in sustaining the momentum for domestic reforms, while also potentially resetting US-Kosovo relations toward a common outlook and approach to resolving the dispute with Serbia. It may not be a completely new beginning, but it’s a helpful step.

Agon Maliqi is a policy analyst and chairman of the board of Sbunker—a pro-democracy think tank and new media platform based in Prishtina, Kosovo—as well as a former Reagan-Fascell Democracy fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy.  

The post Kosovo and Serbia expose the Summit for Democracy’s conundrum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for joining us tonight for the Atlantic Council’s 2021 Distinguished Leadership Awards, which is at the same time our sixtieth-anniversary celebration. Welcome also to the Andrew Mellon Auditorium for the Atlantic Council’s first in-person awards dinner in more than two years.

To kick things off this evening, I’d like to turn over the floor to our chairman, John F.W. Rogers, who is joining us remotely this evening. He’ll explain that. Mr. Chairman, John, the floor is yours.

JOHN F.W. ROGERS: Good evening. Ladies and gentlemen, dignitaries, and distinguished honorees, as chairman of the Atlantic Council it is my pleasure to welcome you to the Distinguished Leadership Awards. I wish that I could be there with you, but a succession of events—not the least of which has been air transportation—have conspired to keep me from arriving on time.

But please do not let my absence lessen the sincerity of my very best wishes to our honorees and the warmest welcome to the Andrew Mellon Auditorium. It was in this very room that President Truman hosted the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, just four short years after the culmination of the Second World War. As the Atlantic community came together at this historic inflection point, it became evident that a clear, coherent, and more effective voice was needed to address the challenges that lie ahead.

It was against this backdrop that the Atlantic Council was founded in 1961, bringing together the transatlantic community to navigate times of crisis. Sixty years later, the transatlantic spirit lives on, stronger, certainly, more global than ever before.

As we gather on the eve of Veterans Day, I want to offer a special salute to our nation’s armed forces who have dedicated their lives to this great country so that we may live in freedom and prosperity and in the enduring gratitude that we have for the brave men and women who have made the ultimate sacrifice. And on behalf of the entire Atlantic Council community, we thank you.

I would like to offer a salute to the previous Atlantic Council chairmen who have come before me, including General James L. Jones, Governor Jon Huntsman, Secretary Chuck Hagel, and General Brent Scowcroft, whom we lost in August [2020] at the age of ninety-five. I deeply appreciate their immense contributions to the Atlantic Council.

Despite the challenges caused by the pandemic over the past two years, this evening’s honorees have demonstrated their own extraordinary approach to global leadership, which have united communities around the world at a time when it is needed most. And thanks to their vision, the strength of their character, and their commitment to a more secure future, we honor Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission; Dr. Albert Bourla, the chairman and CEO of Pfizer; Professor Sahin and Dr. Türeci, the co-founders of BioNTech; and Dua Lipa, a Grammy Award-winning artist and activist. Congratulations once again.

And before I close, I would like to offer my sincere gratitude to the entire Atlantic Council staff, the board of directors, and the International Advisory Board for making tonight and so much more possible. I am deeply proud to work with each of you and thank you and enjoy the evening.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also to Adrienne Arsht, the executive vice chair of the board, who is here, of course, this evening, and to Dave McCormick. A little bit of applause for Adrienne, I heard there. And to Dave McCormick, the chair of our International Advisory Board. We’re so happy to have you here as well, Dave. And it really does make me so happy to see you all.

With that, ladies and gentlemen, please turn your attention and you’ll see—you’ll hear from Dave and you’ll hear from me a little bit later on various things this evening. With that, ladies and gentlemen, please turn your attention to the screens as we begin tonight’s Distinguished Leadership Awards.

PHIL MURPHY: Good evening, everybody. It is an incredible honor to be a part of tonight’s event and I must begin by congratulating the Atlantic Council on achieving its sixtieth anniversary.

Many of our European colleagues refer to the United States as the place across the pond from Europe, but the work of the Atlantic Council has helped shrink the figurative size of an ocean and, with it, the distances between our continents, our governments, and our people. So I want to give John Rogers—a dear friend—and the distinguished board a big shoutout, and Fred Kempe and the incredible staff. Congratulations on your sixtieth.

Now onto the task at hand. By the way, very rare for me, even having lived in Germany, that the Scorpions are playing before I got out here. And I’m opening for both Ursula von der Leyen and Dua Lipa. So I want to—I’ve got to pinch myself here. I salute each of tonight’s outstanding awardees and I am so privileged to introduce the recipient of this year’s award for Distinguished International Leadership, someone who, from our very first moments when I served as the United States ambassador in Germany, my wife, Tammy, who’s with me tonight—we bonded with our honoree tonight instantly and became dear friends. And she’s someone with whom I have found so much both professional and personal common ground. For those of us who have dedicated parts of or all of our careers in service to the preservation and strengthening of the transatlantic partnership, Ursula von der Leyen needs no introduction, but given that this is an awards ceremony and I’m expected to fill up three minutes of the program, she’s going to get one.

The thirteenth president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen counts ancestors across generations in public service—and, by the way, on both sides of the Atlantic—and she is the daughter of an esteemed German civil servant who also served as minister president of Lower Saxony in Germany. That is, for those of you who don’t know the German system, the equivalent of an American governor, and therefore, I know that Ursula also understands the excitement and relief after a successful governor’s reelection. Just making sure you’re paying attention out there.

One could rightfully say that Ursula was born to lead, and certainly, that would be correct. But you could also be incorrect in that assertion, given all that she has done herself throughout her own distinguished career in public service. A doctor and public-health expert by profession, she’s had an even larger impact on our world by answering the calling of public service. Across a distinguished fourteen years in the Cabinet of Chancellor Angela Merkel, another extraordinary champion of the transatlantic partnership, Ursula compiled a unique portfolio that has directly improved the lives of literally tens and tens of millions of German citizens—minister of family affairs and youth, minister of labor and social affairs, minister of defense. But now, as the president of the European Commission, her work is impacting hundreds of millions of European lives and, in turn, billions of lives around the world. Her tenure has also coincided with one of the most challenging periods in our long transatlantic partnership, even beyond the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. But President von der Leyen’s unwavering commitment to strong US-European relations is ensuring that we are not letting anything as wide as an ocean keep us from achieving our shared goals.

So perhaps leadership is in Ursula von der Leyen’s DNA after all, or as my friend Albert Bourla and the other medical leadership, outstanding leaders here tonight might say, it’s in her mRNA. Either way, the seventy-five-year economic and security partnership between the United States and Europe is returning to full strength, and so much of this is due to one person in particular: Liebe Ursula, meine damen und herren, ladies and gentlemen, it is my distinct honor and pleasure to present the Atlantic Council’s 2021 Distinguished International Leadership Award to my dear friend, President Ursula von der Leyen.

PRESIDENT URSULA VON DER LEYEN: … Thank you very much. Thank you, Phil, for your kind words.

And I must say, ladies and gentlemen, I feel incredibly honored by this award. The fact that the Atlantic Council is awarding me, as a European and transatlantic citizen, means so much to me. This is exactly how I feel: A European and a transatlantic citizen.

My great-grandmother was born here in the United States in 1883. When she was nineteen years old, she married a German merchant, my great grandfather, and she moved to Bremen—that is a city in northern Germany—and spent there the rest of her life.

My father —and thank you, Phil, for mentioning him—was fifteen years old when World War II ended. He saw all the atrocities and horrors of war as a boy, but then he also made the overwhelming experience of liberation thanks to the United States and their allies. And after the war, he was one of the first German students awarded a Fulbright US scholarship. He studied at Cornell University, and for him, a completely new world opened up through the generosity and the foresight of a US politician. He never forgot this great experience throughout his life, and he passed on the typical American “why not” and “can do” spirit to his children.

And, my dear friends, around about forty-five years later I fell in love with the United States during the years I spent as [a] trailing spouse in Stanford. My husband was a postdoc and later a faculty member at the Division of Cardiovascular Medicine at Stanford, headed at that time by Dr. Victor Dzau, who is with us tonight. So we moved to California with our at that time three children.

You must know that in Germany in the early 1990s—in the early 1990s, it wasn’t that common to be a mother while having a professional career too. Then coming to the United States felt like a breath of fresh air for me. No one questioned my choice of being a working mom. Everyone expected both me and my husband to work and take care of the kids. I felt supported and empowered like never before. Two more children were born. And thus, since then, my husband and I are proud parents of two American citizens.

The story of the transatlantic ties is made of millions of stories like mine, but most importantly it’s made of shared values and interests between the two sides of the ocean. And this was true when the Atlantic Council was created exactly sixty years ago and it is still true today, in an entirely different world compared to the era of the Cold War. Yes, the European Union and the United States are still natural partners. And even if recently we may have disagreed on some difficult choices, our interests and values converge on all of the most crucial issues of our times. For example: Shaping the economy and the recovery while fighting climate change; rewriting modern rules for the global economy; and protecting our democracies.

And I would like to briefly address these three issues tonight because all of them—on all of them, the United States and the European Union are on the same side of the table and surely on the same side of history.

First, on a green recovery, what are the European Union’s and the United States’ interests? We both want to keep global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius while at the same time relaunching the economy both domestically and around the world. And this means on one hand decarbonizing our economies, investing in green innovation and clean technologies, and in high-quality infrastructure at home; and on the other hand, it means supporting developing countries to leapfrog to a carbon-neutral future. And as President Biden and I demonstrated at the COP26 in Glasgow last week, the European Union and the United States are fully aligned on this. We initiated together [the] Global Methane Pledge and got more than one hundred countries to join. We are working on a circular economy that gives back more to nature than it takes. We are both working on a pilot with South Africa to help them close their coal plants and create new green jobs instead. And at the G20 summit in Rome, we agreed not only to pause our disputes on steel and aluminum but to join our efforts to decarbonize these two crucial industries. The United States and the European Union are exactly where they should be: Showing global leadership to [ensure] nothing less than the survival of our planet at stake.

Second, on rewriting modern rules for the global economy, the challenge we face here is clear. Fast technological change and shifting economic forces need a modern rulebook and effective international action. Take tech policy. Both the European Union and the United States want to become less dependent on international supply chains for critical technologies. We can help each other to diversify and improve resilience.

For example, on critical issues like semiconductors, here at the Atlantic Council you have recently argued that it is time for transatlantic digital policy. Well, with the EU-US Trade and Technology Council we are taking crucial steps in absolutely the right direction.

And I imagine us cooperating also on the rules for digital platforms. We have a convergent vision on how digital platforms should work in open societies and open economies.

And then let me touch on building the networks we need for the global economy. We in the European Union are about to present a new strategy to connect the world. We call it Global Gateway. Like President Biden’s Build Back Better for the World, Global Gateway will seek to be a multiplier for high-standard investment in infrastructure around the world. Our initiatives will help build much-needed networks for transport, energy, trade, data, and people while insisting on the highest environmental and labor standards, and on financial transparency. It will forge links, not create dependencies. And when the European Union and the United States come together, we have the power to shape the world of tomorrow from 6G to green finance.

And therefore, finally, this year has reminded us that we must stand up for democracy every day. Democracy is being challenged from both inside and outside. Authoritarian regimes try to influence the outcomes of our democratic elections. In the United States, hundreds of people attacked the Capitol, the heart of your democracy. In the European Union, some are questioning basic democratic principles upon which our union is built. It is time again to stand up for the values that define our democracies. We believe in the freedom of citizens with both rights and responsibilities. We believe in the rule of law. Every human being is equal before the law. We believe in the dignity of every person, and thus fundamental rights. It is again time to speak up for our democracies.

I know we can count on the Atlantic Council for this. And I want to thank you not just for this award, but for keeping alive the flame of transatlantic cooperation towards a new day in our deep friendship. Thank you so much.

[President Ursula von der Leyen receives the award]

PRESIDENT URSULA VON DER LEYEN: Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, I first spoke to Albert Bourla ten months ago. When the pandemic hit the world, Albert decided to take a gamble. Together with President Ugur Sahin and Dr. Özlem Türeci, he decided to invest billions on a promising yet untested technology, and this is how the success story of the BioNTech-Pfizer vaccine started.

A vaccine based on mRNA technology had never been approved before, nor had it been produced on a mass scale. But you, Albert, trusted your work, and we trusted each other. And after you developed your vaccine against COVID-19, you launched mass production immediately without waiting for its approval, a choice that was described as risky and unorthodox. You chose to put billions of dollars at risk, because if you didn’t try, the whole world would pay the price. And by doing so, you and your team might have saved millions of lives.

The first time we met in person, after months of virtual contacts, we were in Puurs in Belgium at Pfizer’s main manufacturing site in Europe. And right there in Puurs, you have achieved what seemed unthinkable: Not only did you deliver on our initial contract —that’s a lot already—no, month after month, you started delivering ahead of schedule. It is also thanks to this that today, three European adults in four are fully vaccinated. But there is more. Pfizer’s European sites are producing vaccines for the whole world. In fact, more than half of the European vaccine production has been exported to the rest of the world, more than 860 million doses of BioNTech-Pfizer to more than 150 countries. This is serving the world, and you can be so proud of that, and we thank you for that.

With this prize, dear Albert, we celebrate your achievements and your entrepreneurial spirit. But we also celebrate your incredible partnership with Ugur Sahin and Özlem Türeci. You have teamed up as scientists and as fellow human beings, working together for the sake of all humanity. You have added yet another success story to the great history of our transatlantic partnership.

So let me conclude by borrowing a quote from your late mother, dear Albert. During World War II, when the Nazis occupied Greece, your mother narrowly escaped execution. And whenever she told you, Albert, that story, she would conclude, “life is miraculous, nothing is impossible, you can do anything in life.” Indeed, dear Albert, nothing is impossible. Your achievements are the best testimony for your mother’s words.

Excellencies, ladies, and gentlemen, please join me in congratulating Dr. Albert Bourla on the Atlantic Council’s Distinguished Business Leadership Award.

ALBERT BOURLA: I’m speechless. Thank you, Ursula, for these very kind words. You almost made me cry. I will try to do it later.

Let me start by and also to congratulate you for being a fellow honoree this evening. The European Union is really blessed, blessed that the person leading through the pandemic is not only a strong and effective leader but also someone with a deep background in medicine and in public health. This rare combination of skills has made you an invaluable, invaluable partner in ensuring that both Europe and the world [have] the tools they need in the battle against this virus.

Working together often, as you said, communicating very late when your time would allow, or very early in the morning, we found a way to help protect Europeans across the continent, but just as important, to help ensure that vaccines produced in Europe, as you said, are arriving safely and swiftly to the destinations around the world.

I have greatly enjoyed and valued our collaboration. And I’m grateful that I met you in life, Ursula.

Speaking of enjoyable and valuable collaborations, I also want to congratulate my fellow honorees and very, very, very good friends Özlem Türeci and Ugur Sahin.

The first time I spoke with Ugur on the phone, it was clear to me that we share the same values, the same urgency about the virus, and the same unwavering belief in our people and our science. I told my wife the same night, Myriam, it was love at first sight with this guy. And later, when I had the opportunity to meet Özlem, I knew instantly that she shared those things as well. Actually, I realized that the common saying, behind every great man there is a great woman, in their case applies to ahead of every great man is a great woman.

The pandemic has taught us that we can accomplish great things when we are united by a common purpose. The virus knows no geographic borders. It does not discriminate based on race, religion, gender, financial condition, or political affiliation, which is a mistake that we greatly make, particularly in this country.

So to defeat it, we must be united. And I can’t think of a better example of this unity than the strong relationship enjoyed by the leaders, the humans, of the two companies. Think about it. One, a Jew from Greece, immigrated to America; the other, a Muslim from Turkey, immigrated to Germany. Some might consider this an unlikely pairing. I consider it a very good fortune.

Our other fellow honoree, Dua Lipa, who I had the pleasure of meeting her today, and it was my dream—I’m going to call my daughter—also understands the power of collaboration. Her recording of “Cold Heart” with Elton John, which some also might consider an unlikely pairing, like me and Ugur—is proof that artists from different genders and different generations can collaborate to create something special.

But, of course, tonight we are honoring Ms. Lipa not only as a great artist, but also for her efforts as the founder of Sunny Hill Foundation, which works to reduce poverty, injustice, and inequities in Kosovo, a country very close to my country in Greece. And so, I want to thank and congratulate her for using her time, talent, and resources to make the world a better place.

I want to thank the Atlantic Council for this honor, which I proudly accept on behalf of Pfizer’s 80,000 talented and purpose-driven colleagues around the world.

As someone born in Europe and now an American citizen—I used to say I’m Greek by birth, American by choice—I have great respect for the work you do not only to foster the transatlantic cooperation, but also to promote our shared values: global engagement, free and fair trade, intellectual property protection, democracy, equity, and justice, to name just a few.

The response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been a great example of the power of transatlantic cooperation. In addition to US-based Pfizer and German-based BioNTech collaboration to deliver a breakthrough vaccine in record-breaking time, our manufacturing facilities in Belgium and our manufacturing facilities in the United States are poised to produce three billion doses of the vaccine by the end of this year, in a month and a half, and another four billion at least next year, in 2022.

Private-public partnerships also have been critically important. For example, Pfizer is providing one billion doses of our vaccine—or, our BioNTech-Pfizer vaccine—we are providing to the government at the not-for-profit price so they can, in turn, donate these doses to the poorer countries of the world—one billion doses. And we are working with the EU on not only supply agreements, but also the very important education campaigns to help address vaccine hesitancy not only in the EU, but around the world. These are just a few examples of how transatlantic partners are helping lead the battle against this deadly virus.

Let me close by thanking, of course, my fellow Pfizer colleagues for their innovative and tireless efforts over the past twenty months. Recognizing it will take a combination of treatment and protective measures to bring an end to this pandemic, they continue to follow the science. And I’m proud to say that just last week we announced clinical trial results demonstrating that an antiviral candidate—that hopefully will be approved—prevented approximately nine out of ten hospitalizations in high-risk adult patients. Clearly, news that [has] the potential to be a real game-changer, but in all cases should not be news that will feed vaccine hesitancy. Vaccines are very important.

And lastly, of course, I want to thank my family for their love and support, which brightens my every day, particularly during this pandemic. I had to work there in an office torturing people on the other part of the line—why they are not moving fast and listening [to] my wife cooking in the kitchen next door—and having my daughter… and my son… and of course my lovely wife, Myriam, coming and comforting me when I was really pissed or angry—because we were not moving fast.

And to my fellow Pfizer colleagues that are sitting on those tables, thank you. I love you.

DAVID MCCORMICK: Good evening. What a spectacular night to be with you all.

My name’s Dave McCormick, and I’m the chairman of the International Advisory Board of the Atlantic Council. And tonight’s about innovation and tonight’s about inspirational leadership, and the Atlantic Council has a long tradition of honoring and being inspired by military leaders.

There was Brent Scowcroft, who was the two-time chairman, who we lost, sadly, last year—who was the two-time chairman of the Atlantic Council and really, for me, represented the heart and soul of what this place is all about.

And there’s Colin Powell, who we lost last month. Colin Powell was the 2005 award winner of the Atlantic Council Distinguished Leadership Award and an honorary board member. I mean, what a life. What an inspiration. And our respect and condolences go out to Alma and the Powell family.

And in this audience tonight we have three very distinguished military leaders who are also Atlantic Council board members in General Jim Jones, who is [a twice-former] chairman; Curtis Scaparrotti, who was a former Distinguished Leadership Award winner; and Wes Clark, all of whom were former Supreme Allied Commanders in Europe. Thank you guys for being here.

But tonight’s tribute is not about any individual man or woman, and it’s not about any general or admiral. It’s about a group of people to whom we—heroic people to whom we owe our appreciation, our respect, and our honor. The men and women of the armed forces have been at the core of the work of the Atlantic Council for sixty years. And as an Army veteran, it’s such an honor for me to be here tonight to pay tribute to the veterans of the war in Afghanistan.

DAVID MCCORMICK: Ladies and gentlemen, if you’re a veteran, please stand. And ladies and gentlemen, please join me in celebrating our veterans. Thank you. Thank you all.

This is hard for me to say as an Army guy, but as a final special end to my part of the evening, we are going to have a Navy man, Chief Petty Officer Cory Parker, help us with a beautiful rendition. He’s a member of the US Navy Official Chorus. Chief, take it away.

[Dinner break]

FREDERICK KEMPE: … So it was sixty years ago, in July 1961, when Dean Rusk, President Kennedy’s secretary of state, summoned the great and good of American foreign policy to his seventh-floor conference room at Foggy Bottom. The group included the great Dean Acheson, Christian Herter, Mary Pillsbury Lord, Henry Cabot Lodge, and General Lucius Clay, the hero of the 1948-49 Berlin airlift.

Kennedy was the youngest US president in history at age forty-three. He’d been in office only six months, and he was already reeling from the Bay of Pigs crisis and a disastrous Vienna summit with Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna in June. Soviet leader Khrushchev was testing him. Rusk told this group of fifteen that he needed their urgent help. They were members of a disparate array of Atlanticist organizations, and he wanted them to combine forces and rise to the historic challenge.

He told them that the US had lost its nuclear monopoly in its competition with the Soviet Union, that he anticipated a crisis in Berlin by the end of that year. It actually came in August 1961 with the building of the Berlin Wall. I can recommend a really good book about that if you’re interested.

Moscow was spreading its communist ideology and influence across the developing world, [and] Rusk said, and I need your help. It was a defining moment in history, very similar to our time now, when the global tectonic plates were shifting and it was unclear how the world would unfold and it was unclear how America would lead, just like today.

By year’s end, the Atlantic Council was born, with Acheson, Herter, and Lord among its leaders; so September 1961. Exactly six decades later, the Atlantic Council has emerged from the worst pandemic in a century operationally stronger, substantively more vigorous, and financially more robust.

I think that was probably my finance chair, George Lund, applauding the financially more robust one.

That is due to the contributions of so many of you in this room—board members, International Advisory Board members, friends, partners, center directors, and staff. Because of you, the Atlantic Council has never been more robust.

At the same time, the global challenges we face have perhaps never been as complex. We see them in six categories of our work that the board and the staff itself, in retreats, has settled upon.

Number one, we confront a new era of major competition.

Number two—and I was so happy to hear President von der Leyen underscore this—democracies have frayed, autocracies have strengthened, and we must strengthen our democracies.

Thank you. By the way, I’m pretty proud that the number two at the Atlantic Council for the last nine years is now the presidency over the National Endowment [for Democracy]. A hand for Damon Wilson. Thanks, Damon. And you’ll hear from him in a few minutes.

Number three, the global order of rules and institutions that the Atlantic Council founders helped create is in question. It requires reinvigoration.

Number four, rapid technological change must be harnessed for good. Again, President von der Leyen talked about that. And we can do this across the Atlantic as a basis for standards globally.

Number five: We have also greatly expanded our work to take on climate change, mitigation, and adaptation. I was just in Glasgow with the teams from our Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center [and] our Global Energy Center working [on] these issues. This is a new frontier for us.

But most importantly, and throughout our history, we exist to promote constructive US leadership along our partners and allies to ensure that we don’t lose the global gains in peace, democracy, individual rights, and open markets that we achieved in the years, the seventy-plus years, after World War II. We need to build upon that, all that, and that’s what we’re about, particularly about US leadership alongside partners and allies. If there’s anything else you need to remember from this evening is that is our unique selling proposition. And that is why we are all here together understanding the historic imperative of our times now is no less than at the time of our founding, and perhaps even greater.

Within The Atlantic Council, we like to quote the cultural anthropologist Margaret Mead. Quote: “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it’s the only thing that ever has.” And you’re not such a small group.

So it’s in that spirit I want to thank just a few people in the room tonight who helped make this possible, and actually so much more possible.

First, I’ll call your attention to our previous Distinguished Leadership [awardees] with us… General Jim Jones, General Curtis Scaparrotti, and Adrienne Arsht.

By the way, I’m very proud that President von der Leyen is here, but I’m also delighted that she met with another former Distinguished Leadership awardee this morning, President Joe Biden. We gave him our award when he was vice president.

Next up are the Atlantic Council leaders who have pushed the organization forward throughout its history, including General Jones, who served as our chairman twice, and Mrs. Wendy Makins—and Wendy, if you could stand up—whose late husband, Christopher Makins, served as president from 1999 to 2005.

Wendy, that I had Christopher’s blessing to succeed him will mean a lot to me the rest of my life. My thanks to both of you.

Finally, I’d like to salute the co-chairs of tonight’s dinner. I’d like to ask those co-chairs in attendance to stand as I read out their names, and it’s a really impressive list but it’s a bit of a long list; again, my finance chair, George Lund, will be very happy that it’s a long list. I’m happy it’s a long list. But please stand and then hold your applause until I’ve gone through the list.

So join me in thanking Robert J. Abernethy; Adrienne Arsht; Majid Al Futtaim represented by Alain Bejjani; Rubicon Founders represented by Adam Boehler; Pfizer represented by Dr. Albert Bourla; Ahmed Charai; SK Group represented tonight by Richard Chin and Erin McGrain; Bank of America represented by Larry Di Rita; Penguin Random House represented by Markus Dohle—and don’t forget—Markus, it’s great to see you as always, and please take your gift bags at the end of the night; you’ll see in the back page of your program, Markus always supports us but he always gives us a couple of really remarkable books, and you won’t want to leave without those; Edelman represented by Richard Edelman—let me also thank Richard Edelman and Edelman for the pro bono help they give us for this dinner and many other things; Dentons represented tonight by Chris Fetzer—let me also thank Dentons for the pro bono work you do for all of our legal issues; Laurel Strategies represented by Alan H. Fleischmann and Dafna Tapiero; Mapa Group represented by Mehmet Nazif Günal; Hunt Consolidated represented by Hunter Hunt—there’s a Texas constituency here; Nicole and Andre Kelleners; Airbus [Americas] is represented by Jeffrey Knittel; Chevron represented by Karen Knutson; George and Kristen Lund; Leonardo DRS, represented by William J. Lynn III; SICPA, represented tonight by Jane Holl Lute and Greg Dunn; William Marron; David McCormick and Dina Powell McCormick; Dr. Alexander V. Mirtchev; Textron, represented by Mary Claire Murphy; Squire Patton Boggs, represented by Edward Newberry; Franco Nushese; Ahmed M. Oren; Thales, represented by Alan Pellegrini; Goldman Sachs, represented, of course, by Atlantic Council Chairman John F.W. Rogers; S&P Global, represented tonight by Darlene Rosenkoetter; BioNTech, represented by our honorees Professor Ugur Sahin and Dr. Özlem Türeci; Ivan Schlager; Olin Wethington; And then, finally, Dr. Guang Yang. Thank you so much for your support for this dinner.

Two other things I want to say before we move on.

One of them is a special thank you to the EU Delegation and Stavros Lambrinidis, the ambassador. It’s just been such a pleasure working with you elevating US-EU issues. This is one of our most important partnerships, and I really want to salute the director of our Europe Center, Ben Haddad, who’s just been a groundbreaker in this area as well.

We decided not to do an in memoriam for Colin Powell tonight. He was a dear friend. He was an advisor to me. I think it was lovely what Dave McCormick said. And he wouldn’t have wanted anyone to do anything to celebrate him.

I do want to share with you that any time we had an awardee—Placido Domingo, who do you want to introduce you? Colin Powell. Prince Harry, who do you want to introduce you? Colin Powell. Joe Dunford, who do you want to introduce you? Colin Powell. This man was loved, he was full of laughter, he was full of insights, full of friendship, and we miss him.

I’m going to ask two other people to stand. We launched the Atlantic Council’s first documentary this week, “Do Seagulls Migrate?” and it was about four Syrian refugee stories in Turkey. These were four Syrian women refugees who succeeded, were entrepreneurs. We know that wasn’t the general story, but we wanted to inspire people with their story. One of them is here tonight. Her name is Reem—like all great, famous people, one name like Madonna, Reem, and she’s in a dress that she designed. By the way, she’s a fashion designer who also designed the dress for an Oscar awardee from Syria… Reem, thank you for your courage. Thanks for your leadership.

What Syria experienced, no country should experience. What you experienced as a refugee, Reem, and then to rise above it, and then to come with your really inspiring attitude, thank you. And don’t miss the documentary. It’s really remarkable.

Finally—and this is the last and then we’ll move on to the next segment of tonight’s dinner—I really hope you’ll join me in applause. And I would like all members of our staff, center and program directors of staff—some of them are in the wings. You’re not going to see them. Maybe you can thank them on the way out. But if you could all stand so that we can applaud you.

Anyone who’s run any organization, whether it’s a Fortune 100/500 company or a 501(c)(3) nonprofit, knows that in COVID-19 you would either become more relevant or less relevant. I think we’ve become more relevant, and it’s because of the work of this incredible team. Thank you very much.

VICTOR J. DZAU: Good evening. Good evening.

Honored guests, ladies and gentlemen, I’m delighted to be with you at Atlantic Council’s sixtieth anniversary Distinguished Leadership Awards. First and foremost, I want to say how delighted I am to be joining you in person tonight after so many months of physical isolation and distancing.

Now, the distinguished scientists, Professor Ugur Sahin and Dr. Özlem Türeci, both of whom I have the pleasure of introducing tonight, have much to do with why we can all get together tonight. And I’m so grateful.

Before I do that, I would like to congratulate the previous two awardees, my friend, Ursula von der Leyen, and Albert Bourla. They are people that I admire greatly. So thank you very much.

Now, it is a great honor to be presenting this award to two leaders who made the most impactful contribution in the global fight against COVID-19. I cannot think of any other individual who, through incredible foresight, scientific excellence, hard work, and risk-taking, have had such a beneficial effect on every one of us. Professor Sahin and Dr. Türeci are co-founders of BioNTech, the company that developed, in partnership with Pfizer, the world’s first safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine.

So earlier tonight, Pfizer Chairman and CEO Albert Bourla was honored. And their transatlantic partnership has played a pivotal role in the global response to COVID-19, saving millions of lives.

Ugur and [Özlem] met at Saarland University in Germany on a hospital cancer ward. They were driven by their passion to care for those who were suffering, and they co-founded the company in 2001 called Ganymed, focusing on developing antibody therapies for cancer.

BioNTech was their second company, which aimed to develop cancer treatments. But they leveraged a number of platforms, including the mRNA platform. Shortly after the emergence of the earliest cases of COVID-19 in January 2020, they had this incredible foresight to immediately pivot all their focus to creating an mRNA vaccine to target SARS-CoV-2. You know, within two months they had developed twenty vaccine candidates, four of which showed great promise. And as they say, the rest is history.

You know, there are so many remarkable aspects to this story—their love of and dedication to science and medicine, their partnership in life and in business, and their groundbreaking work on mRNA vaccines. You know, that would have allowed us to be all together tonight because of that.

And any part of the story would be worth celebrating. But their story is made even more inspiring when one considers the circumstances in their early lives and what they had to overcome, being raised in Germany by Turkish immigrants.

Tonight it’s great to see also Albert Bourla, who’s also an immigrant being celebrated. As an immigrant myself, I know first-hand how hard it is to leave everything you know, to adjust to a new culture, to overcome bias, and to be accepted in a new country. So if you consider Ugur and Ursula’s achievement, you know, they’re amazing… themselves, but even more incredible when one considers what they had to surmount in their lifetime.

And their work as scientists and humanitarians continues as they work to broaden their impact and the availability of their technology globally. BioNTech will begin construction in 2022 of a manufacturing site for mRNA-based vaccine in the African Union, providing infrastructure for that continent.

As if that’s not enough, they’re also currently developing mRNA vaccine for malaria, which, if successful, could save hundreds of thousands of lives each year.

So Professor Sahin and Dr. Türeci, I cannot think of two individuals more deserving of the 2021 Distinguished Business Leadership award. You embody two fundamental values upon which the United States and European Union have built their successes—the importance of diversity and immigration, and the belief in science.

Your ability to respond so quickly to the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and the unprecedented speed in developing the world’s first COVID-19 vaccine and your astute partnership with Pfizer is truly a transatlantic success story that continues to save lives around the world.

For all these reasons, it’s my enormous pleasure and honor to present the 2021 Distinguished Business Leadership Award to the co-founders of BioNTech. Please join me in welcoming Professor Sahin and Dr. Türeci.

