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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

This forced cancellation is the latest in a series of very public humiliations for Putin, who is struggling to maintain his authority as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel. The March 2023 ICC decision to charge him with war crimes dealt a powerful blow to Putin’s standing at a time when unprecedented sanctions and revelations of Russian atrocities in Ukraine had already made him a toxic figure. Weeks later, he was forced to cancel traditional Victory Day parades in cities across Russia amid rumors of shortages in both troops and tanks due to heavy losses in Ukraine.

Putin’s most humiliating moment came in late June, when units of Russia’s state-funded paramilitary Wagner Group staged a mutiny and briefly threatened to seize control of the country. The Wagner uprising ended as suddenly as it had begun, but not before mutinous troops had captured one of Russia’s largest cities without a fight and marched virtually unopposed to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. The mutiny exposed the fragility of the current regime and the lack of popular support for Putin himself; while crowds of ordinary Russians flocked to cheer Wagner rebels, nobody rallied to defend the country’s current ruler.

The Wagner episode may have played a role in this week’s decision to miss the forthcoming summit in South Africa. With Putin looking weaker than at any point in his 23-year reign, there is widespread speculation that it is only a matter of time before he faces fresh domestic challenges. Coups are often staged when dictators leave the security of their capitals and few in Moscow will have forgotten the failed KGB coup of 1991, which took place in August while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in Crimea.

The Kremlin’s inability to find a way for Putin to attend next month’s BRICS summit in South Africa is a clear indication of Russia’s declining influence on the global stage. Ten years ago, Putin was a respected statesman and the leader of a G8 nation. Today, he must plan his international travel based on the likelihood of being arrested for war crimes. Commenting on Putin’s canceled South Africa visit, US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said there was “no better illustration” of Russia’s vastly diminished standing in the world. “President Putin can hardly leave his own borders now,” he noted. “He’s an international pariah who can barely leave his own borders for fear of arrest.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 20, Markus Garlauskas was quoted in USA Today on US soldier Travis King who was detained by North Korea after fleeing across the border from US military law enforcement authorities. On July 18, Garlauskas explained in an article for The Hill that “Unfortunately, U.S. citizens detained in North Korea are typically used by the Kim regime as bargaining chips.”

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

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Charai in the National Interest: Israel is Not a Racist State

cmcgoldrick — Thu, 20 Jul 2023 18:28:46 +0000

Original Source

Representative Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), who chairs the Congressional Progressive Caucus, called Israel a “racist state,” touching off a controversy about America’s views toward the world’s only Jewish state.

Comparing Israel to Apartheid South Africa, a now well-worn cliché, ignores the reality that is visible to anyone who stands on an Israeli sidewalk.

Ahmed Charai, 2023

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies, a board of trustees member of International Crisis Group, and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and Global Board of Advisors at The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security in Jerusalem.

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The Islamic Republic exported its revolution to my country, Yemen. The international community must do more to stop this.

Moammar Al-Eryani — Thu, 20 Jul 2023 14:12:34 +0000

Editor’s note: This article was updated on July 21, 2023

On July 5, US Central Command declared that it thwarted an Iranian attempt to seize Bahamas and Marshall Islands-flagged oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz. A day later, the US Fifth Fleet announced that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Navy (IRGC-N) had seized a merchant vessel in international waters near the Gulf and that the US Navy had deployed ships to monitor the situation closely.

These recent piracy incidents by the IRGC-N in international waters are not the first. Since 2021, Iran has targeted twenty commercial vessels in continuation of the deep-rooted terrorism it has been practicing since the 1979 revolution, which brought about the Islamic Republic by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, including through its proxies in the region.

The escalation came months after the March 1 announcement that the Saudi and Iranian sides had reached—an agreement sponsored by China—to restore diplomatic relations between them within two months after a seven-year break. (Ties had ceased when mobs stormed Saudi missions in Mashhad and Tehran after the execution of Saudi Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr.) This was part of relentless efforts and endeavors made by the leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to settle crises, heal the rift, solve outstanding problems between the countries of the region, curb interference in the affairs of Arab countries, and establish healthy relations based on the principle of non-interference, respect for national sovereignty, and the exchange of common interests. The moment was considered an opportunity for the Iranian regime to review its malign behavior, respect the principles of the United Nations Charter and international laws and treaties, and refrain from sponsoring its Shia militias and using them to implement its destructive policies.

However, since the agreement’s signing, the Islamic Republic’s conduct remains unchanged, with ongoing support for militias that spread chaos, terrorism, and threaten international interests. Tehran’s actions pose a persistent danger not just to the region but the international community, as it seeks to alter the region’s political, cultural, and ideological balance through force. Iran is determined to export its revolutionary model, also known as the “Khomeinist revolution,” which was named after Khomeini. It does so by expanding its geographic and cultural influence through support to Shia militias like the Houthis in Yemen to consolidate its power internally and externally.

The Islamic Republic, which spends generously on militias loyal to it and finances all their malign activities, not only provides them with weapons and money but also provides training and combat tactics. Tehran considers its militias, including the Houthis, closer to it than the average Iranian citizen who does not believe in its ideology. Herein lies the danger: the Islamic Republic works to undermine the stability and independence of regional states in exchange for empowering its militias, even if that means doing so on the ruin and destruction it has caused. This is no more evident than in Yemen, where the world’s most humanitarian crisis is exacerbating, and one of the most complex and bloody conflicts in the world is taking place.

In Yemen, the people are still paying the price for the Iranian regime’s policy: its expansionist ambitions and blatant interference in Yemen’s internal affairs, which reached its climax with the Houthi militia’s coup against the state in 2014 (aided by Iranian support, financing, and planning).

Iran continues to play a major role in the continued smuggling of weapons and drugs to the Houthis in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216, disrupting initiatives and efforts made by neighboring countries—led by Saudia Arabia—and the international community to de-escalate and restore the UN-sponsored truce, and standing as a stumbling block to efforts to end the war and bring about a comprehensive, just, and sustainable peace. Additionally, Iran disregards the heavy bill of losses and the complex economic and humanitarian conditions that Yemenis are experiencing due to the war triggered by the coup.

Indeed, the Yemeni experience of Iranian influence since the emergence of the Houthis as an armed militia in 2003, which is supported directly by Iran, is strong evidence of the damage wrought by four decades of Iranian expansionist policies and hegemonic ambitions in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and now Yemen.

Anyone who has visited Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, before it fell into the hands of the Houthis and pays a visit today will understand the meaning of exporting the Iranian revolution. Today, the capital displays billboards of pictures of Iranian religious and military leaders, including the IRGC—a US-designated terrorist organization—such as the late Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the late deputy of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq (both were assassinated in a US drone strike in Baghdad in 2020).

Furthermore, while preparations are being made for the closure of the Yali Institute, which specializes in teaching English, Persian language education is being taught in universities and institutes, and some children have even learned to sing Persian language songs. To add insult to injury, Houthis have canceled the commemoration of national events and celebrations and replaced them with sectarian occasions, such as Shia mourning ceremonies (ex. Ashura) imported from Iran.

With that in mind, the international community, led by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, should not stand by and allow the malign behavior of the Iranian regime to go unchecked. The international community must start by designating the Houthis as a terrorist organization and sanctioning Iran for sending arms and support to the group. The international community must also support Yemeni coast guards, improve their capacity to protect Yemeni waters, and integrate them into multi-country maritime missions to protect international waters near Yemen. As talks reportedly continue to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, it is integral that Western negotiators tie the negotiations to stopping Iran’s interference in Yemen.

It is time for the international community to move decisively to carry out their legal responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security. This must be done to confront the threat posed by Tehran and its militias—foremost the Houthis—and the systematic terrorism that it practices, for which countries and peoples of the region pay a heavy toll.

Moammar Al-Eryani is the Minister of Information, Culture, and Tourism of the Republic of Yemen.

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An eight-year diplomatic lull is over. So what did EU and Latin American and Caribbean leaders achieve?

Jason Marczak, Jörn Fleck — Wed, 19 Jul 2023 19:31:26 +0000

Breaking an eight-year dry spell in meeting, more than fifty world leaders and top ministers from Europe and Latin America descended on Brussels in force this week. The purpose: to advance new European Union (EU) outreach toward Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). That was certainly achieved. But also on display was the contrast between how Europe seeks to interact with the region in comparison with the United States.

The EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit was a top priority of the Spanish government, which holds the rotating EU Council presidency. Spain met its objectives with representation from the EU’s twenty-seven member states and the thirty-three CELAC members. But it wasn’t just any representation. LAC countries sent twenty-three presidents and prime ministers to Brussels—the same number of heads of state and government who attended last year’s US-hosted Summit of the Americas, with one big difference: While Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela joined their cohorts in Belgium, none received an invitation to Los Angeles.

The tone of the summit was set at the EU-LAC Business Round Table that took place immediately preceding the leaders’ meeting. Speaking to an overflow audience, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen opened the gathering in the Berlaymont Building, the Commission’s headquarters, with an emphatic message: “Latin America and the Caribbean and Europe need each other more than ever before.” She then went on to reinforce that “Europe aspires to be a partner of choice for Latin America and the Caribbean,” while announcing more than forty-five billion euros of “high-quality European investment” that will “come with a focus on building local value chains.” Her announcement sparked a round of applause in the room among attendees, who likewise saw the importance of diversifying and deepening Europe’s partnerships.

On the CELAC side, upon taking the stage, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva highlighted key areas of mutual interest with the EU, including combating climate change and deforestation, while staying clear of comments regarding Ukraine—on which he has differed from his European counterparts. Lula’s remarks were warmly greeted as well but without the same level of excitement as von der Leyen’s financial announcement.

The takeaways: Europe—reeling from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its effects, along with growing apprehension over increased Chinese assertiveness—realizes that it needs to double down on its global partnerships. Here, CELAC represents thirty-two votes at the United Nations (UN). (Venezuela is unable to vote due to being in arrears in the payment of its UN dues.) CELAC is also a fountain of critical raw materials, which Europe is increasingly focused on securing to fuel its green transition. And although China was not mentioned, the summit’s focus on quality and local investments is certainly a swipe at Chinese financing and a doubling down on the EU’s strategy of diversifying its supply chains.

For LAC countries, no convincing was needed to get regional dignitaries to show up. Europe is willing to put forward substantial strategic planning and the funding behind it as it aspires to be “a partner of choice” for LAC. Launched alongside the summit, the new EU-LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda commits the funding announced by von der Leyen for more than 130 projects through 2027. These projects revolve around four pillars of mutual interest: a fair green transition, an inclusive digital transformation, human development, and health resilience and vaccines. These pillars also stand in stark contrast to the top-down Chinese investments in many parts of the region that have less of an eye toward long-term development objectives.

A distinctly European approach to diplomacy

The summit also reflected the EU’s differing approach to LAC compared with the United States. Start with the invites to Brussels for Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, with Cuba’s leader, Miguel Díaz-Canel, in attendance. This reflects a softer approach on Europe’s part toward the leaders of countries where the United States has imposed sanctions over abuses of power and human-rights concerns. But it also shows that Europe has less diplomatic leverage in the region than that enjoyed by Washington. The United States was able to cajole countries into attending last year’s Summit of the Americas despite many leaders’ opposition to the snub of Cuba and Venezuela, in particular. CELAC leaders would have been less willing to do so in Brussels. This makes sense. The United States—despite concerns about the growing presence of extra-regional actors in LAC, many of which, unlike Europe, carry nefarious intentions toward US interests—remains the most important strategic partner for the hemisphere.

As well, the Global Gateway—in many respects Europe’s counterproposal to China’s Belt and Road Initiative—shows that Europe recognizes its need to match diplomatic outreach with concrete deliverables and large-scale financing. The billions that are slated to come from Europe far surpass US investment announcements at last year’s Summit of the Americas. So while Europe leaned in on specific projects, the United States used its hemispheric gathering to focus on partnership strategies to jointly tackle issues ranging from inclusive economic development to climate.

Perhaps the biggest feat for the EU was the joint agreement on a declaration coming out of this week’s meeting. With such a diversity of interests and priorities among CELAC members and within the EU, a final joint declaration did not always seem possible. The EU’s proposed language condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a non-starter for many CELAC diplomats who tend to view the war as primarily a European problem and are concerned about getting dragged into taking a side. Meanwhile, some EU member diplomats have said they have red lines against removing the language condemning Russia’s invasion. CELAC diplomats also wanted a reference in principle that the EU should give reparations for slavery to its member states. The declaration that emerged was the product of skillful negotiation balancing EU and LAC priorities—and competing positions within each region.

Point fifteen of the declaration was the biggest achievement of the summit:

We express deep concern on the ongoing war against Ukraine, which continues to cause immense human suffering and is exacerbating existing fragilities in the global economy, constraining growth, increasing inflation, disrupting supply chains, heightening energy and food insecurity, and elevating financial stability risks. In this sense, we support the need for a just and sustainable peace. We reiterate equally our support for the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the efforts of the [UN secretary general] to secure its extension.

Although Nicaragua abstained from signing on to the declaration because of this Ukraine war language, the rest of the attendees—including Cuba and Venezuela—agreed to it. This language is a major accomplishment for Europe, while CELAC walks away with a substantial investment pledge from the Global Gateway that others could not match.

Looking ahead to 2025

Europe has clearly unleashed a newfound commitment to the Americas. This summit was a strategic balancing act to shore up European partnerships with a region that is becoming vital to global interests and solutions to world problems. However, the EU’s pledging of billions of euros is one thing; delivering the funds and leveraging them into a new economic partnership will require serious follow-up and sustained engagement. Meanwhile, CELAC countries are increasingly able to take advantage of changing global dynamics to advance regional interests.

What would be the best course for the future? The United States and Europe should each have a seat at the table at their respective summits with LAC countries. The EU has now agreed to host a summit with CELAC every two years—the next one will be in 2025, with Colombia offering to host. The Dominican Republic will host the next Summit of the Americas that same year. Doesn’t some degree of alignment make sense heading to 2025? As in many other priority global issues, transatlantic collaboration will ultimately help to win the day.

Jason Marczak is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He participated in the EU-CELAC Business Round Table in Brussels preceding the leaders’ meeting. He is on Twitter at @jmarczak.

Jörn Fleck is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Experts react: South Korea embarks on a new nuclear era. How will it play out?

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 19 Jul 2023 16:13:27 +0000

When it comes to nuclear-related events, the Korean Peninsula this week resembled an atom’s nucleus, from which the adjective nuclear derives. It was a charged center of activity. On Tuesday, US and South Korean officials gathered in Seoul for the inaugural meeting of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a new bilateral platform coming out of April’s Washington Declaration to coordinate deterrence against a North Korean nuclear attack, including with US nuclear weapons. The same day, a US nuclear submarine docked at a South Korean port for the first time since 1981, even as North Korea continues to launch missiles and claim tensions are escalating “to the brink of nuclear war.” Throw in the curious case of a US soldier crossing from South Korea to North Korea, and it’s been an explosive week.

Below, Atlantic Council experts explain what happened and what to expect next.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Markus Garlauskas: Success will require reaching beyond the officials in the NCG

Robert M. Soofer: On the agenda was the unthinkable—what to do if deterrence fails

Bee Yun Jo: The NCG was a success, even if it didn’t address all of South Korea’s security concerns

Jessica Taylor: The US and South Korea doubled down on ending the Kim regime if it uses nuclear weapons

Thomas Cynkin: Would the US trade Los Angeles for Seoul? South Koreans want to know.

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi: Watch what impact the NCG will have on Japan

Success will require reaching beyond the officials in the NCG

The inaugural meeting of the US-South Korea NCG is an important step in improving the assurance of South Korea, deterrence of North Korea, and the alliance’s military response capability. That senior representatives from the White House and South Korea’s presidential office led the delegations should signal the importance both sides place on following through with the Washington Declaration and set the stage for robust follow-through. However, the NCG’s engagement outside of high-level government channels may be even more pivotal to its success going forward.

The brief joint readout set out an ambitious and logical agenda of quarterly meetings to advance on several workstreams, which include some very practical measures focused not just on reassuring South Korea, but also on improving deterrence of and responses to a North Korean nuclear attack. Such a brief public readout, of course, cannot capture the full scope and detail of what has been and will be discussed at NCG meetings. Such meetings will inevitably touch upon issues that are politically sensitive, involve classified operational and intelligence information, or both. The unfortunate tendency by some South Korean and US officials, as a result, will be to keep the proceedings very “close hold” and the public readouts very brief and selective. Meanwhile, issues deemed too politically sensitive by one or both sides might not even make it on the agenda, for fear of derailing the meetings or that such discussions might leak to the press. Such an approach would not be helpful for the NCG’s goals.

The United States and South Korea should be as forthcoming as possible about the results of NCG discussions in future sessions, and they should engage outside experts extensively in a broader effort to advance the NCG’s workstreams. The benefits of such an approach, if executed, will outweigh the risks. The NCG’s proceedings should take a cue from Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines’s latest efforts on transparency, including the wise and bold step of publicly releasing the recent National Intelligence Estimate on North Korea. Ultimately, exchanging insights with a wider group of experts in parallel with official NCG meetings will help to reassure more South Koreans across the political spectrum, aid in getting the message to North Korean elites, and help to make the best use of the capabilities of government and nongovernment experts inside South Korea and the United States to achieve the NCG’s objectives.

—Markus Garlauskas led the US intelligence community’s strategic analysis on North Korea as the national intelligence officer for North Korea, after serving as the chief strategist at the US-South Korea Combined Forces Command. He is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security of the Atlantic Council, and tweets at @Mister_G_2.

On the agenda was the unthinkable—what to do if deterrence fails

The North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test just days prior to the inaugural meeting of the NCG must have been a poignant reminder to the participants about why they were there. North Korean belligerence and the expansion of its nuclear arsenal have been sowing doubts among South Koreans about the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella. The purpose of the NCG is for the United States to satisfy its ally that it has the capabilities and the resolve to counter North Korean nuclear threats—and that Washington will take South Korean security interests into account when deciding how and when to use nuclear weapons.

On the agenda for the meeting were discussions about measures, some already in place, to share information on the nuclear threat, improve understanding about the role of nuclear weapons, and think through the unthinkable: what to do if nuclear deterrence fails and the United States and its allies are forced to respond to an initial North Korean nuclear use. Perhaps more important than the exchange of information was the establishment of protocols and processes for consultation between the two countries during crisis and conflict.

The nuclear dimension of any conflict will be unique, and how the United States responds will depend on the president and the circumstances (including the concerns of allies), regardless of preexisting plans. South Korean officials should appreciate this when they request ever-more detailed briefings of US nuclear plans that the Department of Defense does not provide even, for example, to its NATO allies. Tabletop exercises examining how the two sides could react after nuclear use are foundational, as are exercises conducted by US nuclear forces with potential South Korean conventional support.

Visits to South Korean ports by US nuclear submarines and overflights by US strategic bombers may not fully address the underlying security dilemma for South Korea, which is whether the United States would be willing to run the risk of North Korean nuclear retaliation against a homeland that is becoming increasingly vulnerable to Pyongyang’s long-range missiles. The United States today is protected against North Korean ICBMs due to the US national missile defense system, which should put South Koreans at ease. But the future of US homeland defense must share space in future NCG agendas along with nuclear and integrated strategic deterrence more broadly.

—Robert M. Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads its Nuclear Strategy Project.

The NCG was a success, even if it didn’t address all of South Korea’s security concerns

The inaugural NCG meeting was a success, highlighting substantial developments in combined efforts to thicken the United States’ nuclear umbrella. First of all, the meeting afforded a visible reaffirmation of the United States’ commitment to provide a full range of US capabilities, including nuclear. Along with reaffirmed words of commitment in the joint readout to “a swift, overwhelming, and decisive response” against “any nuclear attack by North Korea,” the United States and South Korea succeeded in coordinating the first port call of a US nuclear submarine in four decades.

The NCG meeting was also successful in conveying the seriousness to both the South Korean and US governments in the implementation of the new bilateral consultations. Upgrading the first meeting to be held at deputy-level, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol also made a brief appearance at the beginning of the meeting. Reifying the Washington Declaration, the first NCG meeting laid out concrete steps, including the development of security and information sharing protocols, nuclear consultation and communication processes for contingencies, and the development of joint planning, operations, exercises, simulations, trainings, and investment activities, particularly on the execution of South Korea’s conventional support to the United States’ nuclear operations.

Lastly, the NCG meeting reasserted South Korea’s commitment in nonproliferation. As Kim Tae-hyo, Seoul’s principal deputy national security adviser, stated during the joint press briefing, “There is no need for South Korea to consider separate nuclear armament.”

What the first NCG meeting achieved may not fully address South Korea’s security concerns. Disappointments and criticisms can be swift and easy. Yet, an important caveat here is that the Washington Declaration and implementation of the NCG rest on the conviction of the “importance, necessity, and benefit” of enduring maintenance of the United States’ nuclear umbrella. The implementation of the NCG and strengthening of the United States’ nuclear umbrella have succeeded in taking South Korea’s nuclear path again off the table. The combined efforts derive not from naïveté about an impermeable nuclear umbrella, but from realistic assessments on the risks, if not infeasibility, of South Korea’s nuclear path.

—Bee Yun Jo is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an associate research fellow in the Defense Strategy Division at the Center for Security and Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

The US and South Korea doubled down on ending the Kim regime if it uses nuclear weapons

A US soldier’s crossing into North Korea and subsequent detainment significantly complicates matters for the US-South Korea alliance and a Korean Peninsula that is experiencing a precarious ratcheting up of tensions. The soldier’s crossing comes amid South Korean and US efforts to strengthen deterrence through its new NCG, and it follows North Korea’s most recent launching of an ICBM. As this situation unfolds, the US-South Korea alliance will have to face the delicate balancing act of strengthening deterrence and assuaging tensions while also hoping to renew dialogue. Notably, despite the NCG and the deployment of the USS Kentucky nuclear submarine being planned for months, media coverage tied the events to North Korea’s missile launch rather than tying alliance actions to the evolution of Pyongyang’s capabilities. Thus, alliance actions pose the risk of being interpreted as retaliatory and escalatory if not properly communicated.

What was also notable about the NCG readout was the alliance’s doubling down on the threat to end the Kim regime in the event of any North Korea nuclear use. This would have to mean that the alliance intends to possibly further escalate a conflict even in the event of North Korean low-yield nuclear use. By making this threat, the alliance restricts its freedom of maneuver to de-escalate a conflict.

While the US-South Korea alliance at this time likely intends to make good on that threat, it is questionable whether this promise will hold for subsequent US and South Korean administrations. Polarization in both US and South Korean politics make for a questionable trajectory as both countries have pivotal elections in 2024. South Korea’s legislative election in April 2024 has the potential to significantly derail Yoon’s ability to further his foreign policy approach toward North Korea and strengthen the alliance. If the left-leaning Democratic Party of Korea were to, for instance, gain a supermajority (as they did in 2020), then it’s likely that the party will move to thwart Yoon’s approach to North Korea for the remainder of his one-term presidency.

Likewise, the outcome of the US presidential election is far from certain. The election has the potential of leading to another Trump administration or an administration with similar views about alliances. Notably, there has been diminishing support among US Republicans for NATO over the course of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This phenomenon will likely further international concerns surrounding the endurance of other US alliance commitments, particularly amid potential conflict escalation scenarios.

But in the near term, we are likely to see an increasingly recalcitrant North Korea amid US-South Korean efforts to strengthen the alliance. Ahead of the seventieth anniversary of the Korean War armistice on July 27, a robust US-South Korea military exercise schedule, and the 2024 elections in South Korea and the United States, and with the complication of a US citizen now detained in North Korea, Pyongyang is unlikely to be swayed to change course without substantial concessions on the US-South Korea side. Both Seoul and Washington will likely vehemently oppose any such concessions ahead of their elections.

—Jessica Taylor is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Taylor has served in the US Department of Defense in both military and civil service capacities for nearly twenty years.

Would the US trade Los Angeles for Seoul? South Koreans want to know.

The Washington Declaration, which reaffirmed the strength of the US nuclear umbrella covering South Korea, was further reinforced this week with strong signals in the form of the NCG and a rare and highly visible port visit by a US nuclear submarine to South Korea. While these moves were welcome, they did not represent a significant shift in US policy. Rather, they were a more concrete and visible manifestation of existing US extended deterrence policy and related US-South Korea strategic stability consultations. They were aimed as much at building confidence among the South Korean public in the US nuclear deterrent—and ameliorating domestic pressure within South Korea to “go nuclear”—as at deterring North Korean aggression.

With the growth of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, now comprising enough fissile material for an estimated forty-five-to-fifty-five nuclear weapons and an expanding arsenal of missiles, North Korean capability to hold US cities at risk is increasing and the credibility of the US strategic deterrent is concomitantly being corroded. French President Charles de Gaulle famously asked US President John F. Kennedy whether the United States would trade New York for Paris. Similarly, Yoon and the South Korean public must be questioning whether the United States would trade Los Angeles for Seoul. Exercises in confidence building are useful but insufficient to resolve such doubts.

Moreover, deterring a North Korean attack is critical but not the only issue. North Korea’s capacity to sell nuclear materials, missiles, components, or even nuclear weapons poses a grave proliferation threat. Also, as the North Korean nuclear threat continues to grow, so will the pressure on regional countries, including South Korea, to go nuclear themselves. While the Washington Declaration and connected developments are a useful step, they are no substitute for a fundamental review of existing US strategy to actively contain North Korea in the face of the shifting strategic balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula.

—Thomas Cynkin is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the practice lead, Japan and Northeast Asia, of the Transnational Strategy Group, a global consulting firm operating at the nexus of policy and business.

Watch what impact the NCG will have on Japan

The inaugural NCG meeting focused much on confirming the details of how the group will operate, including the formation of workstreams to make the United States and South Korea more effective in their deterrence and response readiness against the threat posed by North Korea. The meeting was also packaged well to express the United States’ strong bilateral commitment to extended deterrence, timed with the port call by the USS Kentucky to Busan.

Indeed, there is still much to see regarding the actual effects produced going forward, which pivots on how the United States and South Korea operationalize and execute the workstreams to prove that the NCG is essential, effective, and mutually beneficial. Moreover, there are also questions concerning the group’s sustainability considering the delicate domestic politics—particularly in South Korea, where the strategic debates and security dilemmas are still real. Should the NCG prove to be merely symbolic, this could very well boost the arguments for indigenous nuclear armament in South Korean.

Another key area to watch going forward will be the impact the NCG has on Japan. While the NCG has to focus on making the bilateral framework effective, the continuously growing nuclear threats in the region and any proven success of the NCG will underscore the need to expand the group to a trilateral framework, or at the very least to establish a separate US-Japan NCG.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, an assistant professor at the University of Tokyo, and a research fellow at Pacific Forum.

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Allen in the Wall Street Journal on US efforts to simultaneously deter Russia and China

sodal — Wed, 19 Jul 2023 14:08:28 +0000

On July 18, Michael Allen and Connor Pfeiffer co-authored a Wall Street Journal piece making the case for the United States’ ability to simultaneously counter Russia and China. Citing the US’ strengthened defense industrial base, partly bolstered by the war in Ukraine, the pair contend that the US is equipped to both provide continued support for Ukraine, as well as deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. However, in order to maintain this position and “remain the arsenal of democracy”, the US must continue to invest in expanding its industrial capacity.

The twin imperatives of backing Ukraine and bolstering deterrence in Asia are achievable for now. But Ukraine urgently needs more weapons, and the US must act quickly to strengthen deterrence in Asia, even if a Chinese invasion of Taiwan might not come until 2027. A narrow trade-off argument focused on Javelins and Stingers obscures the real problem—the limitations of the US defense industrial base.

Michael Allen & Connor Pfeiffer

Fellow

Michael Allen

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

China Cybersecurity

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was never about NATO

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 22:01:29 +0000

Sweden is poised to become the thirty-second member of the NATO Alliance and Russia does not appear to be at all concerned by the prospect. The breakthrough moment for the Swedes came ahead of last week’s NATO summit in Vilnius, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to end months of opposition and back the Scandinavian nation’s bid to join the Alliance. Russia’s response to Sweden’s imminent NATO accession has been muted to say the least, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov limiting himself to promises of “appropriate measures” and Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warning about unspecified “negative consequences.”

This apparent lack of concern mirrors the Kremlin position over Finland’s NATO membership, which was confirmed in April 2023. On that occasion, Russia also downplayed the significance of the news while making vague commitments to strengthen its own military posture in the region. Indeed, in the fourteen months since the two Nordic nations first announced their intention to join the Alliance, Moscow has done almost nothing to protest or obstruct this process, despite having a vast array of military, cyber, economic, informational, and diplomatic tools at its disposal. If Putin genuinely believed the NATO Alliance posed a security threat to the Russian Federation, he would at the very least have increased the Russian military presence close to the Finnish border. Instead, Russia reportedly reduced its troop deployments in the region by approximately 80%. These are obviously not the actions of a nation under siege.

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Russia’s remarkably relaxed reaction to the NATO accession of Finland and Sweden stands in stark contrast to the hysteria over Ukraine’s far less substantial ties to the military alliance. In the months leading up to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin and other Kremlin leaders told the world that the escalating crisis was due to years of provocative NATO expansion, while warning that deepening ties between the Alliance and Ukraine represented a red line. In reality, however, Ukraine in early 2022 was not even remotely close to joining NATO. Far from pursuing Ukraine, the Alliance had repeatedly sidestepped appeals from Kyiv for a Membership Action Plan, refusing to offer even a clear signal regarding future accession. On the eve of Russia’s invasion, the most optimistic forecasts indicated that Ukraine’s dream of joining NATO was still decades away.

It is hard to see any military logic behind the dramatically different Russian reactions to NATO’s Nordic enlargement and the Alliance’s involvement in Ukraine. After all, while a theoretical future NATO presence inside Ukraine could pose a range of major headaches for military planners in Moscow, the recent accession of Finland has already doubled the length of Russia’s shared border with the Alliance overnight. Swedish membership will arguably be even more consequential for Russia, transforming the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. If Russia is so apparently unconcerned by these very real military challenges, why was Putin prepared to launch the biggest European war since World War II over the far more distant prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership?

It is clear from Putin’s own actions that he understands perfectly well NATO will never attack Russia. This should come as no surprise. Indeed, the entire notion of NATO invading Russia is recognized as absurd by all but the terminally swivel-eyed. This does not mean Russian objections to NATO’s post-1991 enlargement are entirely insincere; on the contrary, the growing presence of the Alliance in the former Eastern Bloc over the past thirty years is perhaps the leading source of geopolitical bitterness and resentment throughout the Russian establishment. However, it is critical to clarify that this indignation has nothing to do with legitimate security concerns. NATO is not a threat to Russian security; NATO is a threat to Russian foreign policy because it prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors. In other words, NATO enlargement is no more or less provocative than a burglar alarm is to a thief.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

None of this has prevented Putin from using the NATO issue as a smokescreen for his imperial ambitions. For years, he has skillfully exploited anti-Western sentiment and widespread international suspicion of US foreign policy to distract from Russia’s own acts of international aggression. This tactic has proved remarkably successful; in the seventeen months since Russian troops began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a wide range of academics, commentators, and politicians around the world have all echoed Putin in blaming NATO for provoking the war. They have continued to do so even as Putin himself has compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth-century Russian Czar Peter the Great.

The fact that so many prominent personalities remain ready to accept Russia’s dishonest NATO narrative is evidence of fundamental misconceptions regarding the role of the Alliance and the nature of its post-Cold War enlargement. NATO is routinely depicted by critics as an expansionist military institution seeking to impose Western dominance, but this is entirely at odds with the growth of the Alliance over the past three decades. Nobody has ever been forced to join NATO; instead, every single new member since 1991 has asked for membership and has been obliged to meet a series of strict standards in order to qualify. Indeed, the loaded term “NATO expansion” may itself be misleading, as unlike Russia, the Alliance only ever expands on a voluntary basis. It is also worth underlining that while Putin plays the victim card and complains of being encircled, fear of Russian aggression has been by far the leading cause of all new membership applications.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now approaching the one-and-a-half-year mark, it is time to retire the NATO narrative. Putin has demonstrated that he is not at all threatened by the growing presence of the Alliance on Russia’s northwestern border, and is increasingly open about his imperial agenda in Ukraine. It is this Russian imperialism that poses a grave threat to international security, not the defensive guarantees offered by NATO.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The similarity between the imperial and Soviet views is unmistakable, albeit with one dissonant nuance: Soviet nationality policy, while doing all it could to erase Ukrainian national identity, at the same time officially recognized the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a state entity and Ukrainians as a separate nationality. Putin has been highly critical of Lenin for this approach, and has claimed the Bolshevik leader was personally responsible for “creating” Ukraine. This line of thinking reached what may be seen as its logical conclusion with Putin’s insistence that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people.” By denying the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity, Putin brought the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood into question and set the stage for the current war.

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Russian misconceptions about Ukraine are in part due to the simplistic notion that ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as well as those who express an affinity for Russian culture or share Russia’s antagonism toward the EU, NATO, and the West in general, all fall within the same “pro-Russian” category. Likewise, Many Russians have been all too ready to assume that any Ukrainian expressing nostalgia for the Soviet era is waiting to be “liberated” by Moscow. These misconceptions have been echoed by numerous commentators in the West, who have similarly treated evidence of favorable Ukrainian attitudes toward modern Russia or the Soviet past as indications of a desire for some form of Russian reunion.

In reality, being “pro-Russian” is understood one way in Ukrainian cities like Donetsk, Kramatorsk, or Mariupol, and quite differently in Moscow, Omsk, or Tomsk. During the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine in April 2014, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a wide-ranging poll in the eight southeastern Ukrainian provinces (excluding Crimea) targeted by the Kremlin. This revealed that 70 percent of respondents were against separation from Ukraine and unification with Russia, while just 15 percent were in favor.

If separation from Ukraine was not on their wish list, what did they in fact want? A relative majority of 45 percent preferred the decentralization of power and greater rights for their region; another 25 percent favored a federated Ukraine, while only 19 percent were happy with the existing relationship with Kyiv. Other surveys conducted at around the same time yielded similar findings.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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Unsurprisingly, Russia’s full-scale invasion has further shaped Ukrainian attitudes toward issues of national identity. Today, the people of Ukraine are more consolidated as a political nation than at any time since regaining independence more than thirty years ago. According to the Razumkov Centre, 94 percent of respondents in a May 2023 survey expressed pride in their Ukrainian citizenship; 74 percent expressed feelings of patriotism and love for their country; and 71 percent were ready to come to its defense, either with weapons in hand or as participants in volunteer support groups.

Meanwhile, negative attitudes toward Russia and Russian citizens have skyrocketed. At the end of 2019, only 20 percent of Ukrainians held negative attitudes toward Russians; six months after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in September 2022, 80 percent of respondents asserted that they would not allow Russians into Ukraine. In terms of attitudes toward Russia, the turnaround has been even more drastic. In early February 2022, about a week before the Russian invasion, 34 percent of Ukrainians held positive views of Russia. That number dropped to just two percent three months later, with 92 percent saying they viewed the country in a negative light.

With the war clearly going badly for the Kremlin, there could now be a glimmer of hope for some reality-based adjustments to Russian illusions about Ukraine. Russian MP Konstanin Zatulin, who is well known for championing the plight of Russian “compatriots” abroad and promoting aggressive policies toward Ukraine, has recently questioned the wisdom of denying Ukrainian identity. “I would be happy if there was no Ukraine, but if we continue to constantly repeat that there is no Ukraine and no Ukrainians,” this will only strengthen their resistance on the battlefield, he noted at a June 2023 forum in Moscow.

Zatulin’s comments hint at growing recognition in Russia that widely held beliefs about Ukraine’s indivisibility from Russia are both inaccurate and unhelpful. However, resistance to the entire notion of Ukrainian statehood is so deeply ingrained in Russian society that it may take generations before the attitudes underpinning the current war are no longer dominant.

Roman Solchanyk is author of “Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition” (2001). He has previously served as a senior analyst at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute and the RAND Corporation.

Kroenig in Foreign Policy on Machiavelli’s Art of War

sodal — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 15:24:54 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 16, Scowcroft Vice President and Director Matthew Kroenig was featured in Foreign Policy’s 2023 Summer Reading List, recommending Niccolò Machiavelli’s Art of War. Despite it being published in the 16th century, Kroenig argues that it has contemporary relevance in its discussion of emerging technologies that will revolutionize security, militaries, and war. After all, the famed political thinker faced the same issues surrounding firearms and artillery that modern militaries face with artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and hypersonic missiles.

If one of the world’s greatest minds could not fully appreciate the transformative effects of gunpowder on the battlefield, then it is likely that we, too, lack sufficient imagination to fully conceptualize the disruptive wars to which we will bear witness in our futures.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

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Is Russia really siding with the UAE against Iran?

Mark N. Katz — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 15:10:01 +0000

There has been much reporting recently about how Iran is annoyed with Russia for its apparent siding with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the Iran-UAE dispute over three islands in the Gulf.

These three small islands—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—had been claimed by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. However, they were originally under British control when Britain exercised its “protectorate” over the seven emirates that became the UAE upon independence from the United Kingdom in 1971. Just as the British were leaving, the shah’s forces seized the three islands, which have remained under Iranian control from the 1979 Islamic revolution up to the present. Since the Iranian takeover, the UAE has unsuccessfully sought the return of these islands—first from the shah and then from the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the UAE has also not been in a position to retrieve the islands forcibly, and none of its various partners—including the United States—have been willing to help it do so. The UAE, though, has frequently reiterated its claim to them over the years.

On July 10, a joint statement was issued at the Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting held in Moscow, which called for “bilateral negotiations or the International Court of Justice [ICJ], in accordance with the rules of international law and the United Nations Charter, to resolve this issue is in accordance with international legitimacy.”

This statement might seem innocuous enough, but it was met with a highly negative reaction in Iran from officials and even some in the public. On July 12, the Russian ambassador to Tehran, Alexey Dedov, was summoned to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and Moscow was asked to “correct its position.” Many Iranians commented negatively on the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Arabic Twitter account’s announcement of the Russia-GCC meeting, including forcefully stating their view that the Gulf should be referred to as Persian and not Arab.

After years of tensions, ties between the UAE and Iran improved in August 2022 when the two countries agreed to resume full diplomatic relations, which had been downgraded in 2016 (after attacks on the Saudi missions in Tehran and Mashhad in response to the execution of Saudi Shia cleric Nimr Baqir al-Nimr). Nevertheless, Iran considers its ownership of the three islands a settled fact and is unwilling to negotiate with the UAE nor allow the ICJ to rule on the matter. For Moscow to endorse the UAE and GCC position is especially galling to Tehran, considering how much Iran has done to support Russia in its war with Ukraine. This includes selling Iranian armed drones to Russia and even helping Moscow build a drone factory inside Russia.

Why would Moscow do this? One possibility is that Russia, which is under punitive international sanctions, hopes to beef up its exports to and investments from the UAE and other GCC states—something that Iran cannot provide due to its economic difficulties exacerbated by Western sanctions. Russia-UAE trade rose by 68 percent in 2022 to $9 billion, consisting mainly of Russian exports to the UAE ($8.5 billion). Moscow’s siding with the GCC on this issue may also be based on a cold Russian calculation: while the UAE and other GCC states can cooperate with either the West or Russia, it does not have to fear the prospect of increased Iranian-Western cooperation breaking out. This allows Russia to disregard Iranian preferences, even though Russia has become dependent on Iranian military assistance.

By contrast, the UAE and other GCC states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—are highly gratified that Moscow has backed their position on the need to resolve the disputed islands issue. They can also point to Moscow’s doing so as a reason for resisting American calls for the Gulf Arab states to distance themselves from Russia and join the West in imposing economic sanctions on Moscow. Indeed, GCC states can argue that Russian support for their position on resolving the islands dispute demonstrates the usefulness of their cooperation with Russia.

Still, it is essential not to exaggerate the significance of the Russia-GCC joint statement on resolving the Iran-UAE dispute. As both Moscow and Tehran are fully aware, Iran will not enter into negotiations with the UAE, much less allow the International Court of Justice, to arbitrate their dispute. The Russia-GCC joint statement does nothing to alter the fact that Iran remains in control of the three islands and is likely to remain so.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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Kroenig in Marketplace discussing the recent defense bill

sodal — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 15:07:56 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 14, Scowcroft Vice President and Director Matthew Kroenig was featured in Marketplace discussing the House of Representatives’ recent authorization of an $886 billion defense bill. Kroenig argues that, atypical of most defense bills, the 2023 bill includes various amendments and provisions pertaining to social issues that are completely unrelated to defense or security.

This year is a little bit unusual… there is more debating over these controversial social issues and whether Congress will allocate funding to the Pentagon for things like diversity and diversity training, travel for abortion, and things like that.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

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State of the Order: Assessing June 2023

sodal — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 13:23:59 +0000

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Putin in Peril. Russian President Vladimir Putin faced the most serious challenge to his authority since taking office, as the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, mounted an insurrection against the Kremlin’s military leadership. With heavily armed mercenaries seizing the city of Rostov and moving within a few hundred miles of Moscow, a looming conflict was averted as Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s chief, agreed to stand down and go into exile in Belarus. But Prigozhin’s whereabouts remained in doubt, as Putin sought to reassert control over the Wagner Group and consolidate his grip on power.

Shaping the order. The sudden rebellion by Prigozhin, a longtime close ally of Putin, suggests that the war in Ukraine is placing serious strains on Russia’s political leadership. Though Putin appears safe for now, the insurrection could open the door to future challenges to his rule, with the potential to shake the global order. Moscow appears to be struggling to gain control over Wagner, which has provided a crucial source of funding for Russia’s operations in Ukraine and helped the Kremlin expand its influence across the Middle East and Africa.
Hitting home. The fall of Putin could ultimately lead to a more peaceful Russia, but political instability inside the Kremlin could also pose new risks to US security interests.
What to do. With Putin forced to shift his focus to domestic challenges, Washington should use this opportunity to accelerate weapons support for Kyiv as Ukrainian forces push forward with their critical counteroffensive.

Blinken in Beijing. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Beijing, on a trip intended to “stabilize” relations between the two nations. While China refused a US request to resume military-to-military contacts, both sides appeared to view the talks as productive. But Chinese officials reacted bitterly to President Joe Biden’s subsequent reference to Xi as a “dictator,” calling the comments “extremely absurd and irresponsible.”

Shaping the order. While it may temporarily help improve the atmospherics surrounding the US-China relationship, Blinken’s visit is unlikely to lead to a shift in the overall trajectory. Tensions will remain high in light of Beijing’s threats against Taiwan and other attempts to undermine the global order, as the US pursues efforts to shift supply chains in critical industries away from China, as part of a new “derisking” strategy.
Hitting home. Seeking to maintain stable relations with the world’s second largest economy may be beneficial for the American people, but this will also require sustained efforts to defend against potential threats.
What to do. The Biden administration should continue to coordinate with allies on strategies to counter Beijing’s assault on the global order, even as it tries to establish guardrails in the US-China relationship.

Modi’s State Visit. President Joe Biden hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the White House, as the administration sought to bolster economic and geopolitical ties with India. Amid media criticism of India’s backsliding on democracy, Modi was given a White House state dinner – only the third of Biden’s presidency – and invited to speak before a joint session of Congress. The two nations agreed to strengthen defense and technology cooperation, including building GE military jet engines in India and launching joint initiatives on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and other areas.

Shaping the order. Washington’s warm welcome for Modi reflects a desire to cultivate a stronger relationship with India in the context of strategic competition with China. While joint concerns over China appear to be propelling the relationship forward, it remains unclear whether the two nations can reach a more meaningful strategic partnership, especially given New Delhi’s refusal to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In addition, Modi’s targeting of religious minorities and crackdown on political dissent have raised questions about the future of the relationship.
Hitting home. A stronger US relationship with India could generate new business opportunities for US companies seeking to reduce supply chain dependencies on China.
What to do. While seeking to build on the positive momentum coming out of Modi’s visit, Washington should also make clear that it sees a shared commitment to democratic norms as the foundation for closer ties between the world’s two largest democracies.

Quote of the Month

“Democracies must now rally together around not just our common interests, but also our shared values. Preserving and protecting the freedoms that are essential to peace and prosperity will require vigorous leadership…”
– US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in New Delhi, India, June 5, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↓)

Guatemala’s ruling government sought to overturn the results of the country’s presidential elections after the results indicated that Bernardo Arévalo, a reformist candidate, gained enough votes to qualify for a run-off. The State Department warned that undermining the election results would constitute a “grave threat to democracy.”
With the support of Pakistan’s ruling government, the country’s military began implementing a broad crackdown against the media and political opposition, in the wake of national protests following the arrest of former prime minister Imran Khan.
As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a high-profile visit to Washington, US concerns over democratic backsliding in India appeared to take a back seat in an effort to cultivate closer relations between the two nations.
Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security ()

Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the paramilitary Wagner Group, mounted an insurrection against Russia’s military leadership, but agreed to stand down after his heavily armed mercenaries came within a few hundred miles of Moscow.
China and Cuba reached a secret agreement to allow Beijing to establish a surveillance facility on the island targeting the United States, and are in the process of negotiating a deal to establish a new joint military training facility.
A contingent of leaders from seven African countries, including South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Putin, in a bid to initiate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, though neither side accepted the African proposal.
In a further indication of Seoul’s tilt toward a harder line on China, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol directly criticized China’s ambassador in Beijing for his comments critical of South Korea’s joining US-led initiatives.
On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↑)

The US and Britain issued the Atlantic Declaration, a new economic framework aimed at enhancing cooperation on critical and emerging technology, supply chains, clean energy, and other issues, as a potential counterpart to the US-EU Trade and Technology Council.
The US and thirteen other members of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework reached an agreement on supply chains – one of the framework’s four core pillars – that will result in several new bodies focused on advancing supply chain resiliency.
On balance, the trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons (↑)

The United Nations adopted the world’s first treaty aimed at protecting the high seas and preserving marine biodiversity in international waters, which constitute over two-thirds of the ocean.
The US announced plans to rejoin the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in an effort to counter China’s growing sway in multilateral fora. After the Trump administration withdrew the US from the organization in 2017, China became one of its largest donors.
On balance, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances ()

French President Emmanuel Macron expressed opposition to a proposal by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to open a NATO liaison office in Japan, suggesting that the alliance should stay focused in the North Atlantic region.
On his first trip to the White House since taking office, British prime minister Rishi Sunak met with Joe Biden, as the two leaders committed to closer cooperation on a range of political and economic issues.
US-India relations appeared to enter a new chapter as Prime Minister Narendra Modi joined President Joe Biden for an official state visit in Washington.
On balance, the alliance pillar was unchanged.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

Lucan Ahmad Way, in Foreign Affairs, contends that revolutionary autocracies have demonstrated remarkable staying power, even in the face of mounting challenges.
Hal Brands, in Foreign Policy, suggests that Russia, China, Iran, and to some extent North Korea constitute a bloc of adversaries more cohesive and dangerous than anything the United States has faced in decades.
Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree, in Foreign Affairs, argue that in the face of Chinese aggression, a policy of continued non-alignment will not serve India well.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, contends that Ukraine deserves NATO membership, as well as more robust weapons support.
John Herbst and Dan Fried, in the Washington Post, suggest that the key to a Ukrainian victory in its war against Russia may lie in a successful advance to retake Crimea.
Patrick Quirk and Caitlin Dearing Scott, writing for the Atlantic Council, argue for a fully developed foreign aid strategy to help the US succeed in strategic competition with China and Russia.
Peter Engelke and Emily Weinstein, writing for the Atlantic Council Strategy Paper series, set forth a comprehensive strategy for the US and its allies to retain its technological advantage over China.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

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Kroenig and Ashford debate the potential of NATO membership for Ukraine

sodal — Mon, 17 Jul 2023 20:32:15 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 14, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest article, Kroenig and Ashford extensively debate the NATO Summit in Vilnius, providing inputs on the Alliance’s communique, Turkey’s decision to support Sweden’s bid for NATO membership, and more. Specifically, the pair debate if an “Israel model” would work for Ukraine.