ÖZLEM TÜRECI: First of all, I wanted to thank Victor. There he is. Thank you, Victor, for your generous words.

Yes, ladies and gentlemen, it’s a great honor for Ugur and me to be among the laureates of this year’s Distinguished Leadership Award. And we would like to thank Atlantic Council for bringing us onto the same stage tonight with people we cherish, with Ursula von der Leyen, with Albert Bourla, and with Dua Lipa. This is really a great honor.

When we were notified about this privilege, we had two thoughts. Proud physicians that we are, our first thought was: Why a leadership, not a science award? Fuchan Yuan one said that the three essentials to leadership are courage, humility, and clarity. So it turns out that what is expected from leaders is not much different from the virtues on which the two of us seek to improve continuously, because we believe that they are the key [to[ turning science into survival. And they served us well when we were navigating the scientific and not-so-scientific challenges in this race against a pandemic.

The search for a COVID-19 vaccine, a quest deep in uncharted territory, required courage and also required humility, which means staying teachable. All stakeholders were open to [learning] from each other in the face of a global threat, and we all let science and data be our teachers. The pandemic came with many unknowns, and here is where clarify of communication helped to foster patience and trust in each other’s words.

That brings me to the second thought we pondered: What else beyond science and leadership is a success model for the two of us? There is a saying: Behind every successful man, there is a woman rolling her eyes. Well, that is definitely not—I have to disappoint you; that is not our model. Rather, our success model comes from being blessed with a tribe of comrades, of like-minded people who share our belief in science and its ability to help humanity. Our incredible team at BioNTech, our management board colleagues, our investors, our mentors… all have been with us in this journey of many, many years.

In 2020, our tribe of comrades has grown. Exhibit one, our transatlantic alliance with you, dear Albert, and your exceptional team at Pfizer. And exhibit two, all those trust-based, solution-seeking cooperations formed spontaneously across public- and private-sector boundaries with a shared sense of urgency. For example, with the European Commission, dear Ursula. Very special for Ugur and me because, when we founded BioNTech, our dream was not only to change treatment paradigms but also to contribute to public-private partnership models, to new ones that would enable also a new breed of companies to better serve [the] greater good.

With answers to our two questions, Ugur and I now understand and appreciate how this award celebrates leadership in science and encourages scientists to continue confronting the many challenges impacting the well-being of humanity and the preservation of our planet. So, again, thank you for this award.

UGUR SAHIN: Thank you, Victor. And thank you, Özlem. Thank you, Ursula. And thank you, Albert. And thank you to the Atlantic Council. It’s really a true honor to be here tonight with all of you.

As I was preparing for this meeting last week, I had a fundamental question to Özlem: Do I really need to get a tuxedo for this event here? Yes. So before Özlem could respond, our lovely teenaged daughter who was listening to the conversation suddenly interfered and said: Daddy, don’t screw it up. You are going to meet Dua Lipa—and I want a photo and an autograph from her. So, Albert, we have another thing in common, daughters who love Dua Lipa.

So Özlem talked about science and leadership as important factors to master a challenge of such historic dimensions. Let me conclude with another most critical factor that matters [to] all of us: social responsibility, to be useful and to serve society.

We started our Project Lightspeed because we felt an obligation to act. It was our duty because we knew that our technology and our determination could make a difference to humanity. And we will continue our work until all people around the world have access to vaccines.

But there is more. The development of the COVID-19 vaccine opened up the door to a new pharmaceutical class, mRNA therapies. MRNA therapies will allow us to develop new treatments against many type of diseases: cancer, autoimmune diseases, regenerative medicines. And it will also allow us—and that what we are [convinced of]—is to tackle all diseases that could not be addressed by vaccines or highly-effective vaccines so far like malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV. We are engaged in these projects. And we feel also the obligation to make our technology available to those who need it most, and one of our [projects] is related to [transferring] technologies to Africa and [enabling], after [the] transfer of our technologies, that vaccines could be—could be produced in Africa, for Africa.

Many people feel that social responsibility is the exception rather than the rule, but I don’t think so. I know that the desire to help others is hardwired and encoded in our genes, or you can also say in our mRNA. These genes are not always active. They often need a trigger to be activated—an inspiration, an example, someone to take the first step.

But it is also clear that social responsibility is not just a value; it is the form of any value at the testing point. It depends and it requires to be regarded particularly when it becomes critical. We had a lot of meetings with Albert and also with Ursula, and I am grateful that at every critical situation, we were able to act in a [socially] responsible manner. The willingness of our teams to engage every day, to volunteer 24/7 shifts, work day and night, also on the weekends, and go the thousands of extra miles was not just based on effectivity and calculation, but it was based on everyone’s motivation to help and to contribute.

And it was not just our teams. Nearly everyone in the pharmaceutical, medical, and scientific community tried to get involved in fighting this pandemic. What the entire medical and scientific community has accomplished in just less than two years is outstanding and demonstrates the value of science to society.

Sometimes the work [of] scientists and drug developers [is] celebrated like this evening’s impressive award, but most often it happens behind the scenes in quiet labs or at patient’s bedside. To us, both feel equally rewarding. Özlem and I always have felt the commitment to a larger goal binds us and binds our partners and binds our society together. This is the way [that] we work and live and we intend to keep going on, inspired by this great honor tonight and the ongoing support of our friends and partners. Thank you.

DAMON WILSON: Dua Lipa burst onto the international scene at just the right time, when we did not even realize that we needed her. As the pandemic brought the world to a pause, Dua Lipa pushed us all to move, to dance, and yes, to levitate. Dua Lipa brought joy when so much of the world was fending off despair. She tapped a nerve with inspiring lockdown performances from her flat in London, breaking global streaming records, and often doing so to raise funds to fight COVID-19. For her talent, she has been nominated for eight Grammy Awards, winning three times for Best New Artist, Best Dance Recording, and Best Pop Vocal Album.

It’s perhaps by tapping her pride and her family’s heritage from Kosovo that she is able to help her fans look beyond daunting circumstances to envision an optimistic future. Dua is an inspiration to young women around the world, which is why it is so fitting that she’s accompanied this evening by President Vjosa Osmani of Kosovo, the youngest elected head of state in the world.

Dua Lipa’s first megahit, “New Rules,” became an anthem for female solidarity, setting the scene for the ensuing MeToo movement. Finding her voice beyond her music, she has unabashedly taken on sexism and homophobia. She has pushed for much-delayed justice for those whose human rights were abused during the Balkan wars, especially for victims of rape.

Dua and her father founded the Sunny Hill Festival and Foundation to inspire the next generation of talent from the region and to introduce the region to world-class talent. Through her foundation’s work, Dua gives voice and visibility to the determination, creativity, and hope of the people of Kosovo.

But their story has not been an easy one. Dua Lipa’s grandfather, an historian, lost his job when he refused to rewrite history under occupation. Her parents left to seek a more secure life as Slobodan Milosevic stoked ethnic tensions. In the years that followed, the people of Kosovo endured war. But with US and European support together, they saw their country emerge as a vibrant if at times tumultuous democracy.

Honoring European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the US-EU relationship alongside Dua Lipa is a reminder that her family home is part of the transatlantic tradition we celebrate tonight. And as we pay tribute to veterans on the eve of Veterans Day, we remember that American support was crucial to ending the fighting and helping Kosovo secure its freedom. Our support remains crucial for our prospering, pluralistic, and—yes—a party-loving Kosovo to find its home alongside its neighbors in a Europe whole, free, and at peace.

Please join me in welcoming Dua Lipa to the stage to receive the Atlantic Council’s 2021 Distinguished Leadership Award.

DUA LIPA: Wow. Good evening. Or, as we say in Kosovo, Mirëmbrama. Thank you, Damon, so much for your generous remarks. And thank you, Atlantic Council. You have been and continue to be a great friend to Kosovo, and it truly is an honor to be here to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary.

I’m humbled to share the stage with tonight’s honorees: Dr. Bourla, Dr. Türeci, Professor Sahin. Thank you so much for everything that you’ve done to help us tackle the COVID-19 pandemic.

Your Excellency Ms. von der Leyen, thank you for your leadership. And I can only apologize for the sleepless nights my other country must have caused you during these long and painful Brexit negotiations.

I stand before you as a child of Kosovo who was born and raised in the United Kingdom and is here today as a guest of the United States. I come from a place most of you will have heard of but perhaps not in the way I’m about to describe. I want to share with you a little bit about my Kosovo.

Kosovans love to party, which is no surprise, perhaps, as 50 percent of the population is under twenty-five years old. I’m officially old in Kosovo. I heard a story recently about a visitor that went to Pristina, the capital city of Kosovo, being kept awake until the small hours by a lively crowd at a bar opposite her hotel. The next morning she asked at reception what the occasion was and they said: That? Oh, that was just Monday.

Pristina has a wonderful café culture. Forget grabbing coffee on the go. Dress sharp, pull up a seat, and watch the world go by. It’s very European.

For a small country, Kosovo is bursting with creativity. And I could reel off examples, but here are just a few.

Hive, a beautiful Kosovan film, took three major awards at this year’s Sundance. Watch out for it at the Oscars.

Pristina will also host Manifesta next year, which is a contemporary art and culture biennale. And that will see the city overtaken with public art exhibitions and installations. And journalists from highly respected publications speculate on what must be in the water to produce so many successful music artists.

All I can say is give us a chance and we will excel. In 2018 my dad and I founded the Sunny Hill Festival in Pristina, and it quickly became one of the biggest music festivals in the region. It’s been a lifelong dream of ours to bring artists to Kosovo, not just so fans can see their favorite bands, but so that the visiting bands can experience our own brilliant and diverse music scene.

The second part of our dream will soon become reality. And I couldn’t be more excited to share our plans for the Sunny Hill Foundation with you. We’ve signed an MOU to create the Sunny Hill Arts and Innovation Center in Pristina, and we very much hope that work will start next summer. Thank you.

It will be a creative space where young people can learn about music production and performance. For those who want to break into the industry, there’ll be workshops run by visiting artists and producers from all over the world who will share what they’ve learned. And for others, the center will be a place to build confidence, learn some skills, and, most importantly of all, have some fun.

The first concert I ever went to was Method Man and Redman. It was in Pristina, and I was thirteen. It was a bit random, really cool, and definitely not quite age-appropriate. But it wasn’t like I had any actual choice of shows. Kosovo is just too small a market to be included on most world tours. So now we bring artists to Kosovo. And without exception, everyone that we’ve invited to perform at the Sunny Hill Festival, from Miley Cyrus to Calvin Harris, is just blown away by the whole experience. They say it’s one of the best shows they’ve ever done, as the energy is so roaring, the audience so present, and the welcome so sincere.

The best performances are when you have that really great chemistry with the audience. And that somehow always seems to happen at Sunny Hill.

However, appearances can be also deceiving. In many ways, life in Kosovo is tough and it undeniably bears the scars of years of war. Even for those who mercifully escaped the war, it nonetheless leaves its legacy. My parents left Kosovo in 1992 as tensions were rising. While they were fortunate enough to make a good life in London, there were years when they knew they couldn’t return home. That must have caused a pain that I can only imagine. Sometimes when I talk to my parents about this time, they can speak for hours. And other times it’s just too exhausting and they say they feel they’ve lived through three hundred years.

For me, having this dual identity has actually been really positive. I’m always flattered when people comment on what they call my immigrant work ethic. It’s true. It’s a gift that’s been passed down the generations. But even with a determined and bold national spirit, it takes time to recover and find a new footing.

Today Kosovo still faces many challenges, and often it’s the young generation who bear the brunt of it. Young people struggle to find work, and their opportunities are hampered by restrictions that make it difficult to travel for work or pleasure. After we fulfilled all the criteria, the European Commission actually recommended visa liberalization for Kosovo for more than three years ago. So do you think we could get that done now? Or…

Kosovo is also the youngest country in Europe in another way. We are just thirteen short years into our journey of independence. And as part of a strong international community, we will thrive emotionally. We will thrive economically and culturally. It’s in our DNA.

While it still breaks my heart that the United Kingdom chose to leave the European Union. Rather than dwell on this, I would rather recall that the first purpose of the EU is to secure peace through unity. Wouldn’t it be fitting if Kosovo could take its place within that peaceful union, thrive economically alongside our neighbors, and heal the hurt of recent conflict?

With that vision in mind—thank you. With that vision in mind, I accept this award with gratitude for all the young people of Kosovo. And to receive it on their behalf, I would like to invite Kosovo’s own young leader, Her Excellency President Vjosa Osmani, to the stage.

PRESIDENT VJOSA OSMANI: Dua Lipa. Ladies and gentlemen, please give her another round of applause. Absolutely deserved.

Your excellencies, distinguished guests, first of all, Dua, thank you so much from the bottom of my heart for giving me the honor of accepting this award on behalf of the people of Kosovo.

I am delighted to be here to celebrate tonight’s honorees. Congratulations to all of you.

We in the Republic of Kosovo have been following Dua’s progress since day one, and I am so incredibly proud that her talent has been recognized by the world, too. I thought Dua was best described in a headline of an article written early on in her career which reads: “Meet Dua Lipa: A Restless Spirit with a Mighty Big Voice”—words that ring even more true today. Dua is, indeed, restless, but restless in ambition. Dua, indeed, has a mighty big voice, not just in terms of her vocal capabilities but also in the way she has chosen to use her incredible voice and platform to be an extraordinary advocate for women, unafraid to take on political issues, and a restless champion for her home country, the Republic of Kosovo, and its people.

So thank you once again for being our voice, Dua. You are the greatest ambassador that one country can dream of. You not only make us incredibly proud of what you have personally achieved, but also help us to raise the collective voice of our people every single time that you proudly talk about where you are from. Some might say, in the words of your music, that you are levitating Kosovo.

For those of you in the room who may be unfamiliar with our story, Kosovo is a nation full of restless spirits—bright, brilliant, and ambitious minds who see their future at the heart of the European Union. Perhaps because of our struggles—or, indeed, in spite of our struggles—the youth of our country continues to succeed against all odds. What is quite clear to me is that when our young people are given opportunities, they exceed beyond expectations. And as their president, I will work tirelessly to ensure we build an even stronger foundation for our young people to succeed within and beyond our borders.

If it isn’t convincing enough for me to stand and say this here before you today, just look around the global music. Just look at our Dua and what she has achieved. Look at our film industry and the amazing Hive movie—which I join Dua in inviting you to see—sports, and many other industries to see just what our country and our people are capable of achieving when they are given a chance. From our globally renowned filmmakers to our tech companies attracting investment directly from countries like the United States, or those exporting our goods and services to every part of the world, our athletes who raise Kosovo’s flag even in non-recognizing countries, I couldn’t be more proud than I am with all of our everyday shining stars.

For those of you that have never been to Kosovo, I urge you to visit so that you can see its beauty, its uniqueness, and the warmth and admiration that my people hold for your countries. For the countries who stood by us in our darkest days and in particular the United States of America, you’ll have heard this before, but Kosovo really is the most pro-American and the most pro-European nation on Earth. You supported us, you supported us during a time when, like Dua and her beautiful family, over a million Kosovars were forced to flee throughout the 90s, first from oppression from the then-Serbian regime against the people of Kosovo and then, as you all know, from one of the most brutal wars we have seen in recent times.

Actually, when I came here, I was reminded that it was exactly in this room in 1999 when the [NATO] Alliance was celebrating its fiftieth birthday, that that summit turned into a summit about Kosovo. Exactly where you’re sitting today, the decision to save our lives was made. Exactly because of those courageous and responsible leaders at that time, we are standing alive here today. Many of them are here in this room. So please once again accept our heartfelt gratitude on behalf of all the people of Kosovo.

Of course, we wouldn’t be here and we wouldn’t have achieved everything that we have without the collective support of so many allies around the world. Let’s not forget, Kosovo is the biggest US foreign-policy success story. We can never say that enough. Your bipartisan support has been invaluable. But today we face a different set of challenges, and we hope to continue to count on all of you as we open a new chapter in our efforts to strengthen Kosovo’s international standing.

Kosovo is a beacon of hope and a beacon of democracy. Just thirteen years on from our declaration of independence, today we have the kind of institutional stability that many countries can only dream of. We join our allies in peacekeeping missions and are honored to be among the very few countries that have offered shelter to [Afghans] in need escaping persecution. In fact, we’re the very first country we’re the very first country on Earth to answer that call, because we’ve been refugees ourselves. So we’ve opened not just our doors, but also our hearts and minds, to all of those in need. And we couldn’t be prouder to stand by our allies in this important effort.

I’m also very proud to represent a people who possess so much compassion, so much talent, potential, and resilience, and confident that Kosovo will only continue to strengthen its statehood and make a bigger contribution to the international community, and to peace and stability in the region. We will do all this because it is what our people deserve. We have been through too much to turn back now. And we will continue to defend our freedom and our right to exist as an independent and sovereign country.

And to those that try to dim our lights, I have a message for those. They’re not in this room, obviously. In Dua’s words, we’ve got new rules. Kosovo’s people and its leadership will not give up on our country’s right to exist at any cost. And we will be absolutely vocal in seeking justice and the deserved path for our people.

Kosovo’s future lies within the Euro-Atlantic structures. We have never looked elsewhere.

And finally, I’d like to take this opportunity to once again join Dua’s mighty big voice in calling on EU member states to deliver on the long-overdue promise to grant visa liberalization to the citizens of the Republic of Kosovo.

Dear friends, tonight we celebrate the successes and achievements of Dua and the other honorees. You know, Dua in our language means love. That’s exactly what she has been spreading around the world, but especially in her home country, Kosovo, since day one.

I really look forward to meeting as many of you in other occasions in the future when we will gather to celebrate upcoming successes of Kosovo and our superstar youth. In this journey, we really hope to have you by our side.

So thank you to the Atlantic Council for honoring our remarkable Dua.

Dua, thank you so much for turning the eyes of the world to Kosovo.

Thank you all for a wonderful night, and good night.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So what [an] incredible evening. I want to congratulate our awardees, and I want to thank you all for supporting our cause. We are going to close this evening with an incredible duet by Morgan James, by Cory Parker, and I want to give a special thanks to the American Pops Orchestra under the brilliant direction of Maestro Luke Frazier and the dazzling management of Robert Pullen. Thank you. You are our house orchestra. We’re so proud of it.

And now this is the close. You won’t see me again. But at the end of this, just remember this evening and remember what all of the speakers and awardees stand for.

The post Full Transcript: 2021 Distinguished Leadership Awards honor bold visionaries in challenging times appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What appeared to be a prime example of Chinese COVID-19 diplomacy was built on thriving economic and diplomatic ties between Beijing and Belgrade, a true pillar within China’s 17+1 initiative in Central and Eastern Europe along with the Balkans. After the medical transport, China funded a network of laboratories to carry out coronavirus tests. In mid-January another plane delivered a batch of one million doses of China’s Sinopharm vaccine. Vučić turned up at the airport again to bask in the glory of the moment.

Half a year later, the narrative has changed. It is no longer about China boxing out the West in the Balkans but Serbia’s ability to punch above its weight. Serbian authorities have made impressive headway in inoculating their citizens—and using vaccines as a diplomatic tool:

• In a country with a population of just over seven million, 5.15 million doses have been administered. More than 2.4 million people—over one-third of Serbian citizens—have received two jabs.

• Serbia has donated vaccines to neighbors such as Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (to Republika Srpska, the Serb-majority entity).

• People from neighboring countries have been able to register and get jabs while visiting Serbia.

In short, Belgrade seized the momentum at a juncture when the World Health Organization-led COVAX cooperative program proved woefully slow to procure vaccines and European Union member states were busy taking care of their own citizens.

Arsenal of vaccines

China is part of Serbia’s success but not the full story. Sinopharm’s rollout, starting in January 2021, added to Belgrade’s arsenal of vaccines. Vučić got the Chinese jab in front of TV cameras in a remote village in eastern Serbia. The government floated plans for producing Sinopharm locally in partnership with the United Arab Emirates.

Serbia did not, however, put all its eggs in one basket. In fact, Serbia had already received its first Pfizer vaccine shipment in December 2020, and Prime Minister Ana Brnabić got the jab then—well ahead of most other European leaders. Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine arrived in January; later, in early June, the Belgrade-based Torlak Institute became the first facility outside the Russian Federation to produce it. Serbia’s AstraZeneca vaccine shipment arrived in February. Serbia took vaccines from all sources—China, Russia, and Western companies—and made the most of the stocks it accumulated.

This response to COVID-19 provides a second-to-none illustration of Serbian foreign policy. Vučić is not interested in siding with either China or the West, especially as the power competition between Beijing and Washington ratchets up. He believes Serbia’s interests, and his personal agenda, are best served by being open to business with everyone. The posture reflects Belgrade’s long-standing balancing act between the EU and the United States on the one hand, and Russia on the other. “Sit[ting] on two chairs” is how US diplomat Brian Hoyt Yee described Serbia in 2017.

The power of flexibility

In Serbia’s case, its vaccine diplomacy proves flexibility works. Serbia has fared much better in vaccinating its citizens than its pro-Western neighbors such as North Macedonia and Montenegro, both NATO members. Vučić has won plaudits across the region too.

Chances are he will do even more of these multivector acrobatics in the future, whether playing rival powers off each other or selling to the highest bidder. Eventually, Vučić will take full credit for the EU economic assistance earmarked for Serbia, while his loyal media will continue to sing Xi Jinping’s praises. Titoism has never gone out of fashion in this corner of Europe. 

While China’s vaccine and PPE diplomacy scored some points in the Balkans, it is local players like Serbia’s Vučić who absolutely stole the show.

Dimitar Bechev is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Follow him on Twitter @DimitarBechev.

Further reading

ACFrontPage Apr 23, 2021

Serbian President Vučić on COVID-19, democracy, and Serbia’s bid to join the EU

By Atlantic Council

Serbia is at an inflection point as it deals with a global pandemic and as it navigates its place in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community in the future. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić joined the Atlantic Council to discuss how Serbia fits into a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.

European Union Politics & Diplomacy

New Atlanticist Mar 25, 2021

COVID vaccines: India and China’s new diplomatic currency

By Nitya Biyani, Niels Graham

If the United States truly wants to return to the world stage, as the Biden administration has promised, its diplomatic outreach must extend beyond its core allies. Vaccine diplomacy may be the best way for the United States to do just that.

China Coronavirus

New Atlanticist Mar 22, 2021

What vaccine nationalism and diplomacy tell us about future pandemics

By Hung Tran

Good news: A growing availability of COVID-19 vaccines has cast a light at the end of the pandemic tunnel. Bad news: The world’s experience so far with COVID-19 vaccines has not been very uplifting.

China Coronavirus

The post How Aleksandar Vučić stole the vaccine-diplomacy show appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“If I would get a guest in my office saying, ‘What about the dialogue [with Serbia]?’ My answer [is], ‘What about the vaccines?’” she told the Atlantic Council at a Front Page event last week moderated by Damon Wilson, executive vice president of the Council. She later added that “during a pandemic, where people have lost lives and those who have survived have lost jobs, our focus is clear… It’s about people.”

She said that she rejected the idea that Kosovo’s “entire foreign policy, our entire international relations, should be redundant and reduced to relations with only one country,” even though she acknowledged that the dialogue with Serbia is still “extremely important.”

Ahead of the bilateral talks, which are resuming this week, Osmani claimed that “Kosovo is going [in] all prepared with the intention of contributing to a qualitative, final agreement that is centered around mutual recognition.” But she argued “it’s about time that Serbia actually decides what does it want,” and that it “cannot really sit on two chairs at the same time. You cannot flirt with Russia—militarily, politically, economically, and [in] other areas—and at the same time say that you believe in EU values.”

Here are some of the key takeaways from the conversation, which focused on Kosovo’s domestic reforms, its strategy for joining NATO, and its relationship with the United States.

Watch the full event

First: improvements at home

• Osmani outlined two priorities for her presidency: securing the rule of law and justice, as it is “a precondition for every other area,” and creating new jobs, as “Kosovo has quite a high rate of unemployment even thirteen years after [its] Declaration of Independence, especially among youth and women.”

• She wants to redesign Kosovo’s budget, moving money from infrastructure projects to investments in human capital through the education and health systems. Her goal is to triple the health sector’s budget. “We’ve inherited a health system that was near collapse even without the pandemic,” she said, adding “we need to have a healthy population so that [the] population can become productive because only a healthy population can help the economy of the country.” As for education, “if it is quality, [it] can transform a country. It can make it more democratic, it can make it more open as a society, and it can really transform it economically,” she said.

• As Kosovo attempts to emerge from the pandemic, Osmani does not think international initiatives to distribute vaccines have always been equitable. “In our area, some of the countries that were doing really well were getting more vaccines than countries like Kosovo and Bosnia that were really far behind,” she said. Osmani hailed the Biden administration’s recent announcement that it would allocate vaccines to Kosovo but warned the EU that if it “really wants to be taken seriously in this region, it should not forget about the Western Balkans as part of it in terms of planning for a vaccination.”

• While she aims to “tackle the daily acute problems of [Kosovo’s] citizens” and improve investment in education and health, Osmani acknowledged, “it’s not like the globe is going to wait for us to tackle all of the domestic problems and only then focus on our foreign policy.”

Kosovo has its sights set on joining NATO

• Osmani said Kosovo has two strategies in its attempt to secure its membership in NATO. First, the country is trying to improve its security force based on NATO standards and is participating in NATO’s military exercises like Defender Europe 21. Osmani believes that Kosovo’s position in peacebuilding has flipped: Whereas NATO had sent peacekeepers to Kosovo in 1999, now “we are actually exporting stability by having Kosovo soldiers serve in the Middle East and other places where we can contribute to peacekeeping.”

• Osmani’s second strategy: “Working with members of NATO individually to explain why it is so important, not just for Kosovo but for the security of the entire region, that Kosovo joins the Alliance.”

• She singled out the United States, and President Joe Biden, as one of Kosovo’s key supporters in NATO. “[Biden] is one of the people, if not the person, in the United States that knows Kosovo best,” she said, adding that she is confident that Biden will continue to support Kosovo “on its path towards strengthening its statehood [which] includes recognitions bilaterally as well as memberships multilaterally.” She continued that “to have Kosovo be a member of NATO would be not just Kosovo’s success but a stamp to the United States’ success in the world as well.”

• She said Biden’s appearance at Monday’s NATO Summit solidifies the importance of United States and European cooperation and brings hope as the Western Balkans “has suffered at times when such transatlantic cooperation was not at its best.”

A bumpy ride with neighbors

• Kosovo considers it important that all members of the Western Balkans 6 cooperate economically, Osmani said. To that end, member countries have created a regional economic area and struck the Central European Free Trade Agreement. But Osmani cautioned that “countries need to respect what they sign” and claimed that “none of these were in fact implemented in practice [by Serbia].”

• When asked whether Kosovo’s neighbors could help in the country’s fight against corruption, Osmani said she is “a strong believer of cooperation in every area in the region, but especially… joint rule of law efforts.” In 2018, Kosovo failed to join the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), after Serbia, supported by Russia, had allegedly lobbied against Kosovo’s entry. Osmani said that membership in INTERPOL and Europol is important for Kosovo to fight corruption.

• Osmani said that Kosovo is adopting legislation to tackle corruption and will be implementing a vetting process in its justice ministry. “You need to have people with integrity everywhere, not just in one institution, because the chain is broken somewhere; they’re not going to be able to move on,” said Osmani. “When we [have] an independent, apoliticized justice system that is based on integrity at its core, will we show to the rest of the world that, yes, we can stand on our own feet.”

Read the transcript

Transcript

Jun 9, 2021

President Osmani on Kosovo’s domestic reforms, dialogue with Serbia, and relationship with the US

By Atlantic Council

Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani joined the Atlantic Council just before Kosovo and Serbia reengage in bilateral talks, where she outlined her presidential priorities and concerns in the years ahead.

Corruption Elections

Katherine Walla is assistant director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

Article Nov 5, 2020

Western Balkans Partnership: Getting a common market from the Sofia Summit

By Jim O’Brien

In Sofia on November 10, the Western Balkans Six—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia—the European Union, and ten European countries belonging to the Berlin Process will set an agenda for the next four years. This report discusses what is likely to emerge and what might need to be done later.

Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Jul 29, 2020

Western Balkans leaders meet to drive coronavirus recovery and deepen regional economic cooperation

By David A. Wemer

Leaders from the Western Balkans Six—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia—participated in the Western Balkans Partnership Summit on July 29 to take steps to deepen regional economic cooperation and stimulate growth amid the widespread economic downturn caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.

Inclusive Growth International Markets

New Atlanticist Jun 17, 2020

Here’s how a Kosovo-Serbia White House summit could produce progress

By Damir Marusic

We don’t really know what the goal of the talks is. Most assume that anything short of a final status deal would be a failure, but that could be shortsighted: a smaller win may be possible, and could be significant.

Politics & Diplomacy The Balkans

The post Kosovo President Osmani: Today’s challenges require ‘an entirely different governing mindset’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Wed, June 9, 2021 • 8:30 am ET

A conversation with President of the Republic of Kosovo Vjosa Osmani

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – President Osmani discussed Kosovo’s domestic and foreign policy priorities and her agenda for achieving them.

Europe & Eurasia

Event transcript

Speaker
H.E. Vjosa Osmani
President of the Republic of Kosovo

Introduction and Moderator
Damon Wilson
Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council

Closing Remarks
Benjamin Haddad
Director, Europe Center, Atlantic Council

DAMON WILSON: Good morning to those joining us in the United States and good afternoon to our audience in Europe. I’m Damon Wilson, executive vice president of the Atlantic Council, live from studios—Atlantic Council studios in Washington. And I’m delighted to welcome you to our latest edition of AC Front Page, our premier broadcast featuring top newsmakers.

Today we’re delighted to welcome one of Europe’s youngest and newest leaders, her excellency Vjosa Osmani, the president of the Republic of Kosovo. So welcome to AC Front Page, Madam President. We’re honored to have you with us today.

PRESIDENT VJOSA OSMANI: Thank you, Damon. The honor is all mine. I really look forward to the conversation with you and everyone else joining us today.

DAMON WILSON: Thank you so much.

President Osmani was elected in April to president. And she is only the second female president of Kosovo, the first woman to serve as speaker of the Assembly of Kosovo. And she ran on a reform and anti-corruption platform. She’s also emphasized the need to normalized Kosovo-Serbia relations. So today we’ll explore how she’s going to tackle these priorities during her tenure. And we’ll also discuss President Osmani’s expectations of the United States on President—the eve of President Biden’s trip to Europe.

She has close ties to the United States. We first had the chance to meet in the fall of 2019 in Washington when she was planning for new elections. She brings energy, vision, pragmatism, and a human touch to her work. Kosovo has emerged as among the most dynamic democracies in the region. But still, more than a decade after its independence, it faces tremendous challenges at home and in the region. So we look forward to hearing… the president’s vision for [her] country, for how it can be part of regional stability and economic growth, and anchoring it in the transatlantic community.

And that’s why here at the Atlantic Council we’ve created the Balkans Forward Initiative, to foster a democratic, secure, and prosperous Western Balkans, firmly integrated in the transatlantic community. So I’ll be moderating today’s conversation. I’m going to be joined by some colleagues who will be asking some questions on air. And I would encourage all of you in the audience to join and participate using the hashtag #ACFrontPage and the hashtag #BalkansForward.

So with that, Madam President, let’s jump in. You were just elected as president in April. You are not new to politics, and you’ve been involved in helping to disrupt, if you will, Kosovo’s politics. But share with our audience a little bit of your vision for Kosovo, your priorities as president.

PRESIDENT VJOSA OSMANI: Once again, thank you, Damon. Really looking forward to this. And also looking forward to meeting you all in Washington whenever the time permits, as well as the COVID-19 measures. Let me wish you all health during these very difficult and challenging times. As we all know, that’s the most important thing nowadays and every day, I would say.

As you know, the Kosovo institutions that emerged from the 14th of February elections of this year were all around two main pillars. First of all, our promise to the people of Kosovo that our main job is rule of law and justice as a precondition for success in every other area—be it economy, health, education, and other areas. And secondly is creation of new jobs, given the fact that Kosovo has quite a high rate of unemployment even thirteen years after the declaration of independence, especially among youth and women, which are the two categories that we’re aiming to help support most.