The Israel model does not make sense for Ukraine. Israel has nuclear weapons. Ukraine does not—anymore. Israel’s enemies do not have nuclear weapons. Ukraine’s enemy does. Washington guarantees Israel a “qualitative military edge” through its dominance of the conventional arms market in the Middle East. It cannot guarantee Ukraine such an edge over Russia.

Matthew Kroenig

…the Israel model for Ukraine would effectively be a formalization of what’s happening now, but I would argue that it’s actually more credible as a promise because of that. Biden would commit to maintain a suitable level of support to Ukraine, rather than making a potential future promise to include it in an alliance… I think Ukraine would be wise to focus its efforts there, not on NATO membership.

Emma Ashford

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate the potential of NATO membership for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At risk of separating, can Israel and the US renew their vows?

Shalom Lipner — Mon, 17 Jul 2023 20:08:50 +0000

President Joe Biden is rolling out the red carpet for his Israeli counterpart, Isaac Herzog, who arrives in the United States on July 18. Herzog’s packed agenda includes quality facetime with Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, as well as an address before a special joint meeting of Congress celebrating Israel’s seventy-fifth anniversary. US and Israeli principals will be working overtime to dispel impressions that their two countries are experiencing irreconcilable differences.

The interface between Washington and Jerusalem has evolved over many decades into a virtual gold standard of international partnership. These bonds have been “defined,” President Biden said, on June 27, “by a genuine friendship… a shared interest and shared democratic values.” That view is shared doubtlessly by the overwhelming 87 percent of Israelis who recently imparted to Pew Research Center pollsters that they hold “favorable” views of America. These sentiments, nurtured by large constituencies in both countries, have been the lifeblood of their bilateral ties.

But the template of US-Israel relations is coming under extraordinary siege. The values component of the equation is being tested by, among other factors, the far-reaching plans of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to circumscribe the purview of Israel’s judicial system, a move which is misaligned with the worldview of the Biden administration. After Vice President Harris purposefully hailed—at a belated Israeli Independence Day celebration in Washington on June 7—the “strong institutions, checks and balances, and… independent judiciary” of both democracies, Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen retorted that “she wouldn’t be able to name one clause [of the reform] that bothers her.” A senior official in Netanyahu’s orbit has accused the Biden administration of providing partial financing for the widespread demonstrations—which continue to rage—opposing the legislative overhaul.

It’s becoming more problematic also to speak about the tight commonality of American and Israeli interests. The United States reportedly resumed negotiations with Iran over a new nuclear deal, which Netanyahu has stated emphatically will not be considered binding on Israel. Additionally, the announced construction of thousands of Israeli housing units in the West Bank has earned condemnation from the administration, which does not “want to see actions taken that are going to make a two-state solution that much more difficult to achieve.”

Commenting on that precise state of affairs with the Palestinians, Secretary of State Blinken confessed to informing his Israeli interlocutors that “if there’s a fire burning in their backyard, it’s going to be a lot tougher, if not impossible, to actually both deepen the existing [normalization] agreements as well as to expand them to include potentially Saudi Arabia,” thus undermining a policy objective about which the United States and Israel are both ostensibly passionate.

These developments come at a time when the nexus of personal connections—the proverbial secret ingredient—which nourishes the health of this relationship is under notable stress. Netanyahu has refrained pointedly from appearing at major gatherings of American Jewish organizations in Israel, his home turf, for fear of being heckled loudly by audiences that are sympathetic to his detractors. His ministers have encountered heated protests when addressing Jewish audiences in New York, a historically hospitable venue for Israeli leaders, while others of their government colleagues are not even welcome in the United States and were tellingly absent from the guest list for the annual Fourth of July event hosted by the US Embassy in Israel.

In this context, Biden’s protracted delay in dispatching an invitation for Netanyahu—whom he has known for over forty years—to visit the Oval Office is not merely conspicuous. It channels the zeitgeist of an era in which Democrats, who control the White House and the US Senate, are apparently feeling greater sympathy for Palestinians than Israelis for the first time in decades. Now, with his latest pivot toward China—which 60 percent of Republicans view as an enemy—Netanyahu risks promoting alienation from Israel among both parties.

This estrangement provides the backdrop for the certainty of New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman that Biden—who has been known to confide in Friedman—will convey to Herzog that “when the interests and values of a US government and an Israeli government diverge this much, a reassessment of the relationship is inevitable.” Whether Friedman’s prediction is correct or not, the prevalent discourse is alone sufficient to impact negatively on Israel’s regional standing and security.

Israel and the United States have some tough decisions to make if they harbor any hopes of refreshing the trifecta—shared values, shared interests, and broad-based support—which has kept them famously on the same page. The way back to a more durable US-Israel collaboration will require neutralizing the corrosive effects of narrow political agendas, which are pulling like-minded allies apart and impairing vital strategic coordination. In showering affection upon Herzog—Israel’s formal head of state—Biden is making a concerted effort to suggest that, despite his reservations about some of the “most extreme members of cabinets that I’ve seen,” the fundamentals of America’s covenant with Israel will prove capable of enduring beyond this current crisis.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on Twitter @ShalomLipner.

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Five things to expect from Spain’s EU presidency

Lisa Homel, Marie Jourdain — Mon, 17 Jul 2023 19:43:27 +0000

Spain took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) on July 1, just three weeks ahead of its own snap general elections. As the holder of the presidency, Spain is responsible for driving forward the meetings and decisions of the Council, comprised of combinations of ministers from the twenty-seven member states by portfolio, and will host a number of EU summits. Importantly, these duties come with greater influence to set the EU legislative agenda. As an “honest broker,” Spain has a special responsibility to facilitate compromises among member states and help finalize major pieces of legislation at a critical moment ahead of elections taking place next year.

The Spanish presidency is the first of the new trio comprised also of Belgium and Hungary. Whereas the previous trio was defined by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this new trio will potentially need to reshuffle its priorities for the EU and transatlantic relationship, following not only the parliamentary elections in June 2024 and the formation of the next European Commission, but also the US elections shortly after. Each new presidency trio sets long-term goals for its collective eighteen-month term and the priorities of each individual presidency generally reflect the broad ambitions of the trio (although Hungary may be blocked from chairing the Council given ongoing concerns about the government’s lack of alignment with EU values).

Spain takes up the mantle from Sweden, whose presidency prioritized security, European unity, competitiveness, the green transition, democratic values, and the rule of law. Sweden made a dent in these goals, and Spain is inheriting over three hundred pieces of unfinished legislation, of which it has identified more than 120 as priorities. Spain’s thematic priorities for its own presidency show continuation on some themes (the green transition and European unity) as well as more novel focuses (reindustrialization and social justice).

In a speech on June 15, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez outlined a number of priorities for Spain’s EU presidency. It is worth taking a closer look at four of these priorities to assess the chances of moving each issue forward, as well as one additional wildcard he did not mention.

1. European reindustrialization

Sánchez’s agenda includes a new emphasis on economic security and beefing up European industrial strategy, including in the health and agriculture sectors. Spain will pay special attention to ensuring thriving strategic industries in Europe with greater innovation capacity, combined with an openness to deepen external partnerships.

In that vein, the commitment to openness will likely include a push to deepen ties between the EU and Latin America, potentially as soon as the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States summit on July 17-18. Spain might also prioritize getting the long-negotiated EU-Mercosur free trade agreement with Latin America over the finish line, although divergences over environmental rules might take longer to overcome than Spain would like.

Regarding its intention to ensure economic security within the bloc, Spain will likely take advantage of its presidency to advance the conversation on economic governance. Especially on the future of fiscal rules, EU member states need to reach consensus on the re-imagination of the Stability and Growth pact (the agreement that sets limits of 60 percent of gross domestic product for debt and 3 percent for annual deficits), which has been suspended since the COVID-19 pandemic. The success of the Spanish presidency may well be judged on this contentious issue. In an increasingly fragmented global economy, Europe is facing growing challenges to maintain its competitiveness. These include the effects of the Russian war in Ukraine and the US Inflation Reduction Act, which has drawn criticism as protectionist. Here Spain must facilitate conversations within the EU that build on recent Commission proposals for EU competitiveness beyond 2030.

Although Europe hasn’t produced big tech champions on artificial intelligence (AI), it is leading the world in proactive regulation—a phenomenon called the “Brussels Effect,” in which the EU’s size and active approach toward regulation encourages foreign-based companies to comply with EU standards. In that regard, one of the most likely accomplishments of the Spanish presidency will be finalizing the AI Act, which Sánchez identified as a key priority—unsurprisingly, given Spain’s own leadership in the AI market. Although there is widespread support to get the AI Act passed, there is still a major sticking point between the Parliament and the Commission on banning facial recognition software.

2. The green transition

Driving the green transition has been a long-time focus of the current Spanish government. Heading into the Spanish presidency, pushing environmental legislation around the EU’s “Fit for 55” ambitions is one of Spain’s top priorities.

In particular, following the European Parliament’s vote in May on legislation to reduce methane emissions, the Spanish presidency will preside over the conversations between the Council and the Parliament on the final text of this legislation. Another green transition priority will be building on the progress that took place under Sweden’s presidency on proposals to define the regulatory framework for a future natural gas and hydrogen market. Trilogues—talks among the Parliament, the Council, and the Commission—have begun on the issue, but one of the main hurdles remains identifying, or “unbundling,” gas providers from the owners of the infrastructure.

We’re also likely to see movement on legislation to decouple the EU’s wholesale electricity prices from natural gas, a long-held Spanish priority that Spain helped push into the Commission proposal for reforming the EU electricity market. Despite Spain historically leading the charge on this initiative (motivated most recently by ongoing protests over sky-high energy prices), it may be hindered by its new position as it must oversee the debate on this legislative proposal neutrally. The proposal remains controversial and detractors such as Germany and Denmark continue to argue that the current system is preferable, as it promotes transparency and investment in greener energy sources.

3. Social and economic justice

Progressive social policy has been a priority at the national level in Spain for years, and we can expect this portfolio to receive special attention during its presidency, unless the elections turn to the advantage of the right and far-right. Spain has been a dedicated advocate for policies promoting social equality and workers’ rights, which we will likely see carry over to the EU level. For instance, Madrid’s presidency comes at the final stages of the negotiations on the Commission’s proposed legislation to issue a European disability card, allowing for easier freedom of movement for disabled persons across the EU.

Spain may also push to finalize legislation protecting the rights for platform workers so that ride-share drivers, delivery drivers, and other gig workers are afforded similar rights as traditional company employees. It is a contentious issue. European countries use different practices and approaches, with some more determined to protect gig workers while others seek to preserve the economic advantages offered by the platforms.

While not specifically on the agenda, the multi-pronged demographic challenge Europe has to face in the near future requires much more attention. It is already playing out in issues around competitiveness, social welfare programs, immigration policy, and Europe’s position in the world. Spain could use its presidency to give the necessary impetus to the discussion. In addition, Spain will likely oversee the discussions on the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.

4. Strengthening European unity

The Spanish presidency will likely divide this priority into an individual and an EU-wide component. At the individual level, this will mean ensuring citizens feel a part of Europe. One way to do this might be for Spain to restart the conversation on European identity by hosting a summit or another kind of convening, following the Conference on the Future of Europe, which concluded in 2022.

From an EU perspective, Spain has been vocal in its support for enlargement for candidate countries, including Ukraine. In October, the European Commission will release its report on enlargement, which the European Council will have to draw conclusions from. Western Balkans countries intent on joining the EU have a strong supporter in Spain. (A notable exception is Kosovo, whose independence Spain refuses to recognize, in part because Madrid sees parallels with its own separatist movements.) In April, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs José Manuel Albares toured the Western Balkans, marking the first visit in twelve years by a Spanish foreign minister to the region and signaling Spain’s support for its countries’ EU hopes.

In addition to enlargement, Spain is vocal in its support for institutional reforms at the EU level. In particular, Madrid has been a leader on the debate around extending the EU’s qualified majority voting (QMV) mechanism to include foreign and security policy issues, which would allow the EU to be more dynamic and responsive in these areas. Spain is unlikely to make a significant breakthrough on QMV during its presidency, but it may be able to advance the discussion during its term. Despite growing consensus among EU member states, smaller countries are more reluctant to adopt QMV because their views could be more easily overcome: Only fifteen out of the twenty-seven member states need to agree in a QMV system, but they must represent at least 65 percent of the EU’s total population.

5. Elections could revise the agenda

“Europe must become an area of certainties,” Sánchez said as he was introducing the Spanish agenda for its EU presidency. And yet, the approaching snap general election has introduced a great deal of uncertainty about who will be in power in Spain going forward. Spaniards are now in election mode, with voting taking place on July 23. The elections were supposed to take place in December, but Sánchez called for snap elections after his party had a poor result in local elections at the end of May.

If Sánchez’s party wins the election, it will, of course, have a minimal impact on the current agenda for Spain’s EU presidency. Likewise, if there is no clear majority from the election, the current government will remain as a caretaker during negotiations around a new coalition, albeit with limited ability to prioritize the European agenda. However, in the event of a major shakeup in the election, the formation of a new government will be decisive for the future of Spanish domestic policy, and, just as decisively, the EU agenda could change, too.

Lisa Homel is an assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Marie Jourdain is a visiting fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Charai in the National Interest: Sweden’s NATO Accession Limits Putin’s Options

Atlantic Council — Mon, 17 Jul 2023 18:16:12 +0000

Original Source

The Western powers are now more united with the Baltic nations than ever before. After months of diplomatic delays, Sweden can now join NATO—a genuine triumph for the Biden administration. This development has enormous geostrategic implications for the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

While European leaders are starting to realize that the Russian bear’s teeth and claws are not as sharp as they once feared, it would be a mistake to believe that the Russians can no longer wreak vast harm across Europe, even without resorting to nuclear weapons. Now is the time for realism about Russia, not over-confidence.

Ahmed Charai, 2023

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Dispatch from Vilnius: Inside a NATO Summit of high drama on Ukraine—and historic opportunity

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 15 Jul 2023 11:30:00 +0000

VILNIUS—Drafting NATO Summit communiqués is usually less the stuff of high drama and more mind-numbing bureaucracy.

But that wasn’t the case this week. The NATO Summit in Lithuania will be remembered both for the public fireworks over Ukraine’s aspirations for Alliance membership and outcomes that included a breakthrough on Swedish membership, the most detailed and robust defense plans since the Cold War, and unprecedented Group of Seven (G7) defense commitments to Kyiv.

Let’s start with the fireworks, unusual in a consensus-driven Alliance that values decorum and discretion, and end with the historic outcomes.

Tensions began simmering long before the summit among Biden administration officials and other NATO allies—with Ukraine lobbing arguments from the outside—over just how far to go in committing the Alliance to a time-linked invitation and roadmap for Ukraine’s membership.

For the Biden administration, it was a matter of geopolitical prudence to oppose any fixed timeline for an invitation for fear it would draw NATO, and hence the United States, into a direct conflict with Russia. With one eye on the 2024 US presidential election and the other on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear capabilities, why take the risk, particularly as full Ukrainian membership wasn’t likely to come before the war ended anyway?

For Ukraine’s more impatient supporters—particularly, but not exclusively, those geographically closer to the Russian threat—it was a matter of strategic imperative and moral obligation to draft language that provided more clarity on the pathway and potential timing of a NATO membership invitation than Washington considered acceptable. Several of those supporters had previously been occupied and repressed by Moscow, so they understand the value of NATO security guarantees.

Even if membership itself wouldn’t come for some time, they wanted to demonstrate maximum common cause for a people who miraculously and at enormous human cost are countering Russia’s war and revanchist ambitions.

The behind-the-scenes simmer boiled over when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, apparently having read a draft of the summit communiqué about to be released, threw a Twitter bomb into the negotiating room.

What he objected to was text at the end of paragraph eleven, which read: “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met.”

Zelenskyy shot back before the draft could be released:

“It’s unprecedented and absurd when time frame is not set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership. While at the same time vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine. It seems there is no readiness neither to invite Ukraine to NATO nor to make it a member of the Alliance. This means that a window of opportunity is being left to bargain Ukraine’s membership in NATO in negotiations with Russia. And for Russia, this means motivation to continue its terror. Uncertainty is weakness. And I will openly discuss this at the summit.”

Before long, word spread in Vilnius that at least one ally had “broken silence,” which in NATO-speak means that during an agreed period after the communiqué has been finalized and before it is publicly released, any ally may come back with an objection and reopen negotiations.

Though it’s unclear what transpired next, officials involved in the negotiations described scenes during the summit in which US President Joe Biden and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stood over the document and hand-drafted changes. In the end, the US stance on Ukrainian membership proved immovable, even resisting attempts by at least one other ally to at the very least state that it was NATO’s intention to explore ways to invite Ukraine to join the Alliance as soon as the seventy-fifth-anniversary summit in Washington next July.

Given all that, there was more than a little buzz when Biden, in his fiery speech in Vilnius—in which he hailed the “unbroken” Ukrainian people—neglected to mention or encourage their NATO membership aspirations.

Even after NATO made the communiqué public, tensions still simmered.

At the NATO Public Forum, (a side event for the summit that the Atlantic Council co-hosted), Daria Kaleniuk, a Ukrainian anti-corruption activist, provocatively asked Sullivan how to explain to her young son, who is sleeping in their corridor due to air raids, that Biden isn’t ready to accept Ukraine into NATO. She suggested it might be “because he is afraid of Russia, afraid of Russia losing, afraid Ukraine winning,” or even suggested, “because there are back-channel negotiations with Russia” that ostensibly had Ukraine’s NATO hopes as a bargaining chip.

Sullivan was warm but firm to his questioner, acknowledging that the world stands in “awe” at the way Ukrainians have made sacrifices with “hell raining down from the skies” around them. At the same time, he scolded Kaleniuk for making “insinuations” that were “unfounded and unjustified” and asked that those insinuations “get checked at the door, so that we can talk to one another in goodwill and good faith.”

Beyond that, Sullivan added, “I think the American people do deserve a degree of gratitude” from both the US government and the rest of the world “for their willingness to step up” to provide such plentiful military assistance to Ukraine.

With tensions high, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace hit a similar theme, “providing a slight word of caution” that Ukraine should express more appreciation to its supporters.

When asked by reporters for his response to Wallace, Zelenskyy replied, “he can write to me about how he wants to be thanked.”

Were it not for the fireworks, the world’s focus would have been more singularly on the summit’s results.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan dropped his objections to Sweden’s membership, opening the way for it to join the Alliance. That leaves Putin facing a bigger and more unified NATO, strengthening defense in the Baltic states and the High North.

Real progress also came through a pledge by G7 countries (all in NATO except Japan), although it is not binding, to provide Ukraine “enduring” support—which each country will determine individually—including more defense equipment, increased intelligence sharing, and expanded training, dramatically reducing the likelihood of eroding resolve.

There was plenty more in the NATO Summit communiqué on defense plans, strengthened commitments to defense investment, and deeper global partnerships, particularly with leaders on hand from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea; there was also robust language on China and warnings not to provide lethal support to its Russian friends for their Ukraine war.

By summit’s end, and by the convening of the renamed and reconstituted NATO-Ukraine Council, tempers had calmed some and diplomacy had intervened on the Ukraine issue, though some bad blood will likely linger.

Zelenskyy went home not with a NATO invitation but with family photo-like pictures alongside NATO leaders, as mentioned in my Inflection Points column last week, and a dramatically different tone than his earlier missive, as shown in a video he tweeted from his train ride home to Kyiv:

“We are returning home with a good result for our country and, very importantly, for our warriors… For the first time since independence, we have formed a security foundation for Ukraine on its way to NATO. These are concrete security guarantees that are confirmed by the top seven democracies in the world. Never before have we had such a security foundation, and this is the level of the G7… Very importantly, during these two days of the [NATO] Summit, we have put to rest any doubts and ambiguities about whether Ukraine will be in NATO. It will! For the first time, not only do all the allies agree on this, but a significant majority in the alliance is vigorously pushing for it.”

At a closing session for the NATO Public Forum, I asked Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis how history would remember the Vilnius summit.

“Strategically, we won,” he said. “We committed ourselves to Ukrainian membership in NATO.” Unlike the 2008 commitment at the Bucharest NATO Summit that had no follow up, Landsbergis said the Alliance and Ukraine this time won’t waste another day, because of the urgency that Putin’s war had placed on everyone.

The Vilnius summit “was not the last stop,” he said. “We have to see it as a bridge. And the next stop is Washington. So, we have a full year. Lots to do…. Washington can actually be even more historic than Vilnius.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 NATO’s promises to Ukraine mark real progress
ECONOMIST

The Economist reports that although NATO allies could have done more at this week’s summit in Vilnius, they dealt a number of blows to Putin that went far beyond Ukraine.

“Putin’s first defeat was over a different expansion of NATO,” the Economist writes. “Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said he is dropping his objections to Sweden’s membership, enabling it to follow its Nordic neighbor, Finland, into the alliance. That will strengthen the Baltic states and the High North, and tie up more of Putin’s resources should he attempt mischief against NATO anywhere along its frontier.”

Further, with increased military assistance from G7 countries, it will become harder for Putin to maintain his resolve. “The G7 members promise that this will be an ‘enduring’ commitment, and that each country will, individually, craft its own security guarantees for Ukraine that will give it a ‘sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future.’… This matters because it helps disabuse Putin and his elites of the belief that Western resolve will crumble if only Russia clings on.”

Although delaying Ukraine’s NATO membership process until after the war will likely give Russia incentive to prolong the war, the Economist argues, the additional military assistance should prevent that from happening. “That is where the summit made real progress.” Read more →

#2 The ‘Israel Model’ Won’t Work for Ukraine
Eliot A. Cohen | ATLANTIC

In this important Atlantic piece, Eliot Cohen argues that the “Israel model”—in which the West would arm Ukraine to the teeth to guarantee its ability to defeat any credible military threat—is a poor policy choice based on flawed reasoning.

Cohen writes that the main difference between 1973 Israel and 2023 Ukraine is that Israel had a military edge over its neighbors, which Ukraine currently lacks over Russia. “Israel staged bombing raids against targets deep in Syria and Egypt, including their capitals, from the 1960s forward, and unlike the Ukrainian drones flying to Moscow, these were not mere symbolic strikes. The Six Day War, in 1967, was an overwhelming Israeli victory, which involved the annihilation of its neighbors’ air forces and the advance of Israeli armor and infantry across the de facto 1949 border. The 1973 war similarly ended with Israeli forces within artillery range of Damascus and on the verge of destroying half the Egyptian force that had crossed the Suez Canal.”

Most provocatively, Cohen writes about the difference between an Israel with a nuclear arsenal and a Ukraine that gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994 in a deal under which Moscow promised to safeguard its sovereignty and security. “Unless, of course,” Cohen warns in his conclusion, “[Biden] prefers to be the father of the Ukrainian atom bomb.” Read more →

#3 Russia’s Nuclear Option Hangs Over Ukraine and NATO
Robbie Gramer | FOREIGN POLICY

To gain an understanding of how fears of nuclear conflict played into this week’s decision, read Robbie Gramer in Foreign Policy.

“The nuclear question is an existential one for the alliance,” he writes, “one that’s driven Washington’s calculations on what military aid to send to Ukraine and when, and it has also influenced the debate on when and how to allow Ukraine to join the military alliance as a full-fledged member.”

According to Gramer, US and allied officials are divided over the validity of Russian threats. “Some US and other NATO defense officials believe there could be an increased risk of Russia launching a limited nuclear strike with a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon to stave off a major battlefield defeat if its forces look to be on the verge of a rout, or if Ukraine appears poised to capture Crimea and large swaths of occupied territory in southern and eastern Ukraine. Others say that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling won’t go further than that, and bowing to such threats will only embolden Russia to use such ‘nuclear blackmail’ in the future.”

“At the same time, Ukrainian and Western officials also fear that Russia could mount an attack on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant to attempt to trigger a major radiological event, irrespective of whether it launches a nuclear strike—though it’s unclear how successful those efforts would be.” Read more →

#4 Biden Pledges Long-Term Backing for Ukraine, but a U.S. Election Looms
Zolan Kanno-Youngs | NEW YORK TIMES

For insight into the role of US domestic politics on the NATO summit and Biden’s decision making, look no further than Zolan Kanno-Youngs’s reporting in the New York Times.

“Despite Biden’s repeated promises of staying by Ukraine’s side in its war against Russia, questions about the shelf life of support among American people and lawmakers hung over the summit of Western allies,” Kanno-Youngs writes. “Even as the US president was giving a long-term commitment, a group of far-right Republican lawmakers in Washington was pushing legislation that would scale back aid to Ukraine, exposing fractures in the Republican Party and raising doubts about its commitment should it capture the White House next year.”

According to Kanno-Youngs, to sway domestic public opinion to favor providing aid to Ukraine, Biden has framed the war as an existential battle between democracy and autocracy. In Vilnius, Biden was determined to address the doubts about continued US support for Ukraine. “We will not waver,” Biden said. “I mean that. Our commitment to Ukraine will not weaken.” Read more →

#5 Should Ukraine Negotiate with Russia?
Dmytro Natalukha; Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried; Angela Stent; Samuel Charap | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In dialogue with Samuel Charap, who previously urged the use of diplomacy as a tool to end the war with Ukraine, Dmytro Natalukha, Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried (an Atlantic Council distinguished fellow), and Angela Stent argue that negotiations with Russia are bound to fail. Read this multifaceted analysis to understand the pros and cons of negotiation with Russia.

Natalukha claimed that the only way to secure Ukraine’s future is to remove Putin from power. “If the goal is to prevent Russia from threatening democracies around the world, allowing it to reach an armistice with Ukraine won’t do much good,” he writes. “Ukraine and its allies must aim to make Russia less anti-Western. Regardless of what happens at the negotiating table, therefore, Putin cannot remain in power.”

Polyakova and Fried believe that although negotiation will most likely happen, the battlefield is Ukraine’s best position from which to win the war: “A military stalemate is indeed possible. And at some point, negotiations with Russia will be needed to end this war. But Ukraine should start negotiating only when it is in the strongest possible position; it should not be rushed into talks when Russia shows no interest in any settlement terms other than Ukraine’s surrender. Starting negotiations now would mean accepting Putin’s maximalist terms. If Russia suffers further setbacks on the battlefield, however, talks could proceed from a better starting place.”

Polyakova and Fried continue, “The most important point, which Ukraine’s allies agree on, is that Ukraine must define the right moment for negotiations. That may or may not be when all of Ukraine’s territory is liberated. The key is for Ukraine to maintain flexibility in its decisions about its territory and the path toward a just peace.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Jul 11, 2023

Experts react: What NATO’s Vilnius summit means for Ukraine and the Alliance’s future

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts decode the summit’s implications for Ukraine’s membership, NATO’s approach to China, and more.

Belarus Central Europe

UkraineAlert Jul 11, 2023

NATO summit leaves Ukrainians frustrated

By Peter Dickinson

The 2023 NATO summit failed to deliver on hopes for a clear commitment on future Ukrainian membership, leaving many in Ukraine deeply frustrated by the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s allies, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Corruption

New Atlanticist Jul 10, 2023

Experts react: Erdogan just agreed to support Sweden’s NATO bid. What does that mean for Turkey, Sweden, and the Alliance?

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts weigh in on what’s behind this dramatic and consequential turnabout from Erdoğan and what to expect next.

Europe & Eurasia European Union

The post Dispatch from Vilnius: Inside a NATO Summit of high drama on Ukraine—and historic opportunity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With re-election behind him, Erdogan is turning toward the West

Grady Wilson — Fri, 14 Jul 2023 22:13:53 +0000

In a reprise of the accession drama at last year’s NATO Summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan flashed Turkey’s long-awaited green light for Sweden’s NATO membership on the eve of this year’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. But that green light signals much more than “go” for Stockholm: It also signals that Turkey has taken the opportunity to greater align itself with the West in the months since Erdoğan secured re-election.

Sweden’s journey to accession seems to be playing out along Turkey’s preferred timeline, coming one month after Sweden’s tougher anti-terror laws came into force and having been affirmed at the Alliance’s marquee gathering for maximum effect. Recent developments—including fresh pro-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) demonstrations and a Quran burning in Sweden—threatened to derail the process, but Turkey should be credited for not giving in to these provocations.

The agreement is the latest and greatest signal that Turkey has decided to align more with the West. Other notable signals came in the form of Turkey’s hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (during which Ankara reiterated its longstanding support for Ukraine’s NATO membership and angered Moscow by releasing Azov battalion commanders) and the reiteration of the value it places on European Union membership. All these signals happened in a span of three days. The developments stand in stark contrast to speculation—that has arisen since before Turkey first raised an issue with Sweden’s accession—that Turkey, under Erdoğan, is pivoting toward Russia and the East.

Two months ago, when in the heat of a tough re-election campaign, Erdoğan accused Western countries (including the United States) of colluding with the opposition to remove him from power. At that point, the trajectory of Turkey’s relations with transatlantic allies appeared much less clear. Once Erdoğan won the presidential elections and the parliament became distinctly more nationalist, there were fears an emboldened Turkey would move toward the East. The first hint that this would not be the case, and that the president’s pragmatism would once again emerge, appeared in the selection of the post-election cabinet, which broadly elevated several pro-Western voices—including widely respected Mehmet Şimşek, who was brought back as minister of treasury and finance—and sidelined the most outspoken transatlantic skeptics.

Analysts close to the Turkish government were quick to assert that Turkey’s moves constitute not so much a pivot to the West but a push to balance relations and mend troubled relationships in line with a course Turkey has been pursuing for many years. On the other hand, there is speculation that part of the impetus lies in the perception of a weakened Russia following the Wagner Group mutiny in June and its aftermath. What is clear is that a weaker Russian President Vladimir Putin renders Moscow a less reliable partner for Turkey. Particularly since the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan’s government, Turkey-Russia relations have been driven from the top down by leader-to-leader chemistry. While Turkey and Russia’s deep economic relations are unlikely to be interrupted or curtailed, the idea or illusion of Russia as a balance or alternative to the West in any kind of strategic sense will begin to fray.

This move from Erdoğan is a major win for Sweden, Turkey, and the whole Alliance. It’s also a big win for the Biden administration and for NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who both worked very hard behind the scenes to make the agreement possible.

The breakthrough followed soon after a phone call between the US and Turkish presidents and after a flurry of contact between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and their counterparts. A major, yet unofficial, sweetener to the agreement appears to be the United States’ assurance, issued one day after Erdoğan’s agreement, that it will sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, which Turkey first requested in October 2021 (after its ejection from the F-35 program) but has been thus far blocked by Congress.

In a pre-NATO Summit interview over the weekend, Biden alluded to boosting support for both Greece and Turkey’s defense capabilities simultaneously as a way to push the F-16 deal through Congress. That hearkens back to how the United States has historically balanced its two key allies in Southeastern Europe through aid dating back to the Truman Doctrine, which laid the groundwork for the eventual inclusion of both in NATO. It also underlines the importance of Turkey’s warming of ties with Greece in the wake of the devastating earthquake this February. These factors may play a role in overcoming the concerns of key members of the US Congress, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who confirmed that he is in talks with the Biden administration on the F-16 sale.

Finalizing Sweden’s NATO accession—which still needs to be ratified by Turkey’s parliament (as well as Hungary’s)—and completing the F-16 deal would be big steps toward rebuilding trust between Turkey and its transatlantic partners. In a speech on July 12, Erdogan announced that Turkey’s parliament will take up ratification after the long recess in October, in line with the parliamentary calendar.

One grievance from Turkey regarding its troubled transatlantic relationship is the perception that its Western allies have never fully appreciated Turkey’s security concerns. Despite officially designating the PKK—Turkey’s number one security threat—as a terrorist organization, the United States and Europe have not shown Turkey the deference that it feels due on this issue. This is in part due to the United States’ cooperation with the PKK’s Syrian affiliate to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Turkey’s temporary block on Sweden afforded Turkey the opportunity, in high-stakes fashion, to remind the Alliance that its concerns need to be taken more seriously moving forward.

One way to read Turkey’s post-election foreign-policy posture is a willingness to improve its relations with the West. Over the past three years, Turkey has aggressively pursued and concluded rapprochements with many countries in its neighborhood including Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. While Turkey’s relations with its NATO allies never deteriorated as much as they did with the aforementioned countries, there is without question room to improve. Turkey, Sweden, the United States, and NATO have all committed to win-win moves that would contribute to a more positive and productive atmosphere. Now, they all need to follow through.

Grady Wilson is associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. Follow him on Twitter @GradysWilson.

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The ‘Tehran’ series isn’t far-fetched. Israeli agents are operating with ease in Iran.

Arash Azizi — Fri, 14 Jul 2023 15:09:09 +0000

The news was so incredible that it would have made more sense as an episode on the spy thriller series, Tehran. On June 29, Israeli intelligence agency Mossad revealed the details of an operation inside Iran. Its agents, it claimed, had recently interrogated an operative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) who had planned to kill Israeli citizens in Cyprus. Israel had already thanked Cyprus for helping foil this plan. For good measure, Mossad released footage from a video confession of Yusef Shahbazi Abbasalilu along with a boarding pass that had him traveling from Istanbul to Iran. If this is to be believed, Mossad agents operate with such ease in Iran that they are not only able to gather intelligence but arrest and interrogate a regime operative on Iranian soil.

Shahbazi’s confession is quite detailed. He reveals his alleged chain of command and the name of the agent who recruited him. Shahbazi says that he was put in touch with several IRGC contacts in Cyprus who had taken part in assassination operations before (Israeli media have reported these to be Pakistani nationals.) According to his account, Shahbazi entered the island by flying from Turkey to Northern Cyprus (a breakaway state only recognized by Ankara) and then smuggled himself into the Greek-majority southern part of the island. In contact with his handlers in Iran via WhatsApp, Shahbazi was preparing to kill the target—reportedly an Israeli businessman—when he found out that the police were on his tail and was told to bury his weapons and flee. Shahbazi reportedly followed the instructions and made it to Tehran via Istanbul.

Mossad’s history in Iran

Unlikely as it may sound, it’s not the first time Mossad has claimed to have undertaken such an operation. In fact, this is the third such case in the last eighteen months. In April 2022, Israeli media reported on an alleged Mossad operation on Iranian territory. Israeli intelligence agents had reportedly detained and questioned Mansour Rasouly, a fifty-two-year-old IRGC agent, in his residence in Iran, where he had confessed to a plan to assassinate an Israeli diplomat in Turkey, an American general stationed in Germany, and a journalist in France. The Israeli media published an audio file of Rasouly’s confession without revealing their source.

Months later, in July 2022, London-based diaspora satellite channel Iran International claimed that Mossad had interrogated another IRGC official, Yadollah Khedmati, in Iran, publishing the footage of his confessions about the transfer of weaponry to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

In each of the three cases, the Islamic Republic has come back with a different form of denial. In the two cases from 2022, they confirmed that the interrogations had taken place and claimed that they were done by a group of local criminal thugs recruited by Mossad. But in the case of Rasouly, they declared he was a farmer in northwestern Iran with no military connection. However, in the case of Khedmati, they confirmed that he was an IRGC figure (without naming him) but said that he had been forced to confess to untruths under “torture and threats.”

With Shahbazi’s case, state media outlets have taken a different path. They claim that Mossad has fabricated the entire story to overcome its panic following the recent alleged busting of its networks in Iran. In late May, judicial officials had claimed to have nabbed fourteen members of a “terrorist team” with ties to Israel. Par for the course with such claims, no evidence was given to support the charge.

As proof of their allegations about Shahbazi, regime outlets published pictures of tickets and flight manifests that show him to have taken a flight from Tehran to Baku on May 15, implying that the confession was staged and not recorded in Iran. Claiming this to be a smoking gun makes no sense. Shahbazi would have had plenty of time since May 15 to have returned to Iran from Baku and could have traveled later to Cyprus.

The regime outlets also tied the Shahbazi affair to an incident in May, in which the capsizing of a boat in Lake Maggiore in Italy led to the death of Erez Shimony, a fifty-four-year-old former Mossad agent. They went as far as implying that Shimony’s death might have been revenge for another killing that had happened almost exactly a year before: the assassination of IRGC’s Colonel Hassan Seyed Khodaee right outside his home, which, according to a report by the New York Times, was done by Mossad.

But, just as the IRGC downplays Shahbazi’s confession, some sources claim that Iran is working hard for his release by Israelis. According to the London-based and Saudi-owned newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, Iran is requesting a prisoner exchange from Israel: Shahbazi’s release in return for that of Elizabeth Tsurkov, a Russian-Israeli scholar who was kidnapped in Iraq in March by an Iran-backed Shia militia.

The ongoing shadow war

For years now, Iran and Israel have been engaged in a shadow war involving intelligence operations, assassinations, and attacks on land and sea. When facing Israel, Iran has the benefit of using its vast network of allied militias in the region. Alongside the operations, a war of narratives also rages on and there is no surprise that both sides employ a game of cloak and daggers.

Nevertheless, even if not all Israeli claims were to be believed, there is no doubt that the ease with which they operate inside Iranian territory is astonishing. Since 2009, Israelis have helped assassinate many officials linked to the IRGC or the country’s nuclear program. Its last major hit was the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a leading figure of the IRGC, in November 2020, which took place on a road using a robotic machine gun. Prior to that, in January 2018, Mossad was able to raid the Iranian nuclear archives in a village outside Tehran, gaining access to 55,000 pages of documents and 183 CDs.

On the other side, the Islamic Republic has never been able to retaliate on anything close to a similar scale. This was clearly evident in June of 2022, when Israel worked closely with Turkey to stop an Iranian plan to kill or abduct Israeli civilians in Turkey. Israel went as far as asking all of its thousands of citizens traveling in Turkey to stay in their hotel rooms and not even open the door for food delivery. In the same week, Hossein Taeb, the powerful head of IRGC’s Intelligence Department, was finally dismissed following years of controversy. Taeb had headed the organization from its very inception in 2009 and had come under increasing criticism for all the Israeli operations that kept happening under his watch. The leaking of the Turkey-related plans seems to have been the last straw.

Given the long list of operations that Israel has been able to conduct in Iranian territory, it’s pretty clear that the clerical establishment has failed in its basic task of defending the country. It’s not hard to see why that’s the case. The country’s security forces dedicate most of their energy to oppressing ordinary Iranians and taking random foreign citizens—artists, academics, and journalists—hostage in the hope of using them as bargaining chips. Extracting forced confessions by torture helps the regime with its propaganda purposes but is not a tool for effective counter-espionage.

This was on full display in 2019, when Maziar Ebrahimi, an Iranian businessman based in Iraqi Kurdistan, revealed how he had been tortured into confessing to a role in the assassination of nuclear scientists. Arrested in 2012, Ebrahimi had, under duress, even confessed to traveling to Israel to receive military training. When all of this later turned out to be false, he was released and left the country before sharing his story with BBC Persian.

The amateur methods used by the regime are often so buffoonish to be believable. In 2012, following the execution of Majid Jamali Fashi, an Iranian athlete charged alongside Ebrahimi, the Iranian state broadcaster published an image of his alleged Israeli passport. But journalist Fereshte Ghazi was quickly able to show the source of this image: a Wikipedia template of an Israeli passport had been used with Majid’s picture inserted into it. The basic information on the passport from the Wikipedia template was not even changed.

Thus, the track record of the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus is clear: they can frame and torture their citizens to extract forced confessions but cannot stop numerous Israeli operations on Iranian soil.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar based at New York University. He is the author of “The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions.” Follow him on Twitter: @arash_tehran.

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After Tunisia expelled 1,200 Black Africans, here’s how the West can help avoid a humanitarian disaster

Alissa Pavia and Tarek Megerisi — Fri, 14 Jul 2023 14:48:22 +0000

A human catastrophe is developing on Tunisia’s borders with little international attention. On July 2, Tunisian security forces rounded up over one thousand Black Africans from the city of Sfax. Security forces claimed to have detained their racially selected targets under the pretext of protecting them from civil unrest. However, according to victims’ testimonies provided to Human Rights Watch, Tunisian authorities identified and checked their papers before smashing their cell phones, throwing away their food, violently and sexually abusing them, and expelling them at the borders with Libya and Algeria. Some of these individuals were refugees registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Others were transitory migrants, although most were laborers and students who were residing in Tunisia.

For about ten days, an estimated seven hundred people were stranded in no man’s land between the southeastern Tunisian and Libyan borders, with a further two hundred still stranded in similar circumstances along the western border with Algeria. Tunisian authorities recently resettled most of the migrants stranded on the Libyan border. However, their response remains inadequate, mainly due to the absence of guarantees that this situation will not recur. This is a significant possibility, given local demands for African migrants to be removed from the town of Ben Guerdane, the Tunisian smuggling capital near the Libyan border, where many were resettled, and the aforementioned hundreds that are still stranded at the Algerian border.

Additionally, international organizations remain prohibited from providing crucial humanitarian assistance, and fear dominates the sub-Saharan migrant community. Thus, communication with victims is limited to voice notes and messages from smuggled phones. This means conditions could be even worse—and the numbers of those stranded even greater—than currently reported. And what is known of the conditions is already bad enough; with dwindling food and water and temperatures climbing to over 104 degrees Fahrenheit, victims have reported horrific stories of pregnant women dying in labor and people being driven by thirst to drink seawater.

This catastrophe is brewing against the backdrop of increasing authoritarianism in Tunisia under President Kais Saied and a severely deteriorating economy. Since February, when Saied re-appropriated a local version of the far-right great replacement theory, Tunisia’s president has used Black and migrant communities in Tunisia as a populist scapegoat for the country’s problems. This has stoked mass anti-Black hysteria that is now manifesting as active hostility wherever migrants are settled, as seen with the response in Ben Guerdane.

President Saied has also utilized harsh counter-migration policies to leverage financial support from Europe—specifically Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—creating an incentivization structure and aura of impunity that have fed into the current crackdown.

The situation on Tunisia’s borders is not only a humanitarian catastrophe that could cause the death of hundreds of innocent people—it could also catalyze political, criminal, and diplomatic issues across the broader region. Mass arbitrary expulsions and violent abuse incited by inflammatory speeches of Tunisia’s president have already boosted the numbers of sub-Saharan refugees fleeing to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea since February. Systematic and abusive government crackdowns will exacerbate this fear and could trigger a panicked, mass exodus as Tunisia becomes palpably unsafe for Black Africans, creating a new migration crisis for Europe.

This development also bolsters the already burgeoning business of human traffickers, helping them to entrench and expand other criminal activities. Additionally, it could strain relationships between Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria, as no country wishes to claim these stranded peoples, and Tunisian authorities continue ejecting them into sensitive border zones.

It’s imperative for Europe, and especially the United States, to act to avert this catastrophe—not only for humanitarian reasons but also to protect regional stability and defend key regional interests. The United States has invested more than $1.4 billion in Tunisia’s democracy since 2011 and is invested in promoting democracies to counter China and Russia’s authoritarian systems. As a result, the United States is financially, ideologically, and diplomatically invested in supporting its European allies to stabilize an issue of extreme importance in the central Mediterranean.

A Western policy response should focus on the short-term imperative of providing protection and assistance to the stranded while stopping further expulsions. Additionally, medium-term policies to build structural safeguards can prevent this from re-occurring and perhaps even result in a healthier ecosystem for migrants and migration diplomacy in Tunisia.

Short-term solutions

In light of this ongoing crisis, European and US stakeholders have the opportunity to collaborate in preventing further deaths while simultaneously establishing a solid foundation for holistic and enduring resolutions to the migration predicament in Tunisia.

A first response should come through immediate public statements by senior officials that condemn the crackdown, highlighting Tunisia’s contravention of international conventions it has joined, such as the United Nations and African Refugee Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. All of these accords explicitly forbid the practice of refoulement and forcibly returning or expelling individuals to countries where they may be subjected to torture, threats to their lives or freedom, or other severe forms of harm.

Furthermore, Western governments should call on Tunisian authorities to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to aid the stranded.

Given that the aforementioned suggestions are immediately actionable, uncontroversial, and the most direct way to end the humanitarian crisis, they should be prioritized and enacted as soon as possible. For maximum effect, this could take the form of a joint statement made by the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union (EU), which could be supplemented by senior level phone calls between leaders who have a good relationship with President Saied, like French President Emmanuel Macron.

To create an atmosphere of maximum pressure reflecting the dire situation, further statements condemning the developments and proposing steps forward, such as allowing aid to the stranded, could be issued by the US Congress and the European Parliament—particularly committees such as the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI).

The United States and EU can also provide capacity assistance to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to help conduct voluntary resettlement for stranded Africans who had been working or studying in Tunisia and no longer feel safe, as well as those who were hoping to migrate onwards but would now rather return home. In addition, Western countries can support the home countries of these migrants by helping them provide consular assistance. In many cases, their embassies lack the personnel and resources required to respond to a crisis of this size.

The United States and EU have strong relationships with Tunisia’s defense ministry and interior ministry, respectively, and they should be leveraged. Given the difficulties of directly influencing the infamously intransigent President Saied—and that Tunisia’s security services are perhaps the only institutions retaining significant influence over the president and are the main implementers of these policies—capitalizing on these relationships represents the West’s most practical means of influencing the situation.

As a last resort, the US should communicate that by facilitating these crackdowns in violation of international conventions—the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the United Nations (UN) and African Refugee conventions, the Convention against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—that Tunisia’s security services may end up excluding themselves from further funding programs. Meanwhile, Europeans can threaten to revoke the privileges that the Tunisian interior ministry’s officer class enjoys from their close partnership with Europeans to encourage Tunisia’s security services to uphold the law, cease their participation in egregious human rights abuses, and allow humanitarian organizations to tend to the stranded. This could be further communicated in bilateral conversations between European interior ministers who have recently visited Tunisia to meet with their counterparts.

Medium-term solutions

Since February, the African Union (AU) and countries whose citizens have been victimized by the racist crackdowns incited by President Saied have condemned the situation. They also remain better placed to provide diplomatic accountability measures to try and disincentivize Saied’s regime from continuing this course of action.

Alongside the AU’s responses, the EU could provide support to replicate mechanisms trialed elsewhere—such as the EU-AU-UN Tripartite Taskforce on the Situation of Migrants and Refugees in Libya—to develop and oversee sustained policy responses to help ameliorate the worsening situation of migrants and refugees in Tunisia, and build a working relationship with Tunisian authorities that could help avert such scenarios from reoccurring.

On June 11, when announcing the new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Europe and Tunisia, European Council (EC) President Ursula Von der Leyen claimed that the migration part of the comprehensive package would be implemented in full respect of human rights and would become a model for migration deals with other countries. Considering the developments since, there should be clear stipulations added to the MoU to prevent mass arbitrary expulsions and violent abuse from being repeated, including accountability measures.

Alongside making a more focused, robust, and safeguarded migration pact, the European Parliament should more effectively leverage its role in budgetary scrutiny and oversight over EC spending to not only ensure the future deal is effectively implemented, but also look over existing funding packages given to the Tunisian border police. It is rumored that border guards are disgruntled that additional EU funding has yet to reach them in terms of increased salaries or new equipment and accuse the state of simply repurposing that money to its general budget. In this scenario, border guards are more inclined to accept money from traffickers and thereby enable trafficking instead of policing it. Moreover, this dynamic neutralizes any leverage or incentive this financing could provide to ensure that humanitarian standards are upheld. So, it behooves the European parliament to more closely scrutinize how its existing migration funding is being spent.

The importance of Tunisia’s migration policy—especially given its ability to feed into other delicate issues, such as people smuggling and general regional stability—and its relationship with European migration policy should be routinely highlighted when European and US delegations visit Tunisia. Upcoming visits by European Parliament committees are a prime opportunity to initiate conversations on migration management practices, which can be followed up by identifying robust safeguards to prevent the reoccurrence of such situations.

By implementing these short-term and medium-term policy recommendations, European and US stakeholders can work towards addressing the immediate challenges while laying the groundwork for more comprehensive and sustainable solutions to the migration situation in Tunisia.

Alissa Pavia is associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs’ North Africa Program.

Tarek Megerisi is a senior policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

The post After Tunisia expelled 1,200 Black Africans, here’s how the West can help avoid a humanitarian disaster appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rich Outzen joins TRT World’s Strait Talk to discuss the anniversary of failed coup attempt in Turkey

aozen — Fri, 14 Jul 2023 12:53:59 +0000

The post Rich Outzen joins TRT World’s Strait Talk to discuss the anniversary of failed coup attempt in Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Disappointed but not discouraged: Ukrainians react to NATO summit

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 13 Jul 2023 20:15:34 +0000

The annual NATO summit in Vilnius this week failed to produce the kind of breakthrough toward membership of the alliance that many Ukrainians were hoping for. However, it did offer up ample evidence of continued strong international support for Ukraine in the fight against Russia’s ongoing invasion.

Despite widespread recognition that Ukraine’s future must be as part of NATO, member states were unable to reach a consensus on the crucial issue of a membership invitation. Instead, the summit declaration featured vague references to future membership “when allies agree and conditions are met,” leading to considerable frustration and talk of missed opportunities.

While no NATO invitation was forthcoming, Ukraine did secure confirmation that the country would not have to go through the Membership Action Plan (MAP) stage of the accession process. The summit was also marked by the inaugural session of the NATO-Ukraine Council, a new forum designed to intensify cooperation while helping to prepare Ukraine for future membership. Additional positives included a series of significant announcements on military aid, and a joint declaration from the G7 nations pledging long-term security assistance for Ukraine.

Many in Ukraine expressed frustration over the failure to secure a clear signal over NATO membership, but others argued that expectations had been unrealistically high and noted that the annual gathering in Lithuania brought plenty of good news for Ukraine. The Atlantic Council invited a number of Ukrainian commentators to share their assessment of the Vilnius summit.

Danylo Lubkivsky, Director, Kyiv Security Forum: The NATO summit in Vilnius calls for sober assessment. The alliance has clearly failed to seize the strategic initiative or achieve a political breakthrough. Naturally, this has provoked a wave of disappointment and concern.

Unlike the Ukrainian military, NATO leaders still appear to trapped in defensive thinking. This is unfortunate as Western caution only encourages the enemy. Gradual provision of arms prolongs the war and increases the number of casualties. Far from protecting NATO members, ambiguity over Ukraine’s future membership serves to undermine the alliance’s international authority.

Despite these reservations, I do not think there was much for Russia to cheer in Vilnius. The summit demonstrated that while there is no consensus over Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, the entire Western world remains firm and unwavering in its support for the Ukrainian war effort. This message will have been well understood in Moscow.

Attention must now turn toward next year’s summit in Washington DC. This jubilee summit marking 75 years of NATO will take place against a backdrop of the 2024 US presidential election campaign. The historic nature of the summit may work in Ukraine’s favor, creating a climate for historic decisions. After Vilnius, it is clear that the Ukrainian authorities must work consistently with all partners to secure a positive outcome next summer. Ultimately, much will also depend on the Ukrainian military and its ability to create the conditions for NATO accession by succeeding on the battlefield.

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Olena Halushka, Board Member, Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC): Many practical steps were taken during the Vilnius summit to strengthen Ukraine’s war effort. These included new commitments to supply weapons, F-16 jet fighter training for Ukrainian pilots, and the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Council.

However, Kyiv’s key goal was to receive an official invitation to join NATO. Based on the understanding that full NATO membership would not be possible as long as hostilities continue, Ukrainians saw no legal or practical obstacles to issuing an invitation and beginning the accession process. Instead, the summit declaration made vague references to membership “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This was disappointing but not discouraging. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called this year’s Vilnius summit historic for Sweden. We now hope next year’s summit in Washington DC will finally make history for Ukraine, too.

Oleksiy Goncharenko, Ukrainian MP, European Solidarity Party: This was definitely not an historic summit from a Ukrainian perspective. While Ukraine dominated the summit agenda, NATO leaders chose not to take the bold step of officially inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. It is somewhat ironic that 15 years ago at the NATO summit in Bucharest, the United States was leading the push to offer Ukraine membership. This year, the roles were reversed.

The language adopted in the summit communique was not strong enough. This was a big mistake as the only language Vladimir Putin understands is strength. Instead, NATO leaders opted for the language of caution and hesitation.

There were also some reasons for optimism in Vilnius. The communique included the word “invitation” and also acknowledged that Ukraine can sidestep the Membership Action Plan (MAP) stage of the accession process, which is good news. We must now focus our efforts on securing an historic breakthrough at next year’s summit in the US. Further failure could have a profoundly negative impact on Ukrainian public opinion at a time when Ukrainians overwhelmingly back the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

Eurasia Center events

Russia strikes humanitarian aid delivery point in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Volodymyr Dubovyk, Associate Professor, Odesa Mechnikov National University: I did not have high expectations for the summit and did not think it was likely to become a breakthrough moment in Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership, so I cannot say I was particularly disappointed. At the same time, it is clear that the wording of the final communique was not good. It was reminiscent of the vague language used in Bucharest back in 2008, and reflected the widely acknowledged lack of agreement among NATO allies over Ukrainian membership. Some of the passages from the communique, such as the references to interoperability between Ukraine and the alliance, gave the impression that the dramatic events of the past year and a half had not happened at all.

Having said that, my main concern was that tension over the NATO membership issue could damage ongoing military, political, and financial support for Ukraine in its war of liberation. This did not happen. There was some evidence of emotions flying high, with President Zelenskyy’s angry tweet on the way to the summit provoking a defensive reaction from some allies, but the overall mood was one of constructive cooperation and partnership.

Iuliia Mendel, former press secretary to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrate their commitment to Ukrainian democracy and independence every day as they defend the country along the front lines of the war with Russia. This NATO summit was an opportunity to send a positive signal to them that their sacrifices are acknowledged and appreciated. Unfortunately, the summit communique was too vague to send a clear message.

Instead of decisive action, I saw a lot of bureaucratic discussion. This was frustrating, especially as an invitation would not have meant immediate Ukrainian accession to NATO. It would not have triggered Article 5 or plunged NATO into a war with Russia. Ukrainians find this approach hard to stomach. For us, NATO is a matter of national survival, not a box-ticking exercise.

There are two main reasons for the diplomatic compromises we witnessed in Vilnius. Firstly, some Western leaders are still concerned that issuing Ukraine with an invitation to join NATO could lead to an escalation and expansion of the current war. Secondly, there are also legitimate reservations over Ukraine’s readiness for membership, particularly in terms of the country’s domestic reform agenda.

Despite the disappointment of the Vilnius summit, I remain confident that Ukraine has earned the right to join NATO and will achieve membership sooner or later. Nevertheless, there is no denying that an important opportunity to demonstrate international support for Ukraine has been missed.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Russian military chief makes first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny

Russian forces continue to conduct offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk, with Ukrainian armed forces reporting thirty combat engagements between July 10 and 11 near Hryhorivka, Syeverne, Marinka, Krasnohorivka, and Novomykhailivka. According to the same report, Russian forces shelled villages and towns in the direction of Zaporizhzhia, Lyman, Kupiansk, and Kherson. Ukrainian Telegram channels also reported explosions on the morning of July 11 in Novooleksiivka, Kherson Oblast.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive advanced slowly amid heavy fighting along well-fortified Russian positions. On July 8, a video posted by RFE/RL’s Ukraine service showed how fighters from the 47th Separate Mechanized “Magura” Brigade, alongside soldiers from the Zaporizhzhia Brigade of the Territorial Defense Forces, occupied elevated Russian army positions in the direction of Zaporizhzhia near Novodarivka. However, Russia’s use of remote-controlled landmines has made it difficult for Ukraine to advance. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced on July 10 that Ukrainian forces had taken control of elevated positions around Bakhmut, allowing them to establish fire control over Bakhmut. Russian military bloggers have expressed fears that Ukrainian forces could encircle Russian forces in Bakhmut.

The Russian Ministry of Defense published footage on July 10 of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, his first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny. In the footage, Gerasimov receives reports about alleged Ukrainian attempts to strike Russian targets in occupied Crimea, Rostov, and Kaluga. The ministry published the footage the same day the Kremlin acknowledged President Vladimir Putin’s June 29 meeting with Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.

On July 11, the Russian Telegram channel Military Informant reported that Ukraine had used British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles to strike a Russian army post near Berdyansk. The strike killed Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District. On the same day, explosions were reported in occupied Tokmak, Skadovsk, and Berdyansk. Also that day, the Russian army shelled Sofiivka, Kherson Oblast, with Grad multiple rocket launcher systems, killing at least one person and wounding another.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army is increasingly using equipment created by volunteers and local engineers in an attempt to diversify its supplies. On July 9, a team of Ukrainian engineers known as Immaterium reported that a first-person view (FPV) drone destroyed a Russian observation tower located nine kilometers from the departure point. Immaterium also claimed that the drone strike set a distance record for an FPV drone developed and produced locally.

Elsewhere, Armin Papperger, head of the German defense company Rheinmetall, said on July 10 that an armored vehicle repair plant would open in Ukraine within twelve weeks. Papperger added that he hopes to increase Rheinmetall’s production of shells within one year so the company can provide Ukrainian forces with up to 60 percent of their needs. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Minister for Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin said construction was underway on a new plant to produce Bayraktar drones in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s defense ministry announced on July 8 that five former Azov commanders who fought in the battle over Mariupol were released from Turkey and returning to Ukraine alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Ukraine’s ambassador to Turkey, Vasily Bodnar, said that Turkey did not put any conditions on Ukraine for the return of the Azov commanders. Bodnar added that their release was preceded by months of detailed diplomatic work. The commanders ended up in Turkey as a result of a prisoner swap brokered by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The commanders participated in the Azovstal steelworks plant siege, regarded by Ukrainians as a heroic effort to resist Russian advancements. Russian forces eventually captured the commanders, among the highest-profile fighters to be captured. The commanders have vowed to return to the battlefield. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Ukraine and Turkey had “violated” the prisoner exchange agreement.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia strikes humanitarian aid delivery point in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

On June 9, Ukraine’s interior ministry posted footage on Telegram showing the aftermath of a Russian air strike on a humanitarian aid delivery point in Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The attack reportedly killed at least seven people and injured thirteen. Cross-referencing the shared footage with images posted on Google Maps, the DFRLab determined the location of the incident to be Communal School No. 3, located on the corner of Myru Street and Pokrovska Street. Initial damage analysis, via the images, indicates that the strike destroyed two-thirds of the school’s facilities.

A picture posted by Karyna Ola on Google Maps shows the rear of the school compound, left. A picture posted by the Russian opposition Telegram channel Sota shows the same rear staircase, top right. A picture posted by Ukraine’s interior ministry shows another part of the school compound, bottom right. (Source: Google Maps, left; Telegram/archive, top right; Telegram/archive, bottom right)

Reports from several Russian-speaking news outlets on Telegram confirmed that the school was converted into a humanitarian aid delivery point. Russian opposition media outlet Doxa indicated that a Russian jet may have dropped two guided bombs to attack the delivery point, though this information is not confirmed. According to the office of the prosecutor-general of Ukraine, the attack occurred around 1:30 pm local time.

The following morning, Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration head Yurii Malashko shared additional photos from the incident, including one featuring what appears to be a damaged canvas sign featuring the logo for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

(Screenshot of Telegram post, including an image featuring torn canvas with the UNHCR logo clearly visible. Source: zoda_gov_ua/archive)

The Zaporizhzhia Regional Prosecutor’s Office has launched an investigation into the “violation of the laws and customs of war, combined with intentional murder.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Russian airstrike hits humanitarian aid station appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iran joining the SCO isn’t surprising. But Beijing’s promotion of illiberal norms in Eurasia should get more attention.

Jonathan Fulton — Thu, 13 Jul 2023 13:39:41 +0000

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s ongoing quest for international legitimacy got a boost on July 4 when it finally became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Council (SCO). Iran has long coveted this status, having first applied in 2008 after joining as an observer in 2005.

During the 2021 SCO summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave an opening speech in which he announced that the organization would “launch procedures to admit Iran as a member state.” Nearly two years later, this has come to pass. While it’s important not to overstate the geopolitical implications of the SCO itself, deeper coordination between Iran and other member states gives momentum to the China-centered illiberal order being promoted by Beijing.

The SCO started life as the Shanghai Five in 1996, consisting of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Its effectiveness in dealing with territorial disputes that arose from the collapse of the Soviet Union convinced its members to develop and expand the organization, rebranding it as the SCO in 2001 and admitting Uzbekistan. Several countries have joined as observer states and dialogue partners, but no new full members were admitted until India and Pakistan joined in 2017.

Despite its early post-Cold War successes, there has always been a gap between the SCO’s size and its impact. It is often given weight with big numbers: its member states encompass 40 percent of the world’s population, 60 percent of Eurasia’s landmass, and 20 percent of global GDP. However, the organization doesn’t actually do much. Security cooperation has been the notable outcome, animated by a shared concern with the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The SCO has institutionalized this through the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure and a Collective Security Treaty Organization. Nevertheless, efforts for deeper economic integration have been stalled for years, and the fact that its two most populous and wealthiest members—China and India—are bitter rivals makes political cooperation a challenge.

Still, for Iran, membership has its privileges. Beyond the status that comes with being part of a growing international organization, it also sends a message to the United States and European Union (EU) that “[Iran] can come out of isolation without revising the JCPOA.” Deeper coordination with China and Russia is another factor that cannot be overstated. Those two, along with Iran, are deeply dissatisfied with the norms of the Western-centered international order. In isolation, each of the three face limitations in projecting power and influence in the face of the US and its allies and partners. Together, however, they act as force multipliers. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley recently said, “[T]hose three countries working together are going to be problematic for many years to come.”

As a larger organization, however, the SCO is less than the sum of its parts. The admission of India as a full member dilutes Chinese and Russian influence. Furthermore, with American partners and allies—including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—joining as dialogue partners, it is less likely that the SCO will represent an anti-Western bloc. Differences between member states and weak institutional bureaucracy also contribute to an organization that lacks the capacity to act as more than a talking shop.

At the same time, the evolving shape of the SCO as it takes on new members may present normative challenges. An important insight from the late political scientist John Ruggie was that the international institutions established after World War II were shaped by an “embedded liberalism” that animated interactions within them. Free markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democracy, collective problem-solving, shared sovereignty, and the rule of law are all features of these institutions and are promoted through participation. This embedded liberalism has continued to privilege those countries that set the rules of those institutions and the broader order they support, and this remains a source of dissatisfaction for those whose political values are at odds with them.

The SCO represents something different: a large international organization based on embedded illiberalism. The organizing principles of Western-developed institutions often diverge from the preferences of governments in the SCO. Even India, the world’s largest democracy and a key US partner, has taken a decidedly illiberal turn under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The SCO could be a key platform for institutionalizing authoritarian cooperation and resilience.

China has steadily been developing its homegrown alternatives to liberal norms, working to make “a world safe for autocracy,” in the pithy phrase of political scientist Jessica Chen Weiss. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has received much of the world’s attention, but, in recent years, China has been buttressing it with new offerings that will also appeal to authoritarian governments.

Xi rolled out the Global Development Initiative (GDI) in a 2021 speech at the United Nations General Assembly, calling for “global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated and inclusive growth” rather than that promoted by Western liberal values. In April 2022, Xi delivered another speech with another project, the Global Security Initiative (GSI), framed as another public good from Beijing that represents a normative alternative from unipolarity under the US in the post-Cold War era. This past March, the Global Civilization Initiative was introduced, calling for an approach to global politics that rejects universalist principles while asserting that countries must “refrain from imposing their own values or model on others.”

All three initiatives are vague and aspirational at this point—much like the BRI was for nearly the first two years of its existence. The release of the BRI white paper in March 2015 gave direction to what was initially dismissed as “a new slogan on stuff they’ve wanted to do for a long time.” Expect the same for these three. The ambiguity is the appeal at this point; by speaking in general terms about concerns shared by many countries of the Global South, Beijing is building momentum for “an increasingly comprehensive vision of a new global governance system” with China at the center.

For Iran, SCO membership is cementing its alignment with authoritarian states. This is entirely on-brand and not at all surprising. However, as the SCO continues to expand across Eurasia, the organization’s ability to promote Beijing’s preferred illiberal norms makes it a challenge that deserves more attention.

Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and host of the China-MENA Podcast. He is also an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. Follow him on Twitter: @jonathandfulton.

The post Iran joining the SCO isn’t surprising. But Beijing’s promotion of illiberal norms in Eurasia should get more attention. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yevgeniya Gaber wrote an article for the German journal IPS on what to expect from Turkey’s new government

aozen — Thu, 13 Jul 2023 13:09:56 +0000

The post Yevgeniya Gaber wrote an article for the German journal IPS on what to expect from Turkey’s new government appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The flawed premises behind Janet Yellen’s China visit

Hung Tran — Wed, 12 Jul 2023 18:31:02 +0000

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s July 6-9 visit to China went smoothly, following a well-choreographed script. But the ability of Yellen’s visit to achieve its goal of cooling tensions between the two superpowers will be limited, as Yellen’s statements were premised on two flawed assumptions about the nature of US-China relations.

First, while criticizing China’s unfair economic practices, Yellen also encouraged economic engagement, as well as cooperation in addressing global problems such as climate change and low-income countries’ debt burdens. Yellen’s attempts to compartmentalize areas of cooperation between the two countries will fall flat, as Chinese policymakers do not bracket off China’s economic relationship with the United States from their political disputes with Washington.

Second, Yellen defended measures to restrict China’s access to US advanced technology as necessary for national security. She said the United States aimed to de-risk but not decouple from China and did not intend to constrain China’s growth. This framing will not assuage Beijing’s concerns, as Chinese officials see both de-risking and decoupling as efforts to hinder China’s economic growth. Thus, Yellen’s Beijing visit will not meaningfully improve US-Chinese relations, as the two nations’ core interests remain at odds with each other.

Can compartmentalization work?

The United States has recently enacted measures to control the supply to China of high-tech products and know-how in advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing to safeguard US national security. Yellen suggested that China should not let this stop the two countries from engaging in trade and investment “based on fair rules” for mutual benefit or from collaborating on other global cooperative initiatives. Yellen has employed the compartmentalization approach: trying to promote an economic relationship with China on a separate track from the countries’ rivalries in the political sphere.

Compartmentalization reflects more wishful thinking than realism when it comes to dealing with China, which, since the twentieth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022, has emphasized a holistic approach to national security. That approach encompasses perceived threats to military, diplomatic, political, social, economic, and development interests, which necessitate “all of government” and “all of society” efforts to respond. In fact, China has long used economic coercion to achieve its political goals—demonstrating that Chinese policymakers view trade and politics as linked rather than compartmentalized.

In this context, the more the United States and China engage in tit-for-tat measures in the name of national security, the more those steps will deepen mutual mistrust, coloring relationships in other areas and making compromises more difficult to reach. Appeals to focus on areas of cooperation for mutual benefit sound reasonable, but will ultimately be futile in changing the nature of the US-China rivalry as a whole.

De-risking vs. decoupling

Yellen also adopted the terminology introduced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, stressing that the United States aims to de-risk but not to decouple from the Chinese economy. Yellen was emphatic: Decoupling from China “would be disastrous for both countries and destabilizing for the world… and virtually impossible to undertake.” By contrast, de-risking means “diversification of critical supply chains or taking targeted national security actions.”

The distinction between de-risking and decoupling seems to have some basis in fact. US-China economic interactions in areas under sanctions—either via tariffs or controls over trade and investment—have declined, while those not being sanctioned continue to grow. For example, according to Chad Brown of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, US imports of Chinese goods under increased tariffs fell by 25 percent from 2017 to 2022 while imports of non-taxed goods increased by 42 percent—pushing the bilateral trade volume to a new record high of $690 billion in 2022. Yet, while Yellen mentioned the record trade volume with China as proof that there has been no decoupling, she did not report that the United States recorded a trade deficit of $382 billion with China in that year, compared to a deficit of $375 billion in 2017, at the beginning of then President Donald Trump’s trade war with China. In this context, continued growth in trade volume and deficit with China may not be something to look forward to—without adopting effective measures to safeguard US manufacturing capability.

The deeper problem is that the rhetoric of “de-risking, not decoupling” has been rejected by the Chinese, who see no difference between the two concepts—believing that both are about constraining China’s growth, especially in high-tech sectors crucial for future economic and military development. In particular, China views US “de-risking” measures in certain high-tech sectors as offensive actions meant to delay China’s progress and strengthen US leadership positions in those important areas.

It is also important to keep in mind that China has for a long time attempted both de-risking against US sanctions (mainly by trading more with the Global South and developing alternative settlement mechanisms for cross-border economic transactions) and decoupling by promoting self-sufficiency in advanced tech and military developments.

Talk isn’t cheap, but…

Yellen concluded that her visit represents a step forward in maintaining frequent, high-level communications between the two countries, setting their relationship on “a surer footing,” but recognized that significant differences remain between the two. In fact, China hasn’t changed its positions, insisting that the United States has to take the next steps, dropping all sanctions. Given this reality, it is important for the United States to be clear-eyed about what it can expect from meetings with Chinese officials. While maintaining regular contact is better than having no contact, simply repeating to each other their respective well-known core interests is not going to solve any problems.

Meanwhile, the most important communication between the United States and China is not happening: that between the two militaries, which is critical to avoid an unwanted war in the western Pacific that could be triggered by accidents, mistakes, miscommunications, or misunderstandings. This lack of US-China military communication is particularly worrisome, and its resumption would be much more beneficial than statements about de-risking or decoupling during choreographed diplomatic visits.

Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, a former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance, and a former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

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NATO summit leaves Ukrainians frustrated

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 20:45:19 +0000

As Ukrainians digested the outcome of the NATO summit on July 11, the mood across the country was one of frustration. While the annual gathering of NATO leaders in Vilnius brought a number of tangible gains for Ukraine including confirmation of new weapons deliveries and the creation of a coalition to train Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16 fighter aircraft, the all-important summit declaration failed to provide a clear timetable for Ukraine’s NATO membership. Instead, the communique spoke of “additional democratic and security sector reforms” before concluding: “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance when allies agree and conditions are met.”

This vague wording represented modest progress but fell far short of Ukrainian expectations. In the run-up to the summit, Ukraine and many of the country’s international allies had been calling for a clear signal from NATO regarding future Ukrainian membership. However, while a number of countries have publicly backed Ukraine’s bid to join NATO, there is no unanimity on the issue among the 31-nation alliance. On the eve of this week’s meeting in Lithuania, US President Joe Biden said Ukraine was not ready for membership and claimed it was “premature” to start the accession process in the middle of a war.

Supporters of Ukraine’s bid to join NATO see it as the only way to end Russian aggression against the country and achieve a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe. Anything less, they say, will merely result in a pause before a new Russian invasion as Moscow seeks to achieve its overriding foreign policy goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and returning the country permanently to the Kremlin orbit. Skeptics have responded by noting that the promise of fast-track Ukrainian NATO membership after the war would be likely to convince Putin of the need to prolong hostilities indefinitely. This lack of consensus resulted in what was an underwhelming NATO summit outcome in Vilnius.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled personally to Lithuania on Tuesday, but his last-minute intervention was unable to sway the doubters and secure the kind of unambiguous membership commitment Ukraine has long sought. “Today I embarked on a trip here with faith in decisions, with faith in partners, with faith in a strong NATO. In a NATO that does not hesitate, does not waste time, and does not look back at any aggressor,” he wrote in a carefully worded but emotionally charged post following publication of the summit declaration. “I would like this faith to become confidence; confidence in the decisions that all of us deserve and every warrior, every citizen, every mother, every child expects. Is that too much to expect?” In a social media commentary posted earlier on Tuesday, he was significantly more outspoken, criticizing NATO’s failure to state a specific membership timeline as “unprecedented and absurd.”

Others were in even less diplomatic mood. “No amount of spin will turn this into a “great” or “historic” summit. Best not even to start,” posted former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves. Some fellow politicians in the Baltic region clearly agreed. “This is not leadership,” tweeted Lithuanian MP Zygimantas Pavilionis. “This is appeasement that normally leads to final defeat.” In Kyiv, Ukrainian Ambassador for Strategic Communications Olexander Scherba questioned the logic behind the apparent fear among some NATO members of provoking Putin. “The strategy of “not provoking Russia” is in reality a strategy of provoking Russia,” he wrote. “That’s how it goes with bullies. Will the West ever see it?”

Eurasia Center events

John Herbst: A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Meanwhile, many in Ukraine expressed anger at the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s international partners. These feelings of frustration were summed up in a powerful post by veteran Ukrainian anti-corruption activist Daria Kaleniuk: “Ukraine needs “strategic patience”. Should I patiently wait until a Russian missile strikes my apartment in Kyiv with my kids inside? Or should I patiently wait for my son to turn eighteen and go to fight in a war against the largest threat to NATO? Delays cost lives!”

Despite the undeniable mood of anti-climax in Ukraine, the country’s famed wartime spirit of resilience was also on display as Ukrainians reacted to news from Lithuania. “Disappointment but not discouragement. Next stop, Washington DC,” posted Alyona Getmanchuk, director of the Kyiv-based New Europe Center think tank and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, in reference to next year’s NATO summit, which is scheduled to take place in the US capital.

Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko echoed this sentiment regarding the need to focus on securing a firm membership commitment at the 2024 summit, but warned that further delays could have grave consequences for public opinion in Ukraine. If there is no progress toward joining NATO by this time next year, he wrote, Ukrainians will ask: “So we are good enough to die for democracy and not good enough to live together with other free nations in one alliance?”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

John E. Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Rachel Rizzo (@RachelRizzo): Nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center
Christopher Skaluba: Director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department

Roadmap or roadblock?

John tells us that the communiqué’s conditional language and lack of timeline amounts to “not much movement beyond the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit language noting that Ukraine would eventually be a member.”
That’s remarkable given that the 2008 language, which also encompassed prospective Georgian membership, “has been derided for years for placing both Georgia and Ukraine in the worst strategic position possible,” Rachel observes, with multiple Russian invasions of both countries occurring in the intervening years. “The problem with vague language like this is that it kicks the can down the road.”
“Inside the geeky NATO universe, the upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to Council status and the removal of formal membership action plan requirements for Ukraine are significant developments,” Chris adds. “But neither packs a political punch or will be viewed as real progress on the membership question.”
There was also no mention in the communiqué of security guarantees for Ukraine “that were broadly promised in the run-up to the summit,” Chris notes. “The combination of these things makes for an underwhelming package for Ukraine, though some small hope remains for better outcomes at tomorrow’s inaugural NATO-Ukraine Council meeting.”

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DC drama

John relays that the communiqué’s release was delayed due to the “clear disagreement” between the United States and Germany on one side, and Nordic, Eastern European, and some Western European allies on the other with regard to Ukraine’s membership. Both sides had to bend a bit to get to the final consensus language. “The end result was not quite inspiring,” he says.
But inspiration could always strike: The Alliance will celebrate its seventy-fifth anniversary next year with a Washington summit, which offers US President Joe Biden “a chance to establish a legacy as an outstanding national security president,” John argues. To make that happen, he adds, Biden will need to “provide Ukraine all the weapons it needs to defeat the Kremlin on the battlefield” and “move beyond caution to hasten the anchoring of Ukraine in NATO.”
Rachel fears more disappointment ahead, whether at the Washington summit or ten years from now, when “NATO allies will come face to face with the undeniable truth that all allies might not ever be on the same page regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership. That’s a tough pill for many to swallow, but it might just be reality.”

Defensible moves

John welcomed the communiqué’s labeling of Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to the Alliance. “This is an important reminder that US and NATO support for Ukraine is not philanthropy, but the smart way to defend our vital interests,” he explains.
Chris points out that on the positive side, the Vilnius gathering will be remembered as another “enlargement summit” because of Monday’s deal with Turkey paving the way for Sweden’s accession.
Flying under the radar, the allies also agreed to adopt “some four thousand pages of classified regional plans for the defense of NATO territory,” Chris says. This move “completes a shift, started in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea, to a deterrence-by-denial strategy absent since the waning days of the Cold War. Heady stuff.”

The post The NATO Summit’s underwhelming support for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: What NATO’s Vilnius summit means for Ukraine and the Alliance’s future

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 19:48:24 +0000

The leaders were backed by a NATO banner, but it wasn’t NATO doing the backing. Group of Seven (G7) leaders on Wednesday announced plans for long-term security commitments to Ukraine at the NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. The new framework seeks to create bilateral security commitments between individual G7 member states and Ukraine, providing security assistance, modern military equipment, and economic assistance “for as long as it takes.” This announcement comes a day after NATO released its communiqué, drawing criticism from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and others because the Alliance did not establish a timetable for Ukraine to become a NATO member.

Below, our experts decode all the goings-on in Vilnius—and what they mean for Kyiv’s path to NATO membership, the war in Ukraine, Sweden’s forthcoming accession, the Alliance’s growing focus on China, and more.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Reactions from Wednesday, July 12

Anca Agachi: A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Daniel Fried: The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

Hans Binnendijk: Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

Phillip Cornell: Energy issues took a backseat in the Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

Reactions from Tuesday, July 11

John Herbst: An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Christopher Skaluba: ‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership

Daniel Fried: Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family

Shelby Magid: Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

Rich Outzen: A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

Andrew D’Anieri: The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Rachel Rizzo: Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

David O. Shullman: The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

Ian Brzezinski: The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

There is significant overlap among the members of the G7, NATO, and the European Union (EU). Four of the G7 nations are in the EU and six are in NATO. It is therefore no surprise that the general approach of the three organizations to Moscow’s war on Ukraine share similar characteristics. All three organizations have actively supported Ukraine since Moscow’s aggression began in February of 2014, and much more so when it intensified in February of 2022. All assert Ukraine’s right to enjoy the peace and stability that should be provided by the liberal international order. With the United States in the lead in NATO and the G7, both organizations have provided significant support to Ukraine, ensuring that Russian President Vladimir Putin could not achieve his goal of establishing effective political control in the country.

At the same time, again with the United States’ decisive influence, the G7, like NATO, has avoided steps that might seem overly provocative to Moscow—a clear call for Ukraine’s victory against Moscow’s aggression or decisive steps that would lead to a faster Ukrainian victory. So the best way to look at the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine issued by the G7 on July 12 in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Vilnius is as a mostly US-influenced two-step.

The NATO Summit produced an uninspiring communiqué on the Ukraine-NATO relationship that moved only slightly beyond the language of the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit. The G7 Declaration was timed to the NATO Summit because the question of Ukraine joining NATO is linked with the issue of security guarantees. Both are meant to address the difficult question of how an independent Ukraine can live in peace and security alongside a hostile Russia. So it is no surprise that the G7 statement is a step forward toward enhancing Ukraine’s security but not a very large one.

The declaration affirmatively states Ukraine’s right to choose its own course, join the West, and be free from intimidation and aggression. But it does not offer collective G7 action that might provide greater protection against future Kremlin provocations; instead, it encourages bilateral arrangements between Ukraine and individual G7 states. It places emphasis on the provision of weapons to Ukraine to make it a less appetizing target for a predatory Kremlin. This is a reasonable concept, but less effective than an actual guarantee by the G7 countries to respond forcefully to future Kremlin aggression. Yet even this step is undermined by the fact that all the G7 countries—with the possible exceptions of the United Kingdom and, perhaps now, France—have been reluctant to send Ukraine the more advanced weapons it needs to deliver that decisive blow to Russian forces on its territory.

Russian commentators have dismissed the NATO communiqué as a disappointment for Kyiv, but expressed some dissatisfaction with the G7 Declaration. Their real ire, though, is aimed at Paris, after the French decision to send SCALP long-range missiles to Ukraine. This underscores France’s differences with Washington, which is still unwilling to send Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). French President Emmanuel Macron’s boldness is welcome, but no substitute for strong US leadership.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Overall, the Vilnius summit stuck the landing, and to continue the metaphor, the gymnastic feat was about as tough as it gets. This was indeed a summit of unity, as US President Joe Biden had hoped, and the breakthrough regarding Sweden’s NATO accession especially contributed to that sense. The Alliance also successfully positioned itself as a global actor that understands that the security environment has fundamentally changed, and the European and Indo-Pacific theaters are inextricably linked. The attendance of the Asia-Pacific 4 (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) and language in the communiqué elevating the role of partners is crucial in this regard.

However, the summit’s results were mixed on a range of other issues. Despite high hopes and a strong moral argument, Ukraine was not offered the clear path and timeline it was hoping for to join the Alliance, even as its future in the Euro-Atlantic family was reconfirmed. This outcome, while not surprising, was also likely the best achievable outcome at the moment given Allied differences. This hints at a tough road for NATO in making the ambitious progress necessary by 2024, especially if Ukrainian battlefield advances slow down. Eastern flank reinforcements to brigade-level will only happen “where and when required,” and the language on China was modest in advancing proposals for action, as it was more intent on defining the challenge Beijing poses. The Alliance generally make the most important progress quietly, and here is where I saw encouraging signs: the focus on resilience and securing critical infrastructure; important mentions of Allied enablement and sustainment; and cooperation with the private sector and defense industry to deblock defense supplies.

While kicking the can down the road offers some time, Allies need to start to work with aplomb now to deliver. If anything, the NATO Summit in Washington in 2024 will be an even higher order to rise to—morally and strategically.

—Anca Agachi is an associate director and resident fellow for Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

The G7 Joint Statement on Ukraine is out. It’s no Article 5 security guarantee. It’s a framework for negotiations of bilateral and G7 arrangements with Ukraine to provide military and economic assistance, as well as unspecified security commitments for that country. It includes a promise of consultations with Ukraine in case of a future Russian armed attack that could generate military and other forms of support. For its part, Ukraine commits in the statement to continue its democratic and rule of law transformation, as well as its military reforms. Notably, the statement makes clear that it is no substitute for NATO membership but is intended to help Ukraine while it pursues that goal.

Cynics can make a meal of the statement. It provides little beyond what G7 countries are already doing. But there is another way to look at it. The big strategic question that NATO, the G7, and the United States have faced is whether Ukraine is part of the transatlantic and European family and its institutions or whether it is part of a Kremlin sphere of domination. The Kremlin claims Ukraine as its own.There are many in Europe and the United States who tacitly (or overtly) agree and would cut a dirty deal with Moscow to that end.

Happily, that’s not where NATO and the G7 have come out. The NATO communiqué’s language on Ukraine could have been stronger and the G7 statement is no security guarantee. But they both rest on the premise that Ukraine is part of the European and transatlantic family. The details of how and when have yet to be worked out. The goal is clear: NATO membership for Ukraine. The G7 statement can serve as scaffolding for Ukraine while it works to get there.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

The NATO Summit in Vilnius was a success. But its success was limited, and it will be seen more as a bridging mechanism between last year’s Madrid summit and next year’s Washington summit. At Madrid, the allies agreed on the nature of the new threats and challenges emanating from both Russia and China. Madrid’s new Strategic Concept refocused the Alliance.

Vilnius was to be an implementation summit. And it was. It recorded progress in multiple areas, from enhanced deterrence to hybrid war to climate change. But it stopped short on several key issues like Ukraine’s membership, NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific, and managing the nuclear weapons threat posed by Russia and, increasingly, China.

The Vilnius summit took place in the midst of Europe’s most destructive war in nearly eight decades and a US effort to rebalance its relationship with China. This resulted in a degree of caution. Unity formed around lowest common denominator solutions. During the coming year between Vilnius and Washington, the bridge created this week will hopefully be strengthened enough to bear the weight that the Alliance will need to carry next year.

The most successful element of the Vilnius summit was enhancing NATO deterrence along its front line with Russia, from the High North to the Mediterranean Sea. With Finland in and Sweden soon to be in, there is a solid line of defense against Russian aggression. There is no clearer evidence of Russia’s strategic failure. NATO’s New Force Model, agreed upon last year, will provide clarity for nations with regard to their specific wartime responsibilities and incentives to meet NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product defense spending floor. NATO’s forward presence in eight front line states needs further strengthening to include a continuous brigade-level presence in each. And the readiness and mobility initiatives need further attention.

The greatest disappointment at Vilnius was the inability to provide a more concrete path for Ukrainian membership after the war ends. But cautious steps were taken. The NATO-Ukraine Commission became a Council, giving Ukraine a stronger voice in NATO political affairs. The Council will be used to plan for future Ukrainian membership, which was again solemnly committed to “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This shortfall for Kyiv was somewhat offset by the G7 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, which pledges additional long-term security commitments and arrangements. Hopefully by the Washington summit, that path can be paved with more concrete.

—Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Energy issues took a backseat in Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

While the debate over membership (delayed for Ukraine, confirmed for Sweden) dominated the last-minute negotiations over the NATO Summit communiqué, the opening bulk of the document itself is rightly dedicated to reaffirming the traditional and newly relevant core tenets of NATO’s existence—collective defense, nuclear deterrence, and the production and logistics to achieve them. But about two-thirds of the way down, the communiqué turns to how the Euro-Atlantic security environment has shifted.

The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed that “emerging security challenges” (in NATO parlance) have arrived, from the weaponization of energy to the widespread “digitalization” of warfare and the importance of resilience.

Indeed, energy security and climate change are gaining renewed importance for the Alliance. Climate security issues are a personal priority of the secretary general, and a changing energy economy means that the pipeline politics of yesterday will look simple compared to the complex security implications of integrated power systems, critical digital infrastructure, supply chains for key inputs to transition, and the like. And while NATO wades into the tech innovation space with its own acceleration fund (DIANA), it has yet to grasp the power of military procurement for demonstrating, scaling, and standardizing technologies that will be key to mitigating emissions in the civilian space while also boosting military effectiveness. Meanwhile the energy transition itself will be a messy process, with pockets of volatility and economic mismatches that could directly impact political stability, popular support for a sustainable transition, and strategic relations.

The Vilnius summit is a turning point for many reasons, but perhaps the most fundamental for NATO as an institution is its shift from an internally focused bureaucracy with declining budgets fighting to justify its existence in the post-Cold War world, to one compelled to adopt a growth and ambition mentality. Where before it was simpler to ring-fence NATO’s military mission, concerns about climate change and strategic competition are imposing policy-driven global economic realignments. To fulfill its ambitions for leadership in that new environment, NATO needs the competence and reach to provide important security-related input to key decisions about infrastructure investment and managing new technology—and it needs to be convinced of its own relevance in those spaces.

—Phillip Cornell is a principal at Economist Impact and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Talk about the eleventh hour! The NATO Summit communiqué was finally released at approximately 6:40 p.m. in Vilnius, rather late for a summit document. There was a good reason for this: clear disagreement between a large number of East European, Nordic, and some Western European allies on the one side and the United States and Germany on the other about how forthcoming the Alliance should be about Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO. While the ad hoc coalition wanted clarity in hastening Ukraine’s membership, Washington and, to a lesser extent, Berlin were cautious. Given the weight Washington enjoys in NATO deliberations, this meant that the much larger number of allies could not get their preference. But given the importance of NATO unity, this meant that the United States and Germany had to move beyond their original position.

The end result was not quite inspiring. The communiqué notes that Ukraine no longer needs to meet a Membership Action Plan, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission will become a NATO Ukraine Council: small steps in the right direction. On the crucial membership issue, the communiqué states, “the Alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path towards future membership. We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.” This is not much movement beyond the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit language noting that Ukraine would eventually be a member.

It was no surprise that a few hours before the communiqué appeared, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted his dissatisfaction: “It’s unprecedented and absurd when [a] time frame is not set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership. While at the same time vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine.” This is somewhat sharp, but perhaps understandable from a man whose country is facing an aggression designed to destroy “Ukrainianness.”

While this denouement does not add luster to the Vilnius summit, there are other developments that make this a historic occasion. The main thing, of course, is the admission of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance. This greatly strengthens NATO security in the north. But also important is NATO finally recognizing that “the Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” This is an important reminder that US and NATO support for Ukraine is not philanthropy, but the smart way to defend our vital interests. The communiqué also directly addresses the Belarus problem: “Belarus’ support has been instrumental as it continues to provide its territory and infrastructure to allow Russian forces to attack Ukraine and sustain Russia’s aggression. In particular Belarus, but also Iran, must end their complicity with Russia and return to compliance with international law.”

These two items portend a further strengthening of NATO policy against the Kremlin threat and in support of Ukraine. Vilnius also foreshadows what is to come in NATO dynamics and policy. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Alliance will be celebrated at the NATO Summit next year in Washington DC. That event will give US President Joe Biden a chance to establish a legacy as an outstanding national security president. For that to occur, he will need to listen closely to the United States’ newly active East European allies and 1) provide Ukraine all the weapons it needs to defeat the Kremlin on the battlefield and 2) move beyond caution to hasten the anchoring of Ukraine in NATO.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership

The Vilnius summit is likely to be viewed as a landmark summit for two things that happened and two things that didn’t.

What did happen: The pending agreement by Turkey to ratify Sweden’s membership application will soon add a thirty-second ally to NATO’s ranks, making Vilnius, like Madrid before it, an enlargement summit. That every littoral Baltic Sea state, besides Russia, will be a member of the Alliance is a significant development for NATO’s defense of its northeastern flank. To that end, the adoption of some four thousand pages of classified regional plans for defense of NATO territory completes a shift, started in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea, to a deterrence-by-denial strategy absent since the waning days of the Cold War.

Missing from the Vilnius communiqué, however, is any clear pathway for Ukraine’s membership. Inside the geeky NATO universe, the upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to “Council” status and the removal of formal membership action plan requirements for Ukraine are significant developments. But neither packs a political punch, nor will either move be viewed as real progress on the membership question. In fact, communiqué language stating “we will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is as ambiguous as the infamous Bucharest statement from 2008 promising that Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. It is a head-scratching and disappointing formulation. Moreover, the bilateral security guarantees that were broadly promised in the runup to the summit were missing from the final statement. The combination of these things makes for an underwhelming package for Ukraine, though some small hope remains for better outcomes at tomorrow’s inaugural NATO-Ukraine Council meeting.

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department.

Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family

It might have and should have been stronger. Nevertheless, the NATO communiqué language on Ukraine’s accession to NATO puts Ukraine within, and not outside, the transatlantic family. The “when” and “how” of Ukraine’s accession to NATO have yet to be worked out but, critically, the Vilnius summit has decided the “whether” of Ukraine’s NATO membership in the affirmative–something that the 2008 Bucharest summit did only at a high level of generality. “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is the key sentence from today’s communiqué. It’s weakened by the gratuitous qualifier “we will be in a position to” rather than a straightforward “we will extend an invitation.” Still, this offer—any offer—of an invitation to Ukraine is a step forward, and a big one compared to where the United States and most NATO member governments were even a few months ago.

Less noticed (and less debated) was the communiqué text that makes clear, without weakening qualifiers, that “we do not and will never recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexations, including Crimea.” That language, though it reaffirms long-held positions, helps kill the temptation by some to push Ukraine into surrendering its territory in exchange for a dubious “peace” on Putin’s terms.

While NATO has now set out the goal—Ukraine in the Alliance—much depends on continuing to provide robust military support to Ukraine to help it fight back, and win, on the battlefield. Paragraph twelve of the communiqué notes that allies at the summit agreed on a “substantial package of expanded political and practical support” for Ukraine. It doesn’t provide details, but hopefully they will be announced soon, either by NATO or separately by allies.

Zelenskyy and a number of NATO allies have pushed hard (and pushed the Biden administration) to get the most from this summit. They were right to do so. Now they need to consolidate their gains and prepare next steps, including for next year’s NATO Summit in Washington DC.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

The Vilnius summit communiqué rightly places the Russian Federation as the most significant and direct threat to allies’ security, peace, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area due to Moscow’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, terrorism, war crimes, and horrific violations of international law and norms.

Just as Russia deserves to be so centrally acknowledged for its role as the critical threat to Euro-Atlantic security, Belarus deserves to be right beside it. Any disregard of the role Belarus plays as a threat to regional security and an accomplice to the unprovoked war in Ukraine would be a mistake. NATO smartly recognized the threat from Belarus, condemning Belarus’s instrumental support to the Russian war effort by allowing its territory and infrastructure to be used by Russian forces for attacks into Ukraine.

While the communiqué notes Belarus’s complicity in this aggression, it’s critical to remember these crimes are committed and abetted by the illegitimate regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The dictator, desperately clinging to power, has driven Belarus deeper into the Kremlin’s clutches. NATO’s firm declaration of concern for the situation in Belarus is in part due to Lukashenka deepening the military integration between Russia and Belarus, potentially allowing the deployment of “so-called private military companies” to Belarus (the Wagner Group), as well as (perhaps too mildly put) “malign activities” without respect to human rights, fundamental freedoms, and international law; the Alliance’s declarations are an important signal and sign of hope that Belarus will not be forgotten in the international agenda.

While it is good to see the declaration about threats within Belarus itself, what will surely frustrate many in the democratic forces (along with their supporters), is that there is no acknowledgement that these actions are taken by an illegitimate regime, nor mention of the democratic forces rallying against these actions, against the war, and against any deployment of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable systems on Belarusian territory.

While the communiqué’s comments on Belarus could have been stronger, there is hope NATO leaders and experts in Vilnius have listened in on conversations featuring the democratically elected leader of Belarus and Lukashenka’s rival in the widely disputed 2020 election, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who has been boldly speaking in Vilnius in side-events calling for commitments to Belarus and reminding the world that the Lukashenka regime does not represent the Belarusian people.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

The communiqué presents a clear-eyed snapshot of the Alliance in an era of great power rivalry and strategic competition. Russia receives thorough and excoriating attention as the shatterer of peace and a continuing threat. China is called out for challenging the norms, interests, and security of the Alliance and its members. New and prospective members in the room or at the doorstep (Finland, Sweden, and on a farther horizon, Ukraine) were appropriately hailed, as were Asian partners Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. NATO member Turkey will be pleased by paragraphs four and five, which appreciate Turkish support to Sweden’s accession process and mention Ankara’s preferred language on terrorism as a threat “in all its forms and manifestations” to the Alliance. Hard power, conventional deterrence, and readiness are key focal points, though emerging and nontraditional threats are treated as well. Surprisingly, energy security makes an appearance only in paragraph sixty-eight. All in all, though, the document shows energy, focus, and seriousness appropriate to the geopolitical moment.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Much of the conversation immediately ahead of the NATO summit in Vilnius focused on whether the allies would take concrete steps toward Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance. On Sunday, Biden dumped cold water on Ukraine imminently joining NATO, but whispers in expert circles in Washington suggested that an intermediate initiative toward membership might make a splash at Vilnius. In fact, the communiqué itself caused barely a ripple: a new NATO-Ukraine Council that will formalize consultations between Brussels and Kyiv on Ukraine’s “aspirations for membership in NATO.”