Kosovo has the highest inactivity rate of women in the region when it comes to the job market. And for that reason, it’s extremely important that we understand that without including the other 50 percent of our society in the job market and in every other area of life we cannot aim for a successful country and for long-term and sustainable economic development of it.

So what we’re aiming to do—and as you can—you have heard it so far from both myself and the government—is institutions that very much tackle the daily acute problems of our citizens and are very much focused on the domestic issues. At the same time I’m very much aware, as president of the country, and at the same time head of foreign policy according to our constitution, but it’s not like the globe is going to wait for us to tackle all of the domestic problems and only then focus on our foreign policy.

So, as president of the country, of course, in cooperation with the government, we meet quarterly—on a weekly basis on foreign-policy issues—from regional ones, which of course also include dialogue with Serbia, to bilateral relations with the United States as our most important and most strategic ally, and even other countries in other continents with which, while maybe geographically far, I still think bilateral relations with all of them are extremely important for young nations like Kosovo.

So, having in mind the result of the latest elections and the fact that the change, the positive change that we all aimed for, was mainly made possible because of the votes of women and youth, it is our obligation that these two categories are really heard—all of the citizens of Kosovo, obviously, no matter their gender, no matter their ethnicity, no matter their background. But first and foremost, we really need to make sure that Kosovo becomes a country that its young people, that comprise the majority of the population, see their perspective inside of Kosovo. These are some brilliant young minds that really need to have their potential developed, and then they could be successful in Kosovo or outside. But at the same time, they need support from the Kosovo institutions in fair processes that are based on meritocracy in a country where education is qualitative. Because, as a person that comes from… academia, you would expect… that I would not just say but also act on a platform where investment in education and investment in human capital is really at the center of what we do in our country.

But all these are priorities which, of course, we need to turn into concrete action in the next four to five years because, as you know, the government has a four-year mandate, but I as president have a five-year mandate. But the reforms that are necessary in the justice sector, one, and in the jobs sector, which of course encompasses reforms in education, in economy, and so on and so forth, will require patience, will require courage, will require a vision that will go even beyond four years.

I really want that what we tackle, what we do, what we envision, what we carry out as part of these reforms, are such that will be continued even by presidents that will come after me and even by governments that will come after the Kurti government because only when we understand that, only when we understand that top reforms in education will have to take about a decade, will have to be continued from one government to another, only when we understand that institutional memory really is key to a cohesive success of our institutions, I believe we’ll be successful in tackling some of the biggest problems.

So, as you can see from my very long answer to your first question, the challenges are enormous. But we’re, as President Obama would say, all fired up and ready to go.

DAMON WILSON: Thank you for sharing that. I think you’re right. I mean, as president, you articulate a vision for the state. And while you’re right that the domestic elections, or domestic issues, really drove the elections earlier this year, one of the remarkable things that seems to unite everyone across the political spectrum in Kosovo is the relationship with the United States.

You have an outsized voice as president in your lead on foreign affairs. We’re speaking on the eve of President Biden’s first trip to Europe. What are your expectations for President Biden’s trip? And more specifically, what would you like to see from the United States towards the Western Balkans during this administration?

PRESIDENT VJOSA OSMANI: Probably the list is quite long, but let me mention a couple of the expectations that I think are extremely important not just for the people of Kosovo but wider—for the region and for Europe as a continent.

First and foremost, I strongly believe that President Biden really understands—and probably is one of the US politicians that best understands because of his experience in transatlantic cooperation—how important cooperation between the United States and Europe is. Our region has suffered at times when such transatlantic cooperation was not at its best times. For that reason, I really have the great belief that he will only contribute to strengthening this transatlantic cooperation. And in addition to that, the fact that he is participating in the NATO summit, he is once again emphasizing how important the NATO alliance is for the security of not just our continent, but for the security of the world.

When it comes to Kosovo in particular, of course, having in mind the close ties that President Biden has had with Kosovo—he’s visited Kosovo a couple times—I’ve had the honor of meeting him a couple of times in Washington, DC, at the White House as vice president, previously as senator, and in different capacities during my short but interesting political career, and I have to say that he is one of the people if not the person in the United States that knows Kosovo best. And I think that is quite an important factor in making us feel confident that he will understand that what he has started, together with all of us, in supporting Kosovo in its path towards strengthening its statehood—which among others include recognitions bilaterally as well as memberships multilaterally—is something that he will continue to support. Moreover, the fact that he’s going to be in Brussels for the NATO meeting, the NATO summit, I do hope that is one of the elements that will only increase the level of preparations of the countries in our region towards becoming a NATO member for those of us that are not.

As far as Kosovo is concerned, the new institutions have stepped up their efforts when it comes to preparation for first of all Partnership for Peace, and secondly to prepare for a NATO membership. And I do hope that President Biden and his administration will understand how important that is for the security of the entire region. Albania’s and Montenegro’s membership at NATO has only stepped up the security level and the level of peace in our region. I strongly believe that Kosovo, as a country that used to be an importer of stability in NATO forces in the past and now as being an exporter of stability with Kosovo soldiers joining US forces in the Middle East operations, I think it’s such an incredible example of, one, NATO contribution, but most importantly US contribution to peace in the world and to peace in the European continent, in our region more importantly. And to have Kosovo become a member of NATO would be not just Kosovo’s success, but I think just a stamp to the US success in the world as well.

DAMON WILSON: Thank you for sharing that—sharing that ambition.

Here, the Balkans Forward team at the Atlantic Council works very much to promote strengthened US-EU cooperation on the Balkans. And one of the areas where we’ve seen sometimes really coordinated action, sometimes complementary action, and sometimes disjointed action is on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. So you’ve watched. You’ve been involved and seen this over a decade. How do you see, as president, the prospects for Kosovo-Serbia relations? And how do you begin to translate this dialogue from a dialogue into results that deliver for the people of the region?

PRESIDENT VJOSA OSMANI: Let me be very frank here: I really think it will depend on how much Serbia takes its obligations in the dialogue seriously. It will also depend on how much Serbia truly means when they say integration in the European Union. Because, as the saying goes, you cannot really sit on two chairs at the same time. You cannot flirt with Russia militarily, politically, economically, and in other areas, and at the same time say that you believe in EU values. You cannot promote ideas of border changes based on ethnicities that belongs to the past—belongs to the past centuries—and at the same time aim to join the European Union, which was built on the exact opposite values. You cannot aim to promote human rights and multiethnicity and at the same time promote ideas that would be based on ethnic divisions.

I myself, as the president of Kosovo, as the president of the people of Kosovo, truly believe in the multiethnic values that we have embraced in our constitution and we’re implementing every single day of our work in the institutions and every single day in every other area of life. So I do think that it’s about time that Serbia actually decides what does it want.

From its side, Kosovo has always shown to be the constructive party in the dialogue. We have always extended our hand of cooperation in this process. We have decided to sit at that table in spite of the fact that Serbia has never asked for forgiveness. We were the good neighbor. Kosovo is never a country that destabilizes any other country in the region. So it’s about time that Serbia becomes a good neighbor as well, not just to us but also a good neighbor to Croatia, a good neighbor to Montenegro, a good neighbor to Bosnia. For that reason, I think Europe should start talking with clear language when it comes to Serbia and what their expectations are.

In this process—and, as you know, there will be a meeting now soon in June—Kosovo is going all prepared with the intention of contributing to a qualitative final agreement that is centered around mutual recognition in Kosovo’s current borders and based on its declaration of independence and the constitution of February and April 2008. There are lots of issues that I think are a priority and would really help push the process forward positively.

And let me mention one that is extremely important—not just to me as the representative of the people of Kosovo, but to the people of Kosovo generally—and that is the issue of the missing persons that were forcibly disappeared during the war. We will be doing our utmost to make sure that we contribute to a dialogue where Serbia will finally open up their archives and show the whereabouts of the beloveds of 1,639 families that are still longing for information as to where their kids are. I meet the families of the missing every single day.

And we really should understand that while it’s extremely important to talk about how to remove barriers of movement and, you know, we’ve had so many agreements, even focusing on stickers on the—on the registration plates of cars. But you know, when I go to Suva Reka, a city in Kosovo, and I meet a mother… she found some of her children but she’s still missing one of her—of her girls—little girls, and the grave is still open, I’m sorry, but I cannot talk about the stickers on those registration plates any longer. I need my people back, first of all. When the people are back, then there is an entire new chapter that can be opened on discussing the issues of trade, and issues of stickers, and how to remove these barriers, which unfortunately Serbia has not removed—especially the nontariff barriers—throughout the years.

I belong to a generation of people in politics and outside of politics that really sees a potential of regional cooperation in many other areas apart from politics—in tourism, in trade, in economy, in digitalization. We can truly transform this region. But we also must understand that, just like anywhere else in the world where countries went through wars and paid in destruction, there is a precondition for peace, and that is justice. No one in Kosovo is asking for revenge. We’re simply asking for justice.

And these will be issues that we will openly tackle in the dialogue with Serbia. Every single time that I talk about these crimes, I’m very clear in saying that they were committed by the Milošević regime. It’s about time that Serbia also makes the difference and cuts the ties with that regime of the past and really brings the perpetrators before justice so that the entire region can move forward in development and cooperation.

DAMON WILSON: So, despite some of the differences across the region, one of the things you hear from leaders—whether in Belgrade, Pristina, or anywhere in the region, is this emphasis on economic growth in jobs, recovering from this pandemic. Obviously, the president’s priority here, President Biden’s priority here, economic recovery from the pandemic, that’s the focus in the G7. How do you see the effort in the region, particularly around this Western Balkans Six sort of partnership, to promote an accelerated recovery out of the pandemic through greater regional economic cooperation, greater common cooperation on green recovery, recognizing regional cooperation as a—as a pathway long before EU membership becomes a reality. Is that a viable option economically and politically for Pristina?

PRESIDENT VJOSA OSMANI: For Kosovo, it is extremely important that economic cooperation in the region is something that we all contribute to. But I have to emphasize that countries need to respect what they sign. So if a country signs to remove nontariff barriers, as Serbia did with CEFTA, they should implement that.

The other issue that I need to point out is that, in Kosovo, we’re really concerned with efforts to double up and just replicate the regional initiatives that actually exist, either with the regional economic area that has now turned into a common regional market, in the Berlin Process, or with the RCC and other regional institutions to which Kosovo has always contributed. In early July, as you know, in the new meeting of the Berlin Process—which might be the last one—there will be a reconfirmation of the efforts and the wills of the governments of the Western Balkans to cooperate in a common regional market.

There are—of course, there were a couple of issues with which Kosovo had concerns which were removed. And mostly the focus is to remove the barriers of movement, especially for the people but also for goods. And I think in that sense, since we were never a barrier to anyone, we will continue to contribute in that area. But I do hope that other countries in the region will contribute to that, because if we present important regional projects to the European Union and the United States it will be much easier to convince them, obviously, to invest.

But I think one thing that we should never forget: The support should be equitable. It should be just. The principle of equity needs to be taken into account so that those that have been damaged most like Kosovo, those that need more support like Kosovo, actually get more support. I have to say that even during the delivery of the vaccines of the some of the international initiatives, I don’t think these principles were taking into account the situation in our area. So some of the countries that were doing really well were getting more vaccines than countries like Kosovo and Bosnia that were really far behind. But now we’re lucky to be doing better, and I wanted to take this opportunity to express gratitude towards all of those nations that have helped us within the EU or elsewhere, but in particular to President Biden, first of all, for including Kosovo in the list of countries that will be benefitting not just through COVAX but also bilaterally from the US initiative to spread the surplus of their vaccines with the rest of the world.

So economy is extremely important. But as I said, countries really need to implement what they signed. And just going back to history, I think we don’t need anyone to explain us the numbers because they are very, very clear that despite of what it signed Serbia did not implement, either from the Berlin Process nor from CEFTA agreements nor the regional economic area commitments. None of these are, in fact, implemented in practice. I think it’s about time that the European Union in particular takes into account that investing in Kosovo financially is something that would also turn its, you know, long-term investment in Kosovo into a success. We should not be seen as a country where the West has contributed to its freedom and independence and just forget about its success economically and in other areas.

DAMON WILSON: Thank you. We’ve got some terrific guests who have joined us for this conversation, so I don’t want to monopolize the questions with you, Madam President.

And with that, I want to turn to Ambassador Cameron Munter, who is joining us from Prague. Cameron Munter has become a senior fellow here at the Atlantic Council, with a long track record in the region. He helped build out the Balkans work when he was at the EastWest Institute. He’s also a senior fellow in our South Asia Center. Ambassador Munter, over to you, sir.

CAMERON MUNTER: Madam President, really a pleasure to have this opportunity. And let me just give a brief, more specific kind of question, which is one of the things that I think you and the government of Kosovo is committed to is fighting corruption, and it’s a big topic and a tough one. I’d like to ask what kind of initiatives you have in mind, what specific things that you can do, and especially whether you see fighting corruption simply as a domestic issue or whether it’s part of the effort to try to get the region to work together. Inasmuch as all the countries in the region have this problem, are there ways, A, that there can be these new initiatives? And, B, can your neighbors be involved to help as well?

PRESIDENT VJOSA OSMANI: Thank you, Ambassador. Perhaps I’ll just start with the second part of your question.

I am a strong believer of cooperation in every area in the region, but especially where these are joint rule-of-law efforts. That is why I thought it was so important that Kosovo’s efforts towards joining Interpol would be successful. But unfortunately, because, as you know, the work of Russia and Serbia, we were blocked at the very last minute from joining this institution, which would help us cooperate with other nations in the region and elsewhere.

Recently we’ve had an excellent cooperation example between Kosovo, Italy, and Albania, which actually is the most successful in Kosovo’s recent history as a joint cooperation program. And I think it only shows how important regional cooperation is in combating high-level organized crime because, as you know, if it’s high-level, it means that it’s not just local. It has absolutely crossed borders.

And that is particularly true for the Western Balkans. It’s particularly true. It goes back to the early 90s, to be very frank. But I’m not going to go or dwell into details of that. But it’s a chain of cooperation between these elements, which we need to tackle all together. And we will. We will for sure.

I do agree with you that it does require cooperation in the region, but I think it goes even wider than just the region. And for that reason it’s so important that Kosovo’s membership in Interpol and Europol is supported so that we can also contribute to this, as we have. Kosovo’s police, in fact, is one of the institutions with the highest credibility rate and trustworthiness among the people of Kosovo. And I think that is really helping us have the people cooperate with them in these kind of cases.

But lately we’ve had some really great success stories, which are an example to show also to the rest of the world because being successful in fighting crime and corruption is not just a success domestically. I think it reflects positively for the image of the country internationally. So that’s why I think it’s so important for us. And as I said, the success in this area is a precondition for success in every other area.

Some of the issues which we will—we will be dealing with—and we’re already working on that—is, one, adopting new pieces of legislation that will be tackling this phenomenon much more seriously, whether it’s with confiscation of assets illegally obtained or other pieces of legislation.

Secondly, we will start a vetting process. And the Ministry of Justice is already working on the concept document and the platform and strategy that will be followed, obviously learning from the lessons or some mistakes that were made in other countries during the vetting process. And vetting, I strongly believe, should not only include the justice sector, but also the security sector, because they go together. If you’re really investigating a case, you need to make sure that you’re successful with the police, you’re successful with the prosecutor’s office, and then end up with judges. And in all these pillars—and other security and intelligence institutions, obviously—you need to have people with integrity everywhere, not just in one institution, because if the chain is broken somewhere you’re not going to be able to move on.

So perhaps to conclude by emphasizing what I emphasize every day in my work: Integrity is the key word here. We need integrity in this sector, because even if we as politicians fail, even if the politics of this country end up perhaps violating the rights of the citizens, they need to have a place to go, a place that they trust to have their rights protected. And that should be the courts. That should be the justice system. As a lawyer in particular, I strongly believe that only on the day when we will have an independent, apoliticized justice system that is based on integrity at its core will we show to the rest of the world that, yes, we can stand on our own feet.

DAMON WILSON: Thank you for that clear answer.

I want to bring in Judy Ansley next. Judy is a former deputy national security adviser in the Bush administration, the top staffer on the Senate Armed Services Committee for many years, and now serves as a senior advisor here at the Atlantic Council as well as a board member of the US Institute for Peace. Over to you, Judy.

JUDY ANSLEY: Thank you very much, Damon. And Madam President, it’s very nice to see you again in this new role that you have.

I wanted to ask you a little bit about a topic that you have already mentioned, which is very important as well to the Council, which is the outlook for Kosovo joining NATO. What do you see as Kosovo’s next steps on the path to NATO membership? And you mentioned that your institutions are already stepping up their prep work, but what specifically is being done now to prepare your country for integration into NATO? Thank you.

PRESIDENT VJOSA OSMANI: Thank you, Judy. Great to see you again.

There are two main pillars that we’re working on. And obviously, perhaps I shouldn’t be talking about all the details, but I do want to mention these two main pillars.

The one is very much diplomatic. And it’s focused on working with members of NATO individually to explain why it is so important not just for Kosovo but for the security of the entire region that Kosovo joins the alliance. We’re working with—have stepped up the efforts in working with countries individually so that they could understand this and how important it is to support Kosovo’s path towards this membership. Obviously, we will start by joining Partnership for Peace. And I think that would only help us have a smoother way towards NATO membership.

The second pillar is very much practical. It’s what is happening every day on the ground in Kosovo. Kosovo’s security force, which is our army, is being, I would say, not just built but also becoming more and more professional every single day with the support of NATO and entirely based on NATO standards. We’ve recently joined the Defender Europe ’21 exercise, along [with] other nations in our region, and our forces also received the confirmation from the US forces that they were absolutely in line with all of the data standards and US Army standards to participate in such exercises. The fact that we’re also preparing from a defense point of view, not just diplomatically, I think shows that Kosovo is really taking this more seriously, so that at the time when our diplomatic efforts are culminating with actual membership we also have an army in place that is ready to immediately participate in missions.

Right now, as you know, Kosovo is not only being successful within its territory, but it has also started participating in missions outside—although small missions, but for us these are historic because no matter how small they have a big impact to show that after—twenty-three years after NATO entered Kosovo, and on the 12th of June is the anniversary, we actually are exporting stability by having Kosovo soldiers serve in the Middle East and other places where we can contribute to peacekeeping. So it’s mainly these two pillars and also by increasing the role of the Ministry of Defense in everyday work of the government by increasing the budget that we spend in defense. So it’s these kinds of actions. But mostly it’s focused on cooperation with the United States, obviously, as the main NATO member. But every single effort is in full coordination with the US.

DAMON WILSON: Thank you.

I want to turn now to our final guest, Maja Piscevic, who is joining us live from Belgrade. Maja is a senior fellow for the Atlantic Council, working on our Balkans Forward program. She leads the Balkans Dialogue, which she launched at the EastWest Institute. We’re delighted to have her as part of our team now. Maja, over to you.

MAJA PISCEVIC: Thank you so much, Damon.

And Mrs. President, it is such a pleasure to meet you. You’re such a unique political figure. [You became] President of Kosovo at thirty-eight, you are Europe’s youngest country in which half population is under thirty. You were born in Yugoslavia, but by the time you turned ten, Yugoslavia collapsed into the Balkan wars. In 1999, your family were forced to leave home in northern Mitrovica in a convey of thousands of people, as you describe this journey during which one of the paramilitary fighters put barrel of Kalashnikov in your mouth. These are horrible memories from the very early age.

Peace, you say today, cannot come without Serbia apologizing for the war. On the other hand, Kosovo has to move on. More than 50 percent of young people are unemployed. A poll in 2019, I think, showed that 81.2 percent of ethnic Albanians believed that unemployment was Kosovo’s biggest problem, followed by corruption. Kosovo’s economy was struggling before pandemic, and COVID didn’t make things easier. It has made the economic problems bigger and harder to solve, especially alone without opening up to regional cooperation. So my question to you is, as the most prominent political figure together with Prime Minister Kurti, how do you see your priorities in terms of balancing the past and the future?

PRESIDENT VJOSA OSMANI: Thank you, Maja. This is such an important topic. We are having to deal with making this balance every single day of our work.

As I—as I pointed out at the beginning of this conversation, we won these elections with a historic landslide victory mainly because every single day in front of the people of Kosovo we talked about how are we going to resolve the problems that they face daily—whether it’s security in schools, or whether it’s justice from the institutions, or it’s jobs that need to be created especially for the young generation and women. It is extremely important that we keep that promise. And for that reason, most of our work is absolutely built up on efforts that we make, decisions that we make every single day in what I think and what I call an entirely different government mindset.

The first change that we need to make—and that’s going to be budgetary impact—is to make sure that the small but important budget that we have as a country in fact turns from infrastructure, where it was usually spent, to investment in human capital, which is education and health. We’ve inherited a health system that was near collapse, even without the pandemic. It’s about time that we don’t just double, but even triple the budget in the health sector, even after we pass the pandemic. We really need to make sure that the hospitals are places where people go to heal, and not get the opposite. And unfortunately, it was a sector that was entirely left behind. And it must become a priority. We need to have a healthy population, so that that population can become productive. Because only a productive population can help the economy of the country.

Secondly, we truly need to turn our investment—financially speaking, but also our human investment in education. I think education, if it’s qualitative, can transform a country. It can make it more democratic, it can make it more open as a society, and it can really transform it economically. We don’t really need to actually reinvent the wheel. We can just check, let’s say, the World Bank reports on how countries really succeeded if they had high rates of unemployment and problems such as the ones that we’re facing today in Kosovo. They all invested in human capital, which means investing in your youth, investing in early childhood education, invest in education projects generally speaking, invest in your health sector. Then you will have a population that can really transform the country economically.

We do understand, however, that these are all decisions that are not going to just affect our lives in the next four or five years. They’re going to affect generations to come, especially if we’re talking, let’s say, about decisions that we make on energy transition or environment, because the green agenda is one of the top priorities of my office. This will all affect generations to come, so we need to make the right decisions.

Lots of analysis is also taking place nowadays. It’s not just deciding right there and then. We need to make sure to make the right decisions. So that’s why it takes analysis, so that we can make the right ones, and that effect on the people in the generations to come is a positive one and not a negative one.

At the same time, obviously, while we’re dealing with all these and a thousand other issues, every single day we receive guests from around the world trying to focus on the dialogue with Serbia. Let me be very frank: There was a time where we were the very last country in Europe to get vaccines—in fact, we were the only ones with zero vaccines. And if I would get a guest in my office saying, what about the dialogue, my answer was, what about the vaccines? If the EU really wants to be taken seriously in this region, it should not forget about the Western Balkans as part of it in terms of planning for vaccination. So only until we started vaccination and were doing, you know, fairly well on it, then I really start talking about the dialogue with Serbia—always understanding the importance of it, but not while the people that I’m representing are dying because of lack of vaccination.

So it’s quite a balance that we need to find and keep every single day, always understanding that success in the dialogue with Serbia, with a final agreement that is implementable in practice, that is centered around mutual recognition and Kosovo’s current borders, is extremely important. But I really reject the idea that our entire foreign policy, our entire international relations, should be redundant and reduced to relations with only one country—although Serbia is an immediate neighbor, but it’s not the only country in the globe. We really need to be focused on how to develop and enhance bilateral relations with other countries as well.

I will—I mean, I’ve met with quite many leaders of the world in this past month that I was elected, and I will be meeting plenty more during June. I really want to reemphasize the importance of bilateral relations with all the countries, big and small, around the world, because I represent a peace-loving nation. And for that reason, talking to leaders around the world, saying that Kosovo has this great potential—it should not be seen as a burden any longer but as a potential for itself and the world—is a message that I will try to convey beyond our borders.

So, of course, both are extremely important. But during a pandemic, where people have lost lives and those who have survived have lost jobs, our focus is clear. The focus of every leader around the world should be clear. It’s about the people. It should always be about the people.

DAMON WILSON: Madam President, thank you so much for this extraordinarily wide-ranging conversation so early in your tenure. We look forward to welcoming you in person when you’re able to visit Washington later this year. I want to thank you for your time today.

We’re going to close the program by handing over to Benjamin Haddad, the director of the Atlantic Council Europe Center, to close us out. But Madam President, thank you.

PRESIDENT VJOSA OSMANI: Thank you, Damon. It’s been a pleasure.

BENJAMIN HADDAD: Thank you, Damon.

And thank you so much, Madam President, for joining us. You concluded by saying it’s always about the people. And it’s such a fitting conclusion to this really engaging and wide-ranging conversation on the issues impacting Kosovo and the Western Balkans. You talked about youth empowerment. You talked about defense, of rule of law, regional dialogue, and cooperation.

As Damon said in his introduction, at the Atlantic Council we are committed to the firm integration of Kosovo and the entire Western Balkan region into the institution and the family, the Euro-Atlantic community. In fact, our goal, a Europe whole and free and at peace, won’t be complete without Kosovo and the Western Balkans.

Our Balkans Forward Initiative at the Europe Center here at the Atlantic Council will continue to work with our partners in the region, with you in the United States and in Europe, to make that vision a reality. And so our work on Kosovo-Serbia relations, on regional economic integration in the Western Balkans, and the opportunities in politics and economic development that this young region promises, will focus on just that—helping our friends address their challenges and make the most of their strengths and settle fully into the transatlantic community.

So I want to focus just on this to finish, Madam President. We look forward to hosting you in Washington, DC And always remember that you have friends and partners here at the Atlantic Council to make your vision a reality and to continue to promote the relationship between the United States and Kosovo.

Thank you very much, and I hope to see you all very soon for the rest of our [programming].

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The post President Osmani on Kosovo’s domestic reforms, dialogue with Serbia, and relationship with the US appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Vučić made his comments during an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the organization’s Europe Center and co-moderated by Maja Piscevic, a nonresident senior fellow with the center, and Damon Wilson, executive vice president of the Council.

On Serbia’s recent delivery of more than 120,000 vaccine doses to neighboring Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vučić said he is “very proud [of] being part of a team that did something. I don’t believe that we did something huge or we did something historic, but we just did our job. We invested hard work and we got more vaccines than the others.”

Vučić said Serbia negotiated shipments from Pfizer and AstraZeneca as well as vaccines from China and Russia, and that by late October it will begin receiving doses from Moderna. Yet he denied allegations that Serbia acted as a testing grounds for stage-three trials of China’s Sinovac or Russia’s Sputnik jabs. “We were not a part of that process,” he said. “We just bought and we got more vaccines that finished all their trials in their own countries.”

Serbia’s vaccine diplomacy comes as the country begins its post-COVID recovery. (The country has fully vaccinated more than 17 percent of its population against COVID-19.) The International Monetary Fund predicts Serbia’s economy will expand by 5 percent this year, though Vučić expects gross domestic product (GDP) growth to reach 6.5 percent in 2021. In addition, Serbia received close to 70 percent of all foreign direct investment (FDI) destined for the Western Balkans last year. Vučić credited Serbia’s strong performance to the passage of labor and bankruptcy reforms in 2014 and 2015, as well as subsidies and tax incentives to encourage foreign investment.

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A friendship isn’t without its differences—even for Serbia and the United States

Vučić has placed a high priority on Serbia’s ties with the United States—a relationship likely to grow even closer under US President Joe Biden. “We’ll do our best to boost the friendship between the two countries,” Vučić said, later adding that “there are, of course, differences, particularly on [the] Kosovo issue. But we are ready to discuss this,” he said, noting Biden’s readiness to listen to Serbia’s position on a range of matters. 

“I hope that we can have a serious, responsible approach in developing our relationship. And I think that [the] US interest in the Western Balkans is having Serbia as an ally…” Vučić said. “But of course, ten times more than America’s interest [in] having Serbia as a friend is our interest [in] having America—if I cannot say the best friend in the world, I can say the friend with which we share a common interest and a common future.”

What’s next for Serbia’s EU-membership campaign

Meanwhile, Serbia’s efforts to join the EU have stalled amid concerns raised by the union—also echoed by the US State Department and watchdog groups like Freedom House—about corruption, attacks on journalists, and the general state of democracy in the country.

“I am very much aware that we are not perfect and I’m not hiding this,” Vučić said, outlining Serbia’s efforts to combat corruption, organized crime, and the general abuse of democracy.

On a list of items Serbia needs to complete prior to joining the EU, said Vučić, “we’ve started ticking the [boxes]… We do it because it’s useful for us and it’s good for Serbia’s democracy, and it’s good for Serbia’s image,” he said. “And if we are capable enough of delivering the very best results [on the] economy in this region, the very best results in [the] inoculation process in this region, I have no doubt we are ready to improve the state of human rights and democracy in this country as well.”

As Serbia’s economy improves, however, Vučić said that the country will also need to tackle its impact on the environment to win the European Commission’s favor. He explained that Serbia is working on a green agenda. But “I have some fears,” said Vučić, “and I’m not absolutely jubilant about everything that we need to do…  I’m always very sincere speaking about our economy, which is of an utmost importance for us, and it’s not easy to sacrifice something that works for you because of [a] green agenda. We’ll have to do it, but we’ll have to balance it smartly.”

According to Vučić, Serbia and others in the region are pushing for a common market, sometimes called a “mini-Schengen,” that would unite the smaller countries of the Western Balkans. Yet Vučić acknowledged that some people in neighboring countries are suspicious of Belgrade’s motives.

“We need to understand their fears about Serbian domination in the region much better than we do and much better than we used to—which means that we need to give more guarantees, [and] not only more guarantees,” he said. “We need to be very persuasive and we need to convince them that it’s not good for Serbia only; it’s even better for them.”

Serbia-Kosovo relations remain a major sticking point

Meanwhile, little progress has been made in resolving the impasse between Serbia and Kosovo since April 2013, when the two sides signed a fifteen-point accord that opens the way to EU membership for both countries. So far, ninety-eight countries including the United States have recognized Kosovo’s sovereignty, the most recent being Israel in September 2020.

“What we signed in Brussels exactly eight years ago has to be fulfilled by both sides,” Vučić said, arguing that “the other side wanted to sign it just because they were absolutely certain that they didn’t need to fulfill everything they signed, but we’ll have to deliver more than they signed.”

The problem, he alleged, is that the United States, Germany, and other powerful countries continue to pressure Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s independence without offering Belgrade anything concrete in return—not even guaranteed full-fledged membership status in the EU.

“We need to change the overall atmosphere. We need to discuss everything in a totally different way,” Vučić said. “We need to boost trust and confidence between us, not to see each other as the real enemies. We are not enemies.”

Yet he conceded that mistrust runs deep on both sides. “We need both peoples—Serbs and Albanians—to accept compromise and solutions… I’m afraid that the atmosphere in Pristina is, dare to say, much worse than in Belgrade,” he said. “And in Belgrade it’s not the very best atmosphere [either].”

Vučić also dismissed warnings from neighboring Kosovo and Albania of Belgrade’s expansionist aspirations.

“We are not interested in creating any kind of Greater Serbia. To us, Greater Serbia means a better economy, more FDI, more plants—a green agenda but not jeopardizing our economy,” he said, adding that his government seeks to bring down unemployment and raise living standards. “That’s what we are interested in.”

Larry Luxner is a Tel Aviv-based freelance journalist and photographer who covers the Middle East, Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. Follow him on Twitter @LLuxner.

Further reading

ACFrontPage Apr 23, 2021

Serbian President Vučić on COVID-19, democracy, and Serbia’s bid to join the EU

By Atlantic Council

Serbia is at an inflection point as it deals with a global pandemic and as it navigates its place in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community in the future. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić joined the Atlantic Council to discuss how Serbia fits into a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.

European Union Politics & Diplomacy

Article Nov 5, 2020

Western Balkans Partnership: Getting a common market from the Sofia Summit

By Jim O’Brien

In Sofia on November 10, the Western Balkans Six—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia—the European Union, and ten European countries belonging to the Berlin Process will set an agenda for the next four years. This report discusses what is likely to emerge and what might need to be done later.

Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Jul 29, 2020

Western Balkans leaders meet to drive coronavirus recovery and deepen regional economic cooperation

By David A. Wemer

Leaders from the Western Balkans Six—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia—participated in the Western Balkans Partnership Summit on July 29 to take steps to deepen regional economic cooperation and stimulate growth amid the widespread economic downturn caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.

Inclusive Growth International Markets

The post Serbian president pursues EU membership, better US ties, and a bigger role in the Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Online Event Thu, April 22, 2021 • 9:00 am ET

A conversation with President of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – President Aleksandar Vučić discussed Serbia’s domestic agenda amid the pandemic as well as the country’s regional and foreign policy priorities.

Europe & Eurasia The Balkans

Event transcript

Speaker
H.E. Aleksandar Vučić, President of the Republic of Serbia

Introduction
Damon Wilson
Executive vice president, Atlantic Council

Moderator
Maja Piscevic
Nonresident senior fellow, Atlantic Council

DAMON WILSON: Good morning to those joining us in the United States. Good afternoon to those in Europe. I’m Damon Wilson, executive vice president of the Atlantic Council.

Welcome to today’s Atlantic Council Front Page broadcast featuring the president of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić. Atlantic Council Front Page is our premier platform for conversations with global leaders.

As a leader who has shaped and even dominated Serbian politics, our guest today is playing a pivotal role in determining the trajectory of his nation and shaping the future of the Western Balkans. President Vučić was elected in 2017 and previously served as Serbia’s prime minister, deputy prime minister, and minister of defense. His presidency coincides with Serbia’s own inflection point—not only how it emerges from this global pandemic in the coming year, but how his decisions today determine the place of Serbia in Europe and Euro-Atlantic community in the future. The country is rapidly emerging from the pandemic with an innovative strategy of vaccine diplomacy and an ambitious economic recovery plan. Yet, the region remains fragile, facing stresses on reforms and democratic development, and uncertainty over regional stability and prospects for joining the European Union.

So today we’ll consider how Serbia and the region factor into the unfinished business of building a Europe whole, free and at peace. We’ll discuss President Vučić’s stepped up engagement with the United States and his continuing outreach to Moscow and Beijing. We’ll address the growing questions about the prospect of a dialogue with Kosovo, broader regional cooperation, and the state of democracy in Serbia today.

At the Atlantic Council, we’re committed to shaping the global future with our partners and allies. And we see Serbia and its neighbors as partners in this pursuit. The Atlantic Council created this Balkans Forward initiative to foster a democratic, secure, and prosperous Western Balkans as part of the Euro-Atlantic community, and to ensure US-European engagement in the region, to that end. So we welcome this opportunity to discuss how the United States and Serbia can deepen their relationship and support regional cooperation against the backdrop of a new US administration now in place.

I’ll be co-moderating today’s event with Maja Piscevic, our fantastic senior fellow with our Atlantic Council Europe Center, who is based in Belgrade full time. Maja is with the president in person in Belgrade at the presidency for this conversation. So, Mr. President, we look forward to what we know will be a dynamic conversation. You have already generated a lot of interest with a lot of questions coming in.

So for our audience, if you’re joining us over Zoom, please submit your questions in the Q&A box. Everyone else can engage in the conversation using the hashtag #ACFrontPage and #BalkansForward across our social media platforms. Thank you for joining us.

Maja, over to you.

MAJA PISCEVIC: Thank you so much, Damon. And thank you, President. Really deep thanks for agreeing to talk to the Atlantic Council audience today. I have to say that this feels much better than being in my room in front of the screen and just talking to people’s heads. So I hope this will become a new normal soon again.

We have a lot of things to cover today in a very short time. So first things first: health. Serbia has become a vaccination hub for Western Balkans and also for southeast Serbia. Belgrade has ordered over eleven million vaccines for Serbian citizens. We rank, I think, the second best in Europe in terms of number of vaccinated people, just after Great Britain. So many good results. You personally negotiated with the East and West. You negotiated with China and Russia, but also with companies like Pfizer, Moderna, and AstraZeneca.

When our neighbors didn’t have enough vaccines or, as a matter of fact, didn’t have any, you were the first to deliver the nations—to North Macedonia, to Sarajevo, to Montenegro. For your vaccine diplomacy you’ve been praised, but also sharply criticized. Although you invited the citizens of—thousands of citizens from the region to come to Serbia to get their vaccines comments were contradictory, to say the least. Some leaders accepted your donations with gratitude as an act of solidarity, but others were a little bit frustrated that they had to rely on Belgrade instead of their own government or the EU.

So you were accused or, as I said, criticized also for being a post child for Beijing and Moscow. You were even accused of using Serbia as a testing ground in Europe for China and Russian vaccines. We’ve heard a lot of these things. So you vaccine diplomacy has brought you good, and not all good. What I would like to ask you today is, first to say, what do you base your optimism on, on the economic recovery post-COVID for Serbia? But also, to speak a little to these critics who accuse you of nationalist tendencies, even trying to create a Serbian world—so-called Serbian world, in which you will be the leader of all ethnic Serbs, no matter where they are in this region?

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Wow, too many questions. I’ll do my best…

First of all, I’m really honored and privileged having an opportunity speaking to you, Maja, speaking to Damon, speaking to all our friends from Atlantic Council, and hope to see our old friends in person as soon as possible.

Speaking about vaccines—and you mentioned something that was imminent to everybody that was doing something, that was working on difficult items and issues, which is you have to be sharply criticized whatever you do. You’re not criticized only in a case when you do nothing. And from that point of view, I’m, to be very honest, very proud being a part of a team that did something. And I don’t believe that we did something huge, that we did something historic, but we did—we just did our job. We invested hard work and we got more vaccines than the others.

And I just need to make a few corrections. It means, first of all, we did not participate in that stage three or third trial of Chinese or Russian vaccines. No, not at all. And we were not a part of that process, not for a single moment. We just bought and we got more vaccines that finished all their trials in their own countries.

And first arrangement that we made with someone was with Pfizer. And I can tell you that people from Pfizer were as punctual as—I don’t know whether you have this idiom in American English or British English, but we have it in Serbian language. They were as punctual as a Swiss watch. And you know, it’s—they have always delivered everything that we agreed upon, and I’m very satisfied with that. Also we got our biggest number of jabs from Beijing, from China; then from AstraZeneca; and then from Moscow… And now we made an arrangement with various—we made an arrangement with Moderna, and we’ll start getting Moderna vaccines, I think, from the end of October.

And just to add on that, I think that, yes, we were doing a lot of preparations, investing our hard work, and I’m proud of that. And speaking about those who like the fact that Serbia ranked as number two in that so-called race for vaccines for jabs, I think that what we were doing, it was not about geopolitical issues. It was mainly, I dare to say, all about saving people’s lives. And that’s what we are satisfied with. Everything else, to be very honest and to tell you the truth, I don’t care. Whatever we do here, we’ll always find enough people who criticize you, some people to praise you. That’s always the case. That’s our job.

Speaking about nationalistic tendencies, you have just—certainly, I don’t act like that and I don’t feel like that. And I think that of utmost importance and significance for us is keeping peace, stability, and tranquility in the region, and to be supportive to all the others. And I don’t even comment on some insults and offenses that we got from different parts of the region. I think that’s very normal. That’s something that we are used to.

At the same time, speaking about why did we do so well with the vaccines and inoculation process, first of all, it was being of stronger economy of Serbia. We had the biggest or we were the second-biggest in Europe, speaking about the growth rate last year, 2020: -0.9 [percent]. And—during [the COVID-19] crisis, which was not bad. And even IMF yesterday confirmed their estimation, their assessment, that Serbia will go up to 5 percent. We believe that we’ll go up to… 6.5 percent this year, which is not easy when you compare it with the big basis from last year, which many other countries don’t have.

And secondly, we did this digitalization process in our country, dare to say, faster than the others in the region. And we can be very proud of the [effort] made by our young people for our entire… process. They did it in a terrific way and I really praise them for their great work, and we’ll carry on with this. And we now—how do I base our hopes and our expectations? It’s not—it’s not about our dreams. Actually, it’s not even about our hopes. It’s our expectation that we’ll reach more than 6 percent of growth this year.

It’s about FDIs, number one. Last year we got 70—almost 70 percent of overall FDIs in the Western Balkans. I didn’t explain that therefore it was 61, 62 [percent]; it was almost 70 percent—67 [percent], something like that—of overall Western Balkan FDIs. That was the most important pillar for our growth.

Number two, it’s bigger public consumption. That’s why we wind up with three packages: for the people, for the enterprises, for the entrepreneurs in our country. And people were—you can never say that people were satisfied. People appreciated that. People respected it. And at the same time, we were keeping our public debt-to-GDP ratio on a cannot say very good level, but on a level that we cannot be absolutely dissatisfied, which is below 60 percent—below Maastricht level—which is compared to 80 percent of even EU countries, a bit better.

These are good results. And these are results that follow reforms that took place in 2014 and 2015 after we brought a new, very flexible labor law and then a new bankruptcy law, new bills on incentives and subsidies for FDIs. And also at that time—just don’t forget it—we covered pensions, public wages, which was not done by many countries in the world, and with no pressure on finance.

And now we have… we will carry on our PCI arrangement with IMF, and you know that that’s a bit of my contribution. I always insisted to have this kind of controlling mechanism from the IMF because I know our habits. I know that everybody from Southeast Europe always wanted to spend more than they earned, which is not the case anymore. And disciplined behavior, that’s what guarantees me that we can do it—that we can do a very good job this year.

And speaking about—speaking about all these accusations, it’s either to be—either to do nothing, either to be noticed just by few people or to be noticed by everyone and doing something. Maybe something’s wrong. Maybe something’s not always the very best. What do we do? But at least we strive and we do our best to be helpful to this important country and to an entire region as well, and I’m proud that we could have supported the region with more than 120,000 jabs so far. And when I say this I speak about Bosnia and Herzegovina, I speak about Montenegro, and I speak about North Macedonia. And we are ready to deliver to some other places in the region, but of course, political reasons prevented that. It’s not about us. It’s not about our decision.

MAJA PISCEVIC: Thank you. So I would like now to move to the new administration in Washington. I know that you have met President Biden several times. I think he was even in Serbia twice.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Yes.

MAJA PISCEVIC: You know Tony Blinken for many years, state secretary. And now we just heard that Karen Donfried, president of the German Marshall Fund, is the nominee of President Biden for the assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, and you know her as well.

So these are all good things because we have a good team of experienced people who care about the Balkans, although we don’t expect the Balkans will be the top priority of US foreign policy—which is, I hope, good news, actually, because we remember in history when we were the top priority. But on the other hand, you had a unique but close relationship with President Trump’s administration. And even at the time when US and EU, which was for the first time did not work together on the Kosovo issue, Serbia benefited from this relationship. And when I say that, I mean—I think mostly of the so-called Washington agreement or Washington commitment, and then also on opening the DFC office—the first regional office of Development Finance Cooperation here in Belgrade for the region and the whole approach of this document, focusing on the normalization through economic integration.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Well, first of all, I would divide my answer to your question in two parts.

Number one, speaking about personal relationship, I met President Biden four or even five times… because we met each other in a corridor at that Munich Security forum and we discussed something for three, four minutes. I don’t know if he will actually remember that. But he’s a thousand times more important than I am, and I do remember.

I meant that when I met the president of the United States, I hosted him here in Belgrade. And what I can say personally, he was the best—politically, the best prepared man I’ve ever talked to. And he knew some things that I was very much surprised. But you know, I’m not someone that is ready to flattering everybody to dress those people in power up. We had a good relationship with Trump administration, but I have to say that I met President Trump twice in my life but only once I had an opportunity speaking to him about politics. Which means that speaking about personal engagement, we are much closer to—I am—I know President Biden much better than President Trump.

But I can say that I don’t expect easier time for Serbia because politics is not always—is not necessarily about personal issues. But we’ll do our best to boost the friendship between the two countries, to—not only to recall ourselves on our former alliances in the First and the Second World War. We need to find our place with new approach towards United States of America, getting support and finding some other ways to get more from America and to deliver more to Washington.

At the same time, there are, of course, differences, particularly on Kosovo issue. But we are ready to discuss this—ready to discuss it. I can say that President Biden, when he was in Belgrade and even that when I was meeting him, he always had a good sense and he always wanted to listen to us, which was very good for us. And now I can reveal—(laughs)—I have a small secret. I believe that he remembers that. He can remember my words, at least about this. I was asking him after Obama’s tenure why didn’t he go for the presidency for the president of the United States, and he was maneuvering in a very proper way, avoiding the real answer on this question.

Anyway, I believe that—substantively speaking, that we need United States as a friend of Serbia. And I’m not a guy that is pretending, that we can do something or that we can be an economic power of such a small region, that we can progress in a very fast way without US support. Which means that we need to find a common denominator with the United States of America on the most important issues, and then to deliver on that, and then to see that that will be a sort of preterm or precondition for getting better economy and better living standard for our people.

Although there will be a lot of political difficulties for us—we know this and it’s not an easy time for us—I know Tony Blinken very well. We had a very open and very sincere discussion in State Department a few years ago. And I got his letter, but—his personal writings…—then I did the same to him. And I know many people. I know more people from this administration than from the previous administration.

But I cannot say that we had a bad relationship with Trump administration because he is gone. I cannot be—I cannot lie to anyone. We had very open talks with Mr. Grenell and with all the others—with all the others. But you know, they were saying everything in a very open, sincere way, very frank way, but we were doing the same.

And I hope that we can have serious, responsible approach in developing our relationship. And I think that US interest in the Western Balkans is having Serbia as an ally, although we are very small comparing to such a superpower. But of course, ten times more in America’s interest having Serbia as a friend is our interest having America, if I can say—if I cannot say the best friend in the world, I can say the friend with which we share a common interest and a common future.

MAJA PISCEVIC: Thank you.

And now I think Damon has a few questions, maybe even following up on this one. So, Damon, please, to you.

DAMON WILSON: Thank you, Maja.

Mr. President, let me just ask a quick follow up to that. I mean, you’re clearly signaling that you have tried to open a new chapter with the United States, both in the previous administration and clearly you just shared your goals with this one. You sent your right hand, Ambassador Marko Đurić here to upgrade Serbia’s presence in Washington, but also in Chicago, you’re upgrading the mission in New York, opening a trade mission in San Francisco. We’ve seen stepped up mil-to-mil engagement through the Ohio National Guard, US forces exercising with Serbian forces in Serbia. Just why is the US a priority for Serbia now?

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: I can say to you that you—well, it’s easy for you to make a conclusion that we change our attitude towards United States of America because we have never expected anything from Washington. It was just our obligation having an ambassador in Washington. Now it’s changed. I already sent one of my closest associates to Washington and I’m proud of his diligent work. But not only that, we’ll have to invest into our relationship much more because we have—it sounds strange, but I’m very sincere with you. We underestimated the role of US because, you know, we always thought that we are center of the world, as a small nation, the most important nation, you know, and that was the case with us. And then—and I just hope that we understand today and that we are ready to change our mindsets in understanding the political situation in the world. And I hope that we’ll invest more of our time, that we’ll bring more of our people in doing something and then getting closer with US administration, which would be important for us. But we were not matured enough, and we didn’t understand even in this country what happened with fall of Berlin Wall. And I’m not speaking only about the others. I’m speaking also about myself and about many other people that didn’t get what was happening here.

And now, you know, if you ask me what was—who was our ambassador, let’s say, ten years ago and what he was doing in Washington, I wouldn’t know the answer, to tell you the truth. And now we know what is our aim. We know we want to get to as many people as we can. We want to gather support. We want to see what we can do together. And I can tell you, in all different fields that was not a part of my—I hope not an abstract answer. But speaking about military technical cooperation, speaking about our—speaking about new FDIs from US, speaking about our cooperation in different—in all different fields, it’s getting better. It’s getting better.

You can see the real results. You can see even who is becoming the biggest buyer of the products of our so-called military industry, thinking about ammunition and everything else. Bigger and bigger interest of US companies, and this is—this is really good. And speaking about some industrial complexes and plants, they’re also interested in investing into Serbia and these are good news for us. DFC presence here, it’s very important for us. And you know, now you have some shifts. You have some changes. Anyway, we’ve overcome all this stuff and we’ve already prepared some there to save on a good ground and some good projects in delivering on this as well.

DAMON WILSON: Mr. President, let me come back, if I might, to Serbia and Europe. EU membership is your top priority. However, we haven’t seen the process move very fast. There haven’t been opening of new chapters recently. And some of that is because of the concerns that you hear, whether from Washington or Brussels, about the state of democracy.

So let me bring in a question here from Ivan Kostov, if I may. And he asks: Mr. President, Serbia has declared a strategic policy of joining the EU. Recent reports from the European Parliament, the State Department, Freedom House have raised serious questions about the state of democracy in your country. The rule of law and media freedoms, according to the reports, are regressing, especially with concerning attacks on journalists, unresolved corruption cases. So Ivan’s asking about your views on these common findings by these different institutions and the overall state of democracy in Serbia today.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Of course, this is not—this is not always the easiest answer to be made by someone who is in power. But I’ll be very honest: You expect myself saying, well, everything’s lie, falsity, propaganda, or something like that against us. No. I am very much aware that we are not perfect and I’m not hiding this. And that’s why we very recently started delivering—and I hope that you—when I see you in IGC conference—in IGC in June—that European Union will open an entire cluster with Serbia. These are my hopes. Of course, I have no promises from the European Union, but these are my hopes.

We started delivering on many rule-of-law issues. And speaking about corruption cases, this is more political issue. And I think that we do so—that we do a lot of progress in our fight against organized crime, and with some big corruption cases as well.

Speaking about everything else, you always have a sort of mixture. It’s a bit of politics, then you have big organizations that don’t forget always that we are not criticizing Russia and China, and you always easier—find an easier way to criticize us on the other issues. But there are significant problems, of course, which we’ll have to tackle in times to come. And I have to admit it. I have to acknowledge it. And we’ll have to invest huge efforts into overcoming all these difficulties and all these problems that we created, and hopefully we will be able to do so. And we are ready to listen to all the critics and to hear everything that some good people like Ivan Kostov might think that we should change and we should do. And very ready to listen to them and to implement everything that we have already agreed with the European Union on this.

And to tell you the truth, we’ve got a list of, let’s say, ten, then thirteen, then thirty-four items we need to take care of, but we started putting ticks—ticking the box. Not because of ticking the box, but because—you know, because we are begging someone to open… new clusters. Now we speak about your methodology. We do it because I really think that’s useful for us and it’s good for Serbia. It’s good for Serbia’s democracy and it’s good for Serbia’s image. And if we are capable enough of delivering the very best results in economy in this region, the very best results in inoculation process in this region, I have no doubts that we are ready to improve the state of human rights and democracy in this country as well.

DAMON WILSON: Let me hand it back to Maja in Belgrade.

MAJA PISCEVIC: Thank you, Damon.

Now, the next question, Mr. President, comes from another friend from European Union, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, chairman of the Munich Security Conference.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Just wait a second. That will be the most difficult question, I guarantee you. (Laughter.)

MAJA PISCEVIC: Let’s see.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Before I hear it.

MAJA PISCEVIC: (Laughs.) Mr. President, it is my sincere hope that before too long it will be possible for you personally to appear again on the stage of the Munich Security Conference—this was easy—to discuss the way—

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Yes. It was not a question. (Laughter.)

MAJA PISCEVIC: —to discuss the way forward with your Kosovo counterparts. But in the interim, my question for today is this: After so many years of unsuccessful attempts by the international community—by the UN, by the EU, by the US—to help Belgrade and Pristina to agree on a final settlement, what exactly will be required to happen for Serbia to accept the reality of the independence of Kosovo, and when?

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Well, as I told you, I knew that it was going to be the most difficult question. But I see it a bit differently from the great man, Wolfgang Ischinger, and my best regards to him.

First of all, I think that what we signed in Brussels exactly eight years ago has to be fulfilled by both sides. And it’s—and here is the catch. Here is the problem. And I know—I see Jim O’Brien and Valerie. They know everything about these politics. But what I felt at that time I feel today, eight years after that Brussels agreement that we accomplished at that time. It was—I saw that the other side wanted to sign it just because they were certain—absolutely certain that they didn’t need to fulfill everything they signed but we’ll have to deliver more than they signed. That was something that they were just waiting for in the last eight years, and that is something that you hear it every single day.

If you do just an objective analysis, my dear friends, you don’t hear from Serbia, from Belgrade—you don’t hear any kind of blackmails: If you don’t do that, we’ll go with war compensation requests; we’re going to do another—we’re going to file another lawsuit against you. That’s what you don’t hear from Belgrade. But that’s what you hear every single day from Pristina, and there are no reactions either from the United States of America, either from European Union. Even we don’t react even anymore on a daily basis because it’s unnecessary. But we need to change the normal atmosphere. We need to discuss everything in a totally different way. We need to boost trust and confidence between us, not to see each other as the real enemies. It’s OK seeing someone as an adversary, but we are not enemies. We are—we don’t need to—we must not create hostile environment between us. But when you hear it and when it’s always a competition who’s going to offend the other side in a worse way, there are no results.

And the problem is that the United States of America, Germany, and the strongest countries from the Western part of the world, they always just say we just wait for Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s independence and what is needed to happen. And when you ask someone, OK, what do you offer? Because no one can get all, and I think that everybody understands this. And then you hear nothing. No one can even guarantee you full-fledged membership status. No one can guarantee nothing to you. When you ask them, OK, what Serbs might get, wherever is that Serb community or Serb association, whatever you call it, which was foreseen by Brussels agreement, well, you know, it’s a difficult time for new Kosovo government because, you know, they have some problems, they—we have no problems here in Belgrade, and it has always been the case. We need an absolutely different atmosphere if we want to reach a compromising solution.

And I discussed that with Damon a thousand times. And you cannot—you cannot skip the subject. It’s not about number one up to number ten items that someone has to fulfill. No, it’s about totally different environment, totally different atmosphere. And then we can start believing in each other. We can start doing more things. And this free flow of goods, capital, people, and services has to be guaranteed. And people will speak to each other, businesspeople to businesspeople, ordinary people to ordinary people. Then everything will get us much closer to a compromise and solution. Without that, looking or staring at the other side as an enemy, that won’t bring us to the solution.

You know, you can create a big pressure on us saying you have to do it, you have to do it. Well, even if we become very weak politicians here, saying, OK, OK, give in, but Serbian people won’t do it, won’t accept it. We need both people, Serbian—Serbs and Albanians, to accept that compromise and solutions. That’s why we both need to change an atmosphere. And I’m afraid that the atmosphere in Pristina is, dare to say, much worse than in Belgrade. And in Belgrade it’s not the very best atmosphere, speaking about reconciliation issue and speaking about getting closer to the compromising arrangement with Pristina.

MAJA PISCEVIC: Thank you for this response. I would like now—to turn now to a more interesting—(laughs)—at least dynamic conversation, which is about the regional cooperation. And for this, I have the pleasure to invite dear friend of the Atlantic Council, but also friend of Serbia and of Balkans, Jim O’Brien, who is also vice chair of the Albright Stonebridge Group.

Jim, to you, and welcome.

JIM O’BRIEN: No, thanks, Maja, and thanks for the interesting conversation. Hi, Mr. President.

So you already said Wolfgang’s question will be the most difficult. But I’ll ask a question that is, I think, seems easy but will get complicated. You’ve been one of the major advocates for greater economic integration across the region, a common market. Sometimes it gets called mini-Schengen. It’s what the Berlin Process aims for. It’s what the European Commission now says is a key part of integration. There’s a lot of resistance, though, to the idea. I don’t think it’s substantive. The IMF said that more integration would add 10 percent to each country’s GDP—pre-pandemic levels. So the substantive case is clear.

And it’s an example of Serbia leading in the region, because Serbia’s doing very well from current arrangements. It’s the other countries that need to join European supply chains. And I think more integration will help with that. But I’m curious about the obstacles that the—and the complications that the idea faces. And I’ll ask in three ways, and you can kind of pick. One of them is just some countries see this as an effort to create an alternative to integration with the EU. Do you think that’s right?

Second question is about Kosovo. In your discussion just now of Kosovo, you mentioned that the free flow of people, and goods, and services somehow gets caught up in the other political issues to be discussed. And I wonder if it has to, or whether we can proceed—as the EU did—by addressing some of the economic issues even while the broader environment is being addressed. And then the final point is just how all this ties together with the green deal, because Serbia’s economy has benefitted enormously by the fact that you don’t have to pay a price on carbon, and EU members do. That’s likely to change really soon, and I wonder if as the region goes through this change in integrating it also needs to go through attracting investment to achieve its green transition. So those are three very different issues, but I’m interested in your reaction.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Jim, just—first of all, Jim knows politics ten times better than I do. And—

JIM O’BRIEN: Please.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: No, no, no. I’m not—that’s not—you know that I think that. And it’s not an alleged modest approach.

I wanted to say one thing. I think that, speaking about number one that you mentioned, that people would say, well, this is an alternative to our EU path, and that’s why we don’t want to join this, not a real unification but a unification of some ideas which are good for our entire region, and no one can say anything against it. They say, OK, that’s your replacement. That’s your substitution and alternative to EU path, which it’s not. And it’s not an empty story because that’s—I will say this, that that would be a sufficient excuse—just a sufficient excuse not to participate and not to be a part of this great idea.

And I have to say that Americans—and I’m profoundly grateful to US administration, that it doesn’t matter whether it was White House or State Department, even stronger—even stronger, which was not mainly consisted of Trump’s people. I remember Matt Palmer, he supported it several times. Jim, all the other people did it. Always, Americans supported this idea ten times stronger than Europeans. I have some doubts why is that so, but it wouldn’t be very wise for my side saying it publicly, to be very honest. But we had no problems with Americans on this issue. With the IMF, with the World Bank, with all the other international organizations that are taking care of this region, everybody was very much in favor of this idea.

Number two, I believe as a matter of fact that there are some political issues. And I’ll tell you that there is part of fault on our side as well, because when we started speaking about it… Of course it’s a big idea. And I’m proud of this idea. And we invented this, which I believe would be a future of the region, although it was not easy to sell it politically to our domestic audiences. I think it was the easiest way for me to do it, and to—(inaudible)—as well. Not easy to—(inaudible)—because of Kosovo’s refusal—Pristina’s refusal to participate in that. And if you ask them why do they do so, there are no rational responses to that or they respond nothing. Then they signed in Washington that they were going to change their position on that. So far, they didn’t do anything. And what’s wrong with that for them? I don’t know, to tell you the truth.

And now I’m coming to what I think that’s partly a problem. Let’s say part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1.5 out of 3 members of presidency will always support it. The other part, no. Why? Because of political reasons. They think that it was proposed by Serbia, and that’s the reason why they wouldn’t do it. It’s pretty much the same with Montenegro because you don’t hear any real arguments from them.

But why I’m saying that there is part of our fault? Because we need to understand their fears about Serbian domination in the region much better than we do and much better than we used to. Which means that we need to give more guarantees—not only more guarantees. We need to be very persuasive and we need to convince them that it’s not good for Serbia only; it’s even better for them.

And I have the real example of that, which is FDIs. When we speak about the same level of incentives, the same taxes, excises, and customs, it’s more important for the others than for Serbia. Today it’s a good situation in attracting FDIs for our country. They will get more than we might get if we’ll go for mini-Schengen. I don’t know why they don’t see it. If we create a unique market, it’s—we can be a machine of growth of an entire Europe. OK, we are lagging behind Western European countries, but it will have twice bigger growth rates. Or at least we can come to the same level not within two hundred years, but within fifty-something years. And that’s a long period of time, many people might say, but historically speaking not that big time. Because we were lagging behind most of those countries for the last two hundred, three hundred, four hundred years. It’s not even comparable.

And that’s why we need, once again, to assess our position, maybe to change our attitude. Maybe I behave in an arrogant way from time to time. I need to change that as well. But I think that they need more rational approach. That’s it.

DAMON WILSON: Thank you, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Wait a second. Sorry, sorry, sorry.

DAMON WILSON: Yes.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: It was Jim about green agenda as well. That’s not an easy issue. That’s not an easy issue for us at all. And Maja is smiling or, I don’t know whether laughing or smiling, because people think, you know, the easiest way today for all the politicians is, yes, we need green environment, ecology is the most important question for us, and that’s it, you know. And then we going to deliver, or are we going to do something with the trees. I don’t know what they do with those trees, taking care of them every single day. But you know, and what are you going to do with the coal? What are you going to do—how are you going to produce electricity? But we come to much bigger problems.

We’ll have to tackle it, and we do it—we started doing it together with European Union. And people from European Commission are today ten times more satisfied with us than, let’s say, a month ago—just a month ago… But I can tell you that I have some fears—I have some fears, and I’m not absolutely jubilant about everything that we need to do. Because you know even at least that I’m always very sincere speaking about our economy, which is of an utmost importance for us, and it’s not easy to sacrifice something that works for you because of green agenda. We’ll have to do it, but we’ll have to balance it smartly.

DAMON WILSON: Mr. President, thank you for that. It’s a big issue this week in Washington as President Biden convenes on that issue. But while we’re in the region, let me just—let me ask a quick question before I bring in Valerie Hopkins, because there has been a lot of chatter in the region this past week about a so-called non-paper that went back to the past, that was proposing redrawing borders along ethnic lines. And I had a chance to read this.

And it strikes me almost as an intentional effort to stir the pot. We saw your remarks on Bosnian TV dismissing this whole concept. But let me just ask you about the sentiments behind it. Why do these persist? Why is there continued chatter of greater Albania, greater Serbia? How do you see the future of the region, and getting beyond sort of these issues that keep dragging it back? And then I’ll turn to Valerie after you respond.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: So, friends, I see that we have just a short time in front of us, and that’s why I’m going to be as brief as it is possible.

We have never, ever heard from myself, from the prime minister of Serbia, that we are located in greater Serbia. But you hear it every single day from Pristina and Tirana—every single day, with no reactions from anyone, and even from our side.… Some people made some comments which are also unnecessary. But that’s a sort of different approaches that you—and when I say “you,” I mean US and Western world—around this issue.

Now, concrete response, concrete answer to your question: We are not interested in creating any kind of greater Serbia. Great Serbia to us means better economy, more FDIs, more plants, green agenda implemented but—implemented but not jeopardizing our economy. At the same time, better unemployment rate, which means to decrease the level of unemployed people. Bigger salaries, better living standard, better road and railway infrastructure. That’s what we are interested in.

And I insist on this. And then I see, OK, people—oh, we don’t believe him. I don’t believe him because it’s easier for us to say that we don’t believe him, and we get some votes if we don’t believe him, which is OK. But—and I know that we need time to show to all the others that we are serious about it, that we are very sincere, and that we’re going to do it.

And today I went to Banja Luka and I got some questions from the journalists. When are we going to have new wars, or something like that? People are fed up with wars here. People were leaving this region for more than twenty-five years. Now we have—we see the first steps forward on this issue because some people started coming back to the region, particularly to Serbia. It’s people with a higher education.

But we need those handymans, craftsmen that left Serbia in last twenty to thirty years, to bring them all back. All young people, talented, intelligent young people that left the country, we need them to come in back to our country, not to create new wars, new instabilities. Only stupid people can think that it can be useful to them or they might win in elections. We’re not going to allow that. Even if someone would like to wage wars, they won’t wage wars with us. That’s what I can guarantee to everybody.

DAMON WILSON: So, Mr. President, let me pass the word to Valerie Hopkins, a Financial Times correspondent who’s joined us from Budapest; covers the regional extensively.

Over to you, Valerie.

VALERIE HOPKINS: (Speaks in Serbian.) Thank you very much, the Atlantic Council, for having me.

I know we have a very short time, but I too would like to compete with Ambassador Ischinger for most difficult and most interesting question. And I think I would like to ask about something that combined a lot of the topics that other people already asked about. And that is Chinese investments and the environment.

I was in Belgrade on April 10 when thousands, some say ten thousand people, converged in front of the parliament to protest against certain large infrastructure projects mostly but not only by Chinese companies. And many of the critics, people that I spoke to at that time, said that they were primarily concerned not about the Chinese companies themselves but about the government’s willingness to uphold its own transparency and environmental laws, mentioning the same kind of democratic deficit that Mr. Kostov noted in his question.