A NATO-Ukraine Council is certainly a net positive step toward Ukrainian accession, but the fact that this was the centerpiece of the communiqué suggests it was the bare minimum step upon which allies could agree. The Alliance should have gone further and instead established a defense and deterrence partnership to provide Ukraine lethal aid and training (the renewed Comprehensive Assistance Package will help Ukraine become more interoperable with NATO, but provisions only five hundred million euros for nonlethal aid).

The signers also left open the question of when Ukraine will join the Alliance, writing only that Ukraine will be invited “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This ambiguity may help prevent Russia from blocking specific preconditions to Ukraine’s accession, but it could also create further indignation in Ukraine and in the Baltics if allies continue to disagree on whether Ukraine is “ready” for NATO.

Pressure will grow on the White House and Western European capitals to elucidate their conditions for Ukraine’s membership, at least in private channels, as Kyiv no doubt campaigns for an invitation at the 2024 NATO summit in Washington DC.

—Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

For many, the July 11 communiqué was along the lines of what was expected coming out of the NATO Summit in Vilnius. For others, hope was high that NATO allies would rally around Ukraine and show some clear steps not just in terms of whether the country will eventually join NATO, but exactly how and exactly when. NATO allies didn’t (and couldn’t) go that far, which shows continued disagreement at the highest levels as to Ukraine’s future relationship with the military alliance.

But it’s not all bad news—NATO allies were able to reaffirm their statements in the 2008 communiqué that Ukraine’s future is, indeed, in NATO. The problem with vague language like this is that it kicks the can down the road. The communiqué language basically says that Ukraine can join when all allies agree and when conditions are met. That leaves a lot of room for interpretation. My sense is that in the future—whether it’s in a year at NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington, or five years from now, or ten—NATO allies will come face to face with the undeniable truth that all allies might not ever be on the same page regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership. That’s a tough pill for many to swallow, but it might just be reality.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

While the communiqué naturally reflects NATO’s laser focus on the war in Ukraine and the proximate threat from Russia, it also confirms the Alliance’s renewed strength and growing attention to China and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

Much attention will understandably be paid to the communiqué’s hedging on Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership. But for China, this week’s summit underscores that the war unleashed by its friends in Moscow has single handedly revitalized NATO, which Beijing only recently had viewed (happily) as sinking into irrelevance. This development throws a large wrench into China’s plans to dismantle the US-led alliance network, carve out a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific, and transform the rules-based global order.

The document reiterates language in last year’s Strategic Concept on China’s threat to NATO’s “interests, security and values;” “malicious” hybrid and cyber operations; disinformation; and efforts to control key tech sectors, critical minerals, and supply chains. The communiqué also builds on last year’s warnings about China’s “deepening strategic partnership” with Russia to call on Beijing to abstain from all forms of support for Russia’s war against Ukraine—particularly the provision of any lethal aid.

The call for China to condemn Russia and adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter—paired with a clear refusal to recognize Russia’s illegal annexations—throws cold water on any hopes that Beijing would be welcomed to facilitate peace negotiations based on Putin’s terms.

Beijing will be pleased that the document does not include a reference to the opening of a proposed NATO office in Japan, reflecting a lack of consensus on NATO’s role in Asia. But language on the importance of the Indo-Pacific to security in the Euro-Atlantic and specific praise for the contributions of the four Indo-Pacific countries whose leaders are present in Vilnius—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—reflect NATO’s growing recognition that the regions’ fortunes are linked. NATO cannot ignore the threat of war over Taiwan and, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently put it, “China is watching to see the price Russia pays, or the reward it receives, for its aggression.”

—David O. Shullman is senior director of the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council and former US deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council.

The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

NATO fell short of placing Ukraine onto a clear track to Alliance membership, but that cause for membership gained unambiguous momentum at the Vilnius summit. The assertion in the summit communiqué that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO” frustratingly provides no more clarity than the 2008 Bucharest declaration in which NATO first declared Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. While the Alliance dropped the requirement for Ukraine to jump through the hoops of a membership action plan (MAP)—as was done for the fast-tracked accession of Finland and Sweden—the communiqué states that Ukraine must implement “additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required” which infers an unnecessary de jure MAP.

What we must not overlook or underestimate is the fact that allies brought to the Vilnius summit unprecedented support for Ukraine’s membership aspirations. The warmth with which Zelenskyy was greeted demonstrated how Ukraine is regarded as part of the transtatlantic community. While full allied consensus—a requirement in NATO decision-making—was not achieved, the Biden administration found itself largely alone blocking efforts to provide Ukraine that roadmap to NATO. Even Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserted that “without a doubt, Ukraine deserves to be in NATO.”

The key now is to ensure that Ukraine defeats Russia’s invasion quickly and decisively, and to build on the expanded and significant allied support behind Kyiv’s membership aspirations, leveraging the fact that Ukraine today meets the requirements. These are mutually reinforcing goals. Their achievement will make Europe more secure and NATO more powerful. The progress made in Vilnius should make us all the more determined to secure Ukraine’s accession to NATO at the Alliance’s 2024 Washington summit.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

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Why Khamenei’s son is not the next radical modernizer in the Middle East

Saeid Golkar and Kasra Aarabi — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 19:14:55 +0000

As protests in Iran reach their tenth month, there is widespread consensus—even among regime insiders—that the Islamic Republic is unstable beneath the surface and revolution could be on the horizon.

But the cohort of insiders that have reached this conclusion—mainly from the so-called “reformist” faction—believe there is still hope for the clerical system. During the peak of the anti-regime protests, Mohsen Ranai, a regime-affiliated economist close to the so-called reformist elites, wrote: “[In the absence of a] revolution from above… a revolution from below will naturally occur.” In other words, while the opportunity for “reform” has been lost, the possibility of a “revolution from above”—from the elites—still exists—so long as there’s not a people-led revolution from below. Such a “revolution,” they claim, would preserve the regime and limit bloodshed.

But what does “revolution from above” mean in the Islamic Republic? For more than thirty years, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has held absolute power in the clerical establishment. During his reign, the Islamic Republic became more ideological, totalitarian, and repressive.

This cohort of elites, who are still committed to the clerical regime, believe Khamenei is the biggest impediment to a “revolution from above” and, therefore, are banking on his evermore likely successor: his son, Mojtaba.

All experts, inside and outside of Iran, point exclusively to two hardline Islamist clerics to succeed Khamenei: incumbent President Ebrahim Raisi and Mojtaba Khamenei.

While Raisi—infamously known as the “Butcher of Tehran” for his role in the mass execution of political prisoners in 1988—has a proven track record that underscores he is anything but a radical reformer, not least in his current role in brutally suppressing Mahsa Amini protests that begun in September 2022, less is known about Khamenei’s son, who operates in the shadows.

It is precisely for this reason that this cohort of regime elites hope Mojtaba Khamenei can emerge as the next radical modernizer in the Middle East, mimicking those on the other side of the Persian Gulf and transforming the Islamic Republic from above—a view that may have found some resonance outside of Iran, per conversations we’ve had with policymakers and fellow analysts.

The transformation of Arab monarchies at the behest of their young modernizing leaders—such as Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman—has revolutionized their countries, not least in the realms of cultural and societal liberalization. Even the sharpest critics of Arab monarchies would concede that the changes seen in the past few years have been akin to a “revolution from above.”

But can an ayatollah’s son do the same? The short answer is no. Three major indicators forecast why Mojtaba will be anything but a radical modernizer for Iran.

The first relates to Mojtaba’s background and personal experiences—factors that will have shaped his views and values. To be a transformational, modernizing leader, such an individual has to either have a modern education or, at the very least, be well-traveled and/or connected to the outside world. After all, one must experience the fruits of cultural and societal liberalization—and the modern world—to appreciate their worth.

Mojtaba Khamenei has done no such thing. The Supreme Leader’s son has not only had an extremely isolated and insular upbringing, but has yet to step outside Iran.

At seventeen, Mojtaba joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and fought in the bloody eight-year Iran-Iraq War as part of the 27th Mohammad Rasulullah Division—a notoriously ideological unit. This contingent was founded by the IRGC’s Ahmad Motevaselian, a profoundly anti-Semitic individual and one of the founders of Lebanese Hezbollah. Under Mohammad Kowsari’s command, Mojtaba fought as part of the Habib Battalion, which was made up of the most radical right Islamists, most of whom would later form the core of the regime’s security and intelligence bodies.

Almost a decade after the conflict, in 1999, Mojtaba began his traditional clerical studies at the deeply conservative Qom Shia Seminary. His studies there would be overseen by his father’s closest and most extremist clerics, such as Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi. A few years later, in 2002, Mesbah-Yazdi issued a fatwa calling for killings of Iranian youths who promoted “Western immorality” and engaged in extramarital affairs, which resulted in a string of murders by the IRGC’s paramilitary arm, the Basij, in the province of Kerman.

Following his studies in Qom, Mojtaba returned to Tehran to undertake a role at the Office of the Supreme Leader—the most powerful and securitized center of power in the Islamic Republic—under his father’s direct and close supervision. He even opted to take his father’s dars-e kharej class (Shia jurisprudence specialism classes) in the Office of Supreme Leader to become a mujtahid and achieve ayatollah clerical status. Over time, Khamenei, the elder, would train his son to lead his office—a role he maintains with an iron fist.

Mojtaba’s first taste of politics would come in 2005, when he led the electoral manipulation of the 2005 presidential elections in favor of hardline Basij member Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, despite complaints from other candidates. Since then, with his father’s full backing, Mojtaba has emerged as the man behind the curtain controlling the Office of the Supreme Leader, with heavy involvement in decision-making across the Islamic Republic.

Another indicator to consider relates to Mojtaba’s inner circle. As the old saying goes, “You can judge a man by the company he keeps”—this could not be clearer about Mojtaba. The inner ring of the Supreme Leader’s son includes the most ideologically extremist clerics among the next generation of regime elites, such as Mehdi Taeb, brother of the former IRGC Intelligence head who leads the hardline Ammar Headquarters; Alireza Panahian, an IRGC-affiliated extremist cleric who has a leading role in the IRGC’s indoctrination program; and Mohammad Qomi, head of the Islamic Propaganda Organization.

These extremist clerics and their militant followers have been at the forefront of the brutal violent crackdown against the grassroots cultural and societal liberalization of the Iranian population. They are also leading advocates of the militaristic doctrine of Mahdism, the most radical Islamist doctrine. Those who subscribe to this apocalyptic ideology believe the eradication of Israel will facilitate the return of the Twelfth divinely ordained Shia Imam, Mohammad al-Mahdi, whom Shia Muslims believe went into occultation in 874 AD. If Mojtaba attains the mantle after his father’s death, this so-called “ideologically pure” clique will be rewarded with senior elite positions of power and will have the ear of the new Supreme Leader.

Finally, what vision can be pieced together from the ayatollah’s son? Mojtaba has been a man of few words and has preferred to operate in the shadows. Nevertheless, actions tend to speak louder than words.

A leaked IRGC intelligence report reveals that Mojtaba Khamenei had a crucial role in commanding the violent suppression of Iranian civilians in the recent anti-regime protests. This IRGC report claims that, while Mojtaba conveyed his “appreciation” towards the regime’s security forces for neutralizing the nationwide protests, he also criticized the Basij for ignoring his consistent calls to be better equipped to suppress those on the streets.

This report is consistent with Mojtaba’s direct commanding role in confronting past anti-regime protests in Iran. During the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement, regime insiders indicated that Mojtaba took complete control over coordinating IRGC’s Basij crackdown on protesters that were demanding greater liberalization. Based on accounts from the so-called “reformist faction” during the 2009 suppression, national security meetings were relocated to the Office of the Supreme Leader to be personally supervised by Mojtaba. It was precisely Mojtaba’s direct role in the violent suppression of protesters that resulted in popular slogans being directed at him, such as, “Mojtaba, we hope you die, so you never see the supreme leadership.”

Beyond this, it is known, like his father, that Mojtaba belongs to the radical Shia Islamist faction that subscribes to absolute clerical guardianship and its two core principles: domestic Islamization and exporting the Islamic Revolution.

While this may disappoint the cohort of elites like Ranai, who are banking on a “revolution from above,” the idea that Mojtaba will emerge as the next radical modernizer in the region is nothing but wishful thinking. In fact, from what is known so far, the ayatollah’s son will continue his father’s path, but perhaps with even more youthful energy, given his age of 54 years.

With that in mind, the past ten months have demonstrated that this revolution from below is ongoing. Instead of hedging bets on Mojtaba—a bet doomed to fail—the international focus should be on supporting the Iranian people—the real changemakers in this dynamic.

Saeid Golkar is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Service at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and the author of Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran. Follow him on Twitter: @SaeidGolkar.

Kasra Aarabi is a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute. Follow him on Twitter: @KasraAarabi.

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Grady Wilson quoted in NRC (Dutch) on balancing in Turkish foreign policy

Grady Wilson — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 14:43:43 +0000

The post Grady Wilson quoted in NRC (Dutch) on balancing in Turkish foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rich Outzen joins CNN International to discuss Erdogan’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership

aozen — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 13:04:43 +0000

The post Rich Outzen joins CNN International to discuss Erdogan’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rich Outzen joins TRT World to discuss Erdogan’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership

aozen — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 12:53:46 +0000

Defne Arslan: Turkey comes away with major gains as it prepares to ratify in the fall

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What’s behind Erdogan’s backing of Sweden’s NATO bid?

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 00:03:53 +0000

JUST IN

The wait is (nearly) over. After more than a year of ups and downs since Sweden applied to join NATO in May 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has agreed to back Stockholm’s bid to become the Alliance’s thirty-second member. The announcement came on the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius after Erdoğan, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson held a lightning round of negotiations. Erdoğan agreed to advance ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession to Turkey’s legislature, with Hungary expected to follow suit to complete the process. What changed Erdoğan’s mind? What’s next for the Alliance? Our experts on the ground in Vilnius and beyond share their insights.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Rich Outzen (@RichOutzen): Nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, former US State Department official, and former US Army foreign area officer
Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
Christopher Skaluba: Director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department
Anna Wieslander (@AnnwieAnna): Director for Northern Europe and secretary-general of the Swedish Defence Association

How done is this deal?

The joint memorandum from Monday’s meeting spells out increased counterterrorism efforts by NATO to address Turkey’s security concerns and fresh support from Sweden for Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, among other provisions—and came as a surprise, following Erdogan’s skeptical comments in recent days about the prospects for an agreement.
“It is a typical Erdoğan move to take a maximalist position in a high-stakes negotiation, show readiness to walk, then compromise for progress on key demands,” Rich tells us.
Not (yet) in writing is a looming deal for Turkey to buy F-16 fighter jets from the United States, a likely carrot for Turkish approval of Sweden’s membership. “The practice of international relations is not an art for the purist,” says Dan. “If the Biden team made some understanding, I would look favorably on it.”
Chris, who’s in Vilnius, notes that Erdoğan is only sending the decision on Sweden’s NATO accession to the Turkish parliament, which his party controls, so this is not a done deal. Erdoğan made a show of lending his support to an invitation for Finland and Sweden to join NATO a year ago in Madrid before drawing out the process until now. “There is a non-zero chance that some intervening circumstance (like another public Quran burning [in Sweden]) could serve as pretext for derailing the process again,” he says. “I want to be optimistic, but worry that I have seen this movie before. NATO should not spike the football until it is over the goal line.”
With the action now moving to the Turkish legislature, Erdoğan “retains the ability to kill or delay accession if Sweden backs off on counterterror” measures that Turkey wants or if an F-16 deal doesn’t materialize, Rich adds.
Nevertheless, there was a palpable sense of celebration and relief in Vilnius. “It is unclear how long it will take, but the agreement undoubtedly removes the risk of Sweden falling into a limbo situation—that is, being close to, but not fully in, the Alliance,” Anna tells us from the summit.

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The Wagner factor

Erdoğan’s turnabout comes two weeks after mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived mutiny in Russia—and on the same day that news broke of Russian leader Vladimir Putin meeting with Prigozhin in the days after the revolt—developments that “suggest [Putin] regime weakness,” according to Dan.
“Erdoğan’s reaction to the failed 2016 coup in Turkey showed no such mixed messages,” Dan adds. In choosing to advance Sweden’s efforts to join NATO, “Erdoğan might have concluded that betting on Putin after the mutiny seemed less wise.”
Rich argues that the Prigozhin drama was not much of a factor, since this agreement was all part of a long-term push for NATO to help address Turkish security concerns such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): “The Turks need a functional relationship with Russia but see more common cause with the West; the approach to Sweden should be seen in those terms, as how to prove bona fides to the Western Alliance while extracting necessary concessions to their own security.”
If its security concerns are addressed, Turkey actually favors a bigger NATO with countries such as Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia, Rich tells us, “because by NATO structure and bylaws” Turkey, like other Alliance members, “gets a veto on the world’s most powerful security organization.” So “the bigger the better.”

All for one

“The deal means that the Vilnius Summit is off to a good start,” Anna says, as the Alliance “faced the risk of appearing fragmented and weak” with its members not yet fully united around Sweden’s NATO membership. Now focus turns to a possible membership roadmap and security guarantees for Ukraine, where “tough decisions” await, she says.
Erdoğan also gets to bask in the limelight. “He has lost no real leverage,” Rich notes, “but gained a tremendous optic of Turkey supporting the Atlantic Alliance.”

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Experts react: Erdogan just agreed to support Sweden’s NATO bid. What does that mean for Turkey, Sweden, and the Alliance?

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 23:08:40 +0000

Now that’s an opening act. On the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, and after more than a year of twists and turns, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Monday that he would push forward Sweden’s accession into NATO. The announcement came after a meeting with Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, with NATO agreeing to enhance its counterterrorism work to address Turkey’s security concerns and Sweden agreeing to back Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership bid. Erdoğan, for his part, agreed to push for ratification of Sweden’s accession in its legislature. With Hungary expected to follow suit, the path to Sweden’s entrance into the Alliance could soon be clear.

Below, Atlantic Council experts weigh in on what’s behind this dramatic and consequential turnabout from Erdoğan and what to expect next.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Rich Outzen: Inside Erdoğan’s calculus

Anna Wieslander: Sweden gets out of limbo as the Alliance shows a united front

Christopher Skaluba: Don’t spike the football just yet

Rachel Rizzo: Both sides gain in this geopolitical tit-for-tat

Daniel Fried: Did Erdoğan sense Putin’s weakness?

Ian Brzezinski: Sweden makes the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake—and seals the Vilnius summit’s place in history

Turkey comes away with major gains as it prepares to ratify in the fall

On July 10, Erdoğan committed to send Sweden’s NATO membership ratification to the Turkish parliament. The news was welcomed by all NATO members heading into the NATO summit in Vilnius—and will prove beneficial to Turkey, a major ally with a key role in the Alliance’s southern flank, from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. The announcement also came right after Erdoğan demanded long-sought EU membership for Turkey in return for Sweden’s accession, in addition to Sweden taking Turkey’s security concerns seriously. Sweden eventually took steps on adopting an anti-terrorism law in June. Additionally, language regarding terrorist organizations, which pose an existential threat to Turkey, appeared in the NATO communiqué. These were important gains for Turkey. It is also encouraging to see that NATO will be establishing a terrorism coordination mechanism for the first time.

What will be the timeline for Sweden’s ratification in the Turkish parliament? It is important to note that apart from Erdoğan’s remarks, there has not been any official announcement from the Turkish side regarding Sweden’s accession yet. This tells me that Erdoğan will wait for the next steps both from Sweden and NATO, as well as from the EU before he sends the protocol to the Turkish parliament.

Erdoğan also announced on July 12 in Vilnius that Sweden’s accession will move forward once the Turkish Parliament opens in October, but not before. As the parliament opens, the ratification needs to be discussed and adopted at the parliament’s foreign affairs committee first, before it goes to the floor.

Erdogan’s move on July 10not only took the pressure off of Turkey during the summit, but also gave the president more time to monitor the developments in Turkey’s favor. From the EU side, a customs union revitalization and update, as well as visa liberalization will be beneficial for Turkey, and if things move fast enough, there is always a chance that Sweden’s ratification can happen in September. That said, I also would like to underline that this announcement in Vilnius will also bring obligations to Turkey to meet its side of the agreement.

—Defne Arslan is senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program.

Inside Erdoğan’s calculus

I am mildly surprised that this comes before and not during the Summit, which convenes Tuesday, but overall it makes sense. It is a typical Erdogan move to take a maximalist position in a high-stakes negotiation, show readiness to walk, then compromise for progress on key demands.

It’s the wrong question to ask, “What pushed Erdogan to do this?” Because it underestimates the degree of strategy he and his advisors have applied—and misreads their original intent. Erdogan and the Turks have long said publicly and privately that they favor NATO enlargement. They have supported Ukraine and Georgia in the past, approved Finland this past year, and would like to see Sweden in—if the notoriously lax Swedish counterterror laws, now amended, are fully implemented. Turkey wants a big NATO because by NATO structure and bylaws Erdogan gets a veto on the world’s most powerful security organization—as do all members. The bigger the better. Yet the nature of the enlargement matters greatly for a country with a serious terrorism threat. So the better question is: Did Erdogan get what he thinks he needs on his own security needs, regarding the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and a potential F-16 fighter jet deal with the United States, to advance Sweden’s candidacy? What was the quid pro quo?

It’s important to remember that Erdogan’s announcement was not approval of the bid; it was a statement of intent to pass the question of approval to the Turkish parliament, which Erdogan’s party controls. Thus he retains the ability to kill or delay accession if Sweden backs off on counterterror implementation, or if the United States reneges on the F-16 deal. So all in all, he has lost no real leverage, but gained a tremendous optic of Turkey supporting the Atlantic Alliance.

This removes the question of Swedish accession from the summit’s main agenda, and places it in the category of “business successfully managed.” Thus the summit can focus on two more pressing issues: how to support Ukraine and how to implement NATO’s revised security concept. I would expect that on the first topic (Ukraine) we will see a roadmap or statement of principles that lays out robust military support for Ukraine’s defense, amounting to a security guarantee, but carefully calibrated not to constitute a near-term prospect of accession, an escalation, or an engagement of NATO as an organization in the current defensive war against Russia. On the second topic (security concept), there will be technical progress on how to divide responsibilities and resources more equitably, but this will likely be of less interest to general audiences.

I think this has less to do with the mutiny of Yevgeniy Prigozhin and perceptions of Vladimir Putin’s standing than with the leverage game vis-a-vis NATO allies and how to ensure that if European NATO problems become Turkish problems, Turkish problems become European NATO problems. Ankara will continue to conduct a balancing act by which it maintains trade, diplomatic relations, and occasional strategic cooperation with Russia—while ensuring that together with other NATO powers Turkey disabuses Russia of its dreams of imperial revanche. Putin, Prigozhin, Wagner—in Turkish eyes these are all just layers of the Russian Matryoshka or Maskirovka, deceptive games that obscure a fairly direct power play. The Turks need a functional relationship with Russia but see more common cause with the West; the approach to Sweden should be seen in those terms, as how to prove bona fides to the Western Alliance while extracting necessary concessions to their own security.

As to quid pro quo, for Turkey, it can be only two things—counter-PKK commitments by Sweden, and agreement on F-16s (and perhaps broader strategic engagement) by Washington. Anything else is peripheral, and if these are not obtained, the deal is a bad one for Ankara. Of course there is an escape hatch—Erdogan passed the ball to the Turkish parliament and approved nothing directly—but the pieces are in place now for a good transactional deal that helps NATO, Sweden, and Turkey in a stroke.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

Sweden gets out of limbo as the Alliance shows a united front

Finally Sweden got its green light from Turkey to join NATO. Late in the evening in Vilnius, Stoltenberg called July 10, 2023, “a historic day.” The agreement between Sweden, Turkey, and NATO that was signed on Monday evening means that Sweden will join the Alliance as its thirty-second member “as soon as possible,” given that the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments need to ratify the accession protocol.

It is unclear how long it will take, but the agreement undoubtedly removes the risk of Sweden falling into a limbo situation—that is, being close to, but not fully in, the Alliance. Sweden´s military and political adjustments toward NATO membership can proceed with full speed, which is beneficial not only for Sweden, but for the defense of Northern Europe, in which Sweden could play a crucial role.

The green light also facilitates Finland’s integration as a new member, since the security and defense of the two Nordics is heavily interlinked. As Finnish President Sauli Niinistö stated: “Finland’s NATO membership is not complete without Sweden.”

For NATO, the deal means that the Vilnius Summit is off to a good start. As twenty-nine allies already have ratified Sweden’s accession, NATO otherwise faced the risk of appearing fragmented and weak. Lack of progress could put the credibility of NATO’s “open door” policy at risk, since the Alliance also has to make some tough decisions on Ukrainian membership.

Turkey managed to push Sweden and NATO to take a step forward on counterterrorism measures, and in the end, Erdoğan also put the EU into the mix. Sweden’s decision to support Turkish ambitions to get the European Commission to restart the accession process appeared to seal their NATO agreement. Whether Turkey will also get to purchase the long-sought F-16 fighter jets from the United States remains to be seen. But then, the summit has not even started and US President Joe Biden has yet to arrive.

—Anna Wieslander is the director for Northern Europe and head of the Atlantic Council’s Northern Europe office in Stockholm.

Don’t spike the football just yet

While my instinct tells me that it would be difficult for Erdoğan to backtrack on an agreement he has seemingly made in good faith, recent history provides a cautionary tale. Just over a year ago on the margins of the Madrid Summit, glasses were clinking on what most observers assumed would be a straightforward process for admission once Turkey joined consensus in inviting Finland and Sweden to become members. Yet Erdoğan knew he had a second bite at the apple. He took the accolades in Madrid, only to run Sweden through the paces for another year before another dramatic set of negotiations in Vilnius, where he once again demanded the spotlight before conceding. If he moves with alacrity to push the ratification through the Turkish parliament, skeptics can be reassured. But there is non-zero chance that some intervening circumstance (like another public Quran burning) could serve as pretext for derailing the process again. I want to be optimistic, but worry that I have seen this movie before. NATO should not spike the football until it is over the goal line.

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Both sides gain in this geopolitical tit-for-tat

For months, NATO leaders have been working behind the scenes to broker this agreement between Turkey and Sweden. It’s important to tip our hats to Stoltenberg, Biden, and other leaders who exerted diplomatic pressure to see this through. This is a classic example of a geopolitical tit-for-tat: Erdoğan using his strategic position—as a member of NATO but also straddling the East and West—to extract concessions from Sweden that both bolster his power at home and demonstrate to the broader NATO Alliance that they need him. It also gives both sides something they want: Erdoğan gets to look like a statesman, and Sweden appears on track to finally get its NATO membership. It will be interesting in the coming days to follow reports of what took place behind closed doors over the last few weeks, days, and even hours, and what was actually on offer for Erdoğan to create this shift. He wouldn’t have changed his tune if he didn’t see this move as in his interests. Next up: Be sure to watch the US-Turkey F-16 space closely.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Did Erdoğan sense Putin’s weakness?

While it’s only speculation, the Prigozhin mutiny and the Kremlin’s uncertain response (Prigozhin at liberty in Russia, not in exile in Belarus; Prigozhin’s meeting with Putin) suggest regime weakness. Erdoğan’s reaction to the failed 2016 coup in Turkey showed no such mixed messages. Erdoğan might have concluded that betting on Putin after the mutiny seemed less wise.

We won’t know what the United States might do with respect to F-16 or other military sales to Turkey. If there were an understanding, the details will become clear in coming weeks. Whether a possible deal is a good deal depends on the details. But the practice of international relations is not an art for the purist. Erdoğan’s decision to support Sweden’s (and Ukraine’s) NATO accession is a big deal and worth advancing. If the Biden team made some understanding, I would look favorably on it.

Sweden will bring to the Alliance military capacity (though it will need to build more), political savvy, and good geography. Sweden will help with the defense of NATO’s eastern flank countries and the Baltic Sea. Having worked with Swedish diplomats for many years, I believe they will also be excellent partners in forging NATO consensus and a sustainable, strong policy toward Russia.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Sweden makes the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake—and seals the Vilnius summit’s place in history

Assuming Erdoğan’s announcement is followed by expeditious approvals from the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments, it will be one of the key substantive and geopolitically significant deliverables of NATO’s Vilnius summit. Sweden’s accession will bring to the Alliance real military capability, reinforce its transatlantic outlook, and above all, bring into the Alliance’s ranks a new member determined to fulfill its military responsibilities. Sweden’s membership will complete the transformation of the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake, thereby strengthening the security and military stability of North Central Europe.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

The post Experts react: Erdogan just agreed to support Sweden’s NATO bid. What does that mean for Turkey, Sweden, and the Alliance? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Moldova must seize opportunity to end energy dependence on Russia

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 16:22:04 +0000

When Moldova acceded to the EU Energy Community Treaty in 2010, it pledged to restructure away from Soviet centralization and reform its natural gas sector to comply with the EU’s anti-trust laws. More than 13 years later, the path ahead toward unbundling remains long and winding. The issue is urgent, however, because without gas sector reforms that break Russia’s stranglehold on Moldova’s energy sector and allow for real competition, Europe’s poorest country cannot hope to achieve energy security.

Moldova simply cannot afford to delay reforming its gas sector any longer. It is completely dependent on imports to keep itself heated and lit. Landlocked between Ukraine and Romania, 99% of oil is imported, along with 100% of natural gas. That gas fuels heating and the country’s lone power plant, located in Kremlin-controlled separatist region Transnistria.

This alone would be a recipe for energy disaster (and has been). Additionally, the country’s gas sector is almost entirely controlled by a monopoly called Moldovagaz, which is 51% owned by Russia’s gas monopoly Gazprom, with a 36% share owned by the Moldovan government and 13% by Transnistria. Moldovagaz’s wholly owned subsidiaries dominate all of the various subsectors of the energy industry. For example, Moldovatransgaz runs 98% of the distribution network.

This arrangement has afforded Moscow decades of informal control over Moldova. Indeed, allegations of Russia’s manipulation, coercion, and malign influence over the tiny country as exercised through Moldovagaz are too extensive to illuminate in full. A few highlights are the 2006 and 2009 gas shutoffs by Gazprom, which left tens of thousands of Moldovans without heating in the dead of winter. There have also been several rounds of brutal gas supply negotiations that have left Moldova with deeply disadvantageous gas contracts.

The most recent contract was signed in October 2021 and committed Moldova to another five years of Gazprom supplies. At the same time, President Maia Sandu’s new government, its lawyers, and its Western supporters are struggling with the fact that either pro-Russian actors in the former government or Moldovagaz officials appear to have wiped the files necessary to untangle several of the legal instruments that keep the country in its unhappy marriage with Gazprom.

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Modovagaz also faces various accusations of accounting shenanigans. These include claims that it supplies Transnistria with gas that the breakaway region doesn’t pay for, and then charges the debt to the Moldovan government. Coupled with sometimes dubious debts Moldova has incurred buying gas, Gazprom claims the government now owes it $9 billion. This represents $760 million in purported Moldovan government debt, and $8.24 billion in debt tied to Transnistria. For comparison, Moldova’s GDP is under $14 billion.

Meanwhile, during October 2021 negotiations with Gazprom, Moldovagaz committed “not to carry out a forced reorganization” until this debt is settled. Critics believe this is a further indication that unbundling would be good for Moldova and bad for Russia. Signed in the midst of the mounting energy crisis of late 2021 and with Moldova running entirely out of gas, this agreement has been widely branded as an example of inappropriate Russian influence over the Moldovan energy sector.

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After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

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The obvious solution to break Russia’s energy dominance over Moldova is for the authorities to finally implement the unbundling of the gas sector and vertically de-integrate Moldovagaz. The EU Third Energy Package requires the three tiers of a natural gas market (upstream/production, midstream/transmission, and downstream/distribution) not be controlled by the same entity. In practice, this means separating the gas transmission system operator, Moldovatransgaz. The original deadline for unbundling was in 2016, with extensions then granted until January 2020, and then February 2021. In 2021, EU officials opened infringement proceedings against Moldova for its continued failure to unbundle Moldovagaz. In June 2023, the Ministry of Energy announced it was “determined” to complete Moldovagaz unbundling by September 2023. We shall see.

What form any unbundling will take also remains unclear. The Moldovan government may believe it lacks the capacity to manage Moldovatransgaz and the transmission system and may look for an external company to operate it. This would be a major mistake because giving critical infrastructure assets over to foreign entities would be repeating the same error as with Gazprom and Moldovagaz. It would also preclude Moldova’s learning to be self sufficient, a key aspect of energy independence and security. Another theoretical option is privatization, but that requires finding a buyer. Given Moldova’s history of defaults and disputes with private investors, there’s close to zero chance of that happening.

The best option is almost certainly finding a different government entity other than Moldovagaz to take control of Moldovatransgaz. This would replicate how Ukraine unbundled its gas monopoly, Naftogaz, by spinning off the transmission system operator into a separate entity controlled by a different ministry. There is some tangential precedent: Using a revolving EBRD credit of €300 million, the gas trading team at state agency Energocom, led by Maciej Wozniak, has pushed Gazprom out of the Moldovan market. Along the same lines, another state agency could step into the distribution business. This would have the added benefit of being more efficient because nothing new would need to be created; the unbundling would be a matter of paperwork.

There has probably never been a better time for Moldova to get serious about this; the cessation of gas transit from Gazprom into Europe means Russia has already played its energy trump card and has relatively little leverage left.

At the same time, Western interest and willingness to support Moldova during the transition should help cover any gaps. Politically, Moldova taking control of assets ultimately owned by Russia is good optics for Sandu’s government. And the political turmoil in Moscow coupled with the Kremlin’s distraction from its stalled war in Ukraine could make Moldovan maneuvers less likely to elicit an aggressive response. If everything goes right, becoming the supplier to Transnistria could even forge something of a path to national reconciliation. There’s never been a better moment to try, and there’s no time to waste.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Burden-sharing disagreements within the Alliance are nearly as old as NATO itself. Today, though, transatlantic tension regarding burden-sharing is heightened by a complex security landscape. Increased Russian aggression since 2014 has required reinvestment in conventional military capabilities, while asymmetric threats including cyberattacks, global warming, pandemics, mass migration, and terrorism continue to threaten allied security. Equitable burden-sharing among allies is not only a matter of principle, but also has operational and even tactical implications. Without equitable burden-sharing, the allies will quickly prove unable to meet their security commitments.

The latest allied defense spending figures show that while progress has been made on both elements of the DIP, not all allies will achieve the 2 percent and 20 percent goals by 2024. How then can the United States and like-minded allies successfully negotiate even higher targets? They might start by agreeing to portray NATO burden- and risk-sharing more accurately, as a way of ameliorating the naming and shaming that comes with not achieving the 2 percent and 20 percent goals. Although some argue that “inputs” like defense spending tell us a lot about “outputs” like contributions to Alliance operations, recently available data indicate this is not necessarily the case. If burden- and risk-sharing could be portrayed more accurately, those opposed to increasing the input targets might be more willing to reconsider their opposition. Even if they do not, improving how NATO depicts burden- and risk-sharing would benefit lawmakers, analysts, academics, and the public.

This issue brief begins by examining whether defense inputs really do tell us much about defense outputs, particularly contributions to allied operations. The brief does this first qualitatively by analyzing allied troop contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2011, at the height of the troop surge. It then employs a statistical analysis to examine allied troop contributions to not just ISAF in 2011 but also to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) mission in the Baltic states. The issue brief concludes with recommendations on how NATO might more accurately depict burden- and risk-sharing, as a way of ultimately reaching higher DIP targets.

What do defense inputs tell us?

NATO relies on eleven metrics to measure burden-sharing.³ Two of the metrics focus on so-called inputs and nine focus on outputs. Inputs refer to the funds that member states allocate to defense, and these formed the basis for the 2014 DIP. The DIP was noteworthy not because allies had committed to the 2 percent/20 percent targets—in fact, the 2 percent target had existed for many years prior—but rather because the commitments were made by Alliance heads of state and government. In the past, Alliance defense ministers were the ones who had committed to the defense spending targets.

Regarding burden-sharing outputs, most of the data on these NATO metrics are classified for a variety of political and operational reasons. For example, publicly acknowledging that some Alliance forces are not as ready to respond to a crisis as claimed could prove politically embarrassing, provide adversaries like Russia with useful intelligence, and undermine deterrence. However, the fact that not all burden-sharing metrics are public leaves some decision-makers, legislators, experts, and allied citizens without a complete picture of who in the Alliance is doing their fair share.

Some experts argue that the inputs correlate “a lot” with defense capabilities and capacity and hence provide a good enough picture of the outputs.⁴ This may appear somewhat intuitive—you get what you pay for. However, such claims are problematic on at least two counts. First, these claims ignore risk-sharing, an important yet often overlooked component of the broader concept of burden-sharing. The examples of Greece and Denmark illustrate this point well. Greece routinely spends more than the equivalent of 2 percent of its GDP on defense and recently it has spent well above 20 percent of its defense budget on equipment and related R&D (38.8 percent in 2021). Greece, therefore, may appear to be a model ally. In contrast, Denmark routinely spends less than the equivalent of 2 percent of its GDP on defense, averaging just 1.23 percent since 2014, and less than 20 percent of its defense budget on equipment, averaging 13.8 percent since 2014. Clearly, the Danes appear to be burden-sharing laggards.

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However, during NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, Danish forces operated in southern Afghanistan, a region that saw some of the heaviest fighting. As a result, the Danes had one of the highest per capita casualty rates of allied troop-contributing countries.⁵ Meanwhile, Greek forces served primarily at Kabul’s international airport and in allied medical facilities in Afghanistan. These troops performed important, necessary missions, but they did not face the same risks as Danish troops.

The second reason to doubt claims that NATO’s defense input measures tell us most of what we need to know about defense outputs is that merely possessing capabilities is no guarantee that those capabilities will be used in allied operations, regardless of the risk-sharing factors noted above. Again, referring to the cases of Greece and Denmark, the contributions of the former to Alliance operations in Afghanistan⁶ (1.2 percent of all allied troops during the 2010-12 surge) and Kosovo⁷ (2.8 percent of the total Kosovo Force as of August 2022) were and are somewhat low, given that Greek troops constitute 3.34 percent of total NATO forces. In contrast, at the height of the surge in Afghanistan, Denmark had deployed 0.56 percent of all allied troops even though its forces constituted just 0.51 percent of total NATO forces in 2011. Similarly, today Denmark contributes 0.93 percent of all allied troops in Kosovo even though its troops constitute just 0.52 percent of total NATO forces. In other words, when it comes to sending troops into harm’s way, Denmark appears to do more than what might be expected of it.

It is possible, though, that the cases of Greece and Denmark constitute idiosyncratic burden- and risk-sharing behavior. To explain, perhaps most allies at or above the 2 percent/20 percent thresholds make contributions that are what would be expected of them or greater—given their relative sizes within the Alliance. Conversely, it may be the case that most below the 2 percent/20 percent thresholds make undersized contributions, again relative to their sizes within the Alliance.

This can be tested by looking at three recent NATO operations—the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in 2011; the Kovoso Force over the last decade; and the Enhanced Forward Presence mission in the Baltic states (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) from 2017 until the present.⁸ These three operations were selected for two reasons. First, they are primarily land operations, and nearly all allies have land forces that could play a role in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Eastern Europe. This permits a more broad-based analysis than, for instance, examining NATO’s Baltic air policing operation, since not all allies have fighter aircraft. Second, the operations represent a good mix of typologies—crisis response/counterinsurgency (ISAF), peacekeeping (KFOR), and defense/deterrence (eFP)—even if the needs of the Alliance today likely skew toward defense and deterrence.

The specific time periods for each operation were selected for the following reasons:

NATO’s presence in Afghanistan was at its height in 2011, during the surge of allied forces there. Allies were under pressure from both Washington and Brussels to participate.
KFOR is a long-term peacekeeping operation and examining it over the last decade includes the period when NATO was consumed with Afghanistan, the period when NATO was increasingly focused on deterring and defending against Russia, and the few years in between.
The eFP mission in the Baltics is tied to the very heart of the Alliance—the Article 5 mutual defense clause of the NATO treaty—especially since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

By examining each ally’s contribution to the three operations relative to that ally’s military forces within the entire Alliance, one can get a sense of whether the success in achieving the goals of the DIP really does yield better burden-sharing.⁹ For example, if a particular ally met either the 2 percent or 20 percent threshold, and if inputs tell us a lot about outputs, it is reasonable to expect that that ally would contribute a proportional share of its military forces (relative to its forces within the Alliance) to the three operations.

Table 1 shows the data for ISAF in August 2011. Although the Defense Investment Pledge would not be made for another three years, the second and third columns indicate whether allies were above or below the 2 percent and 20 percent thresholds at the time—cells are highlighted green when above either threshold and red when below. Table 1 then shows a comparison between, on the one hand, each ally’s contribution to ISAF as a percent of all ISAF forces and, on the other hand, their military forces as a percent of NATO’s total military forces. (The figures on defense spending as a percent of GDP and the figures on percent of defense spending dedicated to equipment and R&D are lagged by three years because it takes time for money spent to have impact on capabilities.)

Table 1: NATO in ISAF, August 2011

If defense inputs tell us a lot about defense outputs, one might presume that if a country has sufficient inputs (i.e., it spends at least 2 percent on defense and meets or exceeds the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D), it would contribute a percentage of ISAF’s forces proportionate to its share of total NATO forces. The last column of the table shows whether and to what degree allies’ contributions to ISAF were over (positive number) or under (negative number) their proportion of the Alliance’s total military forces. If an ally failed to spend 2 percent on defense and failed to meet the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D, we would expect this number to be negative—that is, it fielded a percent of ISAF’s total force at a level below that which its forces represent within NATO more broadly. Conversely, if it spent more than 2 percent on defense or crossed the 20 percent threshold for equipment and related R&D, we would expect this number to be positive—that is, it fielded a percent of ISAF’s total force at a level above that which its forces represent within NATO more broadly. Exceptions—either over or under expectations—are highlighted in yellow. Of the twenty-four allies listed,¹⁰ eight did not contribute troops in a way one might expect, either positively or negatively, while sixteen did. More specifically, seven out of twenty-four allies met all or part of the DIP and yet failed to meet expectations for providing defense outputs in ISAF at the height of the surge.

Seven laggards out of twenty-four is not too bad. If roughly 70 percent of the time allies met expectations, it may be fair to conclude that defense inputs result in expected outputs, at least in terms of contributions to current operations. However, when analyzed statistically and when considering other operations like KFOR and eFP, the evidence of correlation between defense inputs and outputs is more mixed.

Table 2 shows the pairwise correlations among non-US allied defense spending as a percent of GDP, equipment spending as a percent of overall defense spending, “other” spending (which includes operations and maintenance, or O&M) as a percent of overall defense spending, and each ally’s defense budget as a percent of NATO’s overall defense spending on the one hand and the percent of ISAF troops on the other. Pairwise correlations allow for comparisons between a pair of variables, to shed light on whether a linear relationship exists between them. The results of a pairwise correlation analysis are expressed as correlation coefficients, ranging from -1, meaning a perfect negative correlation, to 1, meaning a perfect positive correlation. The closer the correlation coefficient is to either end of the scale (-1 or +1), the closer the relationship between the two variables. If, for example, a correlation coefficient between two variables is 0.75, this means that 75 percent of the time, if one of the variables moves in one direction (e.g., increasing), we can predict that the other variable moves in the same direction (e.g., also increasing). In social sciences generally, a coefficient from 0.7 (or -0.7) to 1 (or -1) indicates a strong positive (or negative) correlation; 0.3 (or -0.3) to 0.69 (or -0.69) indicates a moderately positive (or negative) correlation; and coefficients between 0.29 (or -0.29) and 0 indicate a weak or no positive (or negative) correlation.¹¹ Note that correlation does not mean or imply causation.

In the case of ISAF in 2011, the percent of troops contributed is poorly correlated with most key defense spending input measures, including the DIP and the percent of defense spending on O&M.¹² The only variable that shows any strong correlation with the percent of troops contributed to ISAF is each ally’s defense spending as a percent of total NATO defense spending.¹³

Table 2: Correlations among Defense Input Measures and ISAF Troop Contributions, 2011

Moreover, statistical analyses of non-US troop contributions to other Alliance operations show similarly mixed correlations at best or no correlation at all. Table 3 features a similar pairwise correlation analysis for KFOR from 2012 through 2020. Given the nine-year timeframe considered here, the analysis includes over 240 data points. As seen in the table, there are no strong or moderate correlations, positive or negative, between any of the inputs addressed here.

Table 3: NATO in KFOR, 2012-2020

Table 4 features statistical analysis of non-US allied contributions to eFP from 2017 through 2022. The table is based on data for allied contributions to eFP in the eight host countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland from 2017 to the present, and Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia since 2022. Data here include contributions from non-US allies each year from 2017 through 2022, resulting in 140 data points. As with the case of ISAF, the only defense input strongly correlated with percent of troop contributions to eFP is the percent of total allied defense spending. It is unclear why percent of total NATO defense spending is the only defense input that strongly correlates to both ISAF and eFP contributions, but it may reflect differing allied attitudes toward those operations on the one hand versus attitudes toward KFOR on the other.

Table 4: NATO in EFP, 2017-2022

Alternative measures, or just repackaging?

If defense inputs do not tell us much about the outputs, and if NATO does not make public the nine output measures it tracks, how can legislators, academics, other experts, and average citizens understand whether burden-sharing within NATO is fair? NATO burden-sharing is an inherently subjective and political issue. Given this, allies will likely try to manipulate whatever figures or data are used to measure burden-sharing to depict themselves in the best light. In short, no set of measures nor burden-sharing assessment process is perfect.

Nonetheless—and although it may be impossible to keep countries from using burden-sharing assessments as a way of burnishing their images—NATO can and should do more to include outputs in its publicly accessible annual reports. Doing so may offer all allies a fairer depiction of whether and how they are sharing burdens and risks, which could help lessen opposition from some allies to increasing the defense spending targets.

To achieve this, NATO should better leverage the data it already has available publicly—this will be far easier than trying to convince allies to declassify other information. For example, the Alliance should include in its annual defense expenditures report the troop contributions of each ally to ongoing operations. Information on allied contributions to particular operations is already publicly available, but it is not aggregated with the annual defense spending figures. This is sure to displease allies that contribute to other, non-NATO military missions in Europe and beyond including European Union or United Nations operations. To appease these allies, their contributions to non-NATO missions ought to be at least acknowledged, assuming those non-NATO operations are deemed to contribute to security in the transatlantic space.

Additionally, NATO should consider recrafting how it depicts the data it already makes public. For example, the Alliance staff charged with portraying the annually collected fiscal data should add an average trend line for all defense spending categories in its annual defense expenditures report. This is especially important for the personnel, infrastructure, and other (O&M) spending categories, which are not currently part of the DIP. Although there are no recommended minimum spending allocations for these categories, as there is for acquisition and related R&D (20 percent), simply showing a NATO average across all spending categories would provide a sense of which allies may need to recalibrate their spending.