But I was quite, actually, surprised to see that in the week after the protest, two large—one larger than the other—Chinese companies had their operations halted in Serbia. A waste factory—plastic waste factory near Zrenjanin and another one, Zijin Mining, a mine in Bor. This is the first time—one analyst I spoke to said that this is the first time that the government of Serbia has blinked on anything related to China, and that it seems like one of the biggest hurdles in the Sino-Serbian partnership.

So I would love to ask you to say a few words about this. How has these—both of these temporary halts of operations affected your relationship with Beijing? Is this evidence that citizen protest can actually affect your policy? Are you worried that this is becoming a political issue? And what can we expect in the future?

Thank you.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Thank you, Valerie.

Valerie is very well informed and she knows almost everything. She just skips, from time to time, some facts, you know. But anyway, she’s very smart and she knows how to get to the point. What she skipped—unintentionally, no doubt—is that the biggest part of that protest was not against Chinese companies but against Rio Tinto, which was brought to this country by the previous government in 2011, I think, finally—or 2009, something like that. And they have acted against it because of lithium deposits. And it’s—we think that we have 10 percent of lithium deposits—well, lithium deposits, which is huge and very important for Serbia’s future.

And now those people that brought Rio Tinto, they protest against Rio Tinto, which is also OK. And we’ll have to take care of green agenda, no doubt, to put more emphasis in our politics, not because of partners but because I think that they are jeopardized that less than six thousand people—or it can be sixty thousand people, doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter from the sense that we have something against them. No. But we’ll listen to their words. We’ll listen to their words. We’ll listen to not only their words, but to the words of ordinary people. And of course, we’ll do our best in protecting an environment.

But to come to the substance of the issue, it’s not about Chinese companies. It’s not about Chinese companies almost at all. But if there are some Chinese companies which might break some rules, we’ll act in accordance with the Serbian rules, with the Serbian laws, no doubt. But to tell you the truth, I am afraid of some people that might position Serbia in a way that we don’t need any industrial plants, anything, because now they live much better than they used to. Now it becomes the main problem is Serbia. It’s not anymore how to be employed, how to get a working place. It’s not even anymore—although people are never satisfied enough—whether they’re going to get—whether they’re going to have better living standard or not, because they expect that. They know that—they know that Serbia’s heading in the right direction. The main issue is becoming an environment and ecology, which says good things about Serbia.

Of course, we need to tackle it much faster, in a much more organized way, together with the European Union, together with all our partners. But you know, we should not exaggerate on this because it can go to a sort of fatalism that no one wants to see. Because if you say to us don’t use those 10 percent of lithium deposit, never ever, even if the investor will guarantee that everything will be done in accordance with all necessary procedures, with all the rules that are accepted from Australia to the United States of America, then I would ask myself why we would do it.

But, anyway, we’ll have to take care of this issue, and we’ll do it. And of course, Valerie knows that we’ll have elections within a year, and there are big chances for the others winning in elections, and that’s not a problem. Before that we need to do many things, and hopefully we’ll do it.

DAMON WILSON: Maja, back to you to bring us home.

MAJA PISCEVIC: Right. I think we’re getting really close. Oh, we are actually beyond our time. All I want to say is thank you so much for this, as Fareed Zakaria says, fascinating discussion. I think we’ve tackled most of the really important issues. And I hope you found—

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Damon was bored. Damon was bored. That’s what—

MAJA PISCEVIC: No, he wasn’t.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: That’s what I noticed.

MAJA PISCEVIC: No way. (Laughs.) And I hope that it was useful to you to hear some of the views from the transatlantic friends of Serbia.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Of course. You know, I’m amazed, you know, with their real—to speak and to listen to us, and to exchange some views. Why would they do so? That’s why I’m profoundly grateful to all of them. And I really thank them for listening to my answers in a way that I learned a lot from their questions on the issues they raised today.

MAJA PISCEVIC: I’m just sorry that we didn’t have time to tackle the question about your legacy because you mentioned it in several interviews recently, and I think that would be really interesting to hear how do you—how do you—

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Yes. It’s getting closer to analyze it, but I think that the development of Serbia is something that I would be very proud of, and the number of plants, number of investments, number of kilometers of highways and railroads that we built in the recent time. And you know, even if you compare the average salary, which was 329 euros when I became the prime minister; today it’s 562 euros. That salary, it is not good, which still shows that we are a poor country. But it’s almost twice better than it used to be, I think, for a short period of time.

These are not bad results, not bad results at all. But there is something else within the region that we need to do that would be the real legacy that would satisfy myself and, dare to say, all those people that believed in us.

MAJA PISCEVIC: Thank you.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Thank you. And thank you all.

MAJA PISCEVIC: Damon.

DAMON WILSON: Mr. President, just to close us out, if I may, thank you. We’ve had so many comments and questions we couldn’t even scratch the surface. We’ve got comments here from Ambassador Godfrey, welcome from Belgrade. Ambassador Kurt Volker, the head of Microsoft in Serbia, GMF, Human Rights Defenders, an extraordinary number of questions we’ll send to your team, Mr. President. But thank you for your time today. Thank you, Maja, for moderating there in Belgrade.

And I want to thank our audience for joining us today and encourage all of them to remain engaged by following our Balkans Forward initiative. I’d also like to invite all of you to join us for our next edition of AC Front Page tomorrow, same place, same time, on the future of Afghanistan in the wake of decisions from President Biden and NATO with withdraw forces. With the Rockefeller Brothers Fund we’ll be releasing a new transatlantic charter of Afghanistan, outlining an enduring partnership with Secretary Madeleine Albright, former EU High Rep Federica Mogherini, and Chairperson of Afghanistan’s Human Rights Commission Shahrzad Akbar.

And with that, we’re signing off from Washington and Belgrade. Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you to our audience.

PRESIDENT ALEKSANDER VUČIĆ: Thank you.

Watch the full event

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Read the EastWest Institute’s full statement here:

The EastWest Institute Transitions for Post-COVID World

Institute to Maintain its Legacy and Mission at New Institutions   

After four decades of distinctive service, the EastWest Institute’s (EWI) Board of Directors has resolved to establish a partnership with the College of Charleston to preserve the legacy of EWI visionary founder and leader, the late John Edwin Mroz; transition its programs to four new organizations to secure their continuity; and discontinue operation under the current business model, effective January 31, 2021. This decision was taken at the conclusion of a four-month strategic assessment in light of increasing challenges resulting from the global pandemic and related financial challenges facing many nonprofit organizations. The Board unanimously and enthusiastically approved the transition plan.

“The pandemic has shifted attention and resources from international, strategic concerns to more local and immediate ones—the current environment demands new approaches to accomplish the goals of international conflict avoidance and resolution that EWI has pursued with such dedication and success over the past 40 years,” says EWI CEO and President Bruce W. McConnell. “After considering a broad range of options, EWI has settled on a two-pronged approach, assuring that our remaining endowment goes towards supporting EWI’s mission, as well as maintaining and enhancing the legacy of the institute.”  

To ensure that the spirit and mission of John Edwin Mroz endures for generations to come, EWI has formed a unique partnership with the College of Charleston’s School of Languages, Cultures and World Affairs (LCWA). LCWA has a special connection to EWI, as Mroz was instrumental in the school’s creation at the College of Charleston. LCWA will house the newly established John Edwin Mroz Global Leadership Institute, which has as its mission to give students at the college the opportunity to develop high-level international skills necessary to pursue a life-long career capable of global impact. The Institute will also promote the legacy and values of EWI and Mroz, educating new generations as to the methods and benefits of Track 2 diplomacy, sponsoring research and scholarship on its history and impact with special focus on EWI’s history, and maintaining EWI’s global network of influence. 

The second element of the transition involves the transfer of EWI’s ongoing programmatic work to four highly-respected foreign policy organizations: the Stimson Center, Observer Research Foundation America, the Atlantic Council and the George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations.

EWI’s Middle East and North Africa work, including the Iran-Saudi Dialogue and work to stabilize Iraq’s relations with its neighbors, will move to the Stimson Center, an independent research center promoting international security, shared prosperity and justice. Stimson’s well-recognized work on water and energy issues will be enhanced by the addition of our hydro-diplomacy project. Stimson will also take on both the U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue and the U.S.-Russia military-to-military dialogue. 

“It is clear that Stimson shares EWI’s values and methods: Independence, peace building and deep stakeholder engagement,” says Admiral (ret.) William Owens, EWI board member and former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “They also have three decades of experience conducting Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy.”

The institute’s Global Cooperation in Cyberspace programmatic work to encourage countries in the Global South to participate in international efforts to moderate the use of cyber weapons and research to improve the security of the technology supply chain will be transitioning to Observer Research Foundation America, the new Washington-based center of India’s leading think tank, the Observer Research Foundation. 

EWI’s Balkan Dialogues initiative is migrating to the Future Europe Initiative at the Atlantic Council, complementing the Initiative’s existing work on the Western Balkans, which seeks to build further Euro-Atlantic political and economic integration. EWI’s U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue will be hosted by the George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations, which has extensive experience organizing Track 2 diplomatic discussions between current and former government officials from the United States and China.

Jonathan Fanton, eminent nonprofit thought leader and former president of The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, commended EWI’s transitional approach, noting that “EWI is setting a positive example of an orderly transition which honors its founder, John Edwin Mroz, protects its staff and current programs, maintains a global network of experts and provides the basis by which to educate the next generation about unique approaches to conflict prevention, which will prove valuable to our future.”

The EastWest Institute was founded by John Edwin Mroz in 1980 as an independent, global organization that promotes peace by creating trusted settings for candid, global discourse among leaders to tackle intractable security and stability challenges. Mroz served as president and CEO of the institute for 34 years until his death, in 2014. EWI has a long-standing track record of convening dialogue and backchannel diplomacy to develop sustainable solutions for major political, economic and security issues. The organization’s initial success was rooted during the Cold War—in fact, EWI hosted the first ever military-to-military dialogue between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. From its roots as a European-American initiative to bridge the divisions between Europe and Eurasia, John Edwin Mroz built the institute into one of the world’s pre-eminent non-governmental change-agent institutions.

“For 40 years, EWI has been recognized around the world as an independent, trusted adviser driving meaningful dialogue and building trust between global leaders and key representatives of government, military, business and civil society,” reflected EWI Chairman of the Board Ross Perot, Jr. “We are pleased to collaborate with five highly regarded organizations on the successful transfer of EWI legacy and programs, which is a testament to the continuing importance of this difficult work.”  

“As EWI enters its final stage, I would like to recognize the incredible EWI family—our current and former board members, government and corporate leaders, financial sponsors, fellows and staff—that have made EWI such an amazing force over the years,” added Karen Linehan Mroz, wife of EWI’s late founder and member of the EWI Board of Directors. “We have much to be proud of, including this orderly and inspiring rebirth into a new future.”  

For further inquires, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org

The post The EastWest Institute’s Balkan Dialogues initiative to migrate to Atlantic Council appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the early 2000s, North Macedonia was a frontrunner on the path to EU membership as the first post-Yugoslav republic to sign both a membership action plan with NATO (in 1999) and a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU (in 2001). But it has since been overtaken by a number of its neighbors. This report, authored by Damir Marusic and Dimitar Bechev, offers a snapshot of a North Macedonia finally on the threshold of EU accession talks. It outlines the myriad challenges that face North Macedonia as it struggles to chart a path forward in Europe’s shadow. It can be read as a reform agenda—a laundry list of things that need to be done in order for the country to prepare itself for final accession.

Western leaders—and especially those in Europe—looking at North Macedonia in the context of a slowdown in EU enlargement, should ask themselves how they can be more productively and strategically engaged. Because North Macedonia, like the Western Balkans in general, represents not so much a problem to be managed but an opportunity to be seized. If the Western Balkans Six—North Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina—build on existing momentum toward deeper mutual cooperation, new avenues of integration with the rest of Europe become conceivable.

Future Europe Initiative

Providing expertise and building communities to promote transatlantic leadership and a strong Europe in turbulent times.

The Future Europe Initiative promotes the transatlantic leadership and strategies required to ensure a strong Europe.

Explore the program

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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently published a report on the existing infrastructure gap in the Central Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE), including the countries engaged in the 3SI. The report reflects the excellent work of the European Department of the IMF that has been supported by a number of the IMF Executive Board members, who emphasized a need for having a clearer understanding of the size of the infrastructure gap in the region compared to the advanced economies of Europe. The report was launched by the Managing Director of the IMF Kristalina Georgieva, at an event organized by the Atlantic Council on September 29.

Read the full IMF report

“Infrastructure in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe : Benchmarking, Macroeconomic Impact, and Policy Issues”

The IMF report comes at a time when national authorities are considering different options for addressing the economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis. This cutting-edge research empowers policymakers in the CESEE region with an innovative approach to strategic policy formulation in a highly uncertain social, political, and economic environment, where conventional wisdom and macroeconomic theory cannot deliver many tangible results. While all countries in the region have introduced fiscal stimulus packages and adopted both standard and unconventional monetary policies and ad-hoc macroprudential measures to support their hard-hit economies, the future-oriented support packages seem limited in their ability to deliver sustainable growth and convergence with the initial EU15.

Going forward, the fiscal space of CESEE governments is bound by inherent budget constraints, despite the temporary suspension of certain EU budget rules, while monetary policy is also approaching its limitations. In challenging circumstances, unconventional measures are required, and they have proven to be very effective, but in the medium and long term there is no substitute to sound economic policies and structural reforms.

Three Seas Initiative could help jumpstart Europe’s post-COVID recovery and green economy transformation

Read more from the October 19 event with IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid, and European Commissioner for Energy Kadri Simson.

The CESEE countries would be justified by gradually moving away from indiscriminate policy support to better targeted strategic policy resource allocation and growth-enhancing infrastructure projects. Furthermore, public spending should shift towards building human capacity and a massive supply of public infrastructure, which could also crowd-in private investments, facilitate resource re-allocation, promote sustainable growth, and support a structural transformation towards a more resilient economy. This idea makes the conclusions of the above-mentioned IMF report on the infrastructure gap even more compelling. In what follows, it is important to emphasize three specific findings.

First, the size of the infrastructure gap in the 3SI countries relative to the EU15 countries is very large and amounts to $1.2 trillion over the next ten years (or 8 percent of gross domestic product per year). This only refers to three sectors: energy, transportation and IT infrastructure, and it is calculated to reduce the gap by 50 percent—a more realistic objective to be achieved. While this gap is unevenly distributed among the 3SI countries and between the three sectors, one thing is clear: each country would benefit from investing more in infrastructure both internally and regionally.

Second, the current fiscal multipliers are exceptionally high—that is, the estimated impact of each dollar being spent. In its most recent Fiscal Monitor, the IMF demonstrated that, in advanced economies and in emerging economies alike, public investments in infrastructure could have up to a four-times higher fiscal multiplier during a recession than during normal times. It means that each dollar spent building infrastructure during a recession mobilizes four times more dollars than in normal times. For countries operating under long-term budget constraints, and especially for countries with a lower stock of capital (which is the case for the 3SI countries relative to EU15), the IMF report on infrastructure calculates that a permanent increase in public investments of 1 percent of GDP would lead to a permanent increase in GDP of 2-2.5 percent. Moreover, the investment-driven growth would be sustainable, even if the increase in public investments is financed by debt, because public debt would eventually drop as a share of GDP as the pace of economic growth would be higher than that of debt accumulation. There are also second-order effects, leading to higher private consumption and further gross capital formation.

Third, crowding-in private investments and promoting cross-border projects would further raise the efficiency of infrastructure investments. Public debt should not be the only source to finance an investment boom; there are other sources, such as a better allocation of existing resources and involving private investments through public-private partnerships and investment funds. Building the necessary infrastructure does not have to affect fiscal discipline. The IMF report attaches a higher efficiency to private investments than to public investments. If public investments are properly prioritized to generate economic and social benefits, and private investments are mobilized, together they would provide the foundations for a real competitiveness leap. Furthermore, as described in the IMF report, scaling up infrastructure in a coordinated way across countries could yield a doubled impact on trade compared to single country investments.

In addition, it is important to underline that while it is difficult to extrapolate from estimates on the current crisis, increasing public investment could yield substantial benefits for the recovery, if countries improve their governance and public finance management frameworks. In the short-term, increased infrastructure spending can boost both demand and employment, while in the longer-term it would ensure sustainable development and faster convergence with the EU15. However, countries embarking on greater infrastructure spending should also strengthen their infrastructure governance to achieve more effective and integrated public infrastructure management, specifically needed for well-designed public-private partnerships. Moreover, they should reprioritize capital spending towards better planned and managed projects. In order to realize greater cross-border collaboration, they should also review their capacity constraints. To these ends, they could benefit from the IMF Public Investment Management Assessment, a tool designed to identify and improve gaps in infrastructure management.

The United States has already pledged an important investment in 3SI infrastructure projects, seeking to advance the cross-country connectivity prospects in the region. We praise the fact that, on November 18, the US House of Representatives unanimously passed a bipartisan resolution “expressing support of the 3SI in its efforts to increase energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening the United States and European national security.” This, together with the recent EU recovery plan, is paramount for successfully closing the infrastructure gap in the region. The 3SI has the potential to become an infrastructure-driven framework to promote development, security, and integration in our region.

Piotr Trabinski serves as an executive director at the IMF Executive Board, representing Poland

Daniel Palotai serves as an executive director at the IMF Executive Board, representing Hungary

Liviu Voinea serves as a senior advisor to the executive director at the IMF Executive Board, representing Romania

Tsvetan Manchev serves as an advisor to the executive director at the IMF Executive Board, representing Bulgaria

Nils Vaikla serves as an advisor to the executive director at the IMF Executive Board, representing Estonia

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

Further reading:

Report Oct 28, 2020

Digitalization in Central and Eastern Europe: Building regional cooperation

By The Atlantic Council Task Force on Digitalization in Central and Eastern Europe and the Three Seas Initiative

Digitalization has been heralded as “the next engine of growth” for the economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the idea that digitalization can transform the region’s economic model has never been more relevant than amid the current coronavirus pandemic.

Central Europe Digital Policy

New Atlanticist Sep 29, 2020

Three Seas Initiative could help jumpstart Europe’s post-COVID recovery and green economy transformation

By David A. Wemer

Buoyed by a new commercially managed investment fund and a $1 billion pledge from the United States, leaders from the Three Seas Initiative will convene for a summit on October 19 to move the project into its next stage.

Central Europe Climate Change & Climate Action

Press Release Feb 15, 2020

US commits $1 billion dollars to develop Central European infrastructure

By Atlantic Council

“Secretary Pompeo’s announcement of $1 billion for the Three Seas Initiative is a powerful demonstration of America’s continued commitment to Europe,” stated General James L. Jones Jr. (USMC-ret.), executive chairman emeritus of the Atlantic Council, who attended the Munich Security Conference. “It reflects America’s recognition of the strategic significance of Central Europe as well Washington’s high confidence in the economic vitality and economic prospects of the Three Seas region.”

Central Europe Economy & Business

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On July 30, the Atlantic Council hosted a meeting of government leaders from the Western Balkans Six at which leaders agreed to practical steps toward economic integration within the region and between the region and the European Union.  This assessment was promised in the conclusion of that meeting.   

Summary

The Sofia meeting comes toward the end of a horrible year, but also as substantial new international investment funds are committed, European Union (EU) accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia are being prepared, and there is a glimmer of hope for less transatlantic competition on the Balkans. 

Against this backdrop, the Sofia summit is likely to make regional economic integration the organizing principle for international engagement in the region. This report makes two points. First, visible results matter. For example, trucks should not dawdle at Western Balkans Six (WB6) borders, and investments should be seen to produce jobs soon. Sofia needs clear goals and a way of tracking success.

Second, the Western Balkans 6 (WB6) have agency. Their advocacy for a regional focus over the past eighteen months already has changed the international agenda. The leaders of the WB6 should continue to press for a focus on results, especially with regard to investments. The international architecture to coordinate investments seems unlikely to meet the current need for regional, near-term impact, especially in the private sector. The WB6 can address this gap through their own actions, and the announcement on October 30 that several states will create a permanent working group on regional economic integration is welcome. The international community should look at revising this part of its strategy.    

The greatest danger is that the outcomes of the Sofia meeting will reflect what the region’s international partners are comfortable doing, rather than what the people of the Western Balkans need done. The report makes three recommendations:

• First, substantial investments must be focused on quick impact projects, especially on energy efficiency (a large source of jobs) and renewables. The WB6 can lead in this effort: a group of senior officials can identify ten such projects over the next several in time for investment decisions to be made as the end of the pandemic likely comes into view.
• Second, keep goals simple and constant—and monitored.
• Third, the WB6 should build on its advocacy success: take action before the internationals act. 

The greatest danger is that the outcomes of the Sofia meeting will reflect what the region’s international partners are comfortable doing, rather than what the people of the Western Balkans need done.

Background: Why does the Sofia Summit matter? 

What is the Sofia Summit?

The Sofia Summit is a meeting of the Berlin Process, established in 2014 to provide an informal umbrella for both cooperation within the region and economic relationships with EU member states, goals reflected in a diversity of initiatives with overlapping memberships and objectives. It is intertwined with EU enlargement, both politically (the German Presidency of the EU will support the result) and in practice (the European Commission provides substantial support to key elements of all regional initiatives).  The Sofia Summit should also provide an opportunity to address regional concerns including tensions between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, which are co-hosts of the event. These bilateral tensions may affect the Summit in ways beyond the scope of this paper.

Why does the Berlin Process matter? 

The Berlin Process brought together the WB6, the European Commission, sixteen EU member states, and the secretariats of multiple organizations such as the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Energy Community Secretariat, and the Transportation Secretariat.

The Berlin Process created the Regional Coordination Commission, headquartered in Sarajevo, as a way of providing transparency about these initiatives, without the ability to control them. In 2017, in Trieste a working program aimed at removing barriers to trade. 

The agenda agreed in Sofia will run through 2024, that is, through much of the current European Commission, of the next US presidential term, and into the initial Balkan policies of the next, post-Angela Merkel German Government. With France heading into President Emmanuel Macron’s re-election campaign, and a post-Brexit Britain looking for its global role, the decisions at Sofia will be a baseline for international approaches to the region.

Small space, big problems

Like the rest of Europe, the Western Balkans is suffering through a terrible 2020, with the pandemic causing gross domestic product (GDP) to shrink by up to 15 percent. The political cost of this crisis will rise in the next years. Over the longer term, the region’s demographic crisis continues, with 15-20 percent of the population expected to migrate for opportunity elsewhere. Tensions within and among the WB6 too often impede progress on a regional economic agenda. 

State capture by elites remains an obstacle to reform, one that the EU accession process has not shown itself able to address. Perhaps worse, if the region’s most prepared candidates to join the EU succeed, they may leave behind a region lacking both strong champions in the EU and economies able to compete.  The regional common market can be developed and in place before any of the WB6 is accepted into the EU. Done properly, the common market can prepare every state better. It is crucial, as the report will show, that the common market not be disrupted by the accession of any one state. 

What to expect from Sofia: Regional economic integration

Judging by preparatory meetings for Sofia, the Summit will agree on the goal of a regional common market, tied closely to the region’s integration into European supply chains. 

At a rhetorical level, this will not look entirely new. The Zagreb EU Summit in May referred to the importance of regional economic integration as part of the region’s path forward, and the Berlin Process itself was created to encourage regional cooperation. Every EU strategy for the region calls for more cooperation, and at times integration. But a secret of progress is to persuade decisionmakers that what is being agreed has been agreed before. 

The test of success in Sofia is whether all international initiatives re-organize around the establishment of a regional common market. Sofia will produce a blizzard of specific goals, many of them having to do with completing the Berlin Process agenda for the last four years. What will matter is whether the strategy reflects the importance of a market—free movement of goods, services, people, and capital—rather than merely specific and limited goals. 

Several items that may be in the Declaration would serve as benchmarks for a forward-looking, ambitious, and realistic agenda for the next several years: 

• Green Lanes. At the start of the pandemic, the European Commission won agreement to facilitate the movement of food and health equipment across borders, including at major border crossings in the Western Balkans. These Green Lanes should be made permanent; expanded to all goods and services; and the expansion should include major border crossings between the WB6 and EU neighbors, as did the temporary measure in March. The crossings between Greece and Albania would benefit from special attention. Their smooth functioning and integration into the flow of goods would expand a western route into the region and, for Greece, into the EU. 
• Digital Common Market, including regional 5G.  In July, the WB6 leaders called for the exploration of a regional 5G network relying on European and American suppliers. The EU’s investment plan looks to the expansion of broadband throughout the region, an important goal but less ambitious and dependent on incumbents relying on Chinese technology. The leading investors should consider whether concerns over the reliability of suppliers should lead them to review those investments. The Sofia Declaration should clarify the region’s interest in 5G investments as specified by the leaders in July.
• Carbon free future. The region, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia, is among Europe’s most carbon intensive, relying on aging, inefficient coal plants.  If the EU begins to charge for coal consumption, the economies of those three states would face a substantial tax. The EU’s Economic and Investment Plan (EIP) calls for a trebling of energy efficiency and for some large hydro projects but does not address the possibility of replacing these coal plants. The EIP also emphasizes natural gas transition pipelines as transitional projects, but the carbon intensity of natural gas may make them less valuable quickly; applying lessons from the UK’s transition from coal, where natural gas played a minimal role, could be valuable. The Sofia Declaration should be ambitious on carbon reductions and allow for the rapid transition of this marketplace, where prices of renewables are in some instances half that of coal.
• Implementation. Summits on the Western Balkans produce many commitments, often on the same subjects as previous convenings. Sofia should put in place a mechanism to track implementation, publicly and continuously. Annual reports are not enough. Leaders at the meeting are likely to decide that there should be a public scorecard, kept by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC).  This will be a good first step.

The test of success in Sofia is whether all international initiatives re-organize around the establishment of a regional common market.

Why does regional economic integration matter?

It may seem counter-intuitive that the WB6 could or should pursue economic integration, when all six focus on their bilateral processes with the EU; five of them are a generation or less from the dissolution of Yugoslavia; and the sixth—Albania—spent most of the post-World War Two period in isolation. 

But two facts as real as gravity argue for regional economic integration. First, six small economies are worth much less than one region of 18 million people. Outsourcing to the region now costs a company in the EU single market at least twice the time and money of outsourcing to one of the ten states that joined the EU in 2004.  For several of the WB6, like Kosovo, the costs are much higher, up to thirteen times the cost in time and money.

These costs flow from fragmentation. The World Bank famously estimated in 2016 that trucks spend 26 million hours a year—80 percent of their time—waiting to cross borders between the WB6. Anecdotes from developers and business owners suggest that shortages of workers, especially in regulated professions like engineering, impede economic developments. If those bottlenecks are removed, every state, including the region’s front-runners to join the EU, can prepare better to thrive once they acceded to the EU. And it is important that the accession of any one country not disrupt the common market by breaking trading patterns. The EU’s accession plans need to find ways to lift the entire region, not cherry-pick ones that succeed.

Second, current trading patterns will not lead to prosperity. Trade among the six shows that most is in primary goods or simple processes. Serbia, and to a lesser extent North Macedonia, are attracting higher-end economic activity, but their progress may be unsustainable without access to labor, capital, and goods from the other four, especially when a transition from subsidized coal-fired energy is needed.  The path to prosperity runs up the value chain, something that is done most easily by joining supply chains.  

In short, for much of the WB6, trade patterns today look like those of the Roman Empire. Prosperity requires attention to EU supply chains, and only regional economic integration can provide the depth of expertise and capacity needed to compete. For these reasons, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have separately estimated that regional economic integration could boost GDP in each country by 10 percent above pre-pandemic levels.

What should come after Sofia?

Based on the EU’s Economic and Investment Plan and discussions thus far, three things are very likely to be needed:

First, investments should be focused on quick impact projects, especially on energy efficiency (a large source of jobs) and renewables. This will require that international investors reorganize. In discussions thus far, even as political goals are adjusting, investments are decided in bodies established to do conventional things. The EU’s Economic and Investment Plan, for example, lists ten flagship areas, nearly of all which are traditional, public infrastructure projects long discussed. These are important projects, but the kinds of investment bodies needed to carry out those projects are not ones likely to find nimble, private sector projects that promote innovation and have immediate impact. As just one example, the Western Balkans Investment Framework has no clear mandate to incorporate new commitments from the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC). An effort to engage the private sector more often, probably through road shows involving the Chambers of Commerce, has been called for repeatedly over the years. It will not produce better results without a clear focus and an international investor base prepared to engage on a quick-hit investment framework.

In the Atlantic Council meeting in July 2020, the WB6’s leaders called for projects with visible, immediate impact.  This would mean mobilizing the private sector. The EU calls for a trebling in energy efficiency over the next years, but its only vehicle is an expansion of one EU-wide program. Something bolder and more clearly focused on the region is needed. A concerted, regional focus on providing the kinds of financing needed could be useful; in a region awash with liquidity, a loan guarantee program could open up energy efficiency quickly. The payoff in terms of construction jobs and supply chain expansion would be quick and visible.

Western Balkans Partnership Summit: Chair’s conclusions

Leaders from the Western Balkans Six met to agree on bold, practical actions to help the region emerge stronger together from the impact of COVID-19 with greater regional economic development opportunities. Specifically, they agreed to accelerate free movement of goods, services, capital, and people in the region, eliminating barriers that have hindered economic growth; and to pursue an investment plan to attract new foreign direct investment in the region and accelerate the deployment of committed COVID-19 recovery funds, with a focus on infrastructure and energy. The leaders committed to improving political cooperation and good neighborly relations and to strive to resolve bilateral issues in the region.

The WB6 can lead in this effort. On October 30, political leaders of Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia announced that they would form a permanent working group of officials to push forward regional economic integration. Its first task should be to identify ten or so projects ready for investment soon, with each project having regional importance, benefits for employment, and significance for energy efficiency or renewables, two areas where the region would benefit quickly. 

It will take several months to identify these investments, but the pandemic will slow investor responses for that period anyway, so the preparation time will be well spent. Global investors, who do not now consider the region’s fragmented markets, may look seriously at a growing market of 18 million people with rights to trade into the EU, especially rights to trade in clean energy. The next several months will give the region time to persuade those investors to look again. It will also allow for the region to address investor concerns about the rule of law and cronyism; clear conditionality and dispute resolution procedures agreed in advance will make it easier for global investors to consider the region.

Second, keep goals simple and constant—and monitored. The array of regional initiatives can make it difficult to pick priorities or to tell whether anyone is in charge. Instead, all valuable goals are said to be pursued by all actors at all times, a situation that makes it hard to track and measure what is happening.  The Sofia declaration cannot clear out the thicket of actors, but it can create priorities:

• set simple goals (waiting time for trucks, e.g., or speed to have degrees recognized; number of third country nationals traveling across the region);
• a public scorecard to track progress; and
• a single entity to govern the scorecard.  Ideally this would be the RCC. 

Priorities will flow toward what people see.

Third, the WB6 should build on its advocacy success: take action before the internationals act. It may prove too difficult for international structures to reorganize themselves. Each has its own mandate, sometimes treaty-based, and investment decisions tend to be market-driven. By bringing together international investing institutions and private sector investors, however, the region can foster an investment discussion focused on their needs soon. This should be an informal, rolling conversation rather than an annual event only (which the EBRD hosts already).

Can any of this work?

The short answer is that it has worked. Each region that has grown in prosperity has done so by getting to scale and mirroring the product baskets of wealthier trading partners.

And the WB6 already have shown that they can re-shape international approaches. It is through their concerted advocacy that the regional common market has become the organizing principle of the region.  From 2018, leaders in Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia had urged the establishment of a regional free trade zone built around the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital. In the fall of 2019, meetings in Novi Sad, Ohrid, and Tirana produced a series of agreements to achieve practical, visible goals, such as reducing waiting time for trucks at borders; visa-free travel for visitors; and simplified movement of professional service providers. 

Significantly, these meetings did not aim to develop a regional initiative in parallel to existing institutions.  Instead they set a template of advocacy by the WB6 to unlock initiatives that were stuck in existing venues.  The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), for instance, is problematic in Kosovo, due to its representation in CEFTA through UN institutions. 

The Sofia meeting offers an opportunity to overcome the limitations of specific regional initiatives in pursuit of an efficient, functioning common market. Three significant developments give it this potential.  With EU membership talks with Albania and North Macedonia expected to begin soon, four of the WB6 now have accession processes to mind. This provides guardrails for any regional economic initiative, as none of the larger economies will risk their EU prospects.

Second, and more recently, the EU and United States have made substantial new money available for public and private sector investment. In October 2020 the EU announced an initial 9 billion euro for investment in the region as part of its Economic and Investment Plan, with an additional goal of unlocking 20 billion euro through the Western Balkans Guarantee Facility. 

Substantial additional funds will be available through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), World Bank, and European Investment Bank (EIB), especially for projects related to the energy transition and public infrastructure.  Collectively these institutions have available several billion euro for the region annually, although disbursement rates are comparatively low. The DFC a fortified successor to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, has opened an office in Belgrade and has indicated its interest in pursuing regional projects, starting with participation in some bilateral Pristina-Belgrade projects.

Third, the transatlantic environment now supports regional economic cooperation.  Both Washington and European capitals endorse regional economic cooperation, with the Pristina-Belgrade arrangement announced in Washington explicitly endorsing the efforts by the WB6 to build a regional common market. The specific items agreed in Washington between Pristina and Belgrade capture some bilateral elements of longer-standing regional commitments. More importantly, the occasionally energetic, but distracting, US effort to bring together Belgrade and Pristina should now be more easily coordinated with broader efforts aiming at regional economic integration.

James O’Brien is a Senior Advisor with the Future Europe Initiative and Vice Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group (ASG), where he heads the firm’s Europe practice.

Related reading

Elections 2020 Oct 30, 2020

Five big questions as America votes: Europe

By Future Europe Initiative

For the past seven decades, Europe has been the United States’ political, economic, and security partner of first resort. Now, as the transatlantic relationship is challenged by internal and external forces, the EU and the United States find themselves at a crossroads in the relationship.

Coronavirus Digital Policy

New Atlanticist Apr 2, 2020

Forging the Four Freedoms Initiative for prosperity and peace in the Balkans

By Marko Čadež

To demonstrate their readiness to fulfill the responsibilities associated with full-fledged membership in the world’s largest common market, the countries of the region launched the Western Balkans Four Freedoms Initiative to bring down barriers to intra-regional trade, travel, and labor movement. While not identical to Roosevelt’s plans, this project seeks to ensure the same outcome of peace and prosperity through liberty, opportunity, and growth.

International Markets Macroeconomics

New Atlanticist Mar 26, 2020

EU greenlights North Macedonia and Albania membership talks: Breakthrough or symbolic gesture?

By Jörn Fleck

“The decision by the EU foreign ministers to open accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania comes at a time when Europe is battling a major public health crisis and is bracing for its economic aftershocks,” Dimitar Bechev says. “Keeping enlargement alive speaks volumes about the union’s ability to muddle through.”

Democratic Transitions European Union

The post Western Balkans Partnership: Getting a common market from the Sofia Summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As part of the Atlantic Council’s Elections 2020 programming, the New Atlanticist will feature a series of pieces looking at the major questions facing the United States around the world as Americans head to the polls.

For the past seven decades, Europe has been the United States’ political, economic, and security partner of first resort. Now, as the transatlantic relationship is challenged by internal and external forces—the COVID-19 pandemic, economic downturns, climate change, external pressures from Russia and China, and cracks in the foundational liberal international order that underpins the transatlantic community—the EU and the United States find themselves at a crossroads in the relationship. There are new opportunities for constructive partnership in responding to external threats and promoting further Euro-Atlantic integration in Europe’s neighborhood, but there are also chasms growing around issues of trade and regulation, digital policy, and diverging priorities in defense and investment. These challenges and opportunities have been building for a decade, but the two potential administrations have articulated different approaches to the US-EU relationship even as it remains one of the most consequential partners on the world stage.

Below are the five major questions facing the United States on Europe as the US elections approach, answered by top experts:

How can the United States and the EU start a new administration, either under Biden or Trump, on the right foot? What could be one big win that would build positive momentum in the US-EU relationship?

“US and European leaders need to halt the destructive, mainly Trump-instigated, cycle of self-indulgent posturing driving apart the world’s greatest democratic centers and start working on common global challenges and problems from authoritarian Russia and China.

“A Biden presidency will find it easy to stop treating Europe as a punching bag, a move Europe will gladly reciprocate. A Trump administration could as well, if it so chose (I’m skeptical.)

“Substance will need to follow tone, and swiftly. It may be a tactical mistake to bet all on one big win early. Instead, US and EU/European leaders should recommit to join forces on a set of challenges: the coronavirus, economic stresses, climate change, [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s rejectionist aggression, China’s revisionist ambition, Iran, and more. It’s not hard to imagine an early US-EU summit producing agreement along these lines. 

“They should aim even higher: in addition, the United States and EU, joined by other key democracies, could issue a Charter of Principles, a sort of 21^st century version of the Atlantic Charter of 1941 that outlined the principles with which Roosevelt and Churchill sought to fight the Second World War. The challenges today are greater, and the principles must be broader and not issued by only two countries. But after years of democratic decline, authoritarian resurgence, and mounting economic and global problems, the democracies have the responsibility to stand up and declare their fundamentals and intentions.”

Daniel Fried, Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US ambassador to Poland.

How should the United States and EU work together to counter China?

“The lack of transatlantic coordination on China is one of the greatest missed opportunities of the last years. It is particularly striking as, on many areas, Washington and Europeans share similar concerns regarding China’s behavior. Having the largest integrated single market and a global norms setter, the EU, and its Member States, on its side would be the United States’ key asset in the strategic competition that will dominate the next decades.

“European public opinions have increasingly awakened to the challenge represented by China’s assertiveness, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. China’s attempt at “mask diplomacy” has proven ineffective while Europeans have suffered from the regime’s cover-up of the pandemic.

An October Pew poll shows unprecedented unfavorable views of China in many European countries: 70 percent in France, 85 percent in Sweden, 74 percent in the UK, 71 percent in Germany hold negative opinions. The crisis has underscored the dependency of critical assets (such as masks or medicine) on Chinese supply chains and opened a debate on bringing back key industries.

“This change was already reflected in an official 2019 strategy document, where the European Commission pointed to China as a “systemic rival promoting alternative forms of governance.” While the paper also points to areas of potential cooperation and partnership, the phrase stuck and signaled a change in tone in European capitals. On issues such as trade manipulation, human rights, privacy and data collection, this year European Commission Executive Vice President Margrethe Vestager announced an initiative to “level the playing field” and control foreign investments receiving state subsidies. Meanwhile, Member States have also started raising concerns over investments, while France and the United Kingdom are conducting freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.

“The United States and European countries could work together to build a common front with Asian partners to address trade violations at a multilateral level (which would entail reinvesting the World Trade Organization) and build a common approach to screening foreign investments. Such approach would entail building convergence on issues such as digital regulation and trade. Our differences pale in comparison to the systemic challenge represented by China. Americans will have to accept that a stronger EU defending its own sovereignty is in its advantage, while also not amplifying potential differences in tones and approaches. Europeans will probably not follow a rhetoric of confrontation, that doesn’t mean there isn’t much space for a common agenda. A recurrent EU-US strategic dialogue would help shape that agenda.

“Finally, this strategy will work if it isn’t inward looking. As our economies struggle with the consequences of COVID-19, we must not forget the countries suffering from much higher debt-financing costs, from Africa to the Western Balkans or Central Asia. The United States and Europe should not let Beijing pursue its Belt and Road without offering robust alternatives.”

Benjamin Haddad, director of the Atlantic Council’s Future Europe Initiative

In which areas should the United States and Germany work to reconcile their differences to address global challenges and where should they “agree to disagree”?

“In the field of security and defense, Germany and the United States have an interest in reconciling their differences over a number of issues. On one side stand Germany’s attachment to Nord Stream II and Berlin’s tendency to look at the challenge of China’s rise through an economic lens rather than taking seriously its security implications. On the other side stand the US role in destabilizing the architecture of arms control through withdrawing from the Iran deal and not renewing the New START agreement and its neglect of climate change as a global security challenge.

“In order to be able to negotiate over these issues constructively, however, both sides will first have to address the issue of burden sharing. Here they might have to “agree to disagree” but should try hard to move on to a more constructive discussion. If President Trump wins another term, Berlin cannot afford to keep up the increasingly defiant stance it has adopted in response to his 2 percent bullying; nor can it afford to fall back asleep at the wheel out of relief over a Biden presidency. Since it is not at all clear that political circumstances in Germany will allow defense spending to increase to 2 percent of gross domestic product over the next few years, Berlin should instead lobby for a broader transatlantic understanding of what it means to take responsibility for security and defense. For example, it could offer to step up infrastructure contributions to increase military mobility for NATO troops in Europe, make investments in emerging defense technologies to help narrow the transatlantic interoperability gap, and boost support for EU and NATO efforts to turn European countries into more capable defense actors through e.g. joint training and capability cooperation. The arrival of new leaders on both sides of the Atlantic could offer a window of opportunity for such a reframing. This would make it easier to get out of the destructive spiral the US-Germany relationship is in today.”

Sophia Besch, nonresident senior fellow in the Future Europe Initiative

Where will the EU’s push for digital sovereignty take the US-EU relationship in 2020 and beyond?

“In the next year, the transatlantic gulf over digital regulation will widen dramatically, as the European Commission begins to deliver on its promise of digital ‘sovereignty.’ The Commission will introduce legislative proposals to reform the rules governing internet ‘gatekeepers’—large, and almost exclusively American, digital companies that operate platforms such as social networks or app stores.

“According to press reports, current voluntary commitments on content moderation would become mandatory. New responsibilities for content and safety could narrow the immunity from legal liability that platforms enjoy as information intermediaries. A blacklist of forbidden practices in the realms of e-commerce, advertising, marketing of apps, and access to data would be created, along with a greylist of practices requiring regulatory investigation. Also to be proposed is a new competition tool that would enable the Commission’s regulators to intervene in instances of market failure even where consumer harm is not clear-cut.

“Some of these ideas also are being discussed in the US Congress, but US legislators remain fundamentally divided over whether to pursue top-down regulation, in the EU fashion, or to let dynamic market innovation proceed. The US Department of Justice recently filed suit against Google, and a case against Facebook is being readied as well, but these litigation battles could last many years. 

“The EU legislative process, by contrast, advances deliberately but inexorably. 2021 will be remembered as the year that the US government, and US technology companies, began to face up to the challenge of the EU’s new thinking on digital markets.”

Kenneth Propp, nonresident senior fellow in the Future Europe Initiative

How can Europe and the United States build a sustainable transatlantic agenda across the flashpoints on Europe’s borders, such as the Eastern Med and Western Balkans?

“The Eastern Mediterranean is seeing heightened tensions over maritime claims and regional conflicts that threaten NATO’s cohesion and the security of the wider region. Stabilization is key to preserving American interests in an era of great power competition, vital for Europe’s Mediterranean countries, and critical to the security of the European Union in view of continued migration pressures. A common understanding of the Eastern Mediterranean’s geopolitical importance is the first step to addressing these challenges, which require increased security and diplomatic alert during these unstable times.

“A forward-looking transatlantic agenda for the region could take inspiration from the better-defined framework for cooperation in the Western Balkans. Rather than integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions, the main vehicle for filling the power vacuum in the Eastern Mediterranean is regional cooperation. The US National Security Strategy focuses on strengthening its allies in the region by supporting energy and security partnerships among them to promote peace and prosperity. It has already contributed to building economic efficiencies and side-stepping some old enmities. The EU has similar tools in its Neighborhood Policy, as one of its priorities is also centered on connectivity, energy cooperation, and the environment. Another is strengthening institutions and good governance. Yet given the high stakes for the West, the single uncompromising value that the United States and Europe should insist upon is respect for international law: Even as they reward good neighborly relations, they should also target unilateral actions that infringe upon the sovereign rights of others—including through economic sanctions.”

Katerina Sokou, nonresident senior fellow in the Future Europe Initiative

“Europe and the United States need to engage with all allies and partners on the frontier of Europe to establish a more cooperative, productive, and sustainable transatlantic agenda in the context of an increasingly uncertain global geopolitical environment. Turkey, a NATO ally and EU accession country has had a fraught relationship with Europe and the United States in recent years which has harmed transatlantic cohesion. At the same time, Turkey’s importance to European security and stability, at NATO’s southeastern flank, has become all the more apparent since the beginning of the war in Syria and ensuing refugee crisis, and it shares many of the same concerns as its NATO allies in the face of an increasingly aggressive Russia. One emerging area of discord is the Eastern Mediterranean, where Turkey has felt ignored and sidelined. Europe and the United States need to advocate for all parties, including Turkey, to cooperate, find solutions, and in doing so, strengthen transatlantic solidarity.”

Defne Arslan is the Istanbul-based Director of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

“It’s a common refrain among Balkans experts that nothing gets done in the region unless the United States and its European partners are on the same page. The root cause of that is that leaders of these small countries are quite adept at balancing between sides when there is visible daylight between them. 

“It’s also a commonplace that without US leadership, the Western Balkans tend to stagnate, despite the best intentions of Europeans tasked with working on the region.

“The Trump administration showed that energetic US engagement can yield tangible results on the ground. It also learned that without its allies on board, these results prove to be fleeting and much smaller in scope than they otherwise would be. 

“Whoever wins in November needs to internalize both of these realities: America needs to lead on the Western Balkans, and it needs to bring its European allies along. It’s no small task to achieve both of these things at once. But it must be tried.”

Damir Marusic, nonresident senior fellow in the Future Europe Initiative

The post Five big questions as America votes: Europe appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The second round of Lithuanian parliamentary elections on October 25 delivered a victory for the country’s conservatives, who will look to form a new center-right coalition. In a historic first for the country, three parties all led by women will form the government. This government will be particularly well positioned to lead Lithuania through the COVID-19 pandemic, achieve needed domestic reforms, and navigate the delicate situation in neighboring Belarus, where mass protests for democracy continue.

The conservative Homeland Union party won the election and tapped Ingrida Šimonytė to lead the government as prime minister. Since she ran for the presidency in 2019, the forty-five-year-old economist cemented her status as one of the country’s leading politicians. While not officially a member of the Homeland Union, she has emerged as the face of the party and had already served as Homeland’s finance minister (2009-2012) during the global financial crisis. Homeland’s two coalition partners are smaller parties: the conservative-liberal Liberal Movement led by Viktorija Čmilytė-Nielsen and the newly formed socially liberal Freedom party led by Aušrinė Armonaitė.

The anticipated female-led coalition is set to bring competence, experience, and stability. Specifically, the center-right government will make a collaborative tandem with President Gitanas Nausėda. Nausėda and Šimonytė, both economists, non-partisans, and center-right politicians, faced off against each other in the 2019 presidential election, but now could make a good team offering consistency, professionalism, and a commitment to the EU in an increasingly Eurosceptic Europe. This arrangement could look like 2009, when the Homeland Union led the government and former President Dalia Grybauskaite started her first term.

Lithuania’s new female-led government will face some significant challenges. Most importantly, they face a tense situation in neighboring Belarus, where mass women-led protests against falsified presidential elections have continued since August despite beatings, reports of torture, and mass detentions. Lithuania’s foreign policy has already played an important role as the Belarusian opposition presidential candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya found refuge in Lithuania, from where she continues to meet with US and European representatives and continues her campaign for democracy in Belarus.

The Homeland Union will be highly supportive of the Belarusian opposition and Ms. Tikhanovskaya. Homeland Union is known for its tough stance on Russia as a conservative party whose origins lie in the independence movement from the Soviet Union. Lithuania already recognizes Tikhanovskaya as the legitimate president of Belarus. Earlier this month, after considerable lobbying from Lithuania and the other Baltic States, the EU, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada each adopted sanctions against key Belarusian individuals deemed involved in the falsification of the election. All these countries no longer recognize Alyaksandr Lukashenka as the legitimate leader of Belarus. However, given that Vilnius and Minsk are just 100 miles apart and Lithuania and Belarus remain considerable trading partners, and as Lithuania remains cautious of Lukashenka’s main ally Russia, support for Tikhanovskaya is a sensitive foreign policy issue, especially if pursued without considerable coordination and support from the European Union and the United States.

Beyond foreign policy, Lithuania will have a full plate on its domestic agenda. The country has so far weathered well both the economic implications of the COVID pandemic and its spread, but concerns are rising on how it will weather the winter. After a carefree summer when the country did not enforce any social restrictions, COVID infections have started to rise with the onset of the fall and winter. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has predicted that the Lithuanian economy will shrink 1.8 percent—the smallest drop in all of Europe—while 2021 could see a gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 4.1 percent, down from an expected 8.2 percent growth predicted back in April.

Additionally, the new government will contemplate tax changes and a growing public demand for education reform. Lithuania has among the highest educated population in Europe and has become an Information Technology (IT) and start-up hub. More than 90 percent of the population has a high school or college education, while the figure rises to 92 percent among women—the highest figure in the whole European Union. As a result, the fact that this year a third of the high school graduates failed the national mathematics exam has raised great public concern about the deterioration of math and life science education in the country. Such reforms will be difficult to achieve given the dwindling budget and rising debt.

Prominent female politicians are nothing new in Lithuania. The former President Dalia Grybauskaite won two terms and was considered one of the most successful and popular Lithuanian politicians. Lithuania has regularly had female leaders in positions such former Minister of Defense Rasa Jukneviciene and several speakers of the Parliament. The first prime minister after Lithuania gained independence and the last woman in the role was Kazimiera Prunskiene in 1990. This female political engagement has historic roots. Lithuanian women gained the right to vote in 1918, about two years before they did in the United States, while the first Lithuanian female presidential candidate Gabrielė Petkevičaitė-Bitė ran in the 1920s. Nonetheless, Lithuania is still behind European averages in terms of total number of seats women hold in Parliament.

The female-led parties of Lithuania’s new coalition government will be setting a new bar for the government and creating new political traditions. However, their initial focus should be on meeting domestic public expectations given the dwindling budget resources, especially in light of a looming European recession. During their last time leading the government from 2008-2012, Homeland Union professionally dealt with the global financial crisis, but also alienated some of the public with harsh austerity measures. The COVID-19 pandemic, tax changes, and education reform will require a delicate political balance. Nonetheless as former President Grybauskaite stated on Facebook: “This election is the best thing that could happen to Lithuania in this very complicated period…Three parties were led to victory by women. Women aren’t afraid to take responsibility in difficult times.”

Dr. Agnia Grigas is a senior fellow at Atlantic Council. Her three recent books include: The Politics of Energy and Memory between the Baltic States and Russia, The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas, and Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.

Further reading:

New Atlanticist Sep 8, 2020

US must remain committed to NATO and the Baltic States

By Sally A. Painter

The United States has profound interests in maintaining NATO and the sovereignty and security of the Baltic region. Now is the time for the United States to rise to this leadership role by deepening our commitment to NATO and supporting the Baltic countries to foster a strong and united transatlantic community.

NATO Northern Europe

NATO 20/2020 Oct 14, 2020

Set NATO’s sights on the High North

By Jim Danoy and Marisol Maddox

Security in the Arctic is waiting on no one. NATO needs a strategy for defense and deterrence in the High North before it is outflanked.

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Mar 4, 2020

The “time is now or never” for Central Europe to grasp Three Seas opportunity, Estonia’s president says

By David A. Wemer

Now that an investment fund to fuel the development of stronger cross-border transportation, energy, and digital infrastructure links in Central and Eastern Europe has been launched, countries in the region “need to quickly decide” whether they want to participate before the opportunity vanishes, according to Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid.

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Lithuania’s new government: Women-led coalition wins confidence in difficult times appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Reverse flows to Ukraine introduced in 2015 have proven the value of bidirectional east-west transit. And, for the first time on August 26 this year, the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine (GTSOU) carried out a south-north transmission request. This request was placed by a local commodity trader and involved shipping natural gas up the Trans-Balkan pipeline from Greece through Bulgaria and Romania to Ukraine. The purchase helped demonstrate the technical viability of this route, even if it is not yet commercially viable.

The question of whether gas will continue to flow through the Trans-Balkan pipeline and whether the direction will be reversed was raised by ICIS almost a year ago. We have subsequently seen a sharp decline in flows. The projected transit volume for this entire year is 1 bcm at most. In other words, even this admittedly optimistic scenario indicates a utilization rate of a meager 3-4%.

A strategic asset with a transit capacity of 27 bcm per year, the Trans-Balkan gas corridor can and should be a guarantee of energy security for Southeastern Europe. If there are interruptions or maintenance work on TANAP or TurkStream, gas flows could still be assured.

This corridor currently gives countries in the Balkan region access to the gas markets of Central Europe and Ukraine’s storage facilities, which are the largest in Europe. However, without significant transit volumes, neither Ukraine nor Bulgaria and Romania can defend operational expenditure. It is therefore important to understand the very real risk of supply disruptions should this pipeline be marked for decommission.

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There are several concurrent developments in and around the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea that are bound to reshape regional energy system dynamics. These include four major gas field discoveries in the territorial waters of Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus; the latest find by Turkey; and the construction of a new LNG terminal in Greece. Meanwhile, rising tensions between Ankara and Athens; the tightening of US sanctions on TurkStream; and the latest escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan all have the potential to shatter the status quo.

The complexity of the interplay between these diverse developments is such that no single scenario could definitively describe the path forward. What is clear, however, is that the conventional logic no longer applies to the Trans-Balkan gas corridor. What will it take to redeploy this route for the benefit of consumers in Central and Eastern Europe?

First and foremost, we have to find a way to boost the commercial viability of the route.

Arguably, Moldova can pick the lowest hanging fruit by virtue of updating its tariff calculation methodology and bringing it into line with common European practices. At present, the tariff approved by the Moldovan Regulator is about USD 11 per 1,000 m3/100km, while the “historical shipper” Gazprom is understood to be getting a 70% discount, paying only USD 3. Clearly, the current situation does very little to promote fair competition and must be corrected as a priority.

Secondly, Romania, which boasts the second-largest gas reserves in the EU, has yet to overhaul its legacy regulations that restrict exports to non-EU countries. So far, Ukraine and Romania have signed just one interaction agreement. GTSOU stands ready to sign four more agreements, given the number of additional interconnection points that exist between Ukraine and Romania.

At the moment, the process remains bogged down by delays that benefit nobody. Let us aim to conclude four further agreements in the next few months. As Romania is poised to ramp up domestic gas production, in particular from offshore fields in the Black Sea, it could play an ever-increasing role in the regional energy trade. Indeed, Romania stands to benefit most from bidirectional use of the Trans-Balkan pipeline.

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Lastly, the European Union and all 27 member states must stand firmly for the uniform application of the EU’s own Third Energy Package.

An exemption granted to Serbia in 2019 is currently impeding competition in the energy market. The 400km stretch of the pipeline going through Serbia, in which Gazprom has a controlling stake, boasts a capacity of 13.88 bcm per year. “The pipeline is not covered by the Third Energy Package and we regret that,” is how Energy Community Deputy Director Dirk Buschle described the situation in March 2019. To make this pipeline compliant with European energy regulations, a number of remedies and cures are available to Serbia. However, there is currently no political appetite in Belgrade to implement them.

European solidarity is clearly in jeopardy here. As individual member states or EU aspirants pursue their separate interests, the EU as a whole stands to lose out.

Now that Ukraine has completed the unbundling process of its energy sector, the EU must ensure the mandatory and universal application of its own rules and regulations in Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia. The gas market does not end at the borders of the European Union. Neighbors who have committed to comply with the provisions of the Third Energy Package also deserve reciprocation.

Despite the current state of affairs, I am optimistic that the Trans-Balkan pipeline will soon be delivering on its promise and helping revitalize regional economies, boosting the ongoing energy transition away from carbon-intensive coal, and contributing to the diversification of gas imports to Europe. For its part, Ukraine stands ready to deploy its extensive transit and storage network for our common benefit.

Ultimately, the principles of fair competition are only as useful as our willingness to enforce them. When Europe defends its interests by rightfully recognizing the geopolitical and national security implications of the natural gas trade, all of its members and neighbors stand to benefit.

Sergey Makagon is CEO of the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 6, 2020

Has Vladimir Putin poisoned his pet pipeline project?

By Diane Francis

Germany had long resisted US calls to abandon the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, but the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny has now sparked a dramatic shift in German opinion.

Economic Sanctions Geopolitics & Energy Security

UkraineAlert Dec 19, 2019

Naftogaz CEO Andriy Kobolyev: “The likelihood of Russia helping us is zero”

By Diane Francis

Andriy Kobolyev took over the reins of Ukraine’s energy giant Naftogaz during the country’s darkest hour in March 2014. Despite huge progress, he continues to face political opposition at home and an array of international challenges courtesy of the Kremlin.

European Union Geopolitics & Energy Security

UkraineAlert Jul 15, 2020

New US sanctions block Putin’s pipeline despite Danish breakthrough

By Diane Francis

Russia has recently secured approval from Denmark to complete the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, but new US sanctions reflect America’s resolve to make sure the strategically important project remains unfinished.

European Union Geopolitics & Energy Security

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Time for Europe to rethink the Trans-Balkan pipeline appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 11, Foreign Policy published a biweekly column featuring Scowcroft Center Deputy Director Matthew Kroenig and the Cato Institute’s Emma Ashford discussing the latest news in international affairs.

In this column, they discuss US efforts to counter China, including a new US military base in Palau; the possibility that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson pursues a closed border between Ireland and Northern Ireland; and economic normalization between Serbia and Kosovo.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig and Ashford discuss US efforts to counter China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Leaders from the Western Balkans Six—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia—participated in the Western Balkans Partnership Summit on July 29 to take steps to deepen regional economic cooperation and stimulate growth amid the widespread economic downturn caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. Convened by the Atlantic Council, the summit provided an opportunity for the Western Balkans Six to adopt measures to stimulate economic recovery, boost the region’s long-term competitiveness, and strengthen its attractiveness for potential investors.

According to Damon Wilson, executive vice president of the Atlantic Council, the leaders agreed to several key measures that will help remove the obstacles to economic cooperation and drive future growth and investment in the region. Wilson highlighted that the leaders are seeking to “implement the European Union’s Four Freedoms of movement, goods, services, capital, and people,” in part by making permanent so-called “green lanes” which were put in place during the initial stages of the coronavirus pandemic to help expedite the transport of essential goods to and between the region, and also seeking to expand the concept to encompass more goods. The leaders’ also placed emphasis on the need to improve infrastructure at border crossings to facilitate these new measures and to “remove barriers to live, study, work, and visit throughout the region, Wilson said.  

Many of the leaders saw the long wait times at borders for goods and travelers as a huge impediment to the region’s prospects for growth and competitiveness. “Our trucks wait at internal borders for 26 million hours annually,” Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić explained, arguing that “we can save up to 7 percent of operational costs if we can cut all of these bureaucratic procedures and everything else.” Zoran Tegeltija, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, stressed that these delays also negatively impact tourism, which is a growing sector in much of the region. “We have a situation where somebody from our neighboring countries or EU countries need several hours to come to Bosnia and Herzegovina to have their vacation,” he explained.

Watch the full event:

Stevo Pendarovski, president of North Macedonia, highlighted Skopje’s recent agreement with neighboring Greece as an example of how a focus on removing these economic barriers can help drive growth and trade. Through the 2018 Prespa agreement, he explained “North Macedonia and Greece agreed to institutionalize a structured dialogue regarding among other issues border procedures, bureaucratic impediments, and free flow of goods, services, people, and capital,” that mirrors what the Western Balkans Six have discussed. He noted that in the period after the Prespa Agreement was signed there was a “clear increase in the trade between Greece and North Macedonia and also between Greece and the rest of the European Union market but going through our land.”

As governments and international organizations are committing new funds to help economies weather the storm of COVID-19, the leaders also discussed identifying “a substantial set of shovel-ready investment projects so recovery funds and future investment can be deployed swiftly and effectively,” Wilson explained. These projects could help unlock latent economic potential in the region, as Avdullah Hoti, prime minister of Kosovo, noted that “we still do not have full infrastructure links.” The summit’s conclusions demonstrate, however, that “there is a full willingness among all leaders of the region to work together to try to remove these [economic] barriers immediately and to engage in large scale projects that would link our capitals,” Hoti added. In addition to the Western Balkans Six, the summit also included representatives from European governments, the European Union, and the US administration.

While the measures to speed up border crossings and invest in infrastructure may seem small in a region that is still plagued by deep political divisions, Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama argued that “the series of small things, the steps one by one that we have envisaged as part of this big dream of regional development through peace and cooperation are crucial and are more crucial now than they were before the pandemic.” Indeed, Wilson admitted that “the region was already facing headwinds before this historic pandemic hit,” and noted that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development identified the Western Balkans as one of the regions that could be the hardest hit economically by the crisis. “Demanding times demand bold action,” he argued, but added that the Summit’s deliberations prove that “the leaders recognize that working together is part of the answer and that is significant.”

The July 29 Western Balkans Partnership Summit will also build momentum for the next summit of the Berlin Process to be held in the fall in Sofia, Bulgaria. The Berlin Process aims to help facilitate the accession progress of the Western Balkans to the European Union. Dragica Sekulić, minister of economy for Montenegro, stressed the “importance that all the regional initiatives are brought into mutual harmony and that in each of them we recognize a chance for further progress to achieve the standards required for full membership in the Union and accession to the EU single market.” She added that the region should aim to build cooperation that “will speed up the EU accession process for each of us based on the individual merits.”

As the Western Balkans Six look to transform their region and join the European Union, the initial small steps to unlock their common economic potential could not only help mitigate the short term effects of the current coronavirus crisis, but advance them down the path of full European integration.

David A. Wemer is associate director, editorial at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @DavidAWemer.

The post Western Balkans leaders meet to drive coronavirus recovery and deepen regional economic cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Western Balkans Partnership Summit advances regional economic cooperation to attract investment and accelerate recovery

WASHINGTON, DC – JULY 29, 2020 – Today, leaders from the Western Balkan Six – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia – joined together at the Western Balkans Partnership Summit to adopt practical measures to deepen regional economic cooperation and recovery measures to counter the COVID-19 economic crisis. The leaders’ decisions will serve to stimulate economic recovery, boost the region’s long-term competitiveness, and strengthen its attractiveness for investors. US, European, and key institution representatives joined the support the leaders’ decisions.

The summit’s achievements include a renewed regional commitment to implementing free movement for goods, services, capital and people; removing barriers that hinder economic growth; and identifying shovel-ready infrastructure investment projects so recovery funds and future investment can be deployed swiftly and effectively. These projects would focus on infrastructure to support green energy efforts, the digital economy, and job creation. The commitments today will help produce a successful summit this fall as part of the Berlin Process.

Specifically, the leaders agreed to make permanent the so-called green lanes established during the lockdown to ensure the unobstructed flow of all goods and priority passage for essential goods; and to expand the green lane concept to more goods and to EU neighbors of the Western Balkan Six when they meet again in Sophia this fall. They agreed to tackle these issues together and work regionally, making relevant bilateral or multilateral agreements open to all. They also pushed to make this effort visible to citizens by removing barriers to live, study, work, and visit through the region. The leaders also welcomed a commitment from the US Development Finance Corporation to prioritize investment in the region.

Today’s summit, which was convened virtually by the Atlantic Council, resulted in a chair’s statement endorsed by all leaders. The full text of the statement can be found here.

The primary objective of the summit was overcoming the economic challenges resulting from the fragmentation of the region. Barriers to the free movement of goods, services, and people have held back the regional economy and trade with EU member states, with goods spending as much as 80 percent of shipping time idling at border crossings.

While the pandemic is depressing economic activity, economic integration could boost regional economies by as much as 10 percent, according to the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and bring the region and its companies closer to the EU Internal Market.

In addition, the leaders committed to a plan designed to attract new investment in the region and accelerate the deployment of committed COVID-19 recovery funds.

Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti of Kosovo said:

“I welcome the initiative of the Atlantic Council to provide a platform for the countries of the Western Balkans to discuss and agree on concrete measures that will foster economic growth and foreign investment across the region. Regional cooperation is not a substitute for European integration, but rather an important preparatory step that helps our countries prepare for accession to the European Union. As an equal member of the Western Balkans Six, Kosovo is committed to contributing to regional economic cooperation.”