Finally, the Alliance should think about ways to better portray risk-sharing. For instance, the Alliance should consider including per capita casualty figures in its reporting on current operations. For example, none of the “placemats” that the Alliance makes available for its operations in ISAF, KFOR, or eFP list casualty figures. This is politically risky and of course there have been few, if any, casualties in KFOR or eFP, given the nature of operations in Kosovo and across Eastern Europe. Additionally, the Alliance should continue to produce and release maps depicting in gross terms where allies (by country flag) are deployed in a particular operation. For instance, with an understanding that Alliance operations in southern Afghanistan were generally more challenging and dangerous than those in the north, a map depicting Danish, British, Canadian, Romanian, and American flags in the south provides a good sense of which allies are bearing greater risk.

Conclusion

The burden-sharing inputs used by NATO, specifically the Defense Investment Pledge agreed to at the 2014 Wales summit, do not correlate well or sometimes at all with one of the most important outputs—namely, relative troop contributions to NATO operations. Moreover, the inputs tell us nothing about risk-sharing, an important yet often overlooked component of broader burden-sharing considerations.

All of this means that those outside closed-door Alliance meetings—such as the general public but also most legislators—have little insight into whether allies are sharing responsibilities equitably. As the Alliance debates whether and how to replace the 2014 DIP, it should also consider ways to more accurately report on and portray burden- and risk-sharing. Doing so would permit a better informed transatlantic discussion on how allies should equitably share responsibilities, may lessen opposition toward increasing defense spending targets, and would ultimately improve transatlantic security in an era of strategic competition.

Dr. John R. Deni is a research professor of security studies at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a nonresident associate fellow at the NATO Defense College. The views expressed are his own. The author would like to thank Matthew Woessner, Jordan Becker, and two anonymous peer reviewers for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts. Additionally, the author is grateful for research assistance from Chelsea Quilling, Nate Forrest, Max Haseman, and Sean Sanko.

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1 “NATO Countries to Discuss Defence Spending Target—Stoltenberg,” Reuters, January 3, 2023, www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-countries-discuss-defence-spending-target-stoltenberg-2023-01-03.

2 Robbie Gramer, Amy Mackinnon, and Jack Detsch, “Eastern Europe Wants NATO to Beef Up Defense Spending,” Foreign Policy, February 2, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/02/eastern-europe-nato-defense-spending-ukraine-russia-poland-estonia/.

3 Douglas Lute, remarks delivered during “The Cost of European Security” panel event sponsored by Carnegie Europe and held in Brussels, Belgium, on September 17, 2015. Transcript available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CE_Transcript_Cost_of%20European%20Security.pdf, and video available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kw_jJ4jNqyY.

4 Jordan Becker, “Clearing the Air on Transatlantic Burden-Sharing, Part 2: You Gotta Give (Inputs) to Get (Outputs),” War on the Rocks, May 31, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/clearing-the-air-on-transatlantic-burden-sharing-part-2-you-gotta-give-inputs-to-get-outputs/.

5 Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” Brookings, March 31, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/index20120331.pdf.

6 “Afghanistan Troop Numbers Data: How Many Does Each Country Send to the NATO Mission There?” The Guardian, June 22, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2009/sep/21/afghanistan-troop-numbers-nato-data.

7 NATO, “Kosovo Force (KFOR): Key Facts and Figures,” August 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/8/pdf/2022-08-KFOR-Placemat.pdf.

8 There are a variety of reasons why a country may contribute troops to a particular mission, including the role of threats and their proximity, domestic political calculations, relations with other allies, or any number of other factors. The analysis in this issue brief is agnostic on which of these matters most for each ally; instead, the emphasis herein is on whether, from a broader Alliance-wide perspective, there exists a positive relationship between defense inputs and defense outputs like troop contributions.

9 Some have instead sought to focus on the allied contribution to each mission per 1,000 citizens as a measure of burden-sharing. This measure misrepresents the burden carried (or shirked) by those allies that have smaller militaries relative to their populations but that make proportionally larger contributions to allied military operations, like Canada, the Czech Republic, or Latvia, as well as those allies that have large militaries relative to their populations but that make below-average contributions to allied military operations, like Greece and Turkey.

10 The list of allies includes Canada and all European allies that had been in the Alliance for at least three years as of 2011 and that have military forces. Hence, Iceland is not listed because it does not have military forces, and Albania and Croatia are not listed because they did not join the Alliance until 2009. (Montenegro joined in 2017, North Macedonia joined in 2020, and Finland joined in 2023.)

11 Subsequently, a test for statistical significance can indicate whether a strong correlation between the two variables is due to random chance.

12 The conclusions drawn from the pairwise correlations shown in this issue brief stand up even when run through a bivariate regression analysis.

13 It is worth noting that this last correlation—percent of ISAF with percent of NATO’s overall defense spending—is the only one that is statistically significant.

The post We don’t really know which NATO allies are pulling their weight. Here’s how to fix that. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Prigozhin was a torpedo to the idea that the West must not humiliate Putin

Ana Palacio — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 14:40:23 +0000

Two weeks have passed, and few clues have emerged from the theatrical failed coup in Russia. It was closely followed by millions of spectators worldwide, who were captivated by the sensation of attending a gruesome reality show, although aware that, behind the scenes, leaders were carelessly playing with lives and fortunes.

The questions surrounding the June 23-24 events—which, were it not for the nuclear warheads and the casualties, would easily merit the qualification of vaudevillian—have multiplied. One is particularly relevant: What are the consequences for the war in Ukraine? More specifically, how does this plot twist affect Europe’s security?

If one imagines matryoshka dolls (Russian stacking dolls) as a symbol of Russian politics, the Wagner organization has existed because of—and for—Russian President Vladimir Putin. It depended—with all the ambiguity the term implies in the context of the whims of an all-powerful tsar and the personalistic nature of power—on three institutions also apparently controlled by the president: the Russian armed forces, its military intelligence (GRU), and the Federal Security Service (FSB). Notably, the intervention of these institutions in the rebellion—if any—was unclear.

The structure built by Putin has become a snake pit. Perhaps a “house of cards” is a more fitting term. Having previously refrained from sanctioning Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the ruthless leader of the Wagner paramilitary group, Putin spoke following the mutiny of punishing his enemies, even if such efforts are complicated by Wagner’s penetration into the Russian elite. The first arrest related to these consequences (still unconfirmed) appears to be that of Russian General Sergey Surovikin.

Prigozhin had been engaged in a power struggle with the military leadership for some time. Specifically, his attacks have targeted Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. The confrontation was exacerbated after last February’s invasion by the increasing relevance that the head mercenary and his followers have gained. Their relative effectiveness compared to the regular Russian army—which collapsed in the early onslaught of the war—brought Wagner into the spotlight inside and outside of Russia. In addition to its military actions, the group’s cruelty went viral on social media, as did its sermons in the courtyards of the prisons Wagner forces toured, recruiting convicted criminals of all kinds.

The mercenary leader’s strong connection with the great leader—a connection forged during the murky stage of the president’s public debut in Saint Petersburg in the 1990s—seemed to give Prigozhin a blank check. He first emerged on the scene as “Putin’s chef,” a nickname earned from managing the catering service of someone well acquainted with the dangers at the table, himself being a master in the use of poison as a political weapon.

Before the insurrection, the outspoken warrior had been making accusations of all kinds of irregularities, misconduct, and mistreatment against his two enemies: that they had claimed credit for Wagner’s victory in Bakhmut, that men were dying so they could “get fat in their mahogany offices,” and that they had denied his fighters necessary ammunition and support. And, most importantly, that they had deceived Putin about the progress of the military campaign.

The speech that kicked off the mutiny goes even further. No one had dared to question Putin’s justification of the invasion based on a victim mentality incessantly fed to the Russian people. The few in Russia who dared to dissent, such as Vladimir Kara-Murza, immediately found themselves behind bars.

Thus, Prigozhin’s words should be considered inflammatory: a qualified member of the establishment dared to openly and boldly denounce the falsehood of “the story that there was insane aggression on the part of Ukraine, and they were going to attack [Russia] together with the entire NATO bloc.” Careful not to mention the president by name, he stated that, contrary to Kremlin messaging, the war served “not to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine,” but rather “it was launched for completely different reasons.” He implied that the disaster was orchestrated by high-ranking military officials (driven by economic greed and vanity), in combination with “some oligarchs.”

[The] turmoil has shattered the thesis that the Euro-Atlantic community must not humiliate Putin for fear of provoking him, with the unpredictable consequences regarding the use of nuclear weapons that doing so would entail.

Putin’s response was not long in coming. In his televised address on June 24, he labeled the uprising as “a stab in the back of [the] country and [the] people.” His references to the Russian Empire—a frequent topic of his outdated musings—were to be expected, but his implicit identification with the ill-fated Tsar Nicholas II was surprising.

He equated the situation triggered by Prigozhin to the prelude of the upheaval of 1917, which led to the collapse of the system. Was he seeking, in his association with the tragic figure, a symbolic reincarnation of the tsar—in his case, having made the right decisions to avoid falling into the black hole of violence that characterized those years when “Russians killed Russians, brothers killed brothers”? It was a diatribe made with his citizens in mind, who retain a collective memory of that terrible period and who found their livelihoods crushed during the 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

During the uprising, the lack of response was salient, both from the siloviki (the economic and political elite) and the common people. There was no notable support of—or clear opposition to—Putin, who exploits the fact that people cling to the status quo out of fear of the unknown.

Prigozhin has nonetheless proven to be a torpedo aimed at Putin’s narrative. He punctured the myth of a war of necessity, of an inevitable war for historical justice. He undermined Putin’s explanation of an existential struggle against US aggression disguised as NATO. Furthermore, the turmoil has shattered the thesis that the Euro-Atlantic community must not humiliate Putin for fear of provoking him, with the unpredictable consequences regarding the use of nuclear weapons that doing so would entail. This thesis has justified the countries’ stinginess in sending to Ukraine certain equipment classified as offensive and the West’s delay in accepting stark realities, such as the urgent need for full operational readiness in the air.

The Euro-Atlantic community must move away from the habit of delaying decisions based on speculation about the consequences of its actions for third parties. It needs to look beyond the pipe dream of an immediate peace negotiation based on the stalemate on the front or a Kremlin-asserted “right” to subjugated areas. NATO allies’ opportunity to demonstrate determination when facing Russia will come soon—on July 11 in Vilnius at the NATO Summit.

Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain (2002-2004) and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors.

A version of this article originally appeared in El Mundo. It has been translated from Spanish by the staff of Palacio y Asociados and is reprinted here with the author’s and publisher’s permission.

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Why local officials must participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction

Zachary Popovich, Michael Druckman — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 13:58:58 +0000

It is now beyond question: Putin’s dream of decapitating Ukraine’s central leadership and subjugating the country has turned into a nightmare for Russia. Rather than finding Ukraine’s society divided and malleable, Russia has encountered a confident citizenry animated by commitments to a free and democratic future. While many of Ukraine’s national figures have provided commendable leadership examples, local leaders and mayors have also emerged as pivotal sources of resilience and hope.

Since Moscow’s invasion began in February 2022, cities across Ukraine have experienced significant destruction from Russia’s frequent artillery bombardments, drone attacks, and missile strikes. Ongoing fighting around Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine is a reminder of how cities remain central battlefields in the war.

Local officials and mayors have courageously stepped up to the challenge of wartime governance, with citizens increasingly turning to them to address emergency humanitarian and security challenges. Ukrainian mayors often serve as primary lines of defense responsible for processing medical aid, engaging directly with international organizations, and repairing damaged infrastructure.

According to a recent survey conducted across twenty-one cities, between 87% and 96% of Ukrainian residents wish to remain in their cities after the war, with 39% to 62% of respondents agreeing that local officials should decide reconstruction priorities. Clearly, leaders who have managed local response systems are well equipped to identify local needs and mobilize available resources for future targeted reconstruction projects.

For this reason, it is crucial that Ukraine’s nascent reconstruction strategies incorporate local leaders and mayors as primary actors charged with directing and managing redevelopment initiatives. Although any Ukrainian “Marshall Plan” will certainly prioritize financing redevelopment projects and infrastructure repair, Ukrainian officials and the country’s international partners should also work to establish new relationships that empower leaders at the local level.

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Numerous plans to address Ukraine’s future economic and political engagement with transatlantic and other recovery institutions are already underway. During the recent Ukraine Recovery Conference in London, public and private leaders from over 60 countries pledged significant financial resources to address humanitarian needs and outline investments in Ukraine’s battered economy.

Kyiv had earlier presented a draft Recovery and Development Plan at the 2022 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, Switzerland. This plan outlined the need for approximately 850 reconstruction projects set over ten years with total costs estimated at $750 billion dollars.

In January 2023, the European Commission also unveiled its Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform, which is designed to streamline future Ukrainian international recovery assistance and establish clear, transparent, and accountable financial standards. While such initiatives help secure much-needed funds, Ukraine and its allies must also seek to utilize these global opportunities and engage Ukraine’s local leaders as vital partners in their country’s recovery.

Eurasia Center events

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

Expanding on Ukraine’s decentralization experience is not only a pragmatic wartime imperative necessary for distributing equipment and supplies; it will also build upon established reforms necessary for Ukraine’s democratic consolidation. Beginning in 2014 as part of the many sweeping reforms enacted after the Euromaidan Revolution, political decentralization has been an important way of reducing Soviet-style centralization in Kyiv while combating corruption.

Over the past nine years, Ukraine’s mayors have started to gain experience developing and managing public policies and directly responding to constituent needs. Over this period, more than 10,000 informal local councils were merged into officially recognized municipalities and granted formal administrative oversight and financial regulatory powers. Up until Russia’s 2022 invasion, decentralized economic and political reforms introduced unprecedented positive changes in quality of life for millions of Ukrainians; the share of citizens living below subsistence levels fell from 52% to 23% between 2015 to 2019.

Ukraine’s continued success in creating resilient local governance systems will require cooperation with national political leaders with clear expectations outlined in legal commitments. Meanwhile, examples of renewed political centralization in response to wartime demands have highlighted possible fault lines between local and national figures. This trend threatens to exacerbate tensions if left unchecked.

In the city of Chernihiv, located approximately 90 miles north of Kyiv, Mayor Vladyslav Atroshenko was removed by courts following an investigation by Ukraine’s National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) into the alleged use of a municipally-owned car by the mayor’s wife to evacuate from the city during the opening days of the war. Mayor Atroshenko himself stayed in Chernihiv to oversee the defense of the city which withstood a siege and partial occupation in spring 2022.

In the city of Rivne in western Ukraine, rumblings grow of Mayor Oleksandr Tretyak potentially being removed in relation to an NAPC investigation into the payment of bonuses to city officials in 2020. At the same time, Mayor Tretyak claims he has come under increasing pressure to move limited city budget money to the region’s civil military administration, something he has so far refused to do, claiming that the city has already fulfilled all budgetary support requirements. These examples have fueled speculation over the direction of wartime centralization and should give pause to local authorities and regional civic leaders.

Any future national reconstruction policy will be best served by building upon Ukraine’s localized leadership assets and incorporating local councils, mayors, and officials in decision-making processes. By directing incoming aid at the local level, global partners can help expand technical, strategic, and administrative capacities and ensure resources are used effectively across targeted issues. Ukraine’s dedication to continued decentralization reforms is not only necessary to achieve reconstruction goals but is also a critical component of the country’s mission to develop transparent democratic systems from the ground up moving forward.

Zachary Popovich is a senior program associate at the International Republican Institute. Michael Druckman is the resident program director for Ukraine at the International Republican Institute.

aozen — Sun, 09 Jul 2023 14:09:29 +0000

The post Yevgeniya Gaber joins TVP World to discuss Zelenskyy’s visit to Turkey and why Ukraine expected invitation to join NATO at the Vilnius Summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Vilnius: Will Zelenskyy show at the summit? It depends on whether Biden listens to frontline NATO allies.

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 09 Jul 2023 12:45:27 +0000

VILNIUS—Here’s an easy way to judge the success of NATO’s summit here on Tuesday and Wednesday: Will President Volodymyr Zelenskyy join the traditional “family photo” of the Alliance’s thirty-one leaders?

“The summit has only one essential outcome,” Doug Lute, a former US ambassador to NATO and member of the Atlantic Council’s board of directors, told me. “Whatever the agreements on supporting Ukraine, this year it is essential that Zelenskyy be in the photo, capturing vividly that NATO has his back and reminding the world that Russia has no such support.”

Beyond that, if the Ukrainian leader is photographed standing among the thirty-one NATO heads of state, Zelenskyy more than likely got enough of what he needed to make the trip to Lithuania. When I met with him recently in Kyiv, as part of an Atlantic Council delegation, he said anything short of security guarantees and a clear roadmap to NATO membership for Ukraine would be seen as a betrayal of Ukrainians’ sacrifice.

If Zelenskyy doesn’t come to Vilnius, allied leaders will have missed a crucial opportunity to signal to Ukrainians and the world their unflinching commitment to defeating Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s criminal war and revanchist designs in Europe—at a crucible moment in the five-hundred-day-old war.

Zelenskyy was in Turkey on Saturday as part of a pre-summit European tour, shoring up support from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is still withholding his support for Sweden’s membership in NATO. Regarding Kyiv, however, Erdoğan said: “There is no doubt that Ukraine deserves NATO membership.”

Though much still could change before the summit opens on Tuesday, Central European alliance members say that the Biden administration has led the recalcitrance to a stronger, time-linked roadmap to NATO membership for Ukraine.

One Central European senior official, who asked that his name and that of his country not be named, compared the tone coming from the White House to that of Jacques Chirac in 2003, when the French president lectured Central Europeans who were supporting the United States on Iraq that they had “missed a good opportunity to shut up.”

What’s on the table for Ukraine thus far in Vilnius is, among other measures, the renaming of a NATO consultative group to give it more weight, security assurances similar to those the United States has with Israel, and the removal of the bureaucracy of a membership action plan (MAP)—though US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said on Friday that Ukraine “needs to take additional reforms,” hinting that it will still face a MAP-like process. Zelenskyy told us in Kyiv that such moves would be insufficient given his country’s service to democracies everywhere.

To be sure, the Biden administration deserves high praise for its handling of Russia’s war thus far, starting with its early leaking of intelligence predicting the invasion so that Ukraine and Europe were forewarned (not to mention China). Without concerted US military and financial support, Ukraine likely would have failed.

At the same time, if Ukrainians had received the weaponry and equipment they wanted faster and in greater quantities, thousands of Ukrainians would still be alive and the battlefield gains would have been greater.

Softening the potential blow of a disappointing summit outcome for Ukraine, the Biden administration cleared the way this week to provide Ukrainians with the cluster munitions they have long sought, prompting Zelenskyy to praise Biden’s “decisive steps.”

A form of air-dropped or ground-launched explosives that release smaller submunitions, cluster munitions have been widely used by Russia but are outlawed by many allies, though not by the United States. With Ukraine running low on 155 mm artillery shells, which are in low supply globally, cluster munitions are the fastest, most plentiful way to flush out dug-in Russian positions that are blocking the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

The Biden administration’s green light for cluster munitions has followed a pattern: The White House at first blocks the provision of certain weapons, from High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Abrams tanks to Patriot air defenses, only to agree to their provision months later. The administration’s go-slow approach to Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations reflects that caution, born of a desire to defend Ukraine without provoking greater Russian escalation, including tactical nuclear weapons use.

All NATO summits have to balance the longer-term needs of the Alliance with immediate demands. However, officials from non-US NATO member countries who I spoke to last week said there are several reasons why Ukraine’s immediate needs should take on greater priority:

Mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion in June underscored both the fissures in Russia’s leadership and the low morale and discipline of its military. It’s thus an ideal time to double down on support for Ukraine, recognizing that only significant ground gains can force useful negotiations.
Despite the economic and military cost of supporting Ukraine, the costs will grow exponentially if Putin prevails, and the threats go beyond Ukraine. One Biden administration official told me that the geopolitical importance of Ukraine to Washington is far greater than either Afghanistan or Iraq ever was, yet Ukraine can stop Russia at far lower cost and without risking American or other allied soldiers.
To argue that NATO membership for Ukraine can only come after the war ends and Russia leaves Ukrainian territory only provides Moscow an incentive to continue the war. Holding back due to concern about Russian nukes rewards Putin’s nuclear blackmail—and will encourage other unsavory leaders to acquire nukes as well.
Much is said about why Ukraine needs NATO, but not enough is said about why the Alliance needs Ukraine, now one of the strongest and most battle-hardened militaries in the world. The lesson of NATO in Central and Eastern Europe is that it brings stability to its neighbors and more peaceful and secure relations with Russia. The countries that Russia invaded—Georgia and Ukraine—were gray zones outside any military alliance. “Gray zones are green lights” for Putin, argues former US ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker.
Putin thus far has been wrong to count on Ukrainian failure and Western fatigue, but the dangers will grow in 2024 when the United States and much of Europe face elections. Bold decisions that can be made in 2023 will be much more difficult to achieve next year. Ukraine’s biggest threat might be the election year of 2024, and not just in the United States.

“We don’t any longer have the luxury of time,” one senior European official told me. “We certainly don’t have the luxury of getting it wrong. The stakes are too large—they are generational and go far beyond NATO’s borders.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 The war in Ukraine shows how technology is changing the battlefield
ECONOMIST

The Economist breaks down the lessons of the Ukraine war and what they mean for the future of warfare. Read the whole report to gain a deep and nuanced understanding of the implications for future military planning.

“[T]he paradox of the war,” the Economist writes, “is that mass and technology are intimately bound together. Even the artillery war shows this. Weeks before the invasion, America sent Ukraine Excalibur shells. Inside each was a small, rugged chip that could receive GPS signals from America’s constellation of navigation satellites. Whereas Russia often relied on barrages over a wide area, Ukrainian gunners could be more precise.”

This, the Economist argues, portends a shift towards the defensive, analogous to the late nineteenth century. “Precision warfare can counter some advantages of mass: Ukraine was outnumbered 12 to one north of Kyiv. It can also complement mass. Software-based targeting saves around 15-30% in shells, according to sources familiar with the data. But what precision cannot do, says Michael Kofman of the Centre for Naval Analyses (CNA), a think-tank, is substitute for mass.” Read more →

#2 Ukraine wants and expects an invitation to join NATO. Allies are not sure.
David L Stern, Emily Rauhala, and Isabelle Khurshudyan | WASHINGTON POST

For an understanding of what Ukraine seeks at the upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius, what might happen, and what the Ukrainians are worried about, read this excellent piece of reporting from David Stern, Emily Rauhala, and Isabelle Khurshudyan in the Washington Post.

“With or without membership,” they write, “Ukrainian officials are looking for security commitments by Western nations ‘without delay and as soon as possible,’ which would potentially encourage Moscow to withdraw its forces. Many analysts say Russian President Vladimir Putin is counting on Ukraine’s Western supporters to grow exhausted and halt the expensive flow of weapons and economic aid they have been sending to Kyiv. Such security guarantees could also serve to deter Russia from any major acts of aggression in the future. ‘I am sure that if the regime in the Kremlin does not change in the coming years, even after our victory, there will be — in their heads — a desire for revenge,’ [Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii] Reznikov said.” Read more →

#3 Putin’s Real Security Crisis
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

For another angle on the implications of Prigozhin’s failed coup, read this smart analysis of the failure of the Russian security services during the coup and Putin’s apparent non-response to that failure.

“Then, as Wagner forces made their move,” Soldatov and Borogan write, “both the FSB and Russia’s National Guard, the main body assigned to maintain internal security and suppress unrest in Russia, failed as rapid response forces. The National Guard made every effort to avoid a direct confrontation with Wagner; for its part, the FSB—which also has several elite special forces groups—did not appear to take any action at all. Instead, the most powerful security agency in the country issued a press release calling on Wagner’s rank and file to stay out of the uprising and to go arrest Prigozhin—on their own.”

And yet, they note, no one has yet been punished.

“This lack of repercussions for the security services is particularly startling in view of the FSB’s performance in the crisis. When Prigozhin captured the headquarters of the Southern Military District—where he spoke to [Deputy Minister of Defense Yunus-Bek] Yevkurov and [First Deputy Head of the GRU Vladimir] Alekseyev—it looked almost like a hostage taking of several of Russia’s top military commanders. Yet according to sources in the FSB, in response to the arrival of Wagner forces, the FSB agents in Rostov-on-Don simply barricaded themselves in their local headquarters… While a column of Wagner mercenaries marched toward Moscow, taking down helicopters and shooting into the houses of civilians on the way, these brave generals failed to show up—not at the scene or in front of the public at all.” Read more →

#4 Multilateral Man Is More Powerful Than Putin Realized
Anne Applebaum | THE ATLANTIC

In this must-read profile of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Anne Applebaum makes a powerful case for why Stoltenberg’s brand of quiet multilateral leadership will ensure Ukraine’s long-term integration into Europe from behind the scenes.

“[A]lthough historians will argue about whether NATO countries could have done more to deter Russia, they did much more to help Ukraine than Putin expected once the war began. Putin not only underestimated Ukraine; he also underestimated Multilateral Men—the officials who, like Jens Stoltenberg and his counterparts at the European Union, helped the White House put together the military, political, and diplomatic response. Putin believed his own propaganda, the same propaganda used by the transatlantic far right: Democracies are weak, autocrats are strong, and people who use polite, diplomatic language won’t defend themselves. This turned out to be wrong. “‘Democracies have proven much more resilient, much stronger than our adversaries believe,’ Stoltenberg said. And autocracies are more fragile: ‘As we’ve just seen, authoritarian systems can just, suddenly, break down.’” Read more →

#5 Evan Gershkovich, Detained for 100 Days
WALL STREET JOURNAL

As a former Wall Street Journal reporter and longtime advocate for press freedom, I remain determined to do what’s possible to end the Russian imprisonment of WSJ reporter Evan Gershkovich, which is now at one hundred days and counting. I urge Inflection Points readers to follow the WSJ’s guide on what you can do to support Evan and his family.

Writes Emma Tucker, the WSJ’s editor-in-chief, “In the days since Evan was arrested we have been inspired by the support that you, our readers, have provided. It has helped us to keep Evan’s plight at the top of the news agenda. As we reflect on this difficult milestone, we encourage you to continue sharing Evan’s reporting and the latest updates on his situation. Journalism is not a crime, and we will not rest until Evan is released.”

Amen. Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Jul 5, 2023

Here’s the ‘concrete’ path for Ukraine to join NATO

By Franklin D. Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, Christopher Skaluba

The upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius should establish a High Level Group to design a roadmap for Ukraine’s fast-track membership.

Conflict Crisis Management

New Atlanticist Jul 6, 2023

Ukraine needs NATO membership, not an ‘Israel model’

By Ian Brzezinski

Granting NATO membership to Ukraine is critical to ensuring it wins the war against Russia quickly and decisively.

Israel NATO

New Atlanticist Jul 6, 2023

Four scenarios for Russia’s future after the Wagner Group mutiny

By Jeffrey Cimmino

What will be the long-term aftermath of Russia’s Wagner mutiny? Here are four possible paths for Russia’s future the West should consider.

Belarus Crisis Management

The post Dispatch from Vilnius: Will Zelenskyy show at the summit? It depends on whether Biden listens to frontline NATO allies. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A looming US-Turkey F-16 deal is about much more than Sweden’s NATO bid

Rich Outzen, Pınar Dost — Sat, 08 Jul 2023 19:47:16 +0000

The NATO Summit in Vilnius starting on July 11 will mark milestones in several strategic processes of vital importance to the Alliance. These include assessing progress on the Strategic Concept adopted in Madrid last year, recognizing Finland’s successful accession, debating the path forward on Ukraine’s application, and consideration of the end game towards Swedish membership. A long-awaited deal for the United States to sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkey is also on the table in Vilnius, but it’s about much more than unlocking Sweden’s accession: It is a puzzle piece in a broader strategic calculation about Ankara’s role in NATO’s Southeast.

At the 2022 summit, Finland and Sweden signed a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding outlining a path for accession through progress on Turkey’s security concerns. After Finland officially became a member country on April 4, 2023, the United States and other NATO member countries started to exert pressure on Turkey to accelerate approval for Sweden prior to the Vilnius summit. Sweden, with two hundred years of military non-alignment, and Finland, neutral throughout the Cold War, applied for membership only after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February last year. Enhancing Ukraine’s security is high on the agenda at the NATO Summit, necessitating attention to direct support for Ukraine’s defense, Alliance enlargement, and effective cooperation in the Black Sea region.

For Ankara the primary consideration in approving Sweden is tougher enforcement of counter-terror laws against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an internationally recognized terrorist group, and its offshoots. Washington has dangled possible approval of Turkey’s proposed purchase of F-16 fighter jets and upgrade kits in attempts to influence Ankara’s calculation. Ankara, which is a long-time F-16 producer and user, desires reasonable compensation for its earlier expulsion from the F-35 program, after it went ahead with the purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system which also led to the imposition of US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Both the United States and Turkey see Turkish air power as a NATO anchor in the Black Sea region.

Securing the Black Sea

Alongside Romania and Bulgaria, Turkey is the largest of three NATO member countries in the Black Sea region and controls access to it under the Montreux Convention. With the Alliance’s second largest military and unique geographic positioning, Turkey has been a crucial player in the Russia-Ukraine war both diplomatically and militarily. Turkey has managed to maintain trade and diplomatic ties with Russia while providing vigorous support to Ukraine’s defense, and it has built a record of frustrating Russian military ventures in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Securing NATO’s interests in the Black Sea depends on a strong Turkey. Ukraine understands this, leading its officials to consider Turkey as one of the few potential security guarantor countries.

Turkey has provided support to NATO maritime operations in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, and most recently agreed to sell Bayraktar drones to Romania. Yet Turkey’s ability to deter Russia depends in part on the health of its F-16 fleet—the third largest in the world but feeling its age. Ankara’s request for forty new F-16s and upgrade packages for its seventy-nine existing fighters to sustain its air capabilities has made little headway over the past two years, and members of the US Congress have added Swedish accession as a new condition to the frozen sale. At the same time, many members of Congress have indicated that Turkey agreeing to Sweden’s accession will not be enough for them to approve Ankara’s F-16 request.

Ironically, Turkey is not an ordinary F-16 buyer. It has been an important F-16 manufacturer through Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) established in 1984, according to the company, as a “Turkish-U.S. joint investment company to carry out the manufacture of F-16 aircraft, integration of on-board systems and flight tests” following the initial Turkish decision to acquire F-16s. Working with US defense giants such as General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and General Electric, TUSAŞ manufactured and tested almost all of the Turkish F-16 fleet—nearly three hundred aircraft in various configurations.

Additionally, TUSAŞ produced forty-six F-16s for the Egyptian Air Force between 1993 and 1995, and helped modernize the F-16 fleet of the Royal Jordanian Air Force. In short, Turkey has been a critical partner in the F-16 program for decades—and a further sale remains in the mutual interest of Ankara, Washington, and NATO.

A de facto arms embargo?

In February 2023, the US Senate NATO Observer Group co-chairs, Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Thom Tillis (R-NC), presented a bipartisan letter to President Joe Biden requesting that “F-16 fighter jet sales to Türkiye should not begin until the NATO protocols [for Finland and Sweden] are ratified.” This followed, according to a report in Defense News, multiple congressional holds of US arms sales to Turkey starting in 2018 or earlier.

Turkey has not added any new F-16s to its inventory since 2012 as the country was expecting to receive more than one hundred F-35 jets, for which it has already paid $1.4 billion. After Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program in March 2020, Ankara requested F-16s in exchange for the amount it had already paid.

The Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries also remains sanctioned by the United States under CAATSA. There has been a sustained campaign by congressional opponents of Turkey to deny major new arms sales to Ankara, spearheaded by the Hellenic and Armenian caucuses. Ironically, 1970s-era congressional sanctions against arms sales to Turkey catalyzed the drive for defense industrial autonomy that drove Turkey’s rise as a defense exporter. The ongoing replay of similar resistance from the US Congress is only reinforcing Turkey’s view that the United States is not a reliable arms provider in the long run. The resulting drive for self-sufficiency has increased the domestic share of Turkish defense production from roughly 20 percent to 80 percent and established the Turkish arms industry as a major international player.

Defense industrial decoupling

Consequently, Turkey has dropped from the seventh-largest US arms importer between 2013-17 to the twenty-seventh largest between 2018-2022. Meanwhile, Turkey’s defense exports skyrocketed by 69 percent during the same period, making the country the twelfth largest exporter of arms globally. In 2022, it set a new arms export record of $4.3 billion—an increase of nearly 37 percent from the previous year.

In order to produce a national fighter aircraft that can replace the aging F-16, the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries signed a contract with TUSAŞ in 2016 to develop the fifth-generation National Combat Aircraft. The first successful taxi test of the prototype was completed in March this year, and it is expected that the first Kaan (previously known as the TF-X) will join the Turkish air force by 2030.

In the medium to long term, defense industrial decoupling of Turkey from the United States would seem to suit both sides. Ankara will be free from the strings that come with US systems, and Congress will be able to satisfy select constituencies that it is not complicit in Turkish military actions. Bilateral relations can move on to happier and less complicated storylines—like the drive towards one hundred billion dollars in bilateral trade. Turkey will continue to partner with countries with a more streamlined defense cooperation model, such as the United Kingdom and Ukraine.

In the short term, a deal on F-16s could restore a modicum of mutual trust, meet the needs of the Alliance, and close the chapter of US-Turkish defense cooperation on a positive note. For those reasons, far more than to spur Swedish accession, US and Turkish leaders continue to push for progress.

Approval of Swedish accession before the Vilnius Summit is unlikely not because of F-16 haggling, but due to the early stage of implementation of Sweden’s new counter-terror laws. The arrest and conviction of a PKK financier in Stockholm in early July, a first of its kind under Sweden’s newly strengthened anti-terror laws, could mark a new phase of progress. It is unlikely that enough can be done in a few days to conclude the process. More likely, and encouraging nonetheless, would be positive signals out of the summit that real progress is being made: in counter-terror implementation, in F-16 talks, and in eventual Swedish accession. Vilnius probably will not mark the completion of these processes, but it could mark the start of a decisive and positive stage toward their conclusion.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

Pınar Dost is a historian of international relations with a PhD dissertation on the history of US-Turkey relations (Sciences Po Paris). Follow her on Twitter @pdosting.

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Kroenig and Ashford debate the global consequences of Prigozhin’s revolt

sodal — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 20:45:15 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 30, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest piece, the pair debate the international rippling effects caused by Prigozhin’s revolt in Russia. Will this incident spotlight Russia’s internal turmoil, revealing the weakness of Vladimir Putin and his security forces? Or, does the mutiny inadvertently prolong the war in Ukraine?

Wagner, Prigozhin, and Surovikin were the most effective Russian fighting forces on the battlefield in Ukraine. Now they have been removed. It won’t be as significant as a full-blown Russian civil war for Ukraine’s chances on the battlefield, but, overall, the failed mutiny helps Kyiv’s war effort.

Matthew Kroenig

I worry that this whole incident may make it less likely that the conflict can be ended through negotiations. If Putin fears looking weak, he may not wish to engage in diplomacy, and that would mean that the war lasts longer. So on balance, I think Ukraine gets minimal military opportunity from this and potentially faces a longer, grinding war.

Emma Ashford

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate the global consequences of Prigozhin’s revolt appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The mechanisms of corruption in Iran

Masoud Mostajabi and Britt Gronemeyer — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 20:41:19 +0000

On June 13, the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project hosted a virtual event, “The Mechanisms of Corruption in Iran” to discuss the nature of corruption and sanctions in Iran as well as the social, economic, and political implications of these issues.

The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative Director, Jonathan Panikoff conducted opening remarks, stating that discussions of Iran’s current economic situation must also address the corruption that exists within the country given its rampant nature. This was emphasized by Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow Nadereh Chamlou who served as the moderator for the session.

In order to discuss the complexities of corruption within Iran, it is first important to define corruption. Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Dallas, Ali Dadpay, explained that corruption is the use of a public position for personal gain. Dadpay shared how this phenomenon manifests in situations such as the importation of luxury vehicles into the Islamic Republic. He recalled how foreign made vehicles were banned from Iran, however, members of Parliament were able to import foreign made luxury vehicles due to their positions of power.

Causes of Sanctions and Corruption

The beginning of the conversation included a review of the causes of corruption in Iran and specifically analyzed the role that sanctions play in its prevalence. To initiate the discussion, Chamlou mentioned a study by one of Iran’s top economists that found only 20% of corruption can be traced back to sanctions, whereas 80% is attributed to other factors. This begs the question, what could that something else be?

Entrepreneur Majid Zamani claimed that while sanctions are not the only cause of this corruption, they have created a plethora of opportunities for rent-seeking, which only those who are ideologically connected to the regime have access to.

Within Iran specifically, Zamani discussed the existence of a theocratic system, stating that because people are selected for leadership based on their loyalty to ideology, rather than merit, the political system is poorly organized and thus more susceptible to corruption. Furthermore, Dadpay argued that because Iran has a nationalized economy with extensive regulations, as opposed to a globalized economy, the government benefits from corruption and monopolization. Zamani added that the banking system epitomizes this vulnerability to corruption due to the interest rates, corrupting all loans.

Impact of Corruption & Sanctions

The panel then moved to the discussion of how corruption and sanctions have manifested in Iranian society. Given the US Government’s prioritization of US interests, as opposed to those of the Iranian community, Atlantic Council’s nonresident senior fellow Brian O’Toole and Dadpay both recognized that even though these sanctions are targeted, they will ultimately influence all Iranians, by creating a demand for sanctions evasion and a market that avoids financial responsibility. When asked whether Iranians could avoid corruption in the private sector and still succeed, Zamani claimed that the entire private sector in Iran is impacted by its relationship to the government. However, there is a spectrum of involvement, with one end including those who are loyal to the government and comfortable with the corruption and the other end comprising of individuals trying to avoid engaging in corrupt behaviors but ultimately having to comply at times in order to survive. He also clarified that although they do not make up the majority of the GPD, the Iranian private sector includes small market owners and medical professionals, occupations that comprise the bulk of society.

How to address it

After discussing the causes and effects of corruption in Iranian society, the panelists moved to their recommendations as to how to address it. O’Toole said that it takes time, so patience and persistence are crucial, and tackling corruption begins by addressing root problems. While pursuing flashy cases of corruption may be more alluring, it often only targets a single perpetrator rather than the source. To tackle the wider system would require transparency at every stage, even the more mundane. Dadpay agreed with O’Toole, advocating for a clear and transparent legal framework and stating that accountability in corruption cannot be achieved without an explicit and independent judiciary branch. In order to achieve transparency and accountability, according to Zamani, civil society must demand it from the government, through civil disobedience and outward refusal to engage in a corrupt system of governance. Lastly, moderator Chamlou included her own belief that tackling corruption in Iran would require dismantling networks of patronage and government insiders.

Masoud Mostajabi is a Deputy Director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Britt Gronemeyer is a Young Global Professional with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

The post The mechanisms of corruption in Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig in the National Review refuting “Asia First” foreign policy

sodal — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 20:08:42 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 2, Scowcroft Vice President and Director Matthew Kroenig co-wrote with Rebeccah Heinrichs a piece for the National Review challenging the notion of “Asia First” policy proposals, noting that they are based on the flawed and misguided premise of American decline. In a renewed era of strategic competition, Kroenig and Heinrichs argue that the United States and its allies and partners can – and must – counter China and Russia simultaneously.

The necessary assumptions undergirding this “Asia First” foreign-policy position is that Washington can no longer do it all, that America is in decline. But like past declinists and doomers, “Asia First” proponents are mistaken… Washington and its allies have the necessary resources (if appropriately leveraged) to counter China and Russia simultaneously.

Matthew Kroenig & Rebeccah Heinrichs

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in the National Review refuting “Asia First” foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

South Asia’s climate challenges are transnational. Its climate solutions must be, too.

Ahsan Butt — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 20:08:25 +0000

This northern summer has highlighted the transnational nature of the climate challenge. Wildfires in Canada have rendered air in the United States unbreathable, while heatwaves have killed citizens on both sides of the Rio Grande. South Asia is no stranger to such phenomena: Cyclone Biparjoy was, at one point, forecast to almost perfectly bisect Indian and Pakistani territory, albeit lands that are generally sparsely populated.

By luck or providence—even secular Karachiites, half-jokingly, repeatedly invoked the spirit of Abdullah Shah Ghazi in the week before the cyclone was to hit—Pakistan was spared the worst of Biparjoy. And while India was not so lucky as to avoid it completely, the damage it meted out was considerably less intense than initially predicted.

The cyclone highlighted the negligible level of cooperation between the Indian and Pakistani governments on climate issues. Despite its geographic trajectory, the days before the cyclone made landfall saw no communication, collaboration, or coordination between Islamabad and New Delhi, or even among the state governments most likely to be affected—Sindh and Gujarat. And while it is notable that Pakistan used data from the Indian Meteorological Department, which is better equipped than Pakistan’s, neither side acknowledged this help. More importantly, had the cyclone hit more densely populated border areas, each country would have handled its own disaster response.

This siloed strategy for dealing with Biparjoy is emblematic; the lack of a joint approach to climate disaster management reflects a wider lack of climate cooperation across South Asia, whose two billion people share plenty of problems but few solutions. Governments and officials in the region almost never talk about floods and droughts, nor heat plans for cities, nor data on river flow and glacial melt, nor farming techniques. Notwithstanding limited efforts by multilateral organizations such as the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development or the World Bank (through its One South Asia program), it is not controversial to claim that South Asia features the least amount of transnational climate cooperation of any region in the world, a travesty of epic proportions when one considers the region’s vulnerability to climate change.

The reason South Asia lags well behind other regions in transnational climate cooperation is simple: the geopolitical strife between India and Pakistan. In an alternate universe, where the pair had a normal, productive relationship, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation would be the venue for tackling the species-threatening challenge of climate change. Instead, the organization is a moribund joke, not even managing to hold a meeting in almost a decade.

In the same alternate universe, there would be high-level delegations from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh regarding the water cycle and changes in the monsoon, common air sheds that trap heat and pollution, negotiations over the next generation of water treaties, crop burning and air pollution, trade in electric vehicles, and, potentially, the construction of a region-wide renewable energy grid. Instead, in the real world, even Track II meetings—where information, ideas, and conversations were once exchanged by activists, journalists, and experts—have, since 2018, ground to a halt.

Above this structural baseline of regional connectivity, or lack thereof, Pakistan suffers disproportionately. India’s preponderant geopolitical position vis-à-vis Pakistan, especially economically and diplomatically, and its stated mission to isolate Islamabad, (which even manifests in India’s cricket team refusing to visit Pakistan for international tournaments), leaves Pakistan worse off than the typical South Asian country when it comes to tapping into regional networks of climate cooperation. In interviews I conducted in Pakistan this summer, some environmental activists allege that the country tends to be excluded from even multilateral, technocratic ventures run by outside actors such as the World Bank or the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and that Pakistan is suffering a “blackout of sorts.” This is before one even considers bi- or trilateral climate cooperation between national governments.

One illustration of Pakistan’s isolation is the electricity deal poised to be struck between India, Bangladesh, and Nepal. The agreement will allow India’s neighbors to trade surpluses in energy production to each other through India’s grid. This is a landmark achievement that, once formalized, has a great deal of potential to alleviate energy anxiety and promote clean energy throughout the region. But Pakistan is conspicuously absent from these discussions, which feature not just the three signatories but also the likes of Bhutan and Sri Lanka.

While the costs of this marginalization mostly accrue to Pakistan, the rest of South Asia also loses what it could gain from collaboration with Pakistani officials, activists, lawyers, scientists, mayors, farmers, and journalists. Pakistan’s experiences, for instance, with its reforestation of mangroves, widely lauded as one of the world’s most successful such efforts, may prove valuable to others. Even more checkered initiatives, such as Imran Khan’s ballyhooed Billion Tree Tsunami, can furnish important lessons, both in their successes and failures. One of my interviewees, a policy expert with experience throughout Asia, favorably rates Pakistan’s efforts with a carbon market, which outpace the likes of Sri Lanka’s or Nepal’s.

The fundamental reality is that, for South Asia, cooperation on climate change is not a nice-to-have, but a need-to-have. The best case for all concerned would be for India and Pakistan to resolve their geopolitical differences. But even absent such optimistic scenarios, cooperation on climate, easily the biggest political challenge of the twenty-first century, cannot be held hostage to twentieth century disagreements. Climate change is simply too extreme in its impacts, and its nature—transnational, viciously complex in its distributional effects across and within borders, and multifaceted across water, ice, air, heat, and soil—means that cooperation is not just necessary, but existentially urgent.

Given Pakistan’s present distraught and destabilized state, and the uncompromising mood in New Delhi on all matters Pakistan, one should not expect even a minor diplomatic thaw any time soon. Some analysts put hope in the 2024 elections in India, after which, the story goes, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will have more room for maneuver for a breakthrough with Pakistan, and Pakistan itself might become a more stable and less dysfunctional polity able to deliver on whatever agreement the two countries reach.

If all that happens, fantastic. But waiting for intergovernmental cooperation on this score would be wrongheaded. There is a deep reservoir of potential in people-to-people contacts drawn from civil society, the academic and research communities, metropolitan authorities, and those who work in agriculture. Such meetings should be encouraged and institutionalized, preferably at a distance from the sharp glare of ministries, personalities, and government offices for whom, no matter how small the meeting or event, the political stakes will always be too high. Moreover, multilateral organizations devoted to tackling climate change in South Asia, including but not limited to UNEP and the World Bank, must do more to include Pakistan, even if this contradicts the goals of Indian foreign policy.

Ahsan I. Butt is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and an associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.

SouthAsiaSource Apr 12, 2023

The geopolitics of the energy trilemma in South Asia

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

South Asian countries are being subjected to the consequences of China and Russia’s efforts to expand their influence in the region. In this complex geopolitical context, expanded US and G7 clean energy efforts are needed.

Bangladesh Climate Change & Climate Action

SouthAsiaSource Sep 9, 2022

Experts react: Catastrophic flooding in Pakistan

By South Asia Center experts

More than one-third of Pakistan is underwater amid catastrophic climate change-induced flooding. South Asia Center experts provide their analyses of the situation.

Climate Change & Climate Action Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource May 23, 2022

South Asia’s climate crisis: Policymakers need to feel the heat

By Erum Haider

Few things unite South Asia more urgently right now than the climate crisis. We can only hope that policymakers are listening.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

Southasiasource Blog

Cynkin in VOA

everges — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 19:40:41 +0000

On July 6, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Tom Cynkin was quoted in Voice of America to discuss decisions by the United States to de-risk and South Korea to resume dialogue with China. He argues that this isn’t “going soft” on China but rather recognizing the need for good channels of communication even during periods of intense competition.

Fellow

Thomas Cynkin

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Japan

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Iran and Afghanistan are feuding over the Helmand River. The water wars have no end in sight.

Holly Dagres — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 19:09:01 +0000

Water disputes between Iran and Afghanistan date back to as early as the 1870s. However, with the Taliban back in power in Kabul since 2021, the Helmand River has become an increasing topic of contention between the neighboring countries, particularly in recent months. A recent uptick in violence on the 580-mile border between Iran and Afghanistan came to a head on May 27, when border guards on both sides clashed, resulting in the death of one Taliban soldier and two Iranian guards. Fatemeh Aman, a non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Institute with a focus on Afghanistan and Iran, speaks to IranSource editor Holly Dagres about why the Islamic Republic and Taliban are bumping heads on transboundary water issues and why the water wars are not ending any time soon.

IRANSOURCE: The Islamic Republic and the Taliban have been in high tensions recently since the militant group ceased power in Kabul. Both countries have a long-term dispute over shared transboundary waters, but what is different now?

FATEMEH AMAN: The difference this time was that two old issues—the dispute over shared water and clashes at the borders—coincided, which made the transboundary water issue more dramatic. First, let me explain the dispute over each country’s share of Helmand transboundary water.

Iran and Afghanistan’s water disputes have existed for over 150 years and go back to when Afghanistan was a British protectorate. Back then, a British officer drew the Iran-Afghan border along the main branch of the Helmand River. In 1939, serious discussions between the Iranian government of Reza Shah Pahlavi and the Afghan government of Mohammad Zahir Shah led to a treaty over water allocation to each country, which the Afghans never ratified.

The dispute intensified in the 1950s when Afghanistan built two dams on the Helmand River.

Renegotiations continued until 1973, when the then-Iranian and Afghan prime ministers signed a treaty. In recent decades, and under different governments, the issue has taken a more dramatic turn. War, displacement of populations, lucrative dam buildings, disastrous water management, and the impact of climate change have all intensified the dispute.

The good news is that there has been an agreement since 1973 known as the Helmand River Treaty. However, it needs to be reviewed and updated. Nevertheless, the prospect of both governments sitting down and finding a lasting solution is not very bright.

Turning transboundary water rights into a political issue is a terrible idea. Both Tehran and Kabul use rhetoric rather than dialogue. Just recently, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi warned the Taliban “to take the issue of [Helmand] water and Iran’s share of water seriously.” The Taliban hit back with their spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid stating that Iranian officials should present their request “using appropriate words.”

Besides the water dispute, there have been clashes at the border between Iran and Afghanistan. Tension and confrontation have happened frequently on the eastern border, including the most recent violent encounter in May, which occurred in Nimroz and Zabul, leaving several border guards from both sides dead.

However, such clashes did not start with the Taliban government and have happened under previous governments as well.

Both sides commonly blame each other for starting the fire, but eventually, Tehran and Kabul always calm down. The incidents are often called “mistakes” or “misunderstandings.” There are talks about forming a joint committee to quickly resolve the issues on the eastern border. However, I do not see any sign that the occasional clashes will end for good.

IRANSOURCE: Walk us through the Taliban’s relationship with Tehran. Is this the first time we’ve seen tension between the Islamic governments?

FATEMEH AMAN: Iran’s current relationship with Afghanistan has been chaotic since the Taliban took over in 2021. The Islamic Republic does not want to look like allies of the Taliban, as both view each other with mistrust. However, there are conflicting and somewhat confusing messages on the nature of the relationship.

Iran and the Taliban almost went to war in 1998 over a Taliban militant raid on the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e Sharif, which left nine Iranians—eight diplomats and a journalist—dead. Iran deployed two hundred thousand army troops and seventy thousand members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to the border area, but ultimately decided not to enter Afghanistan’s soil.

Iran has always tried to keep its presence in Afghanistan due to its significant concerns: shared transboundary water, drug trafficking, and border security. Iran takes the possibility of infiltration of terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), into Iran from its eastern borders very seriously and firmly believes it is vulnerable from the eastern border it shares with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Since the Taliban was ousted from power in 2001, Iran kept some ties with some Taliban factions. Later, when the Taliban’s presence became more visible, Iran-Taliban ties also grew.

The emergence of IS-K in Afghanistan in 2015, as well as Tehran’s conclusion that the Taliban’s participation in Afghanistan’s future government was inevitable, prompted Iran to get closer to the Taliban. Iran tried to increase their influence within the group. The extent of the Taliban’s ties with Iran was revealed when the group’s former leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, was killed in a US drone strike when returning to Pakistan from Iran in May 2016.

In 2018, Iran admitted to having hosted Taliban delegations in Iran. Iran was actively involved in the intra-Afghan dialogue, inviting Afghanistan’s opposing factions to Tehran for negotiations. At the time, a best-case scenario for Iran would have been an inclusive government with the participation of Iran-leaning factions. This did not happen. The Taliban took control of the government in 2021 and did not plan to form an inclusive government.

IRANSOURCE: Most governments do not recognize the Taliban. Does the Islamic Republic, and how does this impact discussions?

FATEMEH AMAN: No country has recognized the Taliban regime, as no country wants to be the first to recognize them. However, I think once one does, the others will follow.

Iran has not yet recognized the Taliban regime. However, the Afghan embassy in Tehran and the Afghan consulate in Mashhad have been taken over by the Taliban regime since 2021. Iran, like other countries, wants to use recognition as leverage.

IRANSOURCE: Back to the dispute over shared water… The region has been going through a persistent drought. The Islamic Republic complains that Afghanistan is blocking the flow of water, and the Taliban claims there is not enough water to flow into Iran due to drought. How much is the drought in the southeast to blame on government mismanagement versus climate change?

FATEMEH AMAN: Several factors have contributed to the current situation, including the impact of climate change. Let us take the example of the Hamoun wetland drying up. The Lake Hamoun area is a transboundary wetland fed by the Helmand River.

Hamoun Lake, naturally fed by water flowing from the Helmand River, used to be the third-largest lake in Iran and played a vital role in the lives of people in southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan province. However, it has nearly dried up due to several factors, including the disruption of water flow from Afghanistan to Iran. Other factors include unsustainable and profit-driven dam constructions, extensive canal creation, diverting Helmand River water to four giant reservoirs in Sistan and Baluchistan province, construction of dikes on the Iran-Afghan border (on Helmand) to prevent drug traffickers from entering Iran, and the introduction of invasive fish species by the Fisheries Company in the 1980s, which destroyed the entire vegetation cover of Hamoun.

With the disruption of water flow from Helmand into Iran, I was referring to the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e Sharif in 1998 and the subsequent conflict between Iran and the Taliban. This led to the Taliban closing the Kajaki Dam’s sluices, obstructing the water flow from Helmand River to Iran, which ultimately halted the water supply to Hamoun. So, there is never a single reason for a catastrophe.

Both countries took steps to revitalize the Hamoun wetland on the Iran-Afghanistan border in 2015 and 2016. However, the efforts were cut for several reasons, including economic sanctions imposed on Iran that restricted international funds.

IRANSOURCE: Anti-regime protests continue in some parts of Iran, particularly in the impoverished southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan. Some may interpret the dire water situation as the clerical establishment purposely punishing the population for participating in protests. What is your read on this?

FATEMEH AMAN: Sistan and Baluchistan province is the most deprived province in Iran. Yes, there has been an unbelievable level of discrimination by the Shia-centric government against the Sunni-majority province. Yes, there needs to be more investment to improve the livelihoods of millions in that region. There has been disastrous water mismanagement in many parts of Iran, including Sistan and Baluchistan. However, the province’s critical water issue is unrelated to recent protests.

The Islamic Republic had four decades since the 1979 revolution to invest in water and ensure that the region’s drinking water would not be dependent on transboundary water. But they failed. Their failed policies are more comprehensive than those in Sistan and Baluchistan. Many parts of the country face critical water shortages due to ineffective policies.

IRANSOURCE: Iranian lawmakers recently said Sistan and Baluchistan province only have three months of water left before it runs out. How will it impact the neglected population there?

FATEMEH AMAN: As I said, the Islamic Republic had over forty years to invest in improving the water management system. They missed all opportunities. Unfortunately, authorities not only ignored experts’ warnings for many years, but they also prosecuted and imprisoned environmental activists working on the issue. Unless Iran reaches a lasting agreement with the Afghans, I do not see how things can be improved or stopped from worsening. We will probably see mass migration and more conflict in the future due to water and climate change.

IRANSOURCE: How will this dispute impact Afghan refugees in Iran?

FATEMEH AMAN: Before the 2021 Taliban rule, Iranian authorities could blackmail the Afghan government by threatening to send back millions of refugees to Afghanistan. Right now, they do not have this luxury. The Taliban would not care about refugees being forcibly returned. The only leverage Tehran has is recognition of the Taliban, which Iran is not giving away without some concessions. Iran will continue the same approach if the situation does not change.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), since the Taliban regained power in August 2021, an estimated one million Afghans have sought refuge in Iran alone.

Unfortunately, refugees in many countries are used as scapegoats, and Afghan refugees in Iran are no exception. With the deepening dispute, the Afghans will experience more hardship in Iran.

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Oleksii Reznikov: Ukraine’s defense doctrine will define country’s future

Oleksii Reznikov — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 18:49:23 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently initiated a national debate over the creation of a Ukrainian Doctrine that will shape the future development of the country. I am confident that defense policy will be at the heart of this national dialogue and see a number of key points that are worth underlining.

The first point to note is the global nature of Ukrainian security. For decades to come, the entire world will live by the rules established by the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin has demonstrated its readiness to weaponize everything from energy resources and food supplies to cyberspace and social media. Moscow has engaged in nuclear blackmail, interfered with maritime freedoms, and called into question the very idea of territorial integrity. These challenges are not local or even regional in scope; they are global threats that resonate equally around the world.

How we respond to these issues in Ukraine will define the international security climate. Any attempts to address the Russian invasion on a purely local level by freezing the conflict or forcing Ukraine into territorial concessions will result in failure and will only fuel further international instability. Instead, we must acknowledge that the threats posed by Russia are global in character and demand a global response.

The second key point is the need to define Ukraine’s position in regional and global security systems. In simple terms, the desired trajectory should include security guarantees followed by full NATO accession, with internal transformations taking place in parallel that implement the best lessons from Ukraine’s wartime experience and enable the country to acquire the necessary domestic defense capabilities. These processes can and must be advanced during the current active phase of the war.

The third key point is the need to develop a defense doctrine that meets the security expectations of both Ukraine and the country’s partners. It is now clear that Ukraine is capable of serving as a shield on Europe’s eastern frontier. Indeed, Ukraine is currently carrying out NATO’s core mission of defending Europe against Russian military aggression. At the same time, over the past eighteen months Ukraine has received direct and indirect military aid worth more than the country’s entire defense budget since the restoration of Ukrainian independence in 1991. Without continued external assistance, Ukraine will not be able to carry out rapid rearmament or acquire the kind of defense capabilities it needs. The best solution would be to move toward greater reliance on internal resources while maintaining strong levels of international support.

Clearly, Ukraine’s partners will be reluctant to invest in a security model that differs significantly from established NATO standards, or one that conflicts with their own military, industrial, or economic interests. Finding the right balance between strengthening Ukraine’s domestic defense sector capabilities and optimizing international cooperation will be crucial.

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Efforts to develop a practical vision for Ukraine’s army of the future have been underway since June 2022, when I ordered a capacity review. These findings, coupled with Ukraine’s unique wartime experience, form the basis of a concept paper on the transformation of Ukraine’s defense sector submitted to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal at the beginning of June 2023. The next stage will involve consultations to coordinate interagency efforts required to create the right legislative framework and ensure effective cooperation between different government bodies. This synergy will be the key to success.

Russia’s invasion has underlined that defense is an investment not an expense. For instance, strengthening Ukraine’s naval capabilities will help guarantee maritime security in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, which secures vital income from trade. Likewise, failure to provide adequate security measures will leave Ukraine unable to rebuild and trapped in costly wartime insecurity. All of Ukraine’s security policy decisions must reflect these fundamental truths.

Complex defense capabilities revolve around three main factors: people, weapons, and financial resources. Each has their own planning specifics. Successful weapons and financing policies take years to plan; when it comes to human resources, it often takes a generation or longer to get it right.

Ukraine is now looking to coordinate the country’s defense sector transformation under conditions of extreme uncertainty. We know the current war will end in Ukrainian victory, but we do not know when this will be. This makes it difficult to begin the process of optimizing the range of weapons in use by the Ukrainian armed forces. After all, in order to defeat Russia, Ukraine needs to receive as many weapons as it can, and needs to get them as quickly as possible.

We also don’t know exactly when Ukraine’s partners will make the final decision to fully integrate the country into the Euro-Atlantic security community. This is fundamental. It is one thing to reform the Ukrainian military as part of a collective defense strategy in cooperation with partners; it is quite another to build defense capabilities in relative isolation with some external support.

One of my main requests to our partners is therefore to make a decision on Ukraine’s NATO accession as soon as possible. This will make it far easier for all parties to conduct long-term defense planning. If a decision is not forthcoming, Ukraine’s partners will be obliged to include the country’s security needs in their own planning on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

A further priority for Ukraine’s defense doctrine is the de-Sovietization of defense policy and planning. This needs to be addressed in a practical manner that goes beyond mere slogans. Eighteen months ago, many military analysts believed a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine would mean a fight between a large Soviet army against a small Soviet army. In reality, it soon became clear that the Ukrainian army had undergone significant change. However, the same cannot be said for the broader state systems underpinning Ukrainian defense policy. A wide range of political, social, and economic changes are still needed.

For example, the system of registration for military service is still linked in the Soviet fashion with place of work or study. This means that entrepreneurs along with the self-employed and unemployed are often outside the system. Far-reaching changes are needed in order to establish and maintain the right kind of reserve and effectively mobilize the country’s human, material, and financial resources. Efforts to overcome quality problems with quantity must be set aside. In conditions of resource scarcity, such an approach is suicidal.

The human dimension of future Ukrainian defense is a professional army. This must be based on the transparent logic of a military career and an extensive social protection package, relying on well-trained reserves formed of all men liable for military service and of women on a voluntary basis (with the exception of those categories of women who are liable for military service).

The registration of people liable for military service should be fully digitized. This process is underway. We also need to implement separate training policies for different groups in order to create a genuine rather than nominal reserve. This should look to maximize citizen engagement by improving the motivation system.

Statements about there being seven million Ukrainians liable for military service are meaningless if the country is not capable of structuring the reserve in ways that make efficient use of these people. Similarly, declarations that anyone subject to military service must complete their compulsory period in uniform do little to help the state capitalize on existing resources. Instead, basic training should be supplemented by the development of specific groups within the country’s military reserve forces. This should include a combat reserve consisting of those with combat experience; a territorial reserve for territorial defense units; an operational reserve of military veterans without combat experience; a mobilization reserve of those who previously passed through basic training; and a general reserve register featuring individuals with no prior military training.

The development of an efficient reserve is only possible in conjuction with an effective Heroes Policy, which has been identified as a priority by President Zelenskyy. This is a good example of the need for interagency synergies and is also an area where a sense of justice must serve as a cornerstone. Meanwhile, the task of managing military registration should be taken away from the General Staff and the Land Forces Command. Instead, it is necessary to establish a separate and tailored agency within the Ministry of Defense.

Similar efforts are required for the civil reserve. Over the past eighteen months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it has become clear that a significant portion of the almost one million Ukrainian men and women in uniform perform purely civilian functions. It makes no sense to bunch all of these people together with the military until the end of hostilities. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required. When society sees that the state seeks to engage people in defense tasks as rationally and reasonably as possible, we will witness a decline in negative phenomena associated with military service. After all, many of those who seek to avoid military service do so in order to escape perceived uncertainty, injustice, and abuses.

Eurasia Center events

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

After Vilnius: What’s next on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

Eastern Europe NATO Security & Defense Ukraine

A new mobilization and reserve policy will require a new regulatory framework. This will involve comprehensive legislative changes. The entire mobilization system for central and local authorities, enterprises, and institutions should undergo revision, with mobilization tasks in their current form abolished. In its place, the emphasis should be on practical needs and common sense. Training for reservists should be synchronized with real life requirements and skills, with citizens aware of opportunities at the level of school leaver, university undergraduate, employee, or entrepreneur.

Professional military education and career management must be developed according to NATO principles and standards to ensure interoperability. At the same time, all training and education should be adjusted to reflect Ukraine’s unrivalled combat experience. This is the country’s unique advantage and should shape Ukraine’s defense doctrine as much as possible.

Work is already underway on the transformation of Ukraine’s military education system, with a concept approved by the government in December 2022. Over the coming decade, Ukraine’s military education will be fully integrated into the broader European military education environment in terms of both form and content. A separate element here is military-patriotic education. At the moment, this is governed by two laws and a presidential decree which contain a number of apparent conflicts and contradictions. We must achieve a clearer division of tasks and harmonization.

Ukraine’s entire defense doctrine should be underpinned by solid economic foundations. At present, the Ukrainian defense industry is not capable of meeting the demands of the military, but the sector has huge potential. Indeed, if managed correctly, a highly profitable Ukrainian defense industry could realistically become a major engine driving the country toward the goal of a one trillion dollar GDP.

I have repeatedly stated my position that self-sufficiency in the defense sector is a core component of genuine national sovereignty. Moving forward, Ukraine should be aiming to produce as much as possible itself. Once again, Ukraine’s unique combat experience creates exciting opportunities in this area. In order to make the most of the country’s experience and its industrial capabilities, a new defense industry development strategy is required. This should take international defense sector trends into account while also focusing on other economic factors and Ukraine’s specific strengths.

The time has come to turn away from the old Soviet model governed by unprofitability and resource consumption. Instead, Ukraine must strive to become a global defense sector leader and an attractive international partner. This will require a unified center capable of establishing and implementing policy, with exceedingly flexible R&D assets responding rapidly to the latest requirements. Procurement should be synchronized with budget planning, while efforts must be made to move away from lingering problems relating to blurred responsibilities. Efforts in this direction are already underway and must continue.

The overall objective of Ukraine’s defense doctrine is to defend the state against any possible threat. This requires new approaches to everything from managing mobilization and maintaining an effective reserve, to reforming the defense industry and boosting domestic production at every level. The country’s needs will inevitably evolve over time. Five years after victory in the current war, will Ukraine need a mobilization reserve of 500,000 or two million? This is why scalability is so critical.

In the defense sector, Ukraine has huge untapped potential and much to offer the international community. In the drone sector alone, Ukraine is at the cutting edge of current innovations and is well-placed to remain a key source of solutions for European and other markets. This military tech prowess will help open doors to new cooperation that are currently closed. Ukraine can build on its experience and expertize to become a major player in the global defense industry, but this requires solid foundations and a strong domestic sector.

Every day, our defenders are bringing victory closer. This progress is taking place in a rapidly changing world, and is contributing to these changes. Ukraine must be ready to capitalize on the opportunities this creates in ways that guarantee the safety of all Ukrainians while enabling the country to prosper.

Oleksii Reznikov is Ukraine’s Minister of Defense.

Just like at the NATO Summit in Madrid last year, Erdogan has placed himself in the role of kingmaker. All allies except Turkey and Hungary have ratified Sweden’s membership, and Hungary is widely considered to be following Turkey’s lead.

In the symbolically important meeting with Kristersson this week, Biden sent a clear signal to Ankara: The United States is committed to welcoming Sweden into NATO as soon as possible. Kristersson reiterated that Swedish membership would contribute to the security of the Alliance as a whole. “No country knows this better than the United States,” he said.

The trilateral meeting in Brussels showed, however, that Turkey is still not on board. Swedish NATO membership is “within reach,” Stoltenberg said. He added that everyone is working toward a positive outcome in Vilnius and leaders will meet again on Monday, one day before the start of the summit.

At stake in Vilnius is not only the security of Sweden and the Alliance as a whole, but NATO’s open-door credibility.

Potentially paving the way for a successful outcome is this week’s conviction by a Swedish court of a PKK member for the crime of terror financing, the first use of the country’s new anti-terror laws that entered into force in June. The four-and-a-half-year sentence followed by a possible extradition is exactly the type of implementation Turkey has wanted to see from Sweden. Moreover, former Foreign Minister Ann Linde admitted this week that Sweden had not taken the threat posed by the PKK seriously enough in the past. Swedish police are now prioritizing the issue and deeper cooperation with Turkish authorities on combatting terrorism is expected to continue. Public opinion is also shifting, with a majority now in favor of banning the burning of religious texts. Hate speech laws, though not part of the trilateral memorandum, are additionally under review. All the while, rumors continue to swirl of the US Congress ending its roadblock on F-16 fighter jet sales to Turkey, a prospect that could help push the process across the finish line.

At stake in Vilnius is not only the security of Sweden and the Alliance as a whole, but NATO’s open-door credibility. With twenty-nine allies already having ratified Sweden’s membership, failure to fully admit Sweden undermines unity within the Alliance and makes NATO look weak and fragmented. As Stoltenberg correctly pointed out on Thursday, only Russian President Vladimir Putin and the PKK profit from continued delay.

Anna Wieslander is director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council and head of its Northern Europe office in Stockholm. She is a former official at the Swedish Defence Ministry and Swedish Parliament.

Eric Adamson is project manager at the Northern Europe office.

The post Will eleventh-hour diplomacy get Sweden into NATO by the Vilnius summit? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russian conspiracy alleges false flag at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 18:02:29 +0000

Security

Tracking narratives

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Media policy

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

At least ten people were killed and thirty-seven injured in Russia’s July 6 attack on Lviv, in western Ukraine. Regional Governor Maksym Kozytskyy said that a Russian missile struck a residential building in the city, destroying more than fifty apartments.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to launch offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian forces reported thirty-eight combat engagements against Russian troops near Novoselivske, Novohryhorivka, Berkhivka, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka. In the direction of Lyman, Russian forces shelled Nevske, Bilohorivka, Torske, Verkhnokamyanske, and Rozdolivka in Donetsk. Russian aviation conducted an airstrike in Bilohorivka. Russia also attacked villages in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, including Levadne, Olhivske, Malynivka, Huliaipole, and Bilohirka. On July 6, Russian troops shelled Chervonohryhorivka and Nikopol, damaging civilian infrastructure.

On July 5, reports from Russian military bloggers suggested that Ukrainian forces had advanced southwest of Berkhivka, west of Yahidne, and southwest of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army said it conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut and is moving on Bakhmut’s southern flank. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the Ukrainian army conducted offensive operations near Lyman, Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka front, on the border between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, and in western Zaporizhzhia.

The Ukrainian army appears to have launched a coordinated attack on Russian army logistical and communications hubs. On July 4, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an ammunition depot in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk. Russian sources claimed without evidence that Ukraine had struck a hospital. Former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov, also known as Igor Girkin, said the attack demonstrates how Ukraine regularly launches missile strikes against Russian rear targets. Other unconfirmed reports from July 5 indicate Ukraine may have struck Russian positions near Debaltseve. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces hit Russian positions near Yakymivka in the Melitopol area and attempted to strike Berdyansk in the Zaporizhzhia region.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Ahead of next week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, allegations that the United States and Ukraine will launch a false flag operation on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant are spreading on various platforms, including Twitter, 4chan, and Instagram. The allegations seemingly aim to create panic and, in the event of a future attack on the plant, establish a narrative the West and Ukraine are to blame.

On July 3, a post appeared on 4chan from an anonymous user who introduced himself as a US Marine Corps veteran now working for the government in electronic espionage. The user claimed that the Ukrainian and US governments are working together to bomb the Zaporizhzhia power plant. According to the conspiracy theory, after the false flag operation, the United States will be able to use “nuclear warheads” against Russia. At the time of writing, the post had been deleted from 4chan. However, similar posts remain on the platform.

Screencap of an anonymous 4chan post claiming the US and Ukraine are planning a false flag attack. (Source: 4chan)

However, the false flag claims did not originate on 4chan. Russian Twitter accounts posted similar claims building the false flag narrative. After the 4chan post, the claim circulated again on Twitter.

A similar narrative was also shared by Renat Karchaa, an adviser to Rosenergoatom, a subsidiary of the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom. Karchaa claimed on Russian state television channel Russia-24 that on the night of July 5, the Ukrainian army would attempt an attack on the Zaporizhzhia plant. Without evidence, he accused the United States and the West of planning a false flag incident to damage Russia’s reputation. The claims were further amplified by Russian state media outlets.

The allegations escalated on social media after July 4, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeated Ukraine’s concerns about the status of the nuclear power plant. In an address, Zelenskyy restated that Russia plans to attack the plant and that Russian troops have placed explosive-like objects on the building’s roof. In June, Ukrainian military intelligence made similar claims when it reported that the plant’s cooling pond had been mined by Russian troops.

On July 5, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that it was aware of reports that mines and other explosives had been placed around the plant. The IAEA said their experts inspected parts of the facility and did not observe any visible indications of mines or explosives. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi added, “The IAEA experts requested additional access that is necessary to confirm the absence of mines or explosives at the site.” On July 7, the IAEA announced that Russia had granted its experts further access, “without – so far – observing any visible indications of mines or explosives.”

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Several independent Russian media outlets published stories this week interviewing former employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which dissolved on June 30.

In a video published on Telegram, Yevgeny Zubarev, director of Patriot Media Group’s RIA FAN, said the goal was to “work against the opposition, such as Alexei Navalny and others who wanted to destroy our country.” Zubarev confirmed key details previously reported by independent Russian journalists at Novaya Gazeta in 2013 and the now-Kremlin-controlled RBC in 2017 about the existence of paid commentators and the creation of Prigozhin-affiliated media outlets. Zubarev added that, after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2018 re-election, the group hired “foreign affairs observers.” The timing corresponds with attempts by Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency to meddle in the 2020 US presidential election.

Further, independent Russian media outlets Sever.Realii, Bumaga, and Novaya Gazeta interviewed former employees of Prigozhin’s media group. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the former employees confirmed that Prigozhin’s “troll factory” and “media factory” conducted coordinated information attacks on opposition leaders, published fabricated or purchased news “exclusives,” praised Putin, and deliberately ignored particular individuals who criticized Wagner Group. Bumaga and Sever.Realii described a smear campaign against Saint Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov. In 2019, Prigozhin’s media group supported and promoted Beglov, but in 2021, Prigozhin reportedly launched a smear campaign, as Beglov allegedly prevented him from developing a waste collection business in the city. Novaya Gazeta’s report also provided evidence that Prigozhin’s troll farm activities extended beyond Russia, with employees portraying skinheads and fascists in the Baltic region, specifically in Lithuania.

In recent years, additional revelations about Prigozhin’s media group have come to light. For example, Bumaga reported that prospective hires had to pass a “lie detector test” in which “security service specialists” asked candidates about their attitudes toward the opposition and Alexei Navalny in particular. Once hired, employees were closely surveilled. One former employee Bumaga interviewed characterized the atmosphere as being in a “closed military company.” Both Bumaga and Novaya Gazeta’s interviewees said that most of the employees did not believe in the mission. In one example, an employee left after refusing to launch a smear campaign against Ivan Golunov, a journalist at the independent news outlet Meduza who was detained in 2019 under false pretenses. Bumaga, citing an unnamed former employee, also reported that at one point an employee had hacked the system, erased a database, and fled to Poland. The same interviewee claimed they employed two Telegram administrators who also administered pro-Ukraine channels.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan offered to hire employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which reportedly housed his troll factories. In the latest episode of the program Keosayan Daily, Simonyan praised the work of “Wagner’s media empire.” She said their work “was super professional” and that anyone left without a job can join “them,” referring to Russian propaganda outlets. She added, “We know you as professional colleagues of ours.”

The fate of Patriot’s former employees is being actively discussed in Russia. According to Russian outlet Novie Izverstia, Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin outlet MK.ru, volunteered to help find jobs for former employees of Patriot. In addition, the chairman of the Saint Petersburg branch of the Union of Journalists of Russia stated that the union would contact the heads of media outlets to help find opportunities for dismissed employees and would provide additional informational support.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian conspiracy alleges false flag at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The view from Vilnius: NATO needs speed and scale to ensure deterrence

Giedrimas Jeglinskas — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 16:31:04 +0000

Preparations are underway here in Vilnius for the upcoming NATO leaders’ summit, but there is difficult and important diplomatic work ahead. If there is one thing the summit needs to accomplish, it’s to confidently demonstrate the scale and the speed of the Alliance’s ability to defend freedom.

The run-up to the July 11-12 summit in Lithuania has revealed both continuity and chaos: Continuity in that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg will now stay on in his role for another year, after he had earlier said he would step down in the coming weeks; chaos in the fascinating but incomplete coup d’état in Russia. But at this juncture of history—with war raging in Ukraine, uncertainty complicating relations with China, and shifting internal political landscapes in some member states—the Alliance has more work to do to ensure that the international rules-based order remains relevant and potent.

Ukraine’s desire for a firm commitment on joining NATO is likely to hover over the summit. The secretary general and other national leaders have expressed reservations about taking any groundbreaking action on the issue, tempering the expectations of Ukrainians and their most vocal supporters. Yet there is still time to formulate consensus language that goes beyond the empty narrative of the 2008 Bucharest Summit, which only said that Ukraine would become a member at some point.

Assessing the threat picture

Defense spending is a perennial focus at these summits. Since the Alliance’s founding seventy-four years ago, the issue of Europe’s underspending on defense and security has haunted the halls of NATO. While the current ambition to set 2 percent of gross domestic product as a floor is a step in the right direction, success remains far-fetched: Only seven of the then thirty allies met the guideline in 2022 (before Finland’s accession). At the same time, success is very real in strengthening the cyber pledge and the official launch of the NATO Innovation Fund, the first-of-its-kind one billion euro multi-sovereign venture capital fund. Good things can happen in Vilnius.

The question is, will those good things include welcoming Sweden to the Alliance? The puzzle of the Turkish hayir, or no, on Sweden’s accession initially seemed like a misunderstanding, later evolved into a national election issue, and now, unfortunately, has become an example of allied disunity. The same goes for Hungary’s unacceptable drag of the ratification. Yes, allies argue all the time, and NATO offers a forum to align on all the important issues. Democracies know how to deal with these disagreements without compromising members’ security. Without Sweden, NATO is weaker, the Baltic Sea is less secure, and Turkey and Hingary, too, will be less secure.

Taking a step back and looking at the threat picture—and at the elevated volatility due to Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine—one cannot help but ask: What do allies need to do to ensure that NATO remains relevant in deterring aggression against the Alliance and beyond? Are NATO members sufficiently protecting its most vulnerable members and its vast geographic boundary to the east? Does “tripwire” deterrence still work? Can deterrence succeed without proper defense?

Last year, NATO leaders in Madrid made huge promises to be specified and agreed in due course—kicking the can down the road?—on strengthening the eastern perimeter with more troops and better readiness. In other words, the initial enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battalions no longer seem to suffice for effective deterrence on the eastern flank. The same goes for reinforcements, which had been signaled as up to 300,000 troops (and now 400,000 troops), yet whose deployment requires both logistical support and prepositioned equipment and armaments for their deterrent role. All of the above is to be underscored by NATO’s new defense plans, which are in the works.

A speed-and-scale mindset

To make deterrence and defense credible, NATO must make key decisions to act at relevant speed and scale. “Tripwire” deterrence is, hopefully, outmoded thinking—and the realization that defense is a key element of deterrence is slowly setting in. To be fair, it took three years for NATO to set up its eFP in the form of multinational forces in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Can the Alliance be taken seriously if it continues to build its defense at this pace?

The same goes for scale. Will the “brigade-per-country” principle become obsolete in a year or two? A piecemeal approach to defense yields great public relations benefits, many pats on the back, and self-congratulatory speeches. But at the end of day, when an adversary moves further, allies are left scrambling precisely because they underdelivered.

Speed and scale call for more allied troops in place, more prepositioned equipment and ammunition, and swift reinforcement—plus the autonomy of NATO’s supreme allied commander. Essentially, it is a resource question, yet it is affected by how urgently the Western public views the existential threat. If the military and economic support the West has provided to Ukraine so far is a gauge of its threat perception, then there is something to be proud of. Yet much more could have probably been done and faster.

The test in Vilnius will be this: Can leaders adopt a speed-and-scale mindset for a stronger deterrence?

Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as the assistant secretary general for executive management at NATO and as the deputy minister of defense of Lithuania in charge of capability development, defense acquisition, industry, and technology partnerships.

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Peterson on the Silicon Curtain: Countering Russian propaganda narratives

Atlantic Council — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 15:33:20 +0000

The post Peterson on the Silicon Curtain: Countering Russian propaganda narratives appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Mercenary bloodline: The war in Sudan

Alia Brahimi — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 13:19:16 +0000

In Season 1, Episode 5 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by two guests. She speaks with Cameron Hudson, the former US government expert on Sudan, about the mercenary pedigree of one of the two main belligerent parties, the Rapid Support Forces, and the determinative impact this has had on the current conflict in Sudan. By fighting as mercenaries in Libya, and especially Yemen, the RSF secured a cash windfall that let it recruit in numbers to rival the size of the national army, it forged regional relationships that are now central to its resupply, and it has committed crimes and abuses in the conduct of the war which represent a detached mercenary mindset.

Alia also chats with Professor Munzoul Assal of the University of Khartoum about the danger of two parallel governments emerging in Sudan along the lines of the bifurcation in Libya; the presence of RSF fighters at the Sudanese border with the Central African Republic where the Wagner Group is deeply entrenched; and the clear and alarming possibilities of a regional conflagration.

“The origin story of the wealth is really sending the RSF out into the region as a mercenary force… Hemedti has now been able to return back to his fighting roots but doing it with a war chest that has allowed him to recruit and to resupply in such a way that he is now a rival to the authority of the country.”

Cameron Hudson, Former US government expert on Sudan

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About the podcast

The Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalisation of contract warfare tells us about the world as we currently find it, but also about the future of the international system and about what war could look like in the coming decades.

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Does Taiwan’s massive reliance on energy imports put its security at risk?

Joseph Webster — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 09:55:00 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has launched many useful comparisons about how Ukraine’s efforts to survive and repel Russian forces might be applicable to Taiwan’s defense against a potential attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan and its partners, for example, could directly apply a number of military and economic statecraft lessons against China. Energy security is more complicated, however. The Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine clearly demonstrated that energy security and national security are inseparable, yet Ukraine was a thoroughfare of Russian gas pipelines before the invasion and still has substantial coal reserves and nuclear power. Taiwan, in contrast, is one of the world’s most energy-insecure economies, relying on maritime imports for about 97 percent of its energy.

A review of Taiwan’s energy security challenges is urgently needed to assess its specific vulnerabilities and strengths in the face of attempted coercion by the PRC. Beijing appears increasingly capable of launching a quarantine, blockade, siege, or even invasion of the island.

It’s worth defining these terms. In a PRC quarantine of Taiwan, Beijing would employ the People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN, to interdict all shipping under the guise of inspecting for military kit but allow food and some supplies to pass through. It is possible the PRC believes this insidious tactic is its most attractive option in a Taiwan scenario, due to the limited costs and commitments it would require; the ambiguities it would impose on Western policymakers; and the potential that world public opinion, at least in parts of the developing world, would side with Beijing over the West as economic costs mounted.

Other options appear less probable, but much more coercive and potentially violent. In a blockade scenario, the PLAN would prevent all shipments from entering Taiwan, aiming to coerce the island into surrendering. A siege is a subset of both a blockade and invasion. In this scenario, Beijing would degrade the island’s defensive capability for months before launching an invasion. In the invasion scenario, Beijing would attempt a snap assault, hoping to leverage the element of surprise and secure Taiwan with minimal resistance. A snap invasion is extremely unlikely, however. The weeks that Russia built up its forces on its border with Ukraine before its full-scale invasion—in full view of the world—suggest that the PRC will almost certainly be unable to conceal mobilization for an extremely complicated, massive amphibious assault.

The risks of each scenario are real. The PLAN conducted blockade and quarantine trial runs as recently as April, suggesting Beijing is considering disrupting Taipei’s trade, including its maritime energy imports. Military deterrence is the ultimate guarantor of Taiwan’s freedom, but there are additional nonmilitary steps Taiwan can take with the United States and its allies to ensure its energy needs are met in the event of a crisis.

Taiwan’s Middle Eastern oil imports can be replaced, if necessary

The first issue is whether Taiwan can sustain a reliable supply of energy, which means tracing the energy back to its source. The island is highly dependent on maritime crude oil imports. They accounted for 44 percent of Taiwan’s total energy needs in 2022, and most of this oil comes from the Middle East. Last year, it sourced about 72 percent of its crude oil supply from Saudi Arabia (33 percent), Kuwait (21 percent), the United Arab Emirates (9 percent), Oman (7 percent), and Iraq (2 percent).

The PRC’s economic footprint is expanding in the Middle East and exceeds the Taiwanese or even US presence. Beijing’s crude and condensate oil imports have more than quadrupled since 2006 and stood at over 508 million tons in 2022. China, the world’s largest oil importer, is vital for Middle Eastern economies. In 2022, exports to China accounted for 8 percent of Saudi Arabia’s gross domestic product, 15 percent of Kuwait’s, 9 percent of the United Arab Emirates’, and a shocking 33 percent of Oman’s. Gulf Cooperation Council countries exported nearly 8.5 times more crude oil to China than to the United States in 2022; China’s oil imports are projected to rise further even as US imports plateau or recede. Taiwan imported 41 million tons of crude oil and condensates in 2022, just 8 percent of the PRC’s total.

The PRC’s increasing influence in the Middle East is undeniable, but the risks vis-à-vis Taiwan are manageable. Even in a worst-case scenario—Gulf producers abandoning Taiwan under PRC pressure—the island could find alternative suppliers, though not easily. While oil is a globally traded and largely fungible commodity, refineries require different grades of crude oil, as barrels have distinct sulfur content and densities. If the PRC ever successfully pressured Gulf exporters to halt shipments to Taiwan, the United States and Canada could export a mix of heavy and sulfuric grades—notably Western Canada Select—to supply the island’s refineries. If they have not already, US and Canadian energy officials should hold quiet conversations with their counterparts in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan about how North American crude oil and oil products could manage disruptions in the event of a blockade.

What about coal, LNG, and nuclear energy?

Taiwan also imports coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Of the island’s total energy needs in 2022, coal and coal products imports stood at nearly 30 percent, and LNG imports reached 19 percent. Australia accounted for more than half of Taiwan’s total 2022 coal imports; produces more than enough metallurgical and thermal coal to supply the island; and is not vulnerable to Chinese pressure, particularly since Beijing recently imposed an unofficial, two-year ban on Australian coal imports that was walked back only in February. Taiwan’s LNG outlook is also favorable. The island can count on future LNG imports from the United States, Australia, and Canada, while an active LNG fleet is highly dispersed across European and Asian democracies. Taiwan’s coal and LNG import outlook is relatively positive, outside of a physical blockade.

Nuclear energy plays a largely positive role in Taiwan’s energy security. Nuclear imports—that is, imports of nuclear fuel for use in domestic reactors—stood at 5 percent of Taiwan’s total energy needs in 2022. Once nuclear fuel is shipped to Taiwan, the island’s nuclear power plants can continuously produce zero-emission power for approximately eighteen to twenty-four months. Still, there are reasons why Taiwan’s energy planners consider nuclear energy to be an energy import. Russia is deeply embedded in nuclear energy supply chains, while nuclear exports from Kazakhstan could easily be interdicted by the PRC. Kazakhstan accounted for 43 percent of the world’s uranium production from mining in 2022 and Beijing and Moscow, working together, might work to blockade Kazakhstani energy exports.

Taiwan is currently phasing out its nuclear energy use, as the Democratic Progressive Party and the bulk of the island’s voters are opposed to the technology. Nuclear energy is clean and reliable, and it plays a positive role in the island’s energy security. Still, Taiwan’s concerns about its supply chain—especially in the event of a long-duration quarantine or blockade—are not unfounded.

Beware of the PRC’s maritime blockade capabilities

Taiwan’s dependency on seaborne energy imports heightens the risks of maritime disruption. The PRC navy appears increasingly capable of imposing a physical blockade or quarantine of Taiwan. The PLAN had 351 warfighting-capable ships in 2022 and now outnumbers the entire US Navy by more than fifty ships. Moreover, due to the US Navy’s dispersed global responsibilities, the PLAN enjoys an even larger numerical advantage in the Indo-Pacific theater. The PRC also continues to improve its fleet both qualitatively and quantitatively. The latest US Department of Defense China Military Power Report projects that the PLAN’s battle force will grow to four hundred ships by 2025 and 440 ships by 2030. The US Office of Naval Intelligence predicts that PRC blockade-relevant maritime platforms could exceed eight hundred ships by 2030, after units from the Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia are included.

The PRC does not just enjoy numerical superiority; it also has a home field advantage. Although some ships and subs are permanently forward deployed in Japan and Guam, the United States and allied navies would have to transit hundreds or even thousands of miles to reach the Taiwan theater. Meanwhile, the PRC’s anti-ship missile range extends several thousand kilometers off its coastline, implying that US and coalition ships would be forced to break a blockade while sailing within the PRC’s anti-access/area denial envelope. Finally, since Taiwan’s large ports are on the western side of the island, US and coalition ships would have to sail directly opposite the PRC coastline.

Coalition policymakers and naval strategists need to consider how a potential PRC maritime blockade can be defeated along every level of the escalation ladder. Some steps include enhancing the credibility of the United States’ and the coalition’s conventional military deterrent; holding key PRC economic, energy, and financial nodes liable to severe sanctions in the event of a prolonged blockade; addressing gaps in overcoming a long-duration blockade; expanding the merchant marine and convoy escort fleet; ensuring ships from allied and partner civilian fleets can “re-flag” as US vessels; and back-stopping shipping insurance markets, as insurance risk premiums would surely spike in the event of a confrontation over Taiwan. Fortunately, US allies comprise six of the top ten owners of the world’s civilian fleet, as measured in deadweight tons carrying capacity.

Indigenous clean energy generation: opportunities and constraints

Taiwan can further reduce its energy security vulnerabilities by developing its indigenous renewable energy resources. While solar and wind cannot solve all of Taiwan’s energy challenges, the PRC will find it relatively difficult to disrupt production of local renewables, especially distributed solar.

Distributed solar can be installed on any rooftop and is extremely difficult to disrupt via cyber or kinetic means if microgrids are employed. However, it suffers from low utilization rates and unfavorable bespoke installation costs. Utility-scale solar is more efficient and less expensive but may be more susceptible to cyberattacks, due to its concentration of panels. More broadly, Taiwan’s solar potential is also constrained by frequent cloudy skies and land scarcity.

Onshore wind potential is greatest on the western side of the island but land use tradeoffs constrain development—especially since Taiwan imports about 65 percent of its food. Still, onshore wind should be a higher priority than food production, as the Berlin airlift demonstrated that airborne food supply chains can break non-kinetic blockades. Additionally, since prepackaged Meals Ready-to-Eat have a shelf life of eighteen months even at ninety degrees Fahrenheit, there are relatively few risks of the PRC “starving out the island.”

Offshore wind is a promising technology for Taiwan. A nine hundred-megawatt wind farm off Taiwan’s west coast first produced electricity in early 2022; once fully complete, the installation could power approximately one million homes. Taiwan aims to install 5,700 megawatts of offshore wind capacity by 2025, which would substantially improve its energy security. Still, the Taiwanese military is concerned about offshore wind farms’ radar profile and the vulnerability of turbines and transmission cables to attack. Offshore wind has great potential, but Taiwan needs to balance its military and energy security needs carefully.

There are relatively few risks of Taiwan falling prey to sole-supplier dependency in either solar or wind, despite the PRC’s leading role in both technologies. There is limited international trade in wind turbines due to unfavorable weight-to-value ratios. Taiwan’s offshore wind projects have very strict local content requirements, and the island is establishing more wind turbine facilities. The PRC currently dominates solar market supply chains, producing 75 percent of all finished panels, but the United States and its allies and partners are increasing their own manufacturing capacity. Taiwan will be able to procure wind and solar components from non-PRC sources.

Taiwan’s most effective energy security tool may be to raise electricity tariffs, which would help rationalize demand and incentivize domestic clean energy generation. Raising electricity prices would encourage conservation efforts and make new renewables projects more economically viable, reducing Taiwan’s energy import needs.

Defending Taiwan from a military or energy shock

Taiwan’s energy security challenges are serious, but its chief problems are fundamentally military and naval. If the United States and its allies and partners cannot deter a PRC military invasion or naval blockade of Taiwan, disaster will likely result. US, Taiwanese, and other coalition forces must maintain credible conventional and strategic military deterrents against the PRC.

The West must walk a diplomatic tightrope to maintain its policy of dual deterrence. While Beijing’s increasingly provocative behavior vis-à-vis Taiwan is worrisome and warrants firm responses, the United States and its allies should also continue to discourage Taipei from undertaking any irresponsible moves toward independence. The West should continue to communicate to Beijing its vital interests in Taiwan while signaling its intent to avoid any unnecessary confrontation or conflict.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he leads its Chinese energy security and offshore wind programs; he also edits the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.

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A midterm report card for Mexico’s USMCA progress

Luz María de la Mora — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 22:45:36 +0000

The United-States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) is now halfway between its entry into force three years ago and its first required joint review in 2026. At this halfway point in the agreement’s first phase, what are the upcoming challenges for Mexico as it seeks to maximize the benefits of its USMCA membership?

The USMCA has certainly been successful in increasing the volume of Mexico’s trade with the United States and Canada. According to the US Census Bureau, in April 2023, the United States imported more goods from Mexico than from any other country; in 2022, Mexico-US trade was almost 27 percent higher than in 2019, and Mexico-Canada trade grew 21.8 percent in these same years. Between 2020 and 2023, Mexico received fifty billion dollars in US and ten billion dollars in Canadian investments.

This increase in trade and investment flows is explained not only by the USMCA’s implementation, but also by the Biden administration’s decision to diversify supply chains, relocate production to North America, and “de-risk” from China. By seeking to reduce the vulnerability of supply chains in North America, the integration facilitated by the USMCA acquired greater relevance for companies, workers, governments, and societies.

Even though the agreement has spurred dynamism in trade and investment, its implementation has not gone without serious challenges and confrontations, which Mexico will need to address before the 2026 joint review. These include differences in the way the three countries have chosen to comply with the USMCA, heightened scrutiny on labor and environmental issues, and incomplete implementation of the agreement’s provisions.

Unsettled disputes

First, Mexico has faced difficulties on both sides of the USMCA’s dispute settlement mechanism, established in Chapter 31. Mexico’s use of this mechanism signals that it considers the agreement an effective instrument to defend its commercial and investment interests. Together with Canada, Mexico requested the establishment of a panel to settle its differences with the United States regarding the interpretation of the methodology to determine the regional value content of essential auto parts in cars manufactured in North America. The panel ruled in favor of Mexico, but there seems to be no interest in enforcing the ruling.

Mexico has also been the target of Chapter 31. Both the United States and Canada requested consultations regarding Mexico’s energy policy in July 2022 and restrictions on trade in genetically modified corn in June 2023. While both consultation processes could still lead to requests for the establishment of panels, the parties have been in conversation regarding the substance of their concerns.

Chapter 31 is of great value to the private sector in North America because it offers a legal tool to solve differences. The USMCA offers a dispute settlement mechanism that works, unlike the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body, which is paralyzed. The USMCA’s panel reports are binding, and panel decisions are not affected by domestic political pressures.

However, it is the three governments’ responsibility to comply with the panels’ decisions, even if they are unfavorable, and to make sure that rulings are fully enforced. Not doing so undermines the value of the USMCA dispute settlement mechanism and the agreement itself.