President Stevo Pendarovski of North Macedonia said:

“We fully support regional cooperation, and the economic agenda should lead before the political or security issues which occupied us for such a long time. Economic initiatives are very important because they are remedies for the biggest problem of our societies: people leaving the Balkans, primarily looking for a better economic future for their families. We have to find a solution for this challenge and one of the ways to improve the economic parameters of our countries is through regional cooperation.

“We must not allow the EU perspective to remain unclear or distant in the future. The integration limbo has been historically proven to be the worst case scenario for the Balkans. It has always created a space for the unproductive geopolitical competition of the local players and world powers.”

Prime Minister Edi Rama of Albania said:

“I proposed that leaders meet virtually on a monthly basis to take stock at the highest level on the implementation of the commitments taken today. In addition, I highlighted the importance of digital connectivity and broadband infrastructure for the unleashing of our economic potential and bringing the region closer to the Euro-Atlantic community, economically as well as politically.”

Minister of Economy Dragica Sekulić of Montenegro said:

“Our message is very simple: when we cooperate regionally, let’s do it in a way that will speed up the EU Accession process for each of us, based on individual merits.”

Chairman of the Council of Ministers Zoran Tegeltija of Bosnia and Herzegovina said:

“The coronavirus pandemic-caused crisis pointed at the need for closer regional, as well as international, cooperation with the European Union. As the people most responsible for our economies, which are small and interdependent, yet also dependent on partners in the European Union, were are expected to take a swift and decisive action in order to start an investment cycle and have our citizens assured of our determination for fast progress and an expeditious response to the crisis.

“Encouraged by the latest developments in Brussels, I welcome an agreement made by the EU leaders and expect considerable support within the agreed-to EU financial package for projects to be defined jointly. This way, the European Union can demonstrate once again that the Western Balkans is a part of Europe and that Europe is interested in the Western Balkans countries’ integration to the European Union. Our task and obligation are to work in an accelerated fashion on defining and implementation of joint measures and finally show the results thereof to our citizens.”

President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia said:

“For the first time, there are no big politics. Everything comes to the economy. We do understand the political differences between us, but if we want to resolve political problems, we have to resolve economic ones first. We have to bring our citizens closer, we have to raise the level of economic responsibility, and thereby the living standards of our citizens will go up. That’s why Serbia is committed to working on concrete steps towards faster developing of common economic market.”

Experts from the Atlantic Council will work with a robust network of partners in the region to build upon the momentum of today’s summit.

Damon Wilson, Atlantic Council Executive Vice President, said:

“Through the Atlantic Council’s Balkans Forward Initiative, we are committed to fostering a more prosperous Western Balkans that is part of the transatlantic community. Today’s summit marks a major step in that direction as the region confronts a critical moment in the wake of COVID-19. I was inspired to see a shared vision for economic growth through cooperation from the region’s leaders, and the Atlantic Council will continue to provide its full support to help the Western Balkans meet its economic potential.”

The Western Balkan Six leaders were joined by representatives from the US Department of State, the US Development Finance Corporation, the US National Security Council, the European Commission, the Regional Cooperation Council, the European External Action Service, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, and the Western Balkan 6 Chambers of Commerce Investment Forum.

Video from the public discussion with participating leaders can be found here.

Please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org to schedule an interview with an Atlantic Council expert for insights on today’s summit.

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Connect with our experts for insights on the summit:

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Damon Wilson

Former Executive Vice President

NATO Europe & Eurasia

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Damir Marusic

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The post Western Balkans leaders agree to bold actions to help region recover from COVID pandemic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The leaders committed to improving political cooperation and good neighborly relations and to strive to resolve bilateral issues in the region.

CHAIR’S CONCLUSIONS

Leaders of the Western Balkans Six met at the invitation of the Atlantic Council of the United States to discuss practical measures that will create opportunity throughout the region. 

Leaders committed to facilitate and promote concrete steps toward regional economic development in order to stimulate post-COVID-19 economic recovery, boost the region’s long-term competitiveness, and strengthen its attractiveness for investors.

Leaders emphasized that people in the Western Balkans need to see tangible progress, soon. The COVID-19 pandemic threatens to cut economic activity in the region drastically, while regional economic integration can raise GDP by more than 10 percent, according to both the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

The region is committed to European integration, based on European Union (EU) rules and principles and including membership in the EU, and to regional and European initiatives such as the Regional Economic Area (REA) established as part of the Berlin Process, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Treaty Establishing the Transport Community, and the Treaty Establishing the Energy Community. The Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) has a special role to play in providing a framework for progress and preparing for the Sofia Summit scheduled for November.

In order to show results immediately, and to reinforce the processes underway, leaders announced that their approach in the regional initiatives will be built on these pillars:

1 – IMPLEMENTING THE EU’S FOUR FREEDOMS

The free movement of goods, services, capital, and people is the heart of European integration. Leaders accordingly have agreed, as each seeks EU membership through the EU’s processes, to continue deepening regional economic integration, building on EU rules and standards, and thereby bringing the region and its companies closer to the EU Internal Market. It will build on the successes thus far of the Regional Economic Area, bringing regional economic development to a new level.

To do so, leaders have tasked their institutions, in coordination with regional organizations, to prepare an action plan structured around the four freedoms, for their adoption at the Sofia Summit planned for November in the framework of the Berlin Process. This work shall reflect several principles:

Deepen Regional Cooperation. Leaders acknowledge that inclusive regional organizations and initiatives have been instrumental during the lockdown in establishing green lanes to ensure unobstructed flow of all goods and priority passage for essential goods. This achievement will be made permanent, and the Sofia Summit should see further steps in this direction, including expansion of the green lane concept to more goods and to EU neighbors of the WB6, as well as the improvement of infrastructure at priority border crossing points. In 2016 trucks spent 26 million hours at internal border/common crossing points. This is 80 percent of their time in the region. We will agree on measures to match EU targets at border/common crossing points and, if possible, eliminate waiting. 

Follow Through on Implementation. The Western Balkans Six have made various, multiple commitments promoting the four freedoms, but implementation sometimes lags. In preparations for the Sofia Summit, the Western Balkans Six will set specific benchmarks.

Work Regionally. Leaders committed to work through the regional initiatives described above so that all the Western Balkans Six benefit. If implementation involves bilateral or multilateral agreements not including all six, such agreements will be consistent with EU requirements and regional economic initiatives, transparent, and open to all.

Make Progress Visible to Citizens. Citizens must see change and experience opportunity in the region to live, study, work, and visit without requirements beyond their domestic documentation. They should see public services become more efficient and infrastructure improved.

2 – SHOVEL-READY INVESTMENT PROJECTS

Leaders welcome the commitment of the EU to the region as demonstrated by the substantial amount of funding made available – and as noted at the Zagreb Summit, already disbursed – as part of the COVID recovery effort. Leaders also welcome support from international financial institutions and US government entities to facilitate greater private sector investment in the region and note with particular appreciation the work of the European Commission and its partners on a package of investment for the Western Balkans anticipated for later in 2020.

Leaders again emphasized that citizens should see investments made soon, especially in infrastructure. To that end, they commit to create the necessary conditions to maximize the impact of investments made as part of the COVID response – to help identify projects with regional impact, to create conditions required by regional initiatives, and to remain engaged so that funds are disbursed quickly, transparently, and with greatest impact. This will ensure that the citizens of the region see economic activity take place rapidly. 

To that end, the Western Balkan Six will work within the Western Balkans Investment Framework and with potential investors, the EU, the European Investment Bank, EBRD, the World Bank, and the US Development Finance Corporation, to have ready by the Sofia Summit a substantial set of investments in projects with potential investors identified, concerns addressed, and ready for investment decision, respecting the decision-making processes of each investor. 

Leaders have asked their teams to give priority to infrastructure projects that promote regional economic development; that advance the goals of the European Green Deal and Digital Agenda as applied to the Western Balkans Six; and that create economic activity in the form of jobs and disbursement rapidly. The portfolio of projects will include activity in each of the WB6. They stressed that funding for projects in the areas of digital connectivity and broadband infrastructure, railway and other forms of transportation, and the diversification of energy supplies should be particular priorities, as ways to bridge the economic and development gap between the Western Balkans and the rest of Europe and in order to bring the region closer to the Euro-Atlantic community.

The effort aims to promote quality infrastructure investment that is open and inclusive, transparent, economically viable, financially, environmentally and socially sustainable, and compliant with European requirements and international standards, laws, and regulations.

3 – TRACKING IMPLEMENTATION

People should know that the Western Balkans Six are doing what its leaders promise. Leaders agreed to implement in the most transparent, efficient, and inclusive manner the necessary measures to facilitate the free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons and to attract investments.

The Regional Cooperation Council, with the assistance of international partners, will develop an appropriate tool in order to track the implementation of measures agreed in regional economic initiatives, without creating duplicative reporting requirements. The Western Balkans Six Chambers of Commerce already plan quarterly reports on regional company investments, regional trade flows, and the business perspective on whether key indicators are met; this will be important information to be included. This tool should allow all stakeholders, including citizens, to provide input on the effectiveness of steps taken.

The leaders welcomed a suggestion from the Atlantic Council that it produce a report in advance of the Sofia Summit, in consultation with the Western Balkans Six, to contribute to the preparations for that Summit.

The post Western Balkans Partnership Summit: Chair’s conclusions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the world marks Pride Month, three prominent out LGBTI European leaders discussed their countries’ fight against coronavirus, ongoing disagreements between Europe and the United States, and the continuing fight for LGBTI equality.

In a June 30 virtual event hosted by the Atlantic Council to mark Pride Month, Xavier Bettel, prime minister of Luxembourg since 2013, called on European leaders to cooperate more on their coronavirus response, especially on the development of a vaccine, which could turn into a “nightmare” if countries compete for supplies. Ana Brnabić, the prime minister of Serbia, described her struggles with coming out in a conservative society, but said that “if I could have at least one gay person in Serbia feel more at ease with themselves, then my goal will have been achieved.” Leo Varadkar, former Taoiseach (prime minister) and now Tánaiste (deputy prime minister) of Ireland noted that the modern struggle for LGBTI rights largely began at Stonewall in New York, but lamented that on these issues “we don’t really have American leadership anymore.”

Here’s a closer look at what they discussed:

FIGHTING CORONAVIRUS:

• The data so far: The three countries have performed relatively well with regard to COVID-19. So far, Ireland has confirmed 25,462 cases and 1,735 deaths; while Serbia had 14,564 cases and 277 deaths, and Luxembourg, 4,299 cases and 110 deaths.

• Echoes of the migration crisis: Brnabić said that COVID-19 reminded her of the migration crisis in 2014, when each EU member state approached the situation individually. “And now with COVID-19, we saw basically the exact same thing happening all over again,” she said. “We should have a common European response to these types of global challenges, regardless whether a country is an EU member or not.”

• Solidarity needed: Varadkar, praising the EU’s May 27 announcement of a €750 billion recovery program to rescue the bloc from its current crisis, said Italy and Spain suffered the brunt of the pandemic—and that the EU’s other members must share the burden. “We should be able to support countries that have been hit more than others,” he said. But at the same time, “we have to be clear that this money is used as an answer to COVID-19. It can’t be used for other stuff. And finally, we should be able to see that the rules are respected or not. It’s a terrible crisis, so we need strong answers.”

• Economic pain remains: The situation remains dire in Ireland, said Varadkar, who is slated to return as Taoiseach in 2022 as part of an agreement with the government that took power last week. On June 29, all Irish restaurants and cafes reopened, though pubs, nightclubs, and casinos remain shuttered. Unemployment stands at around 20 percent, he said. “It’s a very serious economic crisis, and very unequal. It’s the private sector workers who have lost their jobs—mainly younger people and migrants—whereas people working for big multinationals and the state have been largely unaffected. The economic crisis that’s coming could be very divisive,” Varadkar said, warning of “a second wave which could set us back once more.”

• Digital solutions: Brnabić said her government’s insistence on “going digital in Serbia” before the pandemic began helped her country enormously during its recent lockdown. “Thanks to e-government, we continued providing services,” she said. “Enrollments are currently completely electronic, and our kids did not lose even one single day of school.”

• “Nightmare” race for vaccine: Bettel feared that the competition between countries over protective equipment seen at the beginning of the crisis could also repeat itself if countries do not cooperate on vaccine development and distribution. “The race for the vaccine will be a nightmare if we are not able to collaborate,” he said, noting that many international policymakers “often speak global, but we act local.”

• Safeguards remain, but no return to lockdowns: Brnabić said that “what keeps me awake at night now is that COVID is not going to pass. We will have to learn how to live with this virus at least until a vaccine is found.” Yet she said that Serbia—which aspires to EU membership—“will not be able to go back to a full lockdown. The economy would not survive.”

Watch the full event:

COMING OUT:

• A day when no one will care about “out or not”: Luxembourg’s Bettel, who has been prime minister since 2013, said it’s useless to hide one’s feelings—especially for a gay man with political aspirations. “When I did my coming out a few years ago, the hardest part was to accept myself and tell my mom. I never hid it,” he told moderator Damon Wilson, executive vice-president of the Atlantic Council. “You invited here three ‘out’ politicians. I hope that one day, nobody will care about being out or not. The fact there’s only been five of us who have led governments is sad, because there must have been many more who just didn’t come out, or couldn’t come out.”

• Societal transformation: Varadkar noted that Ireland, a predominantly Roman Catholic nation, had been changing long before he became prime minister. “I’m just a product of a society that has become more modern, more liberal, and less religious,” he said, adding that his sexual orientation was no secret in Dublin, but that he confirmed it in a radio interview during the runup to Ireland’s referendum on marriage equality. “I knew I’d be campaigning for a ‘yes.’ I couldn’t pretend to be disinterested or neutral,” he said. “That was the trigger for me.”

• Difficult times and criticism: In Serbia—still a country dominated by the Orthodox Church—the situation was “very different,” said Brnabić. “I had to go through some really difficult times. It was terrible for my family, and especially for my partner, but we got over it,’ she said, noting that she’s been heavily criticized by Serbia’s LGBT community for not doing enough—a sentiment with which she strongly disagrees. “I do attend every Pride parade in Belgrade, and I talk to people who criticize me.”

• The motivation to serve: Brnabić is not only one of the world’s few lesbian politicians: she also had a son born during her term of office; he’s now sixteen months old. “My mission was firstly to be a gay prime minister. My job wasn’t to push the LGBT agenda, but to be prime minister and assure that everyone lives better,” she said, suggesting that “if I could have at least one gay person in Serbia feel more at ease with themselves, then my goal will have been achieved.”

TRANSATLANTIC TIES:

• Avoiding getting caught in the middle: On the subject of US-China relations, the leaders steered clear of choosing a side. “Serbia is far too small to be in between these giants,” Brnabić argued. “We don’t want to be the grass on which the elephants are fighting. We want to mind our own business.”

• Looking for US leadership: Mike Guest, co-founder of the Council for Global Equity and the first publicly gay man to serve as a US ambassador, asked how Europeans view the US role under President Donald Trump. “There’s a sadness in Ireland that we don’t really have American leadership anymore because for most of the last century if not longer, the US has been a force for good in the world,” Varadkar replied. “The battle for LBGT equality began in New York, at Stonewall. There was a time when America was ahead of the world on so many issues such as this, and it’s not that country anymore. Perhaps that will change in November.”

Larry Luxner is a Tel Aviv-based freelance journalist and photographer who covers the Middle East, Eurasia, Africa and Latin America. Follow him on Twitter @LLuxner.

Further reading:

Inflection Points Jun 14, 2020

The perils of transatlantic decoupling and how to stop it

By Frederick Kempe

It’s time to take urgent measures to head off the danger of “transatlantic decoupling,” a strategic shift that would put at risk more than seven decades of gains in democracy, open markets and individual rights. Two world wars have taught us where transatlantic neglect can lead, while the history of the past 75 years underscores the value of common cause. We forget those lessons at our peril.

Europe & Eurasia Nationalism

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2020

Top European digital official: US and EU must make better use of their shared values and history

By Larry Luxner

Europe’s powerful competition and digital chief Margrethe Vestager is calling for better relations between the United States and the European Union, at a time when economic chaos triggered by the worsening coronavirus pandemic threatens recovery on both sides of the Atlantic.

Digital Policy Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Jun 8, 2020

The US and Europe have addressed COVID unemployment in divergent ways: The differences are revealing.

By Hung Tran

The coronavirus pandemic has inflicted similar economic devastation around the world, but the United States and Europe have sought to minimize the impact of COVID-related unemployment in divergent ways. Understanding the differences in these responses is critical to grasping the likely long-term impact of this crisis on the transatlantic economy.

Coronavirus European Union

The post LGBTI leaders speak out on COVID, US-Europe relations, and the fight for equality appeared first on Atlantic Council.

When Ambassador Richard Grenell, US President Donald J. Trump’s special envoy for peace negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo, initially tweeted that delegations from the two countries, led by their respective presidents, would be coming to the White House in late June for “discussions,” I assumed that a long-elusive deal was in the offing. After all, one usually only calls principals together to such a high profile location if a signing ceremony is within reach, with only the last few elements needing to be hammered out by the only people capable of credibly guaranteeing a final deal’s legitimacy. Could it be that the much-maligned Grenell had pulled off a diplomatic feat that had eluded legions of diplomats for decades?

Minutes later, however, Grenell followed up his initial tweet with a warning that tempered enthusiasm: if the meeting comes up empty, he said, it’s back to the unhappy status quo ante, with the United States washing its hands. Maybe this is just the shape of diplomacy done by tweet, but to me it betrayed the possibility of this being more of a Hail Mary pass than a breakthrough. And indeed, sources on the ground soon confirmed to me that serious work remained to be done before any kind of deal could be signed.

Grenell and former US ambassador to the EU Gordon Sondland are said to have bonded over a shared contempt for process-laden traditional diplomacy—and diplomats. As private sector entrepreneurs serving a self-styled CEO-in-Chief in Washington, they felt their remit was to get stuff done by cutting through what they saw as useless pomp and preening by experts and civil servants alike. Some of that contempt shone through as Grenell sniped back at Ambassador Nick Burns’ criticism about the Trump administration going into the negotiations without the Europeans on board: “You don’t know what you are talking about,” Grenell wrote (on Twitter, naturally). “But you are so sure you do. Typical.”

I share many of the reservations of the so-called “expert class.” A vast gulf has opened between Germany and the United States over the sidelining of Kosovo’s former Prime Minister Albin Kurti; the Trump administration seemed all too happy to have seen his back after the country’s Constitutional Court denied him new elections, while Berlin felt like Washington was meddling behind the scenes to remove a politician hostile to negotiating a quick deal with Serbia. For his part, French President Emmanuel Macron is smarting as well, as he was planning to host the exact kind of summit that Trump has now taken away from him. While the big European players are probably helpless to prevent success, they would surely welcome failure as a deserved comeuppance to a haughty and rude Trump administration.

Still, to dismiss Grenell’s efforts as somehow inevitably doomed would be churlish. For one thing, the stakes are dizzyingly high and both sides know it. Kosovo’s President Hashim Thaçi has announced he will not be seeking another term. He also knows that should he fail, his increasingly popular nemesis Kurti could sail into power with solid majorities—and be looking to settle scores. Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić faces no domestic political threats to his rule, but he knows he will soon have harsher critics in Washington should former US Vice President Joe Biden win in November, a hostile adversary in Prishtina should Thaçi fall after talks, and vanishingly few boosters in major European capitals. It’s now or never.

And moreover, we don’t really know what the goal of the talks is. Most assume that anything short of a final status deal would be a failure, but that could be shortsighted: a smaller win may be possible, and could be significant. Indeed, Grenell himself has averred that “we must first make progress on growing the economies.” Some kind of win-win agreement locking in free movement of goods and people could see Kosovo warming an ongoing initiative to create a cohesive economic zone in the Western Balkans. 

Europeans should try hard to look beyond their grievances with the Trump administration and look to build on whatever positive comes of these negotiations. Even if a genuine breakthrough is achieved, it could well be fragile and will need support from all sides. It would be a shame let opportunities pass due to fits of pique, however rightfully earned they may happen to be.

Damir Marusic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Future Europe Initiative:

Further reading:

New Atlanticist Jun 17, 2020

Don’t count on a White House Kosovo-Serbia breakthrough

By Dimitar Bechev

Setting expectations high would be ill-advised. For one, Vučić has no incentive to rush with recognizing Kosovo. Prishtina, meanwhile, will view the removal of tariffs on Serbia as having done its share, and will seek concessions. Europeans and Americans should be working side by side, pooling their leverage to move forward normalization. But sadly, this is less and less the case recently.

Politics & Diplomacy The Balkans

New Atlanticist Jun 17, 2020

Why a Kosovo-Serbia White House deal could be dangerous

By Molly Montgomery

While the Trump administration and the EU have both flirted with the idea of territorial exchanges at times over the past three years, experts on both sides of the Atlantic fear the precedent such an agreement would set in a region where nationalists regularly demand secession or union with ethnic brethren. Even if Pandora’s box could be closed, the implementation of such an agreement would almost certainly result in de facto ethnic cleansing, heightened tensions, and the potential for renewed violence.

Politics & Diplomacy The Balkans

The post Here’s how a Kosovo-Serbia White House summit could produce progress appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The announcement of White House talks between two parties to a longstanding international dispute would typically be cause for celebration, particularly given the expectation that, if all goes as planned, such talks are usually followed by a Rose Garden ceremony sealing some sort of deal between the parties. The announcement this week that the White House will host Serbian President Aleskandar Vučić and Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi at the White House on June 27, however, has caused trepidation among many Western Balkans watchers, and rightfully so.

The reasons for skepticism of the planned talks are many. The talks usurp the longstanding EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which the EU intends to restart in the near future under the leadership of its new envoy for the region, former Slovakia Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák. That Washington and Brussels may soon be conducting parallel negotiations exemplifies the sad state of US-EU relations and the complete lack of transatlantic coordination, which has been a necessary ingredient for progress in the Western Balkans since the 1990s.

Worse yet, there appears to be little coordination between US Special Envoy Richard Grenell, former US ambassador to Germany, and US experts on or in the region. This has given rise to fears among many in Washington and the region that the Trump administration’s primary goal is the public spectacle of a Rose Garden ceremony, rather than a workable agreement that achieves normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia without inflaming tensions elsewhere in the region.

The rumored discussions of land swaps as part of such a deal (which Grenell continues to deny), only add to these concerns. While the Trump administration and the EU have both flirted with the idea of territorial exchanges at times over the past three years, experts on both sides of the Atlantic fear the precedent such an agreement would set in a region where nationalists regularly demand secession or union with ethnic brethren. Even if Pandora’s box could be closed, the implementation of such an agreement would almost certainly result in de facto ethnic cleansing, heightened tensions, and the potential for renewed violence. There is little evidence of any planning by the Trump administration on these complicated—yet crucial—implementation questions.

Perhaps to lower expectations, Grenell has promised that the parties will first discuss economic questions. If this is the case, with any luck there may be a positive outcome to the summit after all—a Balkan version of Chinese promises to buy more soybeans, the Rose Garden spectacle Trump and Grenell so desperately seek, and no lasting harm to the region’s stability. My fingers are crossed.

Molly Montgomery is a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution.

Read more on the June 27 summit:

New Atlanticist Jun 17, 2020

Don’t count on a White House Kosovo-Serbia breakthrough

By Dimitar Bechev

Setting expectations high would be ill-advised. For one, Vučić has no incentive to rush with recognizing Kosovo. Prishtina, meanwhile, will view the removal of tariffs on Serbia as having done its share, and will seek concessions. Europeans and Americans should be working side by side, pooling their leverage to move forward normalization. But sadly, this is less and less the case recently.

Politics & Diplomacy The Balkans

New Atlanticist Jun 17, 2020

Here’s how a Kosovo-Serbia White House summit could produce progress

By Damir Marusic

We don’t really know what the goal of the talks is. Most assume that anything short of a final status deal would be a failure, but that could be shortsighted: a smaller win may be possible, and could be significant.

Politics & Diplomacy The Balkans

The post Why a Kosovo-Serbia White House deal could be dangerous appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The surprise announcement of Serbia-Kosovo talks hosted by the White House on June 27 caught many off-guard,  with some even quipping that the high-profile meeting should have been scheduled for the following day, June 28. St. Vitus Day (Vidovdan) is remembered in Southeast Europe for the 1389 battle of Kosovo, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the passage of Yugoslavia’s first constitution in 1921, and, more recently, with the extradition of one Slobodan Milošević to The Hague. The Trump administration would, no doubt, be pleased to see itself similarly entering the region’s annals of history. They may have a shot at it, but there are good grounds for skepticism too.

The White House wants to see a deal that includes a recognition of Kosovo by Serbia. Washington doesn’t mind if Belgrade’s price is retaining a piece of the disputed land. A breakthrough in the Balkans would be a rare diplomatic achievement for an administration whose international record is less than stellar. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is looking for a deal too—though he would rather not talk about the recognition part. Same for President Hashim Thaçi who appears willing to trade the Serb-majority lands north of the Ibar River for Belgrade’s acceptance of Kosovo as a sovereign state. In addition, both leaders would be in position to claim a strong mandate by their constituents. Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and its allies are certain to emerge victorious in the general elections on June 21, which the main opposition groups will boycott. Thaçi, not without US support, prevailed over the former Prime Minister Albin Kurti, his rival and leader of the Vetënvendosje (Self-Reliance) movement opposed to surrendering territory to Serbia. As of June 3, a new coalition cabinet aligned with Thaçi has been confirmed with Abdullah Hoti at its head.  With both Belgrade and Prishtina falling in line, it was Special Envoy Richard Grenell’s turn to make the surprise White House invitation.

Yet setting expectations high would be ill-advised. For one, Vučić has no incentive to rush with recognizing Kosovo. The main benefit for Serbia to settle the dispute once and for all has to do with the EU, rather than currying favor with the United States or even cleaving away northern Kosovo, an enclave Belgrade controls informally anyhow. Membership in the EU is, at the end of the day, what could motivate Serbia to give up its sovereignty claim. Since accession is not an immediate prospect, it is unreasonable to expect more than the odd goodwill gesture. Like, for instance, putting on hold the campaign to convince various countries in Africa or Asia-Pacific to withdraw their recognition of Kosovo. But even that is not 100 percent certain. Vučić is expected in Moscow on June 24 where he is attending the Victory Parade. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Vučić’s main ally in the quest to deny Kosovo statehood, will probably tell him not to fold. The EU is weighing in too, with its Balkan Special Envoy Miroslav Lajčák already in the Balkans. Brussels opposes territorial swaps and will probably warn Vučić not to fall for the US initiative, which—in its view—undermines Europe’s long-standing effort at normalizing ties between Kosovo and Serbia.

This brings the discussion back to Prishtina. On June 6, the new government removed all tariffs slapped on Serbian goods, a move that paved the way to the Washington meeting. Having done its share, Kosovo will expect concessions from Serbia. If Thaçi’s people return empty handed, they are bound to face heat domestically. Kurti is calling for fresh elections which are likely to see Vetëvendosje triumphant once more, as in October 2019. Accommodating Vučić would only fan Albanian nationalism. The only external power who can make a positive difference at this point is the EU rather than the United States. Europe has been denying Kosovo visa-free travel despite the fact that it has met the technical criteria. Short of recognition, lifting the Schengen barrier to Kosovo citizens should be a substantial enough reward for Prishtina to keep all parties there committed to normalization. In an ideal world, Europeans and Americans should be working side by side, pooling their leverage to move forward normalization. But sadly, this is less and less the case recently.

Dimitar Bechev is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow him on Twitter @DimitarBechev.

Read more on the June 27 summit:

New Atlanticist Jun 17, 2020

Why a Kosovo-Serbia White House deal could be dangerous

By Molly Montgomery

While the Trump administration and the EU have both flirted with the idea of territorial exchanges at times over the past three years, experts on both sides of the Atlantic fear the precedent such an agreement would set in a region where nationalists regularly demand secession or union with ethnic brethren. Even if Pandora’s box could be closed, the implementation of such an agreement would almost certainly result in de facto ethnic cleansing, heightened tensions, and the potential for renewed violence.

Politics & Diplomacy The Balkans

New Atlanticist Jun 17, 2020

Here’s how a Kosovo-Serbia White House summit could produce progress

By Damir Marusic

We don’t really know what the goal of the talks is. Most assume that anything short of a final status deal would be a failure, but that could be shortsighted: a smaller win may be possible, and could be significant.

Politics & Diplomacy The Balkans

The post Don’t count on a White House Kosovo-Serbia breakthrough appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The architect of a united Europe, a reunited Germany, and Euro-Atlantic expansion to the East would have turned ninety on April 3. Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, like few others, changed the world with his vision and became an inspiration to others.

Germany’s reunification project broke through the isolation of twentieth century Europe and was a central piece in the fall of communism throughout the Eastern Bloc, which began to return to Europe.

As he sought to build international support for German reunification, Kohl positioned Germany close to the United States, whose leadership became decisive for reunification. “This friendship and this partnership with the United States is of existential importance to us Germans,” Kohl said during a visit to New York in June 1990. “There is no price that can buy it.”

Kohl knew that German reunification would have major ramifications for Europe and the world, and could not be done without sitting at the table with everyone—both supporters and opponents. Through his engagement, he managed to secure support, counter opposition, and dispel neighbors’ historical fears of a reunited Germany.

But this journey was by no means easy. Both the United Kingdom and France had serious reservations about German reunification. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand were worried about the outsized role a reunited Germany would have in Europe. Historical fears and geopolitical considerations on the old continent were difficult to overcome.

But in the United States, Germany had found an unwavering supporter of reunification. Kohl urged the United States to persuade London and Paris to support reunification, as failure to implement the project could blunt the geostrategic momentum for Europe and the West. Kohl, along with US President George H.W. Bush, understood that the status quo in Europe would either be broken through a peaceful reunification or through uncontrollable violence in the turbulent East. Bush and Kohl’s leadership helped overcome initial reluctance in Europe and on October 3, 1990, the reunification of Germany took place, born of the will of the German people from within and of decisive US support.

A reunified Germany has become an inspiration for the people of Kosovo who seek freedom and independence, even in the face of opponents in their region. But Kosovo’s leaders and the international community should heed several lessons from Germany’s example.

Lesson 1: Never undermine the strategic relationship with the United States

Despite ups and downs in their relationship since reunification, Germany has never directly confronted the United States. Chancellor Angela Merkel has disagreed with US President Donald J. Trump on many issues, but has never allowed these to directly threaten the strategic relationship, bilaterally and as embedded in the Atlantic alliance.

Our relations with the US are not only political, but, above all, they are emotional. The US is a synonym of Kosovo’s freedom, liberation and independence. Kosovo’s strategic relationship with the US gives it no space to strain its partnership with Washington, even if relations with Berlin or Brussels could be the cost. Nevertheless, it took the Government of Albin Kurti in Kosovo only fifty days to question this relationship when his government claimed that the United States is “sabotaging” Kosovo.

In one statement, Kurti overturned the essential principle of Kosovar foreign policy, established in 1989 by the pacifist movement of Rugova and the Kosovo Liberation Army, to maintain close and credible relations with the United States.

As it now appears that close relations with Washington are now up for political debate, supporters of close US-Kosovo ties should look to formalize tangible cooperation with the United States to protect this relationship.

Kosovo needs to learn from the history of reunified Germany. Even during times of deep disagreement, as in the lead-up to the second Gulf War, Germany has never called into question its strategic relationship with the United States, as Kurti’s statement makes it seem that Kosovo is doing now.

Kurti’s government lost a motion of no-confidence because of its failure to address Kosovo’s foreign policy challenges at a crucial time when the country must come together with our allies, not work against them. Kosovo has only one possible foreign policy orientation: the alliance with the United States and a partnership with Europe.

Our relations with the US will remain untouchable, regardless of who is sitting in the White House or who is raising the voice against the Kosovo-US relationship in Prishtina, Berlin, or the EU.

Lesson 2: Use geopolitical momentum

The history of German reunification shows how important it is to use geopolitical momentum to achieve goals and fulfil foreign policy visions. Former Chancellor Kohl created processes with clear predictability, allowing his political allies and his citizens to see the tangible effects of decisions and political positions.