High standards, heightened scrutiny

Second, Mexico has been subject to scrutiny on labor and environmental matters, reflecting US and Canadian national priorities and their need to respond to political pressure from their own domestic constituencies. Regarding labor, under the Rapid Response Labor Mechanism, the United States has initiated eleven cases against Mexico, and Canada has initiated one. Mexico’s labor authority has sought to address the concerns raised in each case, avoiding sanctions and prohibitions on exports.

On environmental matters, Mexico has faced questioning from its partners regarding compliance with its environmental legislation and its USMCA obligations. For example, in February 2022, the United States requested consultations with Mexico on the protection of the vaquita porpoise, which is associated with totoaba illegal fishing. In May 2023, the US Fish and Wildlife Service determined that Mexico has not done enough to prevent the illegal trafficking of totoaba, so later this month, US President Joe Biden could decide to impose an embargo on the trade of wildlife products from Mexico, in line with Mexico’s Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora obligations, which are also recognized in the USMCA. In labor and environmental affairs, the United States and Canada have used and may continue to use the USMCA mechanisms to pressure Mexico to comply with its obligations, since these issues are key to their own domestic political agendas.

Unfinished business

Third, Mexico has yet to fully implement several USMCA provisions. These include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Cross-Border Privacy Rules Framework, established in Chapter 19, which is already overdue. In addition, Mexico will have to become a signatory to the 1991 agreement of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants as provided in Chapter 20. Likewise, the USMCA has a built-in agenda of future negotiations, such as the inclusion at the sub-federal level of provisions on state-owned companies and designated monopolies (Chapter 22), which should have been concluded in June 2023. Mexico needs to make sure that these provisions are enforced according to its USMCA commitments, since this will align its regulations and policies with those of its North American partners.

At the halfway point between USMCA’s entry into force and its first joint review, Mexico has seen a substantial increase in its trade and investment flows, which are key engines for its economic growth. However, Mexico still faces serious challenges in the full implementation of its commitments and in making sure that the United States also complies with a panel report favorable to Mexico. It is in Mexico’s interest to fully comply with the agreement while also requesting compliance from the United States, since that will provide certainty and predictability to investors in the region. This will facilitate the agreement’s extension at the six-year review in 2026 and will allow Mexico to promote opportunities for North American productive integration and the relocation of supply chains.

Luz María de la Mora is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she supports the Center’s Mexico work. From December 2018 to October 2022, she served as undersecretary of foreign trade in the Mexican Secretariat of Economy, during which she helped implement the USMCA.

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Wagner fallout: Time to begin preparing for a post-Putin Russia

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:48:03 +0000

The recent revolt by Russia’s Wagner Group was a short-lived affair but the repercussions continue to be felt throughout the Russian Federation and beyond. Perhaps the biggest single lesson from the aborted coup is the fragility of the Putin regime. For many years, the Kremlin has sought to present Vladimir Putin as a powerful and popular ruler exercising complete control over a loyal and disciplined power vertical. The Wagner uprising has now shattered this myth of Putin the strongman.

Ever since coming to power at the turn of the millennium, Putin has sought to portray himself as an uncompromising and macho leader. He has frequently employed vulgar slang when promising to dispatch his opponents, and has notoriously engaged in a series of PR stunts including posing topless on horseback and scuba-diving to “discover” ancient Greek urns. However, there was little sign of this tough guy persona during the early stages of the Wagner revolt in late June. As Wagner troops captured Rostov-on-Don and began to march on Moscow, the Russian dictator was nowhere to be seen. He did not appear until the second day of the mutiny, when he delivered a brief video address.

The Kremlin appears to recognize the seriousness of the situation, and has since embarked on an intensive post-putsch PR offensive designed to repair public perceptions of Putin. In the days following the Wagner drama, the Russian dictator has made a flurry of carefully choreographed appearances emphasizing national unity and regime stability. However, this sudden burst of activity has only served to highlight the damage done by Putin’s earlier absence. In a little over twenty-four hours, the Putin regime was exposed as significantly weaker than almost anybody had previously imagined. Despite the best efforts of the Kremlin propaganda machine, this fact is plain as day to both the international community and the Russian elite.

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Nobody will have failed to notice that while Putin has continued to talk tough, he failed to crush the Wagner uprising and instead struck some kind of deal with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his mutinous troops. Putin demonstrated a readiness to compromise despite the fact that Wagner fighters reportedly shot down a number of Russian aircraft and killed numerous Russian airmen. This indicated an apparent lack of concern for the lives of Russian servicemen at a time when tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have already been killed as a result of Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine.

The brief Wagner uprising also revealed a remarkable shortage of Russian military strength and fighting spirit on the home front. Wagner troops were able to seize one of Russia’s largest cities, Rostov-on-Don, without a fight. Perhaps even more significantly, they were cheered and supported by crowds of locals. Wagner forces then advanced to within 200 kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before choosing to turn back.

Meanwhile, there was no surge in street-level or elite support for Putin. Instead, pro-war propagandists fell largely silent as rumors swirled of establishment figures fleeing Moscow. For a brief period, Russia looked to be leaderless and defenseless. The immediate danger has now passed, but these stunning developments have changed attitudes toward Putin and his regime in fundamental ways.

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It would appear that history repeats itself. Just as in 1990 very few foresaw the looming collapse of the USSR, Russia now once again looks suddenly fragile. Unsurprisingly, this is regarded as good news in Ukraine, where any sign of Russian instability is welcomed. Attitudes elsewhere are not so clear-cut. Many international observers are openly alarmed by the potential demise of the Russian Federation in its current form. They worry about the fate of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, and also question the legitimacy of the many new states that could potentially emerge from the wreckage of Putin’s Russia.

These concerns mirror attitudes during the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is often forgotten that US President George Bush H. W. Bush came to Kyiv in the weeks before Ukraine’s August 1991 declaration of independence to argue against such a move in his “Chicken Kiev” speech. Many of today’s leaders share these fears over the potential disintegration of Russia. Nevertheless, the Wagner revolt has demonstrated that the Putin regime may well collapse due to its own internal weaknesses, regardless of the Western world’s wishes.

Elements of the international community, including in the West, also cling to the idea of reaching some kind of compromise and returning to business as usual with Russia. While it is obvious to almost everyone in Ukraine and in nearby countries including Poland and the Baltic states that Russia will only stop when it is decisively defeated, there are still many observers elsewhere who believe they can turn back the clock to 2021 or even 2013. They fondly recall a time when Vladimir Putin was the respected leader of a economically strong nation at the heart of global affairs, and dream of returning to this state of affairs. Such thinking is dangerously delusional.

In reality, there can be no way back to international respectability for Putin. As a result of the disastrous invasion of Ukraine, he will be an enemy of the entire Western world for as long as he remains in power. Crucially for the future of his regime, Putin is also clearly no longer able to guarantee domestic security or protect the interests of the Russian elite on the international stage.

As the international community assesses the fallout from the Wagner revolt, it no longer makes sense to be afraid of a new Russian collapse. On the contrary, the time has come to begin preparing for the possibility of a post-Putin Russia. Western policymakers should now be thinking seriously about how to make any future transition as smooth as possible. This means preparing for the emergence of a democratic Russia, and also exploring what a breakup of the current Russian Federation into a number of smaller states would mean for international security.

When similar processes were underway in the early 1990s, the international community prioritized stability above all else, paving the way for the eventual rise of a revisionist Russia under Putin. This time, a new Russian collapse should be managed in order to bring about a sustainable shift toward democracy. The experience of the past three decades has demonstrated that this is the only way to secure a durable peace. Today’s Western leaders must learn from the mistakes of their predecessors in order to avoid repeating them.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Kroenig and Miller in Foreign Policy on democratic renewal at home and abroad

sodal — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:40:10 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 4, Scowcroft Center senior director and vice president Matthew Kroenig and Scowcroft Center assistant director Danielle Miller penned a review of Charles Dunst’s new book, Defeating the Dictators: How Democracy Can Prevail in the Age of the Strongman, in Foreign Policy. In it, they discuss how democracies can outperform autocracies and maintain their edge.

If democracies want to maintain their edge in the global competition against autocracies… they will need to identify their own deficits and remedy them. Only when democracies are flourishing at home can they maximize their power and influence abroad—and convince the world that the democratic model is one to be admired and emulated.

Matthew Kroenig and Danielle Miler

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

China Defense Policy

Staff

Danielle Miller

Assistant Director

Climate Change & Climate Action National Security

The post Kroenig and Miller in Foreign Policy on democratic renewal at home and abroad appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline

Richard Cashman, Lesia Ogryzko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:14:43 +0000

The attempted putsch by Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his Wagner troops in late June is perhaps best understood as a symptom of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline. Much like the invasion of Ukraine itself, it is part of a broader historical process that can be traced back to 1989 and the fall of the Soviet incarnation of the Russian Empire in Central and Eastern Europe.

Anyone looking to make sense of recent events in Russia should begin by noting that Prigozhin’s dramatic actions were not aimed at ending the war in Ukraine or steering Russia away from its increasingly totalitarian course. On the contrary, he sought to correct mistakes in the conduct of the invasion by effecting changes in the country’s military leadership.

This should come as no surprise. The vast majority of Prigozhin’s public statements about the invasion of Ukraine align him with prominent ultranationalists, which in the Russian context translates into imperial reactionaries. This group is demanding a fuller commitment to the war against Ukraine which, with Belarus, it sees as the core of Russia’s imperial heartlands. Ideally, this group wants to see full mobilization of Russia’s citizens and the country’s productive capacity for the war effort.

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Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

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Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Ukraine needs NATO membership, not an ‘Israel model’

Ian Brzezinski — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 18:22:03 +0000

As Ukraine undertakes a challenging and costly counteroffensive against Russia’s invasion, NATO members are discussing how to reinforce Kyiv’s military capacities and ensure its long-term sovereignty. The Biden administration has reportedly told Congress it wants a security assistance model based on the United States’ relationship with Israel. This approach, an alternative to Ukraine’s membership in NATO, is a mistaken application of Israel’s geopolitical circumstances, one that would indefinitely perpetuate Russia’s aggression.

For decades, the United States has reinforced Israel’s security by providing it $2-4 billion in annual military assistance. Today, that assistance is codified in a ten-year agreement directing $38 billion in military aid to Israel between 2019 and 2028. While Washington does not provide Israel with security guarantees—commitments to intervene militarily in the event of an attack—its military aid has enabled Israel to develop one of the world’s premier fighting forces.

Those advocating this model for Ukraine fear that extending NATO membership to Kyiv today would drag the Alliance into a war with dangerous escalatory risks. Long-term security assistance arrangements, they assert, can sustain Ukraine’s qualitative military edge over Russia. That will eventually break Moscow’s will and lead to a peace settlement, they argue, after which Ukraine can be granted NATO membership.

Indeed, US assistance has been critical to Israel’s survival. Israeli fighters, like their Ukrainian counterparts, are admired around the world for their courage, tenacity, and ingenuity. But that is where the similarities end. Ukraine faces a far different and ultimately more challenging threat.

Israel’s adversaries in the Islamic world are not major powers. They are disparate and often divided. Some are poor and suffer from significant internal schisms. None of their militaries are highly capable. Some have been defeated by Israel. None are armed with nuclear weapons. Israel, by contrast, like Russia, has nuclear weapons. Ukraine does not. Kyiv gave up its nuclear deterrent in 1994 under pressure from the United States and other NATO countries.

Moreover, several of Israel’s previous adversaries are now its security partners. Some have been beneficiaries of Western economic aid and military equipment. These relationships enable the West to exercise some, though not always decisive, influence over their actions. The West is not on track to have similar leverage over Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

If the transatlantic community consigns Kyiv to the Israel model, Ukraine will be left indefinitely in the gray zone of insecurity that has repeatedly catalyzed Putin’s hegemonic ambitions into violent actions.

Nor has the Israel model prevented aggression. Israelis have endured decades of artillery fire, missile strikes, and cross-border terrorist attacks—including those orchestrated by Iran, which arguably faces stricter Western sanctions than those imposed on Russia.

Kyiv confronts a far more significant adversary. Russia is a massive unitary state whose population is more than three times greater than Ukraine’s and whose economy is ten times larger. Moscow’s determination to obliterate Ukraine and its history far exceeds the collective intensity of Israel’s adversaries.

Sustaining Ukraine under such circumstances will be exponentially more expensive than what the United States has provided Israel. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy estimates that Ukraine has received more than $150 billion in military, economic, and humanitarian assistance commitments in just the first year of the war. Of that total, $77 billion came from the United States alone.

If the transatlantic community consigns Kyiv to the Israel model, Ukraine will be left indefinitely in the gray zone of insecurity that has repeatedly catalyzed Putin’s hegemonic ambitions into violent actions. Ukraine would have to consider its options. Regardless of US economic and military assistance, Israel has often undertaken military actions against its adversaries that have contradicted the desires of its Western benefactors. Israel developed its own nuclear arsenal. Why wouldn’t Ukraine do the same?

As long as NATO is not fully committed to defending the security of Ukraine, Putin will continue his violent quest, especially if he believes continuing the conflict is the key to preventing Ukrainian membership in the Alliance. Putin must not be given an indefinite veto over transatlantic security.

Granting NATO membership to Ukraine is critical to ensuring it wins the war against Russia quickly and decisively. It is the most unambiguous way to demonstrate to Putin that suborning Ukraine is unachievable and wasteful. It is the most reliable way to ensure such aggression never happens again.

Establishing an Alliance force posture to credibly deter Russian aggression against Ukraine will be far less financially onerous than reinforcing and sustaining Ukraine’s defenses and rebuilding its economy under perpetual wartime conditions.

NATO could extend its security guarantee to the territory Ukraine controls at the time of accession. The rest of Ukraine could be addressed in the future; such was the case of Germany, as a third of its territory was controlled by the Soviet Union when it joined the Alliance. Moscow would then have to decide whether to expand its war to the Alliance. Recent events have demonstrated that Russian forces are clearly not prepared for that task.

As allied leaders approach their summit meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11, the United States is remarkably alone in its reluctance to grant Kyiv an invitation and clear roadmap to NATO membership. Taking that step is essential to reinforce the morale of the Ukrainian people at a decisive moment in this war, convince Moscow that its hegemonic ambitions are unachievable, and establish military stability along Europe’s frontier with Russia.

This is in the interest not just of Ukraine. It is to the strategic benefit of the transatlantic community.

Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Formerly, he served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

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Hezbollah and Iran have opened a fourth battlefront: Inside Israel

David Daoud — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 15:52:42 +0000

The Blue Line has been relatively calm since the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah—the deceptive quiet obscuring obsessive preparations for a future conflict both sides believe is inevitable. In furtherance of Iran’s regional strategy, the Shia organization has been establishing several frontlines—in south Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and Syria—from which to fight the Jewish state directly and through allies. But with Israel’s attention seemingly focused exclusively on the group’s activities across its borders, Hezbollah appears to be establishing another front behind Israeli lines—both within the country’s official boundaries and the West Bank.

Prompted by Hezbollah’s recent brazen behavior, the Israeli security establishment seems fixated on detecting signals that indicate whether the group is readying for another direct war or security escalation with Israel. In March, Hezbollah deployed a thousand seemingly unarmed personnel along the border (four hundred were Hamas-affiliated Palestinians). Shortly afterward, the Shia organization facilitated two attacks against Israel but maintained a sufficient distance from their execution to avoid an Israeli reprisal or escalation. In late March, a Palestinian militant infiltrated from Lebanon and planted an explosive bearing the hallmark of Hezbollah manufacturing in Megiddo. Then, in early April, Hamas fired a barrage of thirty-four rockets from Lebanon into Israel.

Following this, Hezbollah staged a massive but relatively routine “war game” to commemorate Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon. On a smaller scale, it echoed Hezbollah’s ten thousand-man simulated invasion of the Galilee in August 2012, which commemorated its 2006 “victory” over Israel. This time, the group invited reporters to witness masked fighters training to destroy Israel by jumping through flaming hoops, firing from the backs of motorcycles, emerging through plumes of smoke, and blowing up Israeli flags posted on hills. The exhibition—useless as a battlefield exercise—was pure military theater intended to make headlines, produce images for Hezbollah’s martial music videos, and reinforce its supporters’ belief that Hezbollah can deter, defeat, and destroy Israel. It may also have covered Hezbollah’s infiltration of Israeli territory and installation of two outposts in Har Dov/Shebaa Farms—testing the limits of Israeli patience and gradually attempting to adjust the rules of engagement without incurring retaliation.

Critical as some developments may prove, they obscure a more dangerous Hezbollah initiative to establish a proxy foothold behind Israeli lines. Hezbollah has coveted such an option for decades, beginning—at least—after Israel expelled four hundred Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters to south Lebanon in 1992 and readmitted them a year later. These returnees served as a nucleus for Hezbollah and Iran to fight Israel from within—an effort that continued with direct armed assistance to Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat’s Fatah (beginning in 1998), and then to several armed groups during the Second Intifada and afterward.

Since then, Hezbollah—working with Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) or separately—has spent considerable efforts to enlist Arab Israelis, Lebanese, nationals of Arab countries with foreign passports, and Palestinians to gather intelligence, recruit additional assets, or establish sleeper cells within Israel to plan terror attacks. To that end, the connections between Lebanese and Arab Israeli criminal networks have proven invaluable.

Statements from Hezbollah and Iranian officials—in addition to the group’s past and current behavior—betray a three-fold and ambitious objective that goes far beyond periodically igniting scattered chaos within Israel.

Part of Iran’s regional strategy is to develop its proxies’ domestic weapons production capabilities. The IRGC has achieved this outcome with Hezbollah in south Lebanon—relying on their Lebanese proxy—and with Yemen’s Houthis, as well as in the Gaza Strip. Sometime after the 2005 Israeli withdrawal and before his assassination in 2008, Hezbollah’s then-military commander Imad Mughniyeh spent months in the coastal enclave training Palestinian militants in rocket and launching pad production and tunnel and rocket warfare.

In line with that, Hezbollah and Iran appear set on replicating that outcome in the West Bank. IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami admitted as much in 2022, saying Iran’s goal was to arm the West Bank “the same way that Gaza is armed.” As he told Fars News, “When something is homegrown, it cannot be stopped.” Recent attempts to fire rockets from Jenin on June 26—claimed by a Hamas-affiliated group calling itself the “[Yahya] Ayyash Detachment – West of Jenin”—and the discovery of a launch pad in June in east Jerusalem, as well as weapons laboratories on July 3 in Jenin, indicate these efforts may have begun producing results.

A second and corollary objective, per Salami in 2014, is to “imminently transform the West Bank into an unbearable inferno and hell” for Israel. Iran outsourced the task to Hezbollah, whose Unit 133 had been recruiting and funding cells in the West Bank through Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s son, Jawad. According to Israeli police and the Shin Bet, Hezbollah’s continuous weapons smuggling into Israel and the West Bank has intensified significantly since 2021. This boost immediately preceded the ongoing upsurge of West Bank violence, which began in June 2021, with unrest spreading to cities long considered tranquil, such as Jericho.

As a result of these efforts, groups once thought defunct in the West Bank (ex. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) or all across the region (ex. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AAMB)) have experienced a resurgence. New armed groups have also sprung up, particularly in Jenin and Nablus. Fueled by coherent ideologies, some are affiliated with major organizations, like the PIJ Quds Brigades-linked Jenin Detachment and Nablus Detachment, and AAMB’s Hezam Al-Nar and Liwa al-Shuhada.

Others are motivated more by frustration, like the so-called Lion’s Den—a shadowy and diffuse entity centered in Nablus. This group emerged independently in August 2022, drawing on the disaffection of Palestinian youths through both the efficacy of the Palestinian Authority and negotiations with Israel. Here too, however, Iran has been fanning the flames. Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar recently noted that Tehran has been using online platforms to encourage recruitment, demonstrating the Islamic Republic’s exploitation of any available vector—ideological motivation or disillusionment—to stir up violence.

Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, Iran and Hezbollah have sought to exploit tensions between Arab and Jewish Israelis to establish what, in Resistance Axis jargon, has been called “the unification of the fronts.” To that end, Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem described Israel’s May 2021 inter-ethnic riots, which overlapped with the clash with Gaza-based Palestinian militants, as a “strategic change and historical inflection point.” West Bank, Gazan, and Jerusalemite Palestinians had become united with “’48 Arabs” in purpose, he said, whereby all Palestinians—not just the segment directly affected—would now collectively respond to any Israeli attack or encroachment.

Like Qassem, Hezbollah’s Executive Council Chairman Hashem Safieddine recently suggested that this development would allow the group to strike Israel from within. Fantasizing about the “united fronts” giving Hezbollah the ability to almost sow chaos at will within Israel, he said, “The day will come when the Resistance takes part in operations within [Israel’s] 1948 borders, something that Israel couldn’t imagine… this will cause the [Zionist] regime to crumble from within. Imagine what would happen if the Resistance enters the ‘48 territories.’ “

Establishing a front within Israel and the West Bank has immense utility for Hezbollah—now and during the group’s promised “comprehensive war” against the Jewish state. For now, it allows the group to continue bleeding Israel through proxies while maintaining plausible deniability. At a minimum, this will keep the IDF mired in combating low-level, albeit sustained, violence. At worst, Israel’s ongoing clashes with Palestinian militants increase the possibility of miscalculation or overreaction by one or both parties, potentially igniting a new intifada. Such an outcome appears increasingly plausible as a younger Palestinian generation—disillusioned both with their leadership and negotiations with Israel, and with no memory of the bloodiness of the Second Intifada—is increasingly skewing Palestinian society in support of returning to armed confrontation.

The future utility of Hezbollah’s “frontline” within Israel would come into effect during a war. Years into the future, Hezbollah could ignite that war during one of the religiously or nationalistically sensitive anniversaries cluttering the Israeli-Palestinian calendar. By timing a conflict to coincide with a period of heightened religious or nationalistic sentiment (on either or both the Palestinian and Jewish side), the group could activate the cells it has cultivated in the West Bank.

It could also tap affiliates among Arab Israeli criminal networks to carry out a nationalistically motivated attack on a Jewish target—a synagogue in a mixed Arab-Jewish Israeli city, for example. With this simple act, Hezbollah could exploit independently heightened inter-ethnic tensions to initiate a cycle of actions and reactions by Jewish and Arab extremists, just like in May 2021, which could spread to the rest of those communities and throughout the country. By creating disturbances on both sides of the Green Line, Hezbollah will force Israel to divert the attention of its government and security forces from other active fronts, including—most critically to the group’s survival—Lebanon, to confront a lethal threat behind its lines.

David Daoud is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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Four scenarios for Russia’s future after the Wagner Group mutiny

Jeffrey Cimmino — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 10:00:00 +0000

This article was updated on July 6.

The extraordinary march of Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s forces to within a couple hours of Moscow ended abruptly on June 24. But Prigozhin’s decision to stand down and move to Belarus will not be the end of the story.

While the immediate crisis for Russian President Vladimir Putin may dissipate, what scenarios should US and allied officials prepare for in the coming days, weeks, months, and beyond? Here are four possible paths for Russia’s future.

1. A weakened Putin rules

Putin restores order and effectively reduces the ability of Prigozhin and the Wagner Group to challenge his rule. Prigozhin stays in Belarus with a diminished force, while other Wagner fighters go home or join the ranks of the regular Russian armed forces.

Nevertheless, even if Putin remains in power for the foreseeable future, the façade of order and stability that he has constructed over two decades in power has been shattered, with Russia’s would-be tsar showing himself to be vulnerable to competing actors. Quick action to sideline Prigozhin dissuades potential internal challengers from following Wagner’s example, but Putin still needs to pay extra attention to keep different oligarchical interests and power brokers in line.

Russia’s internal dynamics will also shape, and be shaped by, the war effort in Ukraine. Overcoming the mutiny and preventing severe immediate challenges to his authority allows Putin to refocus to some degree on the war effort.

In this scenario, Putin is better positioned to concentrate his security forces on preventing major gains for the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The rapidity with which the crisis was resolved, as well as the lack of successor crises within Russia, means that any effect on Russian soldiers’ morale is limited. Ukraine could still make some important gains in this counteroffensive, but its forces will receive less help from internal disarray in Russia.

The United States and its NATO allies see Putin as weak and potentially vulnerable, though they still must contend with him as Russia’s leader. Still, seeing his weakness, they are willing to continue supplying Ukraine and keep up the pressure on Moscow, with new weapons systems (e.g., long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS) possibly on the horizon.

Meanwhile, a weakened Putin grows more dependent on China, further reifying Russia’s status as China’s junior partner. China does not want to lose its primary strategic partner, and this scenario offers Beijing greater predictability, insofar as it is able to continue engaging with Putin. Chinese leader Xi Jinping may take note of Prigozhin’s mutiny and consider threats to his, and his party’s, rule in China; however, he also could feel reassured by how quickly the crisis passed.

2. A new regime rises

In the summer of 1991, Kremlin hardliners attempted a coup against Soviet President and General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev. The coup failed, but Gorbachev was weakened and out of power by the end of the year.

In this scenario, Putin suffers a similar fate. The Prigozhin challenge is sidestepped for the moment, but Putin’s political position is irreparable and rapidly deteriorates. Internal competitors line up, consolidating strength and waiting for the right opportunity to strike.

Faced with internal threats, Putin is distracted from the Ukraine war effort and even has to reallocate security forces to deal with his competitors. At the same time, the counteroffensive picks up steam. Ukrainian forces break through weak points in Russia’s lines, retaking substantial ground and severing the land bridge that Russia has created by occupying Ukrainian territory from the Russian border to Crimea. Morale flags among Russian troops, and disgruntled soldiers stream back into Russia, angry with the country’s political leadership for sending them to fight a bloody, failing war.

At this point, Putin’s adversaries strike. Perhaps Prigozhin and the Wagner Group reconstitute in Belarus and conduct another march on Moscow. In addition, or alternatively, other nationalist forces take advantage of discontented troops to build their own miniature armies outside the purview of the state. Regardless of the precise mechanism, political and military elites turn on Putin, who is killed or forced into “retirement.”

Even though chaos appears imminent, a new regime consolidates power quickly, preventing a civil war and restoring order in a post-Putin era. The war in Ukraine does not end immediately, but the exigencies of establishing order reduce the likelihood of any significant new Russian offensives in the near or medium terms, and the new regime instead focuses on salvaging some gains from the war while maintaining stability at home.

The United States and NATO adjust to this new reality, sizing up a new authoritarian regime. There might be an opportunity to ease tensions if a long-term peace agreement or ceasefire is reached in Ukraine, though a comprehensive thaw in relations is unlikely. Tough talk about the West may continue in propaganda outlets, but Russia’s weakened conventional military forces undermine its credibility to present a hard-power threat to NATO allies. Still dealing with the aftereffects of a power transition at home, the new regime is disinclined to conduct provocations abroad and instead could seek stability in its relations with external powers. Nevertheless, the behavior of the new Russian leadership is not wholly predictable, and NATO prepares to deter and defend against potential acts of aggression by the new regime.

This scenario presents unwelcome uncertainty for China, which must navigate relations with a post-Putin regime. The new regime may remain generally aligned with China, recognizing its need to rely more heavily on its foremost strategic partner. On the other hand, absent the strong Xi-Putin partnership, it is plausible that the new leadership chafes at being the junior partner vis-à-vis Beijing and the relationship between the two countries weakens, albeit while retaining a common distaste for the United States.

3. The tempest arrives

As in the previous scenario, there is a temporary pause in tensions, followed by a descent into civil war. Putin’s adversaries are emboldened by his apparent weakness, which is exacerbated by a deteriorating situation on the battlefield in Ukraine. In this case, however, no competitor is strong enough to consolidate power.

Russia fractures into competing power blocs. This could mean Putin retains power and loyalists in some parts of Russia, even as Prigozhin and nationalist leaders develop quasi-fiefdoms elsewhere. Further complicating this scenario would be the rise of secessionist movements that further divide Russia.

As one of the United States’ foremost geopolitical competitors fragments, this scenario raises other questions.

For example, what happens to Russia’s nuclear weapons? Russia has thousands of nuclear warheads, and a civil war opens up opportunities for different actors to take advantage of the chaos and access those weapons. Eager to avoid this proliferation, the United States and NATO seek to contain the civil war within Russia’s borders.

As for the war in Ukraine, an enduring civil war results in Russian lines quickly collapsing as command-and-control disintegrates. Competing power players vie for the loyalty of embittered but battle-hardened soldiers returning to Russia.

This scenario is particularly bad for China, as it witnesses its premier strategic partner reduced to disarray. Moreover, it compounds China’s regional nuclear proliferation concerns, while also creating instability at its border and a potential influx of refugees. China now needs to allocate substantial resources to securing a lengthy border that it previously did not have to worry too much about. Russia’s energy industry also suffers, meaning Beijing cannot rely on Moscow as much to meet its exorbitant energy demands and must look elsewhere. Furthermore, in this scenario especially, Beijing might become even more cautious regarding an invasion of Taiwan as it witnesses the regime-threatening internal instability that can be wrought by invasions gone awry.

4. Reformers seize the moment

A final scenario worth considering is the possibility of a reform-minded regime coming to power in Moscow. As in the previous two scenarios, the temporary reprieve in tensions following Wagner’s mutiny gives way to renewed challenges to Putin’s rule, accelerated by a declining situation on the battlefield.

Putin manages to keep power through the March 2024 Russian presidential election, which is marked by fraud and widely recognized among the populace as illegitimate. In this case, a more democratically inclined opposition, perhaps associated with Alexei Navalny, seizes the opportunity and manages to cultivate sufficient popular support, with rallies and protests across Russia promoting change. Under intense pressure, Kremlin elites express sympathy with the reformers, and Putin ultimately decides to step down. A reformist leader wins the ensuing constitutionally mandated presidential election.* After assuming and consolidating power, the new government seeks a quick end to the war in Ukraine, while focusing on implementing anti-corruption and political reforms in Russia.

For the United States and NATO, this scenario increases the likelihood of Russia becoming a more responsible member of the international system and reducing military tensions between the Alliance and Moscow. That said, change will not happen overnight, and a reform-minded Russia will have to wrestle with deeply entrenched corruption and economic issues. China, for its part, finds this scenario disastrous, as it faces a nuclear-armed state on its border that is ideologically more sympathetic to the West.

These scenarios do not exhaust all possibilities, but they account for four plausible futures US and allied policymakers should consider in their strategic planning. A scenario in which a reform-minded opposition comes to power is the least plausible, as Russia has long proven resistant to extensive political reforms, and it is unclear that there is a movement sufficiently organized and with broad enough support to take advantage of a power vacuum. The first scenario is the closest to the status quo, and Putin has been remarkably resilient as a leader; on the other hand, Putin has also never appeared weaker, and external pressure wrought by Ukrainian success on the battlefield could help to facilitate his downfall.

Jeffrey Cimmino is the deputy director of operations and a fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This article was updated to clarify the circumstances under which a reformist leader could come to power in scenario four.

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Here’s the ‘concrete’ path for Ukraine to join NATO

Franklin D. Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, Christopher Skaluba — Wed, 05 Jul 2023 21:05:02 +0000

As Ukraine continues its determined defense against Russia’s brutal invasion, NATO nations seem ready at their upcoming summit in Vilnius on July 11-12 to take two important steps to provide for Ukraine’s long-term security. NATO is expected to affirm an enduring pledge of arms support for Ukraine and upgrade the NATO-Ukraine Commission to a “Council,” thus providing a more regularized and effective consultative mechanism. But a third step is urgently needed as well. NATO allies should, as French President Emmanuel Macron described it, establish a “concrete” path for Ukraine to join the Alliance.

Other forms of deterrence have failed Ukraine twice since 2014, and only NATO membership will prevent a third failure. There are obstacles to be overcome, not least of which is that Ukraine is at war and Russian forces occupy some of its internationally recognized sovereign territory. But creating a concrete path for future membership at Vilnius is crucial to enhance Ukrainian morale during its difficult counteroffensive and to strengthen its position in any future negotiations with Russia. It will allow NATO to bolster its credibility by taking an overdue step toward a membership pathway, consistent with its 2008 statement that Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO.

With the Vilnius Summit only a few days away, differences remain among allies about Ukraine’s aspirations, and those differences need to be resolved. There is, however, a way forward that all NATO nations should be able to accept. Namely, the summit should establish a High Level Group reporting to NATO’s secretary general to design a roadmap for Ukraine’s fast-track membership. All NATO nations would have a voice in the group. This roadmap should be delivered no later than next year’s NATO summit in Washington.

The High Level Group could include either ambassadors from the North Atlantic Council or senior officials from member nations, an approach NATO has previously undertaken to analyze and resolve difficult issues. In effect, this would allow for an expedited process akin to the one utilized to extend membership offers to Finland and Sweden. In the case of Ukraine, it is possible that there might be divergent views among members of the group. While unanimity is obviously desirable, the group should be authorized to present alternative analyses if agreement cannot be reached.

As part of its remit, the group would stay apprised of the ongoing military interactions between NATO, its members, and Ukraine. Given the high degree of NATO standardization that Ukraine has already achieved, it should be expected that such efforts would proceed smoothly and that the group would not find any standardization issues as a bar to membership.

The two most complex issue areas for the group to assess will be:

Issues of corruption, judicial independence, and protection of minority rights, and
The conditions in the conflict that would generate circumstances in which a membership offer would be extended.

With respect to the first set of issues, Ukraine has been taking significant steps. It has established a Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, a National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, a High Anti-Corruption Court, and a High Qualification Commission of Judges. Independent international experts have been engaged in such efforts, as has civil society. These efforts have borne fruit. By way of example, the head of Ukraine’s Supreme Court is facing corruption charges related to an alleged $2.7 million bribe. More efforts are nonetheless required.

Meanwhile, the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) has undertaken intensive reviews of the minority rights situation in Ukraine. Its June 2023 report “welcome[d] the adoption of a long-expected new Law on National Minorities, which provides a number of guarantees in conformity with international standards.” The report further stated that “to ensure full conformity with such standards, a number of provisions of that Law should be reconsidered.”

In judging Ukraine’s progress on these issues, the group would have the benefit of the Venice Commission’s report, discussions with Ukrainian authorities and civil society, and consultations with the European Union, which has included such issues as part of extending candidacy status to Ukraine.

The more complicated set of issues for resolution by the group involves deciding under what conditions of conflict a membership offer should be extended. The most desirable circumstance, of course, would be a victory by Ukraine that regains the country’s pre-2014 borders and is followed by a settlement with Russia. Were that to happen by the time of the Washington summit, there would be strong reasons for the Alliance to extend a membership offer. Given the uncertainty of war, however, it would also be valuable for the group to evaluate at least two other circumstances.

First, it could be the case that Ukraine succeeds in achieving significant control of much of its territory but not all. The group might consider whether membership with a guarantee covering only that portion of territory should be considered. This is an option that would likely have a higher degree of clarity closer to the Washington summit. As noted above, different NATO nations may have different views with respect to such an approach, but the group could design relevant recommendations and propose a roadmap for each.

Second, it might be the case that Ukraine is entirely—or very substantially—successful in regaining its pre-2014 borders but that Russia continues sporadic or low-level attacks, so the conflict is somewhat diminished but not ended. Again, the group could make recommendations as to whether a membership offer should be extended in such circumstances.

In sum, heads of state and government should establish a High Level Group in Vilnius tasked to provide an evaluation of the key issues affecting Ukraine’s potential membership and to present specific recommendations at the Washington summit that constitute the “concrete” path suggested by Macron. This would be a significant step forward politically for Ukraine. It would prompt NATO to define the conditions for membership while not immediately altering the status quo. It is a proper compromise between those who want to extend an immediate membership offer and those who prefer to avoid the membership question until the war is settled.

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and board member at the Atlantic Council. He is a former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served in the White House as special assistant to the president for defense policy and as director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He formerly served as the principal director for European and NATO policy and the principal director for strategy and force development in the office of the US secretary of defense.

The post Here’s the ‘concrete’ path for Ukraine to join NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rich Outzen joins Israeli TV i24 to discuss Syria-Russian exercises

aozen — Wed, 05 Jul 2023 13:34:10 +0000

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The minilateral moment in the Middle East: An opportunity for US regional policy?

Jean-Loup Samaan — Wed, 05 Jul 2023 13:00:00 +0000

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In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “The Minilateral Moment in the Middle East: An Opportunity for US Regional Policy,” the Atlantic Council’s nonresident senior fellow Jean-Loup Samaan analyzes how regional powers are reconsidering the multilateral balance of their foreign policy arrangements, and the emerging implications for US Middle East policy.

Over the past three years, the Middle East has experienced major intra-regional changes. After a decade of fierce competition between two blocs—one led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the other by Qatar and Turkey—both parties now seem willing to cooperate. One of the key features of this new regional environment, according to Samaan, has been the growth of so-called minilateral initiatives that regroup several countries on an ad hoc basis.

Samaan also addresses how powers outside the region have embarked on a similar path of building relationships with countries in the Middle East. Russia’s recent attempt to build a similar framework with Turkey and Iran, he argues, provides evidence of how minilateralism is increasingly considered an effective instrument of regional diplomacy.

About the author

Jean-Loup Samaan

Nonresident Senior Fellow
Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs

Senior Research Fellow
Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore

Samaan serves as a senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute. Prior to that, Samaan was a policy analyst at the Directorate for Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defense from 2008 to 2011, research advisor at the NATO Defense College from 2011 to 2016, and associate professor in strategic studies detached by the US Near East South Asia Center to the UAE National Defense College from 2016 to 2021.

Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

The Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative (SMESI) provides policymakers fresh insights into core US national security interests by leveraging its expertise, networks, and on-the-ground programs to develop unique and holistic assessments on the future of the most pressing strategic, political, and security challenges and opportunities in the Middle East.

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Roberts quoted in South China Morning Post

kimai — Sun, 02 Jul 2023 23:03:44 +0000

Original Source

On July 2, 2023 Nonresident Senior Fellow Dexter Tiff Roberts was quoted in a South China Morning Post article on a proposal by Chinese officials to update its Trademark Law in an attempt to improve intellectual property protection to better appeal to foreign investors amid its slowing economy.

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Rich Outzen joins WION TV to discuss Ukrainian counter-offensive

aozen — Sat, 01 Jul 2023 13:34:06 +0000

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Success is not just showing up. Blinken’s Caribbean trip needs to deliver.

Wazim Mowla — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:43:58 +0000

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to the Caribbean cannot be a wasted opportunity. The July 5-6 trip begins in Trinidad and Tobago—where heads of government and state will gather for the fiftieth anniversary of the Caribbean Community’s (CARICOM) formation—and ends in Guyana. On the surface, this is a win for US-Caribbean relations, as it comes off the back of several high-level US visits to the region.

In the past twelve months, Vice President Kamala Harris launched the US-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030, welcomed leaders to Washington, and met in person with leaders in The Bahamas. This has helped build goodwill in the region. But US visits and diplomatic engagement have yet to yield many results. Simply put, if Blinken arrives in the Caribbean with little to announce, frustration is likely to brew.

Blinken’s visit must start an action-oriented agenda for the region. He should focus on two key areas of cooperation. First, the United States should work with multilateral development banks (MDBs) to provide access to low-cost and low-interest financing to high- and middle-income Caribbean countries. Second, Washington should provide requisite tools to local private sector businesses so they can play a larger role in the region’s own development.

For the United States, the consequences of insufficient action so far are evident. Given the enormity of the challenges facing the Caribbean, the region’s leaders are seeking solutions to their problems elsewhere. Barbadian Prime Minister Mia Mottley has taken to the global stage to overhaul MDB financing, Guyana is welcoming investment in its oil sector from all corners of the world, and Trinidad and Tobago is increasing engagement with Venezuela over shared gas reserves. Other Caribbean leaders see African countries, India, and China as attractive partners that can provide financing, investment, and aid.

This does not mean that US presence in the region will evaporate. The Caribbean’s proximity to the United States, strong trade relations, and a large US-based diaspora ties the partners together. But US government officials must realize that the United States will no longer be the only actor with which Caribbean leaders will engage. Therefore, if the United States wants to remain relevant in the region, now is the moment to deliver real solutions to the challenges facing its Caribbean neighbors.

A plan to amplify financial instruments

The first step should be working with MDBs, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, to amplify new financial instruments to support access to concessional financing for Caribbean countries. Most Caribbean countries are classified as high- or middle-income, which means that they are not able to access low-cost and low-interest financing from MDBs to fund needed infrastructure or social programs in times of crisis. Part of this work is ongoing, with the World Bank recently announcing a debt pause on loan repayments for developing countries hit by natural disasters.

However, the pause only applies to new loans, not existing ones. Given the specific vulnerabilities of Caribbean countries, which extend beyond just the effects of climate change–induced events, the United States should work with MDBs to create a specific carve-out for small island development states such as the CARICOM countries. Hurricanes and other natural disasters pose significant risks to the Caribbean. But due to the small size and openness of their economies, so do other external events, such as pandemics, the volatility of commodity prices, and disruptions in supply chains. These external risks should be accounted for as well, because if another COVID-19 pandemic occurred today, Caribbean countries would still be on the hook for loan repayments.

Charging up the private sector

The United States should also work closer with local businesses to embolden the Caribbean private sector. Big infrastructure projects in the Caribbean, such as roads, bridges, and new buildings, are mostly led by governments. The private sector is often left out, as local banks provide only limited financing or loans with high interest rates. This creates a vast asymmetry between government and private sector resources, with governments scoring political points from new infrastructure projects, while the skills, expertise, and capital that bring these projects to fruition result in little benefit for local companies. Foreign companies, therefore, reap the benefits, with returns on projects benefitting external actors rather than populations in the Caribbean, including the business community. This creates a dependency on the state to provide jobs, resources, and skills to citizens, meaning that the distribution of these resources is tied to the government of the day.

To address this, the United States should create a US-Caribbean Public Private Partnership program that incubates small businesses in the region. The objective should be to train small businesses and transfer skills and technologies to local companies so that they can scale to a level where they are competitive in bidding rounds for upcoming projects. This is all the more important in the construction and energy sectors, as new climate-resilient infrastructure and energy systems are needed in the Caribbean now and going forward. The benefits would be twofold. First, a stronger and more robust private sector should strengthen and stabilize the region’s financial sector, making Caribbean countries less susceptible to volatility in global markets. Second, the larger the private sector, the more jobs will be available to citizens. This should stimulate domestic growth and create more diverse job opportunities outside of public service and the tourism industry—two sectors highly vulnerable to climate change and growing debt-to-gross-domestic-product ratios.

It is a consequential moment for the Caribbean—its challenges grow worse each day. To survive the next few decades, it needs the support of its partners, including the United States. High-level visits alone will not suffice. To capitalize on the goodwill the United States has built in the Caribbean, Blinken’s trip should mark the beginning of an active policy toward the region. Working with MDBs and supporting private sector growth would be a giant step forward.

Wazim Mowla is the associate director of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Success is not just showing up. Blinken’s Caribbean trip needs to deliver. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#AtlanticDebrief – What were the main takeaways from the EUCO summit? | A Debrief from Dave Keating

nlawler — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:13:48 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

What were the main outcomes from the recent European Council summit? Why are European Council summits important? How did EU leaders come together to address the latest European issues from Russia’s war in Ukraine, de-risking from China, and migration?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Ben Judah sits down with Dave Keating, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and France 24 Brussels correspondent, to discuss the developments from the summit and the main political debates.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – What were the main takeaways from the EUCO summit? | A Debrief from Dave Keating appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:00:00 +0000

Security

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

Media policy

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

International Response

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia’s loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Russian independent outlet Verstka reported on the construction of camps for Wagner forces near Asipovichi, Mogilev Oblast, located in Belarus approximately two hundred kilometers from the Ukraine border. According to Verstka’s local forestry source, the area will cover 2.4 hectares (5.9 acres) and accommodate eight thousand Wagner fighters. The source also claimed that there will be additional camps constructed. Family members of Wagner fighters also confirmed to Verstka that they were deploying to Belarus.

Radio Svaboda, the Belarusian-language edition of Radio Liberty, reviewed satellite imagery from Planet Labs that suggested signs of expansion at the Unit 61732 military camp adjacent to the village of Tsel, twenty kilometers northwest of Asipovichi. The outlet interviewed Ukrainian military analyst Oleg Zhdanov, who suggested it was “too early to tell” as to whether the military camp’s expansion is specifically for Wagner forces. “Very little time has passed to start building a camp specifically for the Wagnerites—it’s unreal,” Zhdanov told Radio Svaboda.

Location of possible construction at the Unit 61732 military camp in Tsel, Belarus. (Source: Planet Labs)

On June 27, in his first speech after the Wagner mutiny, Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the deal that ended the rebellion on June 24 in which Yevgeniy Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus. Putin praised those Wagner fighters who did not participate in the revolt and said they could sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense of other services. He added that other mercenaries who do not want to join could go either home or follow Prigozhin to Belarus.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Pro-Kremlin sources denied Russia targeted civilians when a missile struck a crowded pizza restaurant in Kramatorsk, killing at least twelve civilians and injuring more than fifty others. According to this narrative, RIA Pizza was actually a military base hosting US and Ukrainian soldiers. To support the claims, pictures taken after the strike were published on Telegram and Twitter.

To support the claim that soldiers of 101st Airborne Division were located at the pizza “military base,” pro-Kremlin sources circulated grisly footage of the attack aftermath recorded by freelance journalist Arnaud De Decker. The clip shows a man wearing a morale patch of a US flag with the words “Always Be Ready: 5.11 Tactical.” 5.11 Tactical is a military apparel company that sells branded merchandise, including morale patches, worn to offer support to various causes and slogans but not used official unit patches. Various types of 5.11 Tactical’s “Always Be Ready” patches are readily available for purchase online.

Top: A 5.11 Tactical morale patch for sale on its website. Bottom: Image taken during the aftermath of the Kramatorsk attack showing a man wearing the same morale patch on his helmet. (Source: 5.11 Tactical/archive, top; @arnaud.dedecker/archive, bottom)

Similarly, another post from Aleksandr Simonov’s Telegram channel that a man wearing an 101^st Airborne t-shirt was a member of the US Army division. These t-shirts are also readily available from online retailers.

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101^st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro/archive)

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro)

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

In addition to pro-Kremlin accusations that the Kramatorsk attack targeted a base housing US Army soldiers, Kremlin influencers also targeted citizens of Colombia, three of whom were injured in the attack, for being at the site of the incident. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said the attack targeted “three defenseless Colombian civilians” in violation of the protocols of war and called for the Colombian Foreign Ministry to submit a note of diplomatic protest to Russia. While the Kremlin acknowledged launching the attack, it insisted the assault struck military personnel rather than civilians.

The three Colombian citizens injured in the attack include acclaimed Colombian writer Hector Abad Faciolince; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, who previously led Colombia’s peace negotiations with FARC rebels; and Ukrainian-based journalist Catalina Gomez. According to the New York Times, Abad and Jaramillo were in Kramatorsk “collecting material” in support of their initiative, ¡Aguanta Ucrania! (“Hang On Ukraine!”), which seeks to garner support for Ukraine in Latin America.

Following the attack, Colombian influencers and officials criticized the attack through media outlets and social media accounts in Spanish. Danilo Rueda, Colombia’s current high commissioner for peace, issued a statement expressing support for the victims without mentioning Russia, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its “strongest condemnation of the unacceptable attack by Russian forces on a civilian target.”

Gomez, who was injured in the attack, broadcast a video for France 24 from the site of the explosion. Meanwhile, Abad and Jaramillo conducted interviews with Colombian media outlets such as El Tiempo in which they described the incident.

Actualidad RT, a Russian media outlets with enormous reach in the Spanish-speaking world, insisted that the victims of the attack were mercenaries and instructors of NATO and Ukraine rather than civilians. Actualidad RT quoted statements from Igor Konashenkov, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Defense, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, who said the attack struck “military targets” and that “Russia does not attack civilian infrastructure.” Actualidad RT promoted its claims via Twitter and Facebook multiple times on June 28.

Colombian radio station WRadio interviewed Kremlin foreign policy spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the morning of June 28. Zakharova stated that the restaurant was a Russian military target and called for an investigation into Victoria Amelina, a Ukrainian writer who was gravely injured while purportedly hosting the Colombians at the restaurant, claiming without evidence that Amelina had prior knowledge that the restaurant was a military target. Zakharova reiterated this statement after a WRadio journalist asked her to confirm the accusation. In contrast, Abad stated that it was Gomez who suggested they visit the restaurant, and that she apologized for doing so after the attack.

The Russian embassy in Colombia amplified Zakharova’s narrative later that same afternoon and evening. On Twitter, the embassy insisted that the city was “an operational and logistical-military hub, not a suitable place to enjoy Ukrainian cuisine dishes.” It also seemed to celebrate that the “reckless trip [of the Colombians] did not turn into an irreparable tragedy.”

—Daniel Suárez Pére z, research associate, Bogota, Colombia

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

Over the course of the thirty-six-hour Wagner mutiny, the Kremlin attempted to limit information about Yevgeniy Prigozin on Russian social media and search engines, eventually blocking websites affiliated with Prigozhin. On June 24, the Telegram channel of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet RT reported that several Prigozhin-controlled media outlets including RIA FAN, People’s News, and Patriot Media Group were no longer accessible in parts of Russia. RT added that the reason for their disappearance was unknown. Similar reports appeared in Mediazona and several Telegram channels.

The DFRLab used the Internet censorship measurement platform OONI to verify the claim and check the accessibility of RIA FAN within Russia. OONI detected signs that riafan.ru was blocked in the country.

Internet censorship measurement platform OONI detected the apparent blocking of Prigozhin-owned media outlet RIA FAN. (Source: OONI)

On June 29, independent Russian outlet The Bell claimed the Kremlin was searching for a new owner for Patriot Media Group, which includes media assets associated with Prigozhin. The following day, multiple Russian outlets reported that Prigozhin had dissolved Patriot Media Group.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

For years, Wagner has acted as Russia’s primary form of influence in Africa—spreading disinformation and propaganda, securing military contracts, and exporting natural resources to support Putin’s war effort. Following Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny, the future of Wagner’s operations on the continent has come into question. While it is highly unlikely the Kremlin would willingly abandon its influence in Africa, if Wagner is retired or its troops absorbed into the Ministry of Defense, it is uncertain who would maintain the group’s operations on the continent.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that Russia’s work in Africa will continue. In a TV interview with Russia Today, Lavrov said, “In addition to relations with this PMC the governments of CAR and Mali have official contacts with our leadership. At their request, several hundred soldiers are working in CAR as instructors.”

A top advisor to Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra appeared unconcerned about the weekend’s events. Speaking of Wagner’s military instructors, Fidèle Gouandjika said, “If Moscow decides to withdraw them and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have them.” In a statement released to its Telegram channel, the Officer’s Union for International Security—a US-sanctioned Wagner front company operating in CAR—claimed CAR’s defense minister had apologized for Gouandjika’s remarks. It quoted Defense Minister Claude Rameaux Bireau as saying, “The people of the CAR are grateful to the Russian instructors of Wagner, ask any Central African on the streets of Bangui or in the village of the CAR—he will confirm my words.”

In Mali, where Wagner forces have taken over responsibility for pushing back jihadists after the departure of French forces, the online outlet Mali Actu reported that the situation could dramatically impact Mali. “This situation raises major concerns about the security, stability and sovereignty of Mali, as well as the impact on the local population and counter-terrorism efforts,” it wrote.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

While Wagner’s future in Africa remains uncertain, it is important to consider that the Wagner Group not just a paramilitary force. It is also a conglomerate of companies active in different sectors, from mining and logistics to political warfare and moviemaking, able to travel the spectrum between private entrepreneurism to state proxy. This flexibility has previously allowed Moscow to deploy Wagner to act as a force multiplier in Africa while simultaneously denying Russia’s direct presence on the continent. In Africa, Russia has used Wagner multiple times as part of a strategy to help authoritarian leaders stay in power and gain a pro-Russian military presence on the ground, all while maintaining plausible deniability. Until now, the positive outcomes of this strategy have far exceeded the costs for the Kremlin, as Russia has built a strong network of African influence with relatively little effort, securing concessions in strategic extractive industries, and expanding military-to-military relations on the continent.

However, this principle of plausible deniability, which made Wagner so successful and so useful for Moscow as an extension of its foreign policy and influence, is now damaged. As previously noted, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Putin, publicly confirmed direct links between Wagner and the Russian state apparatus.

Africa is intimately linked to Wagner: In the wake of Wagner’s involvement in Syria, Africa became the scene of the group’s expansion. Engaging in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mali, Wagner employed an opportunistic strategy of supplying security while taking concessions to mine natural resources. While its forces were in most cases invited to stabilize fragile states, its actions actively invited further instability, creating more opportunities and a greater demand signal for its services, ultimately granting renewing opportunities to Moscow to reinforce its footprint in the continent.

While denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa might have become more difficult for the Kremlin, Russia is unlikely to waste the network of influence built by the group in recent years. Instead, Moscow will likely continue to deploy hybrid tools such as Wagner, although organized in different shapes and forms, so Russia can continue displacing Western influence, exploiting natural resources, and evading sanctions through dozens of front companies.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

On June 20, the Organized Crime and Corruption reporting project (OCCRP) published a series of investigations titled “The Rotenberg Files” that shed light on the business dealings and alleged sanctions evasion attempts of Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, close friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The report is based on fifty thousand leaked emails and documents, examined by journalists from seventeen outlets. The OCCRP said the leak came from a source who worked for the brothers at a Russian management firm. The OCCRP investigation was conducted in partnership with the Times of London, Le Monde, and Forbes, among others.

Boris and Arkady Rotenberg are childhood friends of Putin. The billionaire brothers faced Western sanctions amid Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, but their lavish lifestyles do not appear to have been impacted.

According to the OCCRP, the leaked documents demonstrate how the Rotenberg brothers allegedly used Western lawyers, bankers, corporate service providers, and proxies to evade sanctions.

One of the report’s findings also alleges the brothers maintain business links to Prince Michael of Kent, a cousin of the late Queen Elizabeth II who was previously accused by the Sunday Times and Channel 4 of profiting off close access to the Kremlin. According to the latest investigation, “Prince Michael distanced himself from earlier ties to the Putin regime in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But leaked emails and corporate records show he co-owns a company with two Russian businessmen who helped billionaire oligarch and Putin ally Boris Rotenberg dodge Western sanctions.”

Another investigation from the Rotenberg files reported that Putin’s eldest daughter regularly visited a holiday property financed by Arkady Rotenberg in an exclusive Austrian skiing destination. Documents reviewed by the OCCRP suggest that the house was purchased by a Cypriot company in 2013 with a loan from a bank then owned by Arkady, using funds invested by another company he owned. Other records suggested that the former romantic partner of Putin’s daughter is connected to the company that owns the Austrian property. Residents claim to have seen Putin himself at the Kitzbühel residence, though this has not been confirmed.

The Rotenberg brothers and Prince Michael declined to comment to the OCCRP investigative consortium.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The next European Union member is…

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 14:22:51 +0000

July 1 marks ten years since Croatia joined the European Union (EU)—and no country has done so since. It’s the longest duration without a new member for the EU and its predecessor institutions going back to 1973. Below, the Europe Center’s Frances Burwell explains the current complex political debate within the EU over enlargement, then eleven experts share their insights on potential new members—official candidates as well as a couple wild cards.

Hard lessons about EU enlargement

During the ten years since the last enlargement of the EU, some hard lessons have emerged for the existing twenty-seven member states. Contrary to expectations, these lessons have little to do with the reform of EU institutions and processes. Instead, they are rooted in political vulnerabilities in both “old” Europe and “new” Europe. Above all, the existing member states fear the emergence of new members—and especially a large new member, such as Ukraine—with serious rule-of-law failings, à la Poland or Hungary.

When the EU decided to grant Ukraine and Moldova candidacy status in June 2022, it was a political decision motivated by the desire to show unity in the face of Russian aggression. Neither country would have qualified for candidacy status under normal circumstances, nor would the existing member states have been willing to make such an exception. But both countries have worked hard, and the question now is when to open negotiations on specific regulations. Prospective members from the Balkans present a more mixed picture, with some governments making progress and others even seeming unconvinced of the value of membership. As the EU enlargement debate begins to heat up, keep in mind four key lessons:

The institutions can adapt. Every enlargement round has been accompanied by calls for institutional reform and treaty change. No way, it was said, can the EU operate at fifteen, at twenty-five, or twenty-seven. Yet, the EU institutions continue to function. Indeed, during the COVID-19 pandemic and in response to the invasion of Ukraine, the EU has made more difficult decisions more quickly than at any time in its history.
The accession process offers too many opportunities for existing members to settle historical scores with potential members, slowing the process. Too often, this is due to niche historical grievances exploited by member state politicians; see Bulgaria’s efforts to slow down the accession of North Macedonia or Spain’s failure to countenance Kosovo’s bid.
Rigorous benchmarking of regulations does not prevent democratic backsliding. The twelve mostly postcommunist states admitted in 2004 and 2007 had to meet much higher standards of regulatory cohesion than earlier entrants. Yet today, members of the class of 2004 Poland and Hungary face charges that they have strayed from basic EU values on the rule of law, especially regarding the judiciary and media. Other member states have also had questions raised about the state of their democracies.
The biggest lesson of them all is that politics is the key element in the accession process. What will be the reaction of the radical left and extreme right that has become such a factor in EU domestic politics? Will ratification of each accession by existing members be too high of a hurdle? Ukraine and Moldova have benefited from politics so far, but as the accession process moves forward and membership seems closer, the politics—especially among the current member states—will only get harder.

—Frances Burwell is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Click to learn more about leading candidates and wild cards

Lisa Homel

Albania

Valbona Zeneli

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Laura Linderman

Georgia

Agon Maliqi

Kosovo

Andrew D’Anieri

Moldova

Maja Piscevic

Montenegro

Ilva Tare

North Macedonia

Cameron Munter

Serbia

Alp Ozen

Turkey

Benton Coblentz

Ukraine

Ben Judah

United Kingdom

Albania: Strong momentum to overcome rule-of-law concerns

Albania was granted EU candidate status in June 2014. The EU grouped Albania’s accession bid with North Macedonia’s (which was stalled due to a dispute with Greece over naming issues), and it wasn’t until July 2022 that Albania had its first intergovernmental conference with the EU to actually launch negotiations officially.

Albania’s greatest progress toward accession thus far has been its substantial judicial reform, which is unprecedented in its ambition in the Western Balkans. The reform, which implemented serious vetting of the judiciary, led to the dismissal of more than 60 percent of judges and prosecutors across the country who were found to have criminal ties, concealed wealth, or otherwise unprofessional behavior.

Despite this initiative, Albania still has a long way to go on rule-of-law reform to meet EU standards. With so many judges and prosecutors dismissed, there is a serious shortage of officials available to deal with continued criminal cases. And while the reform is strong on paper, international assessments find Albania to still suffer from significant corruption (even compared to other Western Balkans countries) and needs to strengthen its record on indictments in high-level corruption cases, prioritize anti-money laundering initiatives, and increase transparency in consolidating property rights.

But Albania has the drive to continue with these reforms: EU membership remains incredibly popular and is supported by nearly 96 percent of Albanians according to a 2022 Euronews Albania poll. The same poll showed that more than 35 percent of Albanians think the country will join the EU by 2027. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has consistently expressed his willingness to keep the country on track to meet EU reforms and he has been transparent in his appeal for pre-accession EU funds to enable the country to meet EU benchmarks. Within the region, he’s an ardent supporter of regional cooperation opportunities such as the Berlin Process and Open Balkan Initiative that would allow for the movement of people and trade throughout the region as a good exercise to prepare for future EU membership.

Although Albania had a late start in the EU accession process, its substantial judicial reforms, clear messaging from its leader on the value of EU membership, and overwhelming popular support for the effort have given it unique momentum within the region to continue on its path toward joining the bloc.

—Lisa Homel is an assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bumpy accession progress leaves an opening for Russia and China

Twenty years ago, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was promised EU membership at the Thessaloniki Summit. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU entered into force in June 2015, and BiH applied for membership in February 2016. Candidate status was granted six years later, in December 2022, as result of a new geopolitical situation in Europe, propping up the EU’s renewed engagement with the Western Balkans as vital for European security.

The long and bumpy EU integration process, lack of sustainable reforms in the country, dysfunction in the government, ethnic divisions, weak economic development, and systemic corruption of ethno-political elites controlling institutions have increased apathy and skepticism in BiH. EU membership is supported by half of the population, but when it comes to expectations of citizens, 35 percent believe that the country will never join the EU. The risk of competing visions for the future of the country is increasing, and the EU’s strategic competitors, Russia and China, are gaining more space. Young people have opted for the easier way to join the EU, through massive emigration into Western Europe. Migration and brain drain have become new security challenges, as BiH is among the countries that have lost the largest share of their population since the early 1990s (33 percent).

The new government in BiH has prioritized EU integration, and the main focus should be on implementing the fourteen priorities of the European Commission, dealing mostly with the functionality of the government focusing on the rule of law and judiciary reform and by creating a clear division of competencies between different levels of government. To be successful, the EU’s higher focus on fundamentals and stricter conditionality and accountability should be paired with earlier access to structural funds to promote socioeconomic convergence and a gradual phasing-in of candidate countries in various sectors of the EU market.

—Valbona Zeneli is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Georgia: Backsliding and Russian influence put the EU in a bind

In June 2022, the European Commission decided not to grant Georgia candidate status, unlike Moldova and Ukraine. Instead, the Commission granted it a “European perspective” and provided twelve recommendations for issues that the country must tackle first. Despite widespread agreement in the West that the government has been backsliding in key indicators such as independence of the judiciary and state institutions, the Commission’s June 2022 decision was questionable because Georgia has completed far more of the legislative and technical requirements for candidate status than Ukraine or Moldova and has a vibrant, if tenuous, democratic system. In a March 2023 International Republican Institute poll, 89 percent of the Georgian population said it supports the country joining the EU. Widespread public protests erupted that month when the government attempted to introduce a foreign agent law, modeled on a similar Russian law, that was undemocratic and in direct conflict with the Commission’s recommendations. The government withdrew the bill in response.

The EU now finds itself in a bind, as the Georgian government has not implemented many reforms addressing the most serious problems and its commitment to this Western course is somewhere between fickle and self-sabotaging. The EU is in a position where if it grants candidate status now, it risks rewarding a government that is backsliding in terms of democratic reform. Conversely, if it refuses to give candidate status, it risks consigning Georgia to a bureaucratic gray zone where it could find itself increasingly unable or unwilling to counter Russian influence. However, so far, the country remains an imperfect but spirited and pluralistic democracy with a population deeply committed to a European future.

—Laura Linderman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Kosovo: Progress is stalled as the Serbia standoff continues

Kosovo signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2015 and submitted its application for candidate status in 2022. Although 85 percent of Kosovars want to join the EU, Kosovo faces the unique obstacle of not being able to advance further in EU accession because five EU member states do not recognize its independence (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain). A key precondition set by the EU for Kosovo to move forward has been the conclusion of the normalization agreement with Serbia, which has effectively stalled since 2015. A recent European proposal on normalization agreed to in principle by both sides is also on the brink of failure due to tensions in Kosovo’s Serbian-majority north.

The deterioration in the security situation and Kosovo’s stagnant EU accession process undermines the country’s recent progress in democratic reforms and in tackling corruption. The lack of clear EU prospects for Kosovo and the Western Balkans in general—especially many years of delays in approving visa liberalization for Kosovo (it comes into force in January 2024)—have fueled frustrations with the EU and brought anti-EU narratives to the mainstream of public discourse.

—Agon Maliqi is an independent analyst and researcher from Kosovo working on security and democracy issues in the Western Balkans.

Moldova: Corruption and Transnistria remain challenges

In June 2022, the European Council announced it would grant Moldova and Ukraine candidacy status—almost eight years to the day since Chisinau earned an association agreement with the EU in 2014. Candidacy was a major symbolic boon for Moldova, which had endured a maddeningly stop-start progression toward EU reforms and candidacy. But pro-European president Maia Sandu has her country on the right track: She is tough enough to enact real reforms and as a former International Monetary Fund official, has the right combination of technocratic and diplomatic skills to lead Moldova toward Europe.

Yet Moldova faces major roadblocks to pass through before its eventual accession. The EU’s June 2022 announcement carried with it nine political conditions before accession talks, compared to seven for Ukraine. With a population of less than three million people, Moldova lacks the capacity of Ukraine but faces similar challenges of outside influence. Chisinau continues to battle corrupt politicians and oligarchs who consistently threaten to blow Sandu’s reform drive off course. Moldova will also likely need to solve the fate of Transnistria, the Russia-dominated statelet that broke away in 1992. EU countries will rightly want to strengthen border controls with a Russian client statelet.

Greater EU diplomatic engagement with Chisinau and technical support for market and judicial reforms can help shore up Moldova’s capacity to make meaningful progress on EU conditions. Additional Western sanctions on Shor, Plahotniuc, and their proxies can mitigate their malign influence in Moldovan politics and help consolidate the country’s democracy.

—Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Montenegro: A stable political coalition is necessary for progress

Montenegro started negotiations for EU membership eleven years ago. So far, Podgorica has opened all the chapters but has only closed three. The negotiations came to a halt in 2018 when Brussels made it clear that progress in the EU accession process would be directly conditioned by advancements in the rule of law and democratic institutions. Since the former regime of President Milo Đukanović turned Montenegro into a so-called captured state, with a corrupt judiciary and police and where organized crime thrived, the EU accession process has de facto been slowed down, if not halted.

The process of forming a new government is underway in Podgorica. The winning party in the recent elections is the Europe Now Movement (PES). The main challenge for PES leader Milojko Spajić, the likely prime minister in the future government, will be to form a stable coalition capable of executing necessary reforms which would unlock Montenegro’s path to the EU.

The biggest problems in Montenegrin society are organized crime and corruption. They cannot be resolved without appointing new prosecutors and judges and adopting and implementing reforms in the judiciary and police. While Russia’s influence in Montenegro exists, it is limited. The pro-Russian sentiment among certain segments of Montenegrin society, which dates back to the eighteenth century, is often mistakenly interpreted as a result of Russian influence rather than historical heritage.

Public support for Montenegro’s accession to the EU consistently ranges between 70 and 80 percent, indicating that this is one of the few issues in the country with a fairly broad consensus. Therefore, the implementation of the so-called EU agenda is a crucial tool in forming a new government and creating a stronger parliamentary majority.

—Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the Center in the Western Balkans.

North Macedonia: Amid delays, public support for EU membership is plunging

North Macedonia’s perspective on EU membership has drastically shifted in the past two decades, replacing initial enthusiasm with caution and diminished optimism. Despite obtaining candidate status in 2005, the country has endured eighteen years of uncertainty, waiting for the European Commission recommendations to translate into official negotiations from the European Council. The Prespa Agreement, considered a significant compromise five years ago, failed to deliver on its promise of faster progress toward EU membership, further dampening hopes.

In November 2020, Bulgaria’s blockade on North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations, demanding constitutional changes for the Bulgarian minority, worsened the situation. The opposition’s refusal to join votes for the necessary constitutional changes, requiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority, has led to an impending political crisis. Trust has eroded, significantly undermining the EU’s credibility compared to sentiments held two decades ago.

To tackle this challenge, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed an effective strategy: immediate and generous allocation of pre-accession funds to facilitate North Macedonia’s transformation and benefit other Western Balkan countries. However, the specific amount of funds remains unspecified, leaving room for uncertainty.

The forthcoming Balkan Barometer report from the Regional Cooperation Council reveals a diminishing perception of EU membership in North Macedonia, once a fierce supporter. In 2019, 70 percent of citizens viewed EU membership as a positive development, but the 2023 Balkan Barometer shows that only 50 percent of respondents consider it a positive prospect, with 34 percent neutral and 13 percent negative.

These survey findings serve as a wake-up call for North Macedonian leaders, EU officials, and US policymakers. Urgent measures are necessary to address citizens’ concerns and doubts. Open dialogue, trust-building, and effective communication about the advantages and opportunities of EU membership are crucial. Specific challenges must be tackled, aligning the EU integration process with citizens’ expectations. Mere promises and kind words will not suffice to reverse the current gloomy narrative. Boosting the local economy through investments and improving standards of living would be a highly welcomed step, revitalizing the path to EU membership and restoring faith in the process, ultimately bringing back hope to the citizens for the once-promised European future.

At this critical juncture, Bulgaria must refrain from employing vetoes or placing undue pressure on North Macedonia and should foster a constructive and cooperative relationship free from unnecessary obstacles. Additionally, the EU member states should collectively exert pressure on Sofia, urging responsible actions based on European values towards its neighbor.

—Ilva Tare is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and was most recently a broadcaster with EuroNews Group.

Serbia: ‘Sitting on two stools’ means no movement toward EU

For most Serbs, EU membership increasingly seems like a mirage, and certainly the prospect does not have the power and gravitational pull that it had in the years immediately following the wars of Yugoslav succession. Serbia officially applied for membership in December 2009, and all governments since that time have professed pro-EU sentiments. But over the last decade, Serbia has not made progress on reforms necessary for accession and has continued its reputation as trying to “sit on two stools” (claiming commitment to a Western course while remaining closely tied to Russia). Moreover, the current leadership has been deft at looking to other sources of support and investment (China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Gulf states) for visible development projects even as the EU provides the overwhelming amount of its foreign assistance. And in certain areas, such as press freedom, Serbia has a way to go to achieve EU standards.

So even as 65 percent of Serbs support EU reforms, only 43 percent are actually in favor of joining the EU. The fate of Russia’s attack on Ukraine may have an impact on the leadership and public opinion in Serbia, but for now, there is great “EU fatigue” and a lack of confidence that membership in the union is anywhere near. Finally, relations with Kosovo will be key to Serbia’s prospects in the EU, and recent events have not been encouraging there, despite the best efforts of the transatlantic community.

—Cameron Munter is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Europe Center and a former US ambassador to Serbia.

Turkey: Rule of law and Cyprus hamper a long-stalled process

Turkey’s EU accession history goes back a long way, starting in 1959 when it applied for associate membership to what was then known as the European Economic Community (EEC). Turkey officially applied for full membership in the EEC in 1987, and Turkey became eligible to join the EU in 1999. The same year, during the Helsinki European Council, the EU recognized Turkey as a candidate and official negotiations for accession began in 2005. However, progress has been slow and to date, only sixteen of thirty-five accession chapters have been opened, and only one has been completed. A total of fourteen chapters are blocked due to the decisions of the European Council and Cyprus. Meanwhile, the war in Syria led to a refugee crisis for the EU—with Turkey on the front line. In the 2015 and 2016 EU summits, burden-sharing in migration management was a major topic between Turkey and the EU. As a result, currently Turkey hosts almost four million Syrian refugees under temporary protection status.

The most important step for overcoming this period and helping to normalize relations was the Turkey-EU summit in March 2018, in Varna, Bulgaria, which was beneficial to reestablishing confidence in Turkey-EU relations. But just three months later, the General Affairs Council stated that “Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union. Turkey’s accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is foreseen.”

The 2022 enlargement report released by the European Commission offered an assessment of where things stand now: “The Turkish government has not reversed the negative trend in relation to reform, despite its repeated commitment to EU accession,” the report reads. “The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights, and the independence of the judiciary have not been addressed.”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who just won another term to rule for the next five years, is pushing for membership less than he did in his prior twenty years leading the country. However, Erdoğan recently called for increased communications for Turkey’s EU membership. According to a 2022 poll by the German Marshall Fund, 59 percent of Turks support EU membership. The big issues Turkey needs to overcome before being admitted are the rule of law and a resolution to the Cyprus dispute with the EU. Despite these issues, Turkey has stepped up recently to de-escalate tensions with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially after Turkey’s devastating earthquake early this year, which led to a warm earthquake diplomacy between the two countries.

—Alp Ozen is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program.

Ukraine: As reforms advance, accession talks could begin this fall

The dramatic events of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity made clear to the world the Ukrainian people’s desire to pursue the path of European integration. Now, the Ukrainian people are fighting an existential war to protect that vision against a full-scale Russian invasion.

In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine was officially granted EU candidacy status in June 2022. Brussels set out seven conditions before accession talks could begin. In June 2023, the EU reported that Ukraine had satisfied two of these conditions, made good progress in one other area, and made some progress in the remaining four. The two conditions already met relate to the judiciary and media, while Ukraine must still pass laws regarding the Constitutional Court, anti-corruption efforts, anti-money laundering efforts, de-oligarchization, and the protection of minority rights in order to align its legislation with EU standards.

Ukraine could begin accession talks as soon as this fall, once all seven conditions are fulfilled. That process will be a long and technical one, but Ukrainian officials and the Ukrainian people have demonstrated their strong commitment to the process. The February 2023 visit to Kyiv by von der Leyen and fifteen EU commissioners to meet with their Ukrainian counterparts underscored the leaders’ commitment, while the people’s commitment was resounding in a recent poll finding that 92 percent of Ukrainians want the country to join the EU by 2030, with all regions of the country squarely in support: 88 percent, 94 percent, 93 percent, and 91 percent in the east, north, west, and south, respectively.

—Benton Coblentz is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, where he facilitates the center’s work on Ukraine and the wider Eurasia region.

United Kingdom: A post-Brexit reexamination of the relationship is underway

Few slogans have been as effective in British politics as “Get Brexit Done,” which helped carry Boris Johnson to victory in the 2019 general election after three years of uncertainty about whether or not the United Kingdom would actually leave the European Union. However, the mood in Britain suggests that Brexit—if understood to mean a stable, fixed, relationship with the bloc outside the EU—is anything but done.

Two trends are pushing toward a reexamination of the relationship. Firstly, a growing number of Britons regret the decision to leave by a margin as wide as 60 percent to 40 percent. In addition, as many as 20 percent of those who voted to “leave” now signal to pollsters that they would have chosen to “remain” instead. Secondly, the opposition Labour Party, a “remain” spirited party, is now seeing poll leads as high as 25 percent. The chances are that Britain will be led by a Labour government by the end of 2024, with strong public support for a closer relationship with the EU.

That doesn’t mean Britain is on the verge of rejoining the EU. Opposition leader, and probably soon-to-be prime minister, Keir Starmer has committed the party not to rejoin the EU’s single market or customs union, which are the arrangements as far as trade is concerned, but to push for better ties beneath that. The EU and its supporters in the United States need to start paying attention to what Labour is saying. David Lammy, the shadow foreign secretary, has proposed a “security pact” between the EU and the United Kingdom as a first step to rebuilding the relationship.

This should be encouraged but more needs to be done. With the European economy in general in such a bad way, Washington should encourage Britain and the EU to go for the most ambitious form of new relationship politically possible within Starmer’s constraints—with economics and trade at the heart of it. Throttled trade benefits nobody, and the failure of Brexit in practice means the EU can afford to be generous. No other EU country is keen to copy what made the United Kingdom “the sick man of Europe.”

—Ben Judah is director of the Europe Center’s Transform Europe Initiative and the author of “This is Europe.”

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“What just happened?” The Wagner mutiny

Alia Brahimi — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 14:03:04 +0000

In Season 1, Episode 4 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi speaks with renowned Russia expert Mark Galeotti about the striking developments which saw mutinous mercenary forces from the Wagner Group take over two Russian cities and march towards Moscow. Professor Galeotti argues that the rebellion is both a symptom and an accelerator of the decay of the Putin state and of systemic capacity to deal with crisis. He points out that the plot was not picked up in a timely manner precisely because the Wagner Group is a mercenary force operating outside of the purview of counterintelligence and the units that ordinarily monitor the loyalty of the military. He describes how the Wagner’s group shadow status was doubly corrosive: on the one hand it was a mercenary group engaging in organised armed violence for profit, and on the other hand it was enough of a state institution that it could tap into the resources of the state and play both sides.

“It’s likely that this is the start of the real endgame… most crucially of all it was the spectacle of the security forces in the main not joining Wagner, but nor did they act to stop Wagner. They sat back and just thought, let’s see how this all plays out.”

Mark Galeotti, Professor and Russia expert

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Yevgeniya Gaber quoted by Roll Call for an article on Prigozhin mutiny

aozen — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 13:34:01 +0000

The post Yevgeniya Gaber quoted by Roll Call for an article on Prigozhin mutiny appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

Taras Kuzio — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 20:57:02 +0000

The recent Wagner mutiny in Russia was a short-lived affair but it has succeeded in exposing the myth of Vladimir Putin as a formidable political strongman who will go to extremes to achieve his goals. In reality, Putin’s failure to punish mutinous troops who seized a major Russian city and marched on Moscow has revealed him as a weak leader who is more inclined to capitulate than escalate.

This makes a mockery of longstanding international concerns over “provoking Putin” that have done so much to slow down the flow of Western military aid to Ukraine over the past sixteen months. The Russian dictator’s feeble response to the Wagner rebellion should now serve as a strong signal to increase Western support for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive.

Putin’s handling of the Wagner mutiny compares unfavorably to the conduct of his predecessor in the Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin, and that of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Yeltsin famously led opposition to the failed coup in August 1991 that sealed the fate of the USSR. When the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Zelenskyy rejected offers to evacuate and instead announced that he was staying in Kyiv. In contrast, Putin was notably absent during the first day of the Wagner mutiny when Russia appeared to be in real danger. Subsequent attempts to minimize the damage via a series of carefully choreographed public appearances have merely served to highlight Putin’s earlier absence.

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In hindsight, none of this is surprising. Throughout his career, Putin has made a habit of backing down whenever he has found himself confronted by a determined adversary. In 2014, Putin occupied Crimea without a fight but then got cold feet when faced with fierce resistance in eastern Ukraine. Instead of pressing home his overwhelming military advantage and seizing the whole of eastern and southern Ukraine, he settled for less than half of the Donbas region. Likewise, Putin ordered no direct military response when Turkey shot down a Russian jet in 2015, and took no action three years later when clashes with US forces in Syria led to the heavy casualties among Russian Wagner troops.

Like a true bully, Putin only embarked on the full-scale invasion of Ukraine because he believed the country was an easy target. His intelligence agencies claimed the Ukrainian military would not fight back and assured him that most ordinary Ukrainians would welcome his invading army as liberators. Crucially, Putin was also confident the Western response would be as half-hearted as it had been in 2014 when he invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine. These miscalculations have proven extremely costly for Russia.

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Ukraine’s resolute resistance and the West’s powerful military support have placed Putin in a quandary. He has responded with empty bluster, declaring a series of meaningless red lines while refraining from any attacks on the NATO countries engaged in arming Ukraine. Throughout the war, Putin has used nuclear blackmail in a bid to intimidate Western leaders, but even this extreme measure is proving increasingly ineffective. In September 2022, he vowed to use nuclear weapons to defend recently annexed Ukrainian lands, declaring, “I’m not bluffing.” However, when Ukrainian forces called his bluff and continued to advance, he did not act on his earlier nuclear threats.

This lack of decisive leadership has contributed to the poor battlefield performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. Demoralized Russian troops have barely advanced since summer 2022, and spent more than ten months capturing the small city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine. Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin was at pains to state that his recent mutiny was against Russia’s army chiefs rather than Putin himself, but the Russian dictator must ultimately accept personal responsibility for the disastrous invasion. After all, he has stood by his failing commanders despite their obvious shortcomings, and has consistently placed loyalty above competence.

Putin’s emphasis on loyalty reflects his fear of domestic opposition. For much of his reign, he has been preoccupied with the idea of losing power through a popular uprising or palace coup. This has led to the elimination of all political opponents and the silencing of independent media in today’s Russia. It has also shaped the conduct of the current war, with Putin deeply reluctant to undertake a new round of mobilization that could further destabilize the situation inside Russia.

The Wagner mutiny demonstrated that these fears of a domestic uprising are entirely justified. Wagner troops were able to capture Rostov-on-Don without a fight and then advance virtually unopposed across Russia to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. Strikingly, thousands of ordinary Russians in Rostov-on-Don welcomed the Wagner takeover of the city and openly demonstrated their backing for the mutiny.

Meanwhile, there was little evidence of any surge in support for Putin, either among the public or within the ranks of the Russian military and security services. Putin’s obvious reluctance to hold Prigozhin or his troops accountable for their actions has now further undermined morale within the armed forces and raised the prospect of infighting engulfing Russia.

Putin’s toothless response to Prigozhin’s mutiny has sent a signal that he is far from the all-powerful ruler of Kremlin propaganda, and is in fact much weaker than previously imagined. Many within the Russian elite now recognize this reality and are growing increasingly alarmed over the fragility of the current regime. They understand that Putin has lost his legitimacy as a strongman ruler and is leading Russia toward an uncertain future of deepening domestic divisions and international isolation. Understandably, thoughts are now turning to the post-Putin era.

Western leaders should respond to the Wagner affair by doubling down on their military aid to Ukraine. Ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, misplaced concerns over possible Russian escalation have served to limit weapons deliveries to Kyiv, when a more decisive approach might have already ended the war. With Putin’s weakness now on display for all to see, the time has come to provide Ukraine with everything it needs to secure victory.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

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Could the IRGC pull a Wagner Group move in Iran? That’s what some Iranians are hoping for.

Holly Dagres — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 18:06:23 +0000

“Military forces staged a coup against the regime… It was Russia,” said a meme depicting a smiling, then disappointed former Iranian Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. When Wagner Group mercenaries, led by Yevgeniy Prigozhin, advanced toward Moscow—reaching within 125 miles of the capital within twenty-four hours—to take down Russia’s military command on June 23-24, it was not just Ukrainians watching with schadenfreude and hope. Many Iranians—both inside Iran and in the diaspora—wondered what it meant for the Islamic Republic’s future if Russian President Vladimir Putin, one of the clerical establishment’s top allies, was taken down.

Meme of former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi.

Upon news of the Prigozhin-led rebellion, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Telegram channels quickly covered the breaking story. One viral screenshot of the IRGC’s main channel reposted a tweet by a pro-regime journalist emphasizing, “If necessary, just as we prevented the fall of [Bashar al-]Assad, we will prevent the fall of #Putin.”

The upper echelons of the Islamic Republic were quick to respond to the events. “The Islamic Republic of Iran supports the rule of law in the Russian Federation,” noted the Foreign Ministry spokesman on June 24 without any mention of Putin, adding that the mutiny was a “domestic affair.” Russian media reported that Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi spoke with Putin on the same day, but didn’t provide any details on what was discussed. Meanwhile, the Iranian foreign minister spoke with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov regarding “developments related to the situation in some regions of Russia”—a reference to the events in Bakhmut, where the rebellion came to a head. Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said that Moscow would “pass this phase” and warned against “foreign interference.”

State media outlets gave a better sense of how the higher-ups interpreted the revolt. Nour News, closely tied to the Supreme National Security Council, tweeted that, although the Wagner Group could have “destructive psychological effects due to its involvement in the Ukraine war,” the group “lacks the necessary strength to challenge the Russian army.”

خلاصه جنگ روسیه و واگنرا در 19ثانیه#حسن_ختام #روسیه #کودتا #واگنر #واگنرها pic.twitter.com/zxBIwqETOp
— trader mohamad (@Shobeirinasab) June 25, 2023

Meme’d scene from Braveheart

After the Wagner Group rebellion seemingly ended, on June 25, state media outlets covered the events with front-page headlines that mostly took jabs at the mercenary leader and his forces. Hardline daily Kayhan played into common conspiracy theories blaming the West and NATO. A headline for the hardline newspaper Javan read, “Treacherous dagger did not cut it,” referring to Prigozhin stabbing Putin in the back. Even pro-regime social media users made light of the events, with one posting a meme’d scene from Braveheart, with Ukraine and the United States watching gleefully as Wagner and Russian fighters are about to clash, only to see them kiss and make up.

Reformist papers took a slightly nuanced approach. Pro-reform Hammihan newspaper published an op-ed about how the rebellion may be an “alarm bell” for Tehran not to rely solely on the East—a reference to China and Russia. Similarly, a dissenting voice came from the former head of the parliament’s National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh. He argued that “it was naturally clear that Putin cannot have a stable future” and that Russia was heading “back to the [Boris] Yeltsin period.”

None of these reactions are much of a surprise. A pro-Russia angle was expected from the Islamic Republic, given that it is one of Moscow’s main military backers.

Since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Iran has been providing hundreds of attack drones to Russia and is currently delivering materials to build an Iranian unmanned-aerial-vehicle manufacturing plant east of Moscow. The two countries are also heavily relying on one another as part of a sanctions evasion axis, having reportedly conducted $4.9 billion in trade during 2022 (up 20 percent compared to 2021).

There’s a soft power element as well, with Russian tourists making Iran a top three tourist destination (after Turkey and India). Additionally, a historical drama series named Khatoon (“Once Upon a Time in Iran”), which portrays the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran during World War II, became a point of controversy in Iran for not depicting Moscow favorably.

اجاره‌ی این گروه‌ وانگر‌‌ واسه یک هفته چقدر میشه ؟ #کودتا pic.twitter.com/28o7xkaLm2
— Daenerys 𓃬︎︎ (@Queennkhaleesi) June 25, 2023

“How much does it cost to rent the Wagner Group for a week?”

Whereas official organs of the Islamic Republic attempted to downplay the events in Russia, many Iranians joked on social media about the possibility of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei getting “orphaned if Daddy Putin falls,” while one asked how much it cost to “rent the Wagner Group for a week” in order to take out Khamenei. Another Iranian quipped that it was as if the late IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani and the Supreme Leader were going head-to-head and that the former was coming to take Tehran.

That last tweet was particularly reflective of the thoughts of a portion of Iranian society, as they pondered whether similar events could play out in Iran in the near future. For years, some Iranians have held on to the idea that when the Supreme Leader eventually passes away, the IRGC would take the helm of the country in the form of a social liberal military dictatorship—something that has only intensified in recent months due to the ongoing anti-establishment protests that began in September 2022. Separately, Pahlavi, a leading Western-based opposition figure to the Islamic Republic, has repeatedly called on IRGC members who have not committed atrocities to defect and join the people to overthrow the regime (hence the meme at the beginning of the piece).

While the IRGC is no monolith and has its own external operations arm—the Quds Force, which could arguably have parallels drawn between it and the Wagner Group (the former is also state-funded but has roles in conflicts such as Libya, Mali, and Ukraine), it is best to stay clear of such comparisons.

The role of the IRGC since the 1980s was to protect the Islamic Republic from inside and outside threats, including mass uprisings, coup d’états, and foreign interventions. Consequently, the IRGC shares the ideology of the Velayat-e Faqih itself. Since Khamenei became Supreme Leader in 1989, the IRGC has played a larger role not just domestically—by controlling much of the Iranian economy, swaying elections, and crushing dissent—but also externally, with its involvement in countries in the region (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen). It is highly unlikely that the IRGC would defect in its entirety from the clerical establishment to overthrow its leadership.

What the IRGC continues to do is have its members occupy high positions in government, with the Raisi cabinet having the most positions occupied by the IRGC compared to past administrations. The Guards will continue to maintain a key role as the right hand of the next Supreme Leader whenever succession does occur.

Given the news out of Russia, like much of the international community, the security and intelligence apparatus of the Islamic Republic was watching the events closely to see its outcome. Had Prigozhin followed through with his plans and succeeded at ousting Putin, Tehran’s calculations with one of its top allies would’ve had to adjust accordingly. However, an aborted attack on Moscow is merely seen by Tehran as a nuisance for Putin in the same way that the Russian president likely views the ongoing anti-regime protests in Iran as an annoyance for the clerical establishment. In November 2022, Raisi and Putin discussed deepening bilateral ties at the height of protests in Iran, and the Russian president reportedly didn’t even bring up the unrest.

For those betting on the IRGC, perhaps the lesson of the Wagner Group’s failed rebellion in Russia—which was about a personal vendetta against an authoritarian leader more than anything—is that only the people of Iran and Russia can control their destinies.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog. She is also the author of the “Iranians on #SocialMedia” report. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

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Egyptians aren’t racist. They’re frustrated with Western appropriation of their ancient history.

Shahira Amin — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 15:13:23 +0000

“This is the land of my ancestors,” American actor Danny Glover proudly said to a small group of journalists, including myself, in December 2006, as he kneeled and kissed the ground at the Pyramids of Giza.

I soon discovered that Glover’s conviction is shared by many other American performers of African descent, who take pride in the notion that the kings and queens of ancient Egypt are their ancestors. Many African-American musicians and artists embrace their purported connection with ancient Egyptian civilization, drawing inspiration from it for their music and art.

The idea is rooted in Afrocentrism, a cultural and political movement that originated around the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—when the colonial era ended and slavery was abolished—to counter Eurocentrism, which favors European and Western civilization over non-Western civilizations. The pushback against the colonialist ideas of supposed white superiority empowers Africans in the diaspora who—based on the Afrocentric theory—can be proud of their alleged links to the ancient kingdom that has fascinated the modern world with its art and culture.

Best known for his roles in the Lethal Weapon franchise, Glover, who also provided the voice for Jethro—Tzipporah’s father in the 1998 animated film, The Prince of Egypt—jokingly said to me that he identifies as Egyptian during a 2018 visit to Aswan to attend an African film festival.

However, as much as Afrocentrists claim that ancient Egypt was a predominantly black civilization, it has been refuted by the Egyptian government, which has been promoting ancient Egyptian civilization as the chief element of Egyptian heritage.

This was evident from the lavish parade organized by the state in 2021 to transport twenty-two royal mummies from the Egyptian museum to their new resting place—the National Museum of Civilizations—which featured a rare performance by an Egyptian soprano, who sang in an ancient Egyptian language no longer spoken today. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was on hand to welcome the ancient Egyptian mummies upon arriving at the museum.

Many Egyptians shun their Africanness, preferring to associate themselves with the Middle East and identify as Muslims and Arabs. African refugees in Egypt often complain of harassment and discrimination and claim Egyptians are “racist,” looking down on Sub-Saharan Africans as inferior. Egypt’s Coptic Christians and secularists, meanwhile, choose to distance themselves from Arabism and Islam, associating themselves with ancient Egyptian heritage instead. This is part of a xenophobic nationalism that emerged as a push back against the 2012-2013 rule of the Muslim Brotherhood as opponents of the Islamist group feared that Islamist President Mohammed Morsi would seek to “Islamize” society.

As a result, a series of recent incidents have rubbed Egyptians the wrong way, triggering accusations of “Afrocentrism” from critics and a firestorm on Egyptian social media platforms.

The latest of these is the exhibition “Kemet: Egypt in Hip-Hop, Jazz, Soul, and Funk,” currently being held at the National Museum of Antiquities in the Dutch city of Leiden. The exhibit which continues until September 3, takes visitors on “a musical journey through history,” according to its webpage. The show explores the influence of ancient Egypt in the works of Western musicians of African descent, showcasing photographs, music videos, album covers, and artworks that explain how ancient Egypt served as an inspiration to these artists and how it is reflected in their music.

The mere suggestion by the curators that “Egypt is a part of Africa” has drawn a backlash from the Egyptian government, which retaliated by banning the museum’s team of archaeologists from excavating in Saqqara. At a parliamentary session on May 2, Ahmed Belal, an Egyptian member of parliament, slammed the exhibit, accusing the curators of “distorting Egyptian identity” and “attacking Egyptian heritage and civilization.”

Joining the chorus of condemnation, many Egyptians took to social media to express their rejection of “attempts to distort our history.” Photos of a sculpture showcased at the exhibition, which depicted King Tutankhamun as black, widely circulated on social media platforms and were deemed “offensive” by critics. The backlash from Egyptians prompted the show’s organizers to publish an additional webpage that unapologetically explained the exhibition’s aim, warning that “racist” comments would not be tolerated and would be removed.

The uproar over the controversial exhibition came on the heels of an online hullaballoo over the trailer of a Netflix series portraying Cleopatra as black. The fact that a non-white actress—Adele James—was selected to play the role of the ancient Egyptian queen in the historical series Queen Cleopatra infuriated many Egyptians who accused Netflix of “deliberately erasing and reinterpreting history” and “spreading misinformation.”

Speaking to BNN Breaking, Dr. Zahi Hawas, a prominent archaeologist, insisted that Cleopatra was not black nor of African descent. He argued that she was “of Greek descent” and “resembled the queens and princesses of Macedonia.” Egyptian satirist Bassem Youssef also criticized the casting of a mixed-race actress in the Netflix series. In an episode of Piers Morgan Uncensored, he called the decision “cultural appropriation ” and “falsification of history.”

The Netflix series also spurred a lawsuit against the California-based streaming platform, which was filed by Egyptian lawyer Essam Khalaf. He demanded the Queen Cleopatra series be retracted, describing it as “historical forgery.” Another lawyer, Mahmoud El Sennary, also filed a legal complaint against the streaming service with the Public Prosecutor’s Office, accusing it of “blackwashing Cleopatra.”

The casting of James in the Netflix series and the Leiden exhibition are not the only incidents that have recently sparked controversy in Egypt.

In March, American comedian Kevin Hart had his planned show in Cairo canceled over “Afrocentric remarks” he had allegedly made.

Hart is believed to have said, “We must teach our children the true history of Black Africans when they were kings in Egypt and not just the era of slavery cemented by education in America. Do you remember the time when we were kings?”

Although it is unclear if and when Hart had made the remarks, Egyptian social media users called for the show’s cancellation, accusing him of “blackwashing” their history.

In what appears to be an attempt to appease the nationalists, the authorities decided to call off the comedian’s Cairo debut, citing “logistical issues.”

The angry reactions of Egyptians to the incidents mentioned above have raised eyebrows in the West. Many Europeans and Americans fail to understand the fuss. Why are Egyptians so touchy over any suggested links between Africans in the diaspora and ancient Egypt? A plausible explanation is that decades of looting and trafficking of Egyptian cultural artifacts have made Egyptians defensive—they fear that their heritage and culture are being hijacked. It hasn’t helped that many of the ancient artifacts that were seized during the colonialist era, such as the Rosetta Stone—seized from Egypt by forces of the British empire in 1801—continue to be in possession of other states.

Statements like the one made by former US President John F. Kennedy in 1961—that the United States had “a special interest in the civilization of ancient Egypt from which many of our cultural traditions have sprung”—are seen by Egyptians as appropriation of their ancient civilization. While Kennedy meant well—at the time he was trying to convince Congress to appropriate $10 million of US taxpayer money to rescue Nubian monuments from flooding—similar statements by other Westerners laying claim to ancient Egyptian heritage are not always made in good faith.

Although comments by some Egyptians on social media in reaction to the Leiden exhibit and the Queen Cleopatra series can indeed be dismissed as “racist,” colonialist attitudes denying Egyptians the right to ownership of their history and culture are equally abhorrent.

Perhaps the Arabic