Kosovo must understand that it lives in an ever-changing international environment where its strategic allies have to cope with their differences which will impact Kosovo’s standing. We must provide strategic reasoning to the US, EU, and its members to achieve consensus on Kosovo.

But Kosovo also has the historical trust in Washington that it can lead a way forward in the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia which would be finalized with a peace agreement that ensures full mutual diplomatic recognition.

Neither Kosovo nor the European Union can achieve this geopolitical momentum alone. In order to succeed in this strategic process for the Western Balkans, the  political weight anddiplomatic machinery of the United States is needed.

The Basic Treaty of 1972, which normalized relations between the two German states accepted a degree of ambiguity in their relationship, leaving controversial points open which were only resolved with eventual reunification of Germany 18 years later.

Any attempt to seek similar solutions in the case between Kosovo and Serbia would mean bringing back a solution that proved unsustainable for European security and the coexistence of states. This is why the United States has provided clarity and finality in their mission to end the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia.

The history between Kosovo and Serbia talks over the last decades shows that both countries need a final agreement that resolves the outstanding disputes. Interim solutions have shown that the status-quo is not sustainable and keeps both countries and the region in a limbo. In contrast to the Basic Treaty of 1972, Kosovo and Serbia need the agreement to end the current disputes and not an interim agreement that brings both countries to another negotiation process.

The goal is to ensure full mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia. President Trump has made clear to both Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić that this is the desired outcome of the dialogue for normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. President Trump has become the first world leader to seek this. This is what Kosovo wants too.

Like Kohl, Kosovo’s leaders must break the status quo through peaceful processes so that it is not disrupted by unknown scenarios uncontrolled by them and their allies. Like Kohl, Kosovo must sit down with all those who have different opinions from us to achieve its goal: to be a full member of NATO, the EU, and the United Nations.

Lesson 3: Merkel’s Germany must also learn from Kohl’s Germany

Germany has invested heavily in the process of Kosovo’s freedom, independence, state-building, and economic development. The people of Kosovo will forever be grateful to the country.

Historically, Kosovo has been a fault-line in relations between the West and Russia. Nowadays, Kosovo has turned into an arena for competition between the United States and the EU over who will lead the peace dialogue.

While the EU insists on a EU centric role, the United States has not explicitly excluded the Europeans from its process. The historical attachment to the United States means a majority in Kosovo want a US-led negotiation process.

Germany must join the United States to complete the key peace project of the Western Balkans, which will be crucial for peace and security in Europe. Using the Kosovo situation to squabble with Washington damages transatlantic relations and especially Kosovo, which is striving to become a valuable member of the international system.

The Trump administration is following the consistent line of all US presidents over Kosovo. President Bill Clinton led the West on Kosovo’s freedom. President George W. Bush led the West on ensuring Kosovo’s independence. Now the Trump administration seeks to make Kosovo an equal and full member of the international community and end the historical long dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. There has been a consistent bipartisan policy on Kosovo for the last thirty years. And that should remain the same.

Kosovo can only be helped when the United States and Germany act together. Any wavering of this alliance would be incredibly damaging to Kosovo and its people’s pursuit of freedom and peace.

Artan Behrami is a political advisor to the President of Kosovo. Previously he served as advisor and spokesperson to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was posted also as a diplomat at the Kosovo Embassy in DC. Views are his own. Twitter: @artanbehrami.

The post What German reunification can teach Kosovo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Imagine your country is trapped in a constitutional crisis. The government has just been toppled in a no-confidence vote. Parties in parliament are at loggerheads and unwilling to form a new coalition. The president insists on a cabinet of national unity. The largest parliamentary party, having been ousted from power, is loath to heed his call. Instead, its leader, the outgoing prime minister, calls for fresh legislative elections. It is the people who should have a say how to break the deadlock, he argues, not us politicians. Fair enough. Going back to the polls is how democracies handle such situations. Except that it happens at the time of COVID-19. Holding elections and breaking the lockdown measures might be risky. The president refuses to dissolve parliament and doubles down on effort to bring his own party, until now in opposition, to power and outmaneuver his rival who still occupies the prime minister’s seat until a new cabinet is cobbled together.

That story is real in Kosovo. Coronavirus has caused something of a perfect storm. The clash between Albin Kurti, the firebrand leader of Vetvendosje (Self-Determination), with President Hashim Thaçi is long-standing. Kurti backs an uncompromising approach to Serbia, as Belgrade continues to dispute Kosovo’s sovereignty. Thaçi, together with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, famously floated a plan for a land swap in exchange for Belgrade’s recognition of Kosovo.

The quarrel between the two Prishtina politicians threatens to cause tensions in transatlantic relations. The Trump administration is backing Thaçi. Europeans meanwhile thought Kurti, an advocate for clean government, should be given a chance. The French and the German ambassadors in Kosovo spoke out against the no-confidence vote. By contrast, their US colleague welcomed Kurti’s removal. Even if a national unity coalition does emerge, as Thaçi wishes, it is bound to be short-lived. In any case, it won’t have a strong mandate to negotiate on a compromise with Serbia, and therefore is unlikely deliver a deal the White House would be able to tout as a major foreign policy achievement.

Kosovo might be a special case but there is a common feature that applies to all its neighbors.  COVID-19 has put on hold elections in other Western Balkan countries too. North Macedonia was supposed to go to the polls on April 12 and Serbia on April 26.  On March 16, the two countries decided to postpone the elections. The manner in which that happened speaks volumes about the differences between the two post-Yugoslav republics. In North Macedonia, President Stevo Pendarovski gathered the leaders of the main political parties who then issued a joint decision. In Serbia, President Aleksandar Vučić essentially declared a state of emergency together with the prime minister and the parliament’s speaker, who come from his own party. In Skopje, the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM) and the main opposition force, VMRO-DPMNE,  both participate in a technical government tasked with organizing the elections. In Belgrade, power is concentrated in the hands of the president with the cabinet rubber stamping his policies, despite the constitutional provisions. North Macedonia has a fairly competitive political system, though split into an ethnic Macedonians and Albanian bloc. Serbia looks more and more like a one-man show. As in next-door Hungary, where Prime Minister Viktor Orban has taken the opportunity to introduce rule by decree, COVID-19 is playing into the hands of Vučić, tightening his grip on power.  The worst part is that elections would not have made a great deal of difference since the Serbian opposition were already planning on boycotting.

The crisis around the coronavirus has also put focus on the Western Balkans’ place in the soft power competition between the EU and China. Central Belgrade now sports billboards thanking “Brother Xi” for the assistance Beijing has sent Serbia—the message paid for by a tabloid aligned with Vučić.  “European solidarity does not exist. That was a fairytale on paper,” the president himself lamented. “These are the same people who have asked us to fix our tender procedures to exclude the Chinese so that EU companies would get Serbian money. Now our Serbian money is no longer good enough for them.” Such rhetoric tapping in on anti-Western sentiment goes a long way in boosting Vučić s popularity. It also seeks to undermine and silence his critics who typically see the EU as an ally in the fight against authoritarianism and high-level corruption in Serbia. In reality, the Serbian leadership is set to gain from EU integration, including substantial financial assistance, while flirting with the likes of Russia and, increasingly China.

COVID-19 overshadowed two major developments in the region: the EU decision to open membership talks with North Macedonia and Albania, as well as North Macedonia’s formal accession to NATO on March 27.  In normal circumstances, this would have been huge news. Yet now the pandemic leaves little bandwidth for other matters, even in the Western Balkans.

NATO membership and EU accession talks should have boosted North Macedonia’s former Prime Minister Zoran Zaev in the forthcoming elections. Regaining power would be the ultimate political payoff for the Prespa Agreement of June 2018, settling the name dispute with Greece and scoring a victory for both Europe and the United States. But as time goes on and as elections are deferred until an unspecified date, such an outcome becomes more and more uncertain.

Dimitar Bechev is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow him on Twitter @DimitarBechev.

Further reading:

New Atlanticist Apr 3, 2020

Can coronavirus achieve elusive unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

By Semir Dzebo and Shelby Magid

Their initial response to the COVID-19 outbreak shows that even the staunchest opponents of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s unity are capable of working within its institutions and putting the public interest before their ethno-political ambitions. Now they only need to be willing to do so outside of the threat of a global pandemic.

Coronavirus Politics & Diplomacy

New Atlanticist Apr 2, 2020

Forging the Four Freedoms Initiative for prosperity and peace in the Balkans

By Marko Čadež

To demonstrate their readiness to fulfill the responsibilities associated with full-fledged membership in the world’s largest common market, the countries of the region launched the Western Balkans Four Freedoms Initiative to bring down barriers to intra-regional trade, travel, and labor movement. While not identical to Roosevelt’s plans, this project seeks to ensure the same outcome of peace and prosperity through liberty, opportunity, and growth.

International Markets Macroeconomics

New Atlanticist Mar 26, 2020

EU greenlights North Macedonia and Albania membership talks: Breakthrough or symbolic gesture?

By Jörn Fleck

“The decision by the EU foreign ministers to open accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania comes at a time when Europe is battling a major public health crisis and is bracing for its economic aftershocks,” Dimitar Bechev says. “Keeping enlargement alive speaks volumes about the union’s ability to muddle through.”

Democratic Transitions European Union

The post COVID-19 in the Western Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since its emergence in December 2019, the spread of COVID-19 has overwhelmed health systems, damaged economies, and provided opportunistic politicians a chance to exploit the crisis to solidify political control. Following suit with governments around the world, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s prime minister and its two entities, the predominantly Bosniak and Croat populated Federation and the majority Serb Republika Srpska (RS), declared a state of disaster on March 17. Surprisingly, politicians from across the country—even secessionist advocate and Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik—are rallying around a message of unity to defeat a common enemy: the novel coronavirus.

Throughout this pandemic, the ability of the often gridlocked and competing state institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to implement a mostly uniform strategy has surprised its citizens, who are long accustomed to political disunity. In a startling pivot just one month after his recent “Goodbye BiH, welcome RS-Exit” statement, Dodik himself pressed for a united effort to combat the looming threat to public health. He called upon the armed forces to strengthen national borders and help establish quarantine tents for those coming into the country. Politicians from all of BiH’s “three constituent peoples” put aside their own ethno-political grudges and affiliations, as this proposal garnered immediatesupport from the other two members of the presidency.

Dodik’s unified messaging came only a week after he refused to consent to positioning troops on the border with Serbia to prevent the potential influx of migrants, opposing any sort of action that would “strengthen” the border between BiH and Serbia. Moreover, Dodik’s new call for the army to police the borders flies in the face of his previous opposition to the very creation of the unified Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The vast majority of BiH citizens, however, approved of his initiative and decisions regarding COVID-19. In a rare joint address to the public, the tripartite presidency emphasized the necessity for a joint effort in combating the pandemic and called upon citizens to trust the country’s institutions.

Such a shift in rhetoric and action is certainly unusual in the Bosnian context, but it may be evidence of a positive trend among varied responses to disasters. In their recent coronavirus focused report, Crisis Group notes that “economic, social, and political factors may converge to spark or aggravate crises,” but it is not “guaranteed that the pandemic’s consequences will be entirely or uniformly negative for peace and security. Natural disasters have sometimes resulted in the diminution of conflicts, as rival parties have had to work together, or at least maintain calm, to focus on preserving and rebuilding their societies.” For Bosnia, a crisis as far reaching and serious as COVID-19 may prove to be just enough of a force to bring a divided government together at a time when it is most needed.

How has the novel coronavirus managed to do the seemingly impossible and unite BiH’s political elite? For once, the crisis is external rather than manufactured by the elites themselves. Whether it is Bosnian Serbs talking about secession, Bosniaks desiring a more centralized state, or the Bosnian Croats aspiring for the creation of a third political entity, BiH elites tend to create a vicious cycle that increases inter-ethnic mistrust and keeps them in power. But the novel coronavirus pandemic knows no borders and recognizes no ethnic or class divisions, nor can it be stopped via a mutual agreement among just elites. Political leaders have been forced to acknowledge that the only way to implement the necessary measures to curtail the spread of the virus is through the institutions of the state, which necessitates joint decision making.

This moment could be short-lived. Deep divisions remain and could spark old flames of ethno-political tensions, as reflected in some of the coronavirus measures. Residents currently face different treatment when entering the country, depending on whether they reside in Republika Srpska or the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). While those living in RS would have to stay in tents as part of the quarantine camps located at land border posts, those from FBiH are allowed to go home and self-isolate. RS was also quicker to impose a curfew and Dodik voiced some of his frustrations over what he perceived as a lack of seriousness on the part of FBiH, which he criticized as slow in making important decisions relating to the containment.

Both US President Donald J. Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron proclaimed their countries to be “at war” with the coronavirus, as their citizens are forced to adopt measures that disrupt their daily lives. No such declaration was necessary in Bosnia and Herzegovina; setting up of crisis committees, curfews, and restrictions on visiting family members is familiar for anyone who was alive during the war in the 1990s. If quarantining entities, cantons, and cities is eventually required, many will fear that this will be used as precedent for harder control of the country’s “invisible” internal borders, even after the crisis ends.

On the other hand, this pandemic is also an opportunity to come together and realize how mutually dependent the people of BiH are. Since neighboring countries have closed their borders, this could also be an opportunity for both citizens and politicians to realize that the virus does not consider whether one is Bosniak, Croat, or Serb, and cooperation is the prerequisite for successful containment, as well as the functioning of the country more broadly. Their initial response to the COVID-19 outbreak shows that even the staunchest opponents of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s unity are capable of working within its institutions and putting the public interest before their ethno-political ambitions. Now they only need to be willing to do so outside of the threat of a global pandemic.

Semir Dzebo is a doctoral candidate at the Department of International Relations at Central European University.

Shelby Magid is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading:

New Atlanticist Apr 2, 2020

Forging the Four Freedoms Initiative for prosperity and peace in the Balkans

By Marko Čadež

To demonstrate their readiness to fulfill the responsibilities associated with full-fledged membership in the world’s largest common market, the countries of the region launched the Western Balkans Four Freedoms Initiative to bring down barriers to intra-regional trade, travel, and labor movement. While not identical to Roosevelt’s plans, this project seeks to ensure the same outcome of peace and prosperity through liberty, opportunity, and growth.

International Markets Macroeconomics

New Atlanticist Mar 25, 2020

Is China winning the coronavirus response narrative in the EU?

By Atlantic Council

With European countries still in the midst of the crisis or anxiously waiting to be hit, it is too soon to tell which narrative will win out in Europe—that of a generous China, whose systems managed to combat the virus, or that of an authoritarian regime, whose initial efforts to cover up the extent of the crisis cost the world valuable preparation time.

China Coronavirus

New Atlanticist Mar 26, 2020

EU greenlights North Macedonia and Albania membership talks: Breakthrough or symbolic gesture?

By Jörn Fleck

“The decision by the EU foreign ministers to open accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania comes at a time when Europe is battling a major public health crisis and is bracing for its economic aftershocks,” Dimitar Bechev says. “Keeping enlargement alive speaks volumes about the union’s ability to muddle through.”

Democratic Transitions European Union

The post Can coronavirus achieve elusive unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As World War II raged in Europe and Asia, former US President Franklin D. Roosevelt used his now famous 1941 State of the Union address to describe the “Four Freedoms” Americans should expect from their political and economic system: the freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.

He argued that American society should provide “equality of opportunity for youth and others; jobs for those who can work; security for those who need it; the ending of special privilege for the few; the preservation of civil liberties for all; the enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a wider and constantly rising standard of living.”

Almost eighty years after Roosevelt proposed his Four Freedoms, leaders in the Western Balkans have initiated their own “new deal” for the region’s economic integration: a Western Balkans Four Freedoms Initiative, which aims to satisfy the same universal rights and accelerate the region’s accession to the European Union (EU).

In the 1990s, the former Yugoslavia collapsed in a series of tragic conflicts that involved almost every country in the Western Balkans in one way or another. Twenty years later, the countries of the Western Balkans have come to a joint position that regional economic integration can help them more effectively meet their citizens’ demands and expectations for better living standards, as well as meet the collective desire of all countries in the Western Balkans to join the EU.

To demonstrate their readiness to fulfill the responsibilities associated with full-fledged membership in the world’s largest common market, the countries of the region launched the Western Balkans Four Freedoms Initiative to bring down barriers to intra-regional trade, travel, and labor movement. While not identical to Roosevelt’s plans, this project seeks to ensure the same outcome of peace and prosperity through liberty, opportunity, and growth.

The initiative was launched in October 2019 as a common platform for three Western Balkans countries—Albania, Serbia, and North Macedonia—to expand the free movement of people, goods, capital, and services. The remaining countries of the Western Balkans region—Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo—have been invited to join, which is vital for the project to be truly successful.

The region’s chambers of commerce, representing 350,000 companies throughout the Western Balkans, have been advocating and promoting a regional economic integration framework for years. In 2017, the chambers of commerce established the Western Balkans 6 Chamber Investment Forum, bringing together all six chambers of commerce and creating a platform to speak on behalf of the region’s business community with one voice.

Each individual economy in the region is too small to succeed on its own in a highly competitive global market—Serbia, the largest market, is only 7 million people. Improving collaboration and forging partnerships within the region and in third markets will result in growth, improved rule of law, more responsive governmental institutions, and greater transparency. It will simultaneously help the countries of the region fulfill the EU’s formal accession criteria, especially regarding good-neighborly relations, and position the Western Balkans as one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic areas of the world.

All the countries of the Western Balkans face virtually the same challenges. They must improve education, advance health reform, boost employment, reverse the brain drain, and develop basic infrastructure. These shared challenges require shared solutions that can only be applied successfully if the entire region acts in unison. While a number of disputes persist in the Western Balkans, namely the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue and the internal tensions within Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is nonetheless far more that connects us in the region than which sets us apart.

The creation of a common market will amplify and expand these connections, commonalities, and shared interests. But for this common market to be successful in the global economy, direct investment is needed by both large multinational companies, as well as regional and domestic actors. Moreover, in addition to improving the business climate, it will be necessary for the Western Balkans common market to strategically approach the development of economies of scale by raising the quality of production capacities and human capital within individual economies.

The business communities in the Western Balkans are collaborating to forge a de facto covenant with political leaders about sharing responsibility for the future of the region and the delivery of tangible results to improve the lives of citizens. But the Western Balkans economic integration process cannot fully succeed and maximize its potential based solely on the support of local governments and business leaders. Rather, the international community, led by the United States and the EU, must provide political, economic, technical, and general support to the Four Freedoms Initiative that complements other numerous efforts in the region, mainly led by the EU or EU-funded institutions.

The Four Freedoms Initiative showcases the maturity of political leaders in the Western Balkans and their ability to rise above the national level and create policies that will advance the wellbeing of their citizens. If pursued in an inclusive way to encompass the entire region, and if supported by the United States and the EU, this initiative will help cement long-lasting prosperity and peace in the Western Balkans.

As Roosevelt concluded in his Four Freedoms speech: “Our strength is in our unity of purpose,” and this unity of purpose is what will enable peace and prosperity for the nations of the Western Balkans.

Marko Čadež is president of the Western Balkans 6 Chamber Investment Forum, which represents the chambers of commerce and industry from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

Further reading:

New Atlanticist Mar 26, 2020

EU greenlights North Macedonia and Albania membership talks: Breakthrough or symbolic gesture?

By Jörn Fleck

“The decision by the EU foreign ministers to open accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania comes at a time when Europe is battling a major public health crisis and is bracing for its economic aftershocks,” Dimitar Bechev says. “Keeping enlargement alive speaks volumes about the union’s ability to muddle through.”

Democratic Transitions European Union

New Atlanticist Feb 5, 2020

Albania still committed to EU membership, PM says

By David A. Wemer

Despite continued delays in the opening of accession negotiations with the European Union, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama said that his country remains committed to pursuing EU membership because “there is no alternative.” Speaking at the Atlantic Council on February 5, Rama reported that Albania is continuing with its planned reforms as European leaders debate the proper time to begin the membership process for Albania and its neighbor North Macedonia. “We are not sitting and crying,” Rama said. Albania is “not waiting for some miracle to happen.”

Democratic Transitions European Union

New Atlanticist Jul 22, 2019

Macron’s Belgrade pivot

By Petrit Selimi

Macron’s trip may yet be remembered as a turning point for French involvement in the Balkans. The payoff could be big for France, but it must first decide if it is willing to prove that the Balkans truly belong in Europe.

France The Balkans

The post Forging the Four Freedoms Initiative for prosperity and peace in the Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

EU foreign ministers greenlighted the launch of accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania during a meeting by videoconference on March 24. European officials heralded the decision as a sign that the EU is still able to take strategic decisions, even in times of crisis such as the current coronavirus outbreak.

The much-awaited decision for North Macedonia and Albania comes almost half a year after France, supported by the Netherlands and Denmark, blocked the opening of negotiations at the October 2019 European summit out of a concern for the ability of the EU to absorb new members and what critics saw as the need to reform the enlargement process. The veto triggered a debate about the blow last year’s decision may have dealt to the EU’s credibility in the Western Balkans, the opening it may have created in the region for other geopolitical competitors, and the future of the enlargement process. At the same time, the European Commission and member states moved quickly to overhaul the rules for the Union’s enlargement process and break the deadlock.

The March 24 decision by the foreign ministers sets no specific date for the start of accession talks. It places additional conditions on Albania with regard to the rule of law and anti-corruption measures, which Tirana must meet before negotiations can begin. The decision also still must be approved formally by the EU heads of state and is widely expected to be rubberstamped, even if this formality may be delayed at this week’s European Summit because of an all-consuming focus on COVID-19 crisis management.

The New Atlanticist asked Atlantic Council experts and friends about the EU’s new enlargement negotiations and what impact they may have on North Macedonia and Albania, and the quest for accession in the Western Balkans:

Daniel Fried, Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Future Europe Initiative:

“Amid general coronavirus pessimism (and related fretting over presumed EU dysfunctionality) comes good news: on March 24, the EU’s General Affairs Council [GAC] ministers “gave their political agreement to the opening of accession negotiations” with North Macedonia and Albania. Last October, when French President Emmanuel Macron (joined by the Dutch) blocked accession negotiations, critics charged France (and Europe by extension) with slamming the EU’s door in the face of countries that believed in the EU, effectively ending EU enlargement. This blow came after North Macedonia had made a courageous decision to change its name, ending a bitter bilateral dispute with Greece, partly on the promise that what it lost in nationalist pride, it would gain from a European future. Some critics saw last fall’s blockage of talks as another sign of an inward-looking, selfish Europe, part of a baleful trend of nativism throughout the transatlantic world.”

“Not so fast, as it turns out.”

“Macron asserted at the time that he was not putting a hard stop on EU enlargement but strengthening conditionality, concerned about backsliding among candidate (or newly-admitted) members. Skeptics dismissed this rationale but he seems to have meant it. After months of careful work, a deal got worked out: EU enlargement will be based on “rigorous positive and negative conditionality, and reversibility” (French demands) and “tackling the phenomenon of unfounded asylum applications and ensuring repatriations” (a Dutch concern, especially with respect to Albania), according the GAC draft.”

“The EU can be messy, like any democratic political structure. But it still works. The enlargement decision vindicates Macedonian and Albanian perseverance and the champions of enlargement within the EU who worked out the deal. Enlargement remains for the future, but good steps are what are needed to get there. This was one.”

Dimitar Bechev, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center:

“The decision by the EU foreign ministers to open accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania is welcome news. It comes at a time when Europe is battling a major public health crisis and is bracing for its economic aftershocks. Keeping enlargement alive speaks volumes about the union’s ability to muddle through. One is reminded of Montenegro, which launched its membership negotiations in June 2012 as the eurozone was hovering on the edge. But the two Western Balkan countries are at the start of a long journey. North Macedonia, which the European Commission deemed prepared to begin talks as early as 2009, would be lucky to make it into the EU before the end of the current decade. Albania, who won’t be given an actual start date this year, would probably take even longer.”

“The destination Skopje and Tirana are heading to remains unclear. They will likely be admitted to an outer circle of a differentiated EU. Integration will no doubt deliver economic benefits but the jury is out whether it could bring about profound political changes. French President Emmanuel Macron is rightfully insisting on a more rigorous approach in the negotiations and the European Commission’s new methodology could give Brussels’ more clout. But ultimately domestic dynamics in North Macedonia and Albania will play a decisive part.”

“The news, coming shortly after North Macedonia’s de facto acceptance into NATO, is positive for the entire Western Balkans. But let’s not get carried away. The EU is still at a loss on how to handle the two difficult cases, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Relations with Serbia, the largest state in the region negotiating its accession since 2014, are not in perfect shape as the authoritarian-minded President Aleksandar Vučić flirts with Russia, and increasingly with China. A decade ago it looked as if the EU would be the only game in town for the Balkans. This is less the case at present.”

Judy Ansley, senior advisor with the Atlantic Council’s Future Europe Initiative:

“This is a long overdue but very welcome decision by the EU—a decision that recognizes and rewards the significant progress both countries have made in implementing reforms and resolving conflicts to advance toward integration with the EU. In particular, former Prime Minister Zoran Zaev’s courageous stance in concluding the Prespa Agreement to resolve the long-simmering conflict with Greece should have been recognized by the EU in October with the opening of accession talks. The EU’s failure last fall led many in the region—and beyond—to question whether there was a viable path forward for EU expansion. The EU’s recent decision sends a strong message to all nations of the Western Balkans that the path to EU membership is open, and that their future lies with the West. It is now up to them to make the needed reforms.”

Valeska Esch, program director for Europe with the Aspen Institute Germany:

“EU member states reaching a consensus on starting accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia is a good and long overdue step for both the EU and the Western Balkans. With this decision, the EU has finally demonstrated that it still takes the membership perspective for the Western Balkan countries seriously and rewards reform efforts. This is an important signal for Western Balkan countries and the credibility of their perspectives, and a reaffirmation of the conditionality approach of the accession process. This week’s decision, however, can only be a first step in re-engaging in the region more actively.”

“The EU needs to continue its support for reforms across the region, make use of the revised methodology, closely monitor and strictly assess developments in all countries, reward progress and respond to lack thereof firmly. The spiral of stagnating reforms and backsliding without firm responses by the EU has to end to strengthen the credibility of the process on both sides. This includes the need to finally agree to the long overdue visa liberalization for Kosovo’s citizens.”

“Finally, the EU needs to become engaged again in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. The nomination of Miroslav Lajcak as Special Envoy is a step in the right direction. Now it is up to him to engage with local actors and restart the dialogue, not only between presidents, as was done so far, but with governments, as required by the Kosovar constitution, and societies. To achieve a lasting solution, society-wide agreement in both countries as well as close coordination with EU member states and the United States will be required. Transatlantic cooperation will be essential in finding a sustainable solution to this conflict.”

Olivier-Rémy Bel, visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council:

“March 24’s accession go-ahead by EU foreign ministers, given remotely of course, is a major step for the two countries, North Macedonia and Albania that have worked hard to reach this point.”

“Yet it also reflects well on the EU, further showcasing the nimbleness that it has displayed on other issues such as defense. In mid-October, commentators were alarmed following France’s position in the Council. By December, a productive dialogue was underway between the Commission and member states, which resulted in a new methodology, largely inspired by the French December non-paper, being presented in February. In five months, in the middle of a leadership transition (and a coronavirus outbreak), the EU was able to have a hard and productive look at a highly political issue and come up with a compromise. It was able to challenge a process that had become too administrative and made it more political. The coming years of negotiations will tell us how deep a reform this is but, if anything, Europe’s ability to work rapidly and competently through the sequence should be put to its credit.”

“For North Macedonia and Albania, much lies ahead. The recently adopted Council conclusions place further preconditions on Albania, notably relating to electoral reform, the rule of law, and fighting corruption. Now the Commission needs to present a framework for negotiations before the intergovernmental conference can take place. Talks will likely last years and, if the new methodology is being applied, backsliding will mean delaying further potential accession. Sustaining domestic political momentum will be key—though the new process, which frontloads some of the benefits, might help. Yet candidate countries would also be wise to use this time to canvass the public opinions of member state. Complementing the too often heard defensive narrative—e.g. countering Russia and China or controlling migration—with a positive case detailing what they are bringing to the European Union would serve them well down the road.”

Damir Marusic, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Future Europe Initiative:

“The news that the EU is opening accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania is of course welcome. Signs of normalcy are hard to come by these days, and nothing is more normal than the sight of Brussels committing itself to a process—enlargement—that has in many ways defined the EU since the end of the Cold War.”

“But like with so much happening today, we should not be seduced by the sight of something familiar into concluding that we are back to “normal.” Before the coronavirus upended everything, French President Emmanuel Macron rattled the European establishment by blocking the opening of talks and demanding a more “political” protocol for enlargement—a euphemism of sorts for what amounts to full reversibility of the process—be adopted in exchange for lifting his veto. Macron got everything he wanted and green-lighted accession earlier this year. The end result, however, is that the opening of accession talks, largely a symbolic gesture anyway given how countries like Turkey and Serbia have been caught in limbo for years, has had even its meager symbolism degraded.”

“On the merits, North Macedonia has been ready for years to start, and given its recent reforms by all rights deserves a shot at being in the club as much as neighboring Bulgaria. Given how small a country it is, perhaps it could even sneak through before the decade is out. Albania, however, faces a much steeper climb, and underscores how little this week’s milestone actually means. The Dutch, who were most opposed to even starting the process with the Albanians given concerns about organized crime, were mollified by assurances that the revised protocol all but assures Albania will be kept out. Even the announced opening of the process with Albania has several preconditions attached.”

“Since Macron’s veto, there has been a lot of discussion about what alternatives to enlargement in Europe’s periphery could look like. It’s high time some of these visions be fully fleshed out and institutionalized. A “European” future remains inevitable for the Western Balkans by sheer force of geography alone. But with full membership increasingly a non-credible prospect, the EU needs to spell out the benefits close integration with the core will bring. With China and Russia already deeply engaged in the region, it fails to do so at its own peril.”

Molly Montgomery, vice president at the Europe practice of the Albright Stonebridge Group:

“Albania and North Macedonia’s opening of EU accession talks—and North Macedonia’s imminent NATO membership—are indisputably positive steps toward fulfilling the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Western Balkans. However, the EU’s delay in approving this step, and the competing visions for the body’s future that it revealed among member states, have caused many in the region to question whether the European project remains alive for them. Other factors, such as a perceived lack of solidarity between EU member states and aspirant countries in the face of the coronavirus pandemic, have further damaged the EU’s credibility with publics in the region.”

“In a February 18 speech, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Oliver Varhelyi said the Commission’s top priority must be to win back the trust and confidence of both member states and aspirant countries in the enlargement process. This is the right approach. However, the world looks different now than it did then, and the mileposts he outlined—beginning accession negotiations by the Zagreb summit planned for May and launching there an economic and investment plan for the region—will almost certainly slide further into the future. However, the EU cannot afford to let the Western Balkans slip to the bottom of its agenda for long without risking a permanent loss of confidence and credibility, which would only be detrimental to its own security and prosperity and that of the region.”

Jörn Fleck is an associate director in the Atlantic Council’s Future Europe Initiative.

Further reading:

New Atlanticist Feb 10, 2020

Will the Commission’s new EU proposal revive Western Balkans enlargement?

By David A. Wemer

“For a region whose politics, both domestic and foreign, have been shaped by the promise of EU membership in almost every way since the 1990s, the coming months and years will prove trying,” Damir Marusic says.

Democratic Transitions European Union

New Atlanticist Nov 22, 2019

Evaluating Macron’s pitch for enlargement reform

By David A. Wemer

French officials hope the proposal can open the door to a real debate over how the European Union adds new members, while also limiting the political blowback for the Western Balkan countries

Democratic Transitions European Union

New Atlanticist Oct 30, 2019

By blocking enlargement decision, Macron undercuts France’s Balkan goals

By Loic Tregoures

By strongly supporting the government of North Macedonia from the start and granting it the opening of negotiations, it would have been possible to create a virtuous circle in the region and kill four birds with one stone. President Macron chose to do exactly the opposite.

European Union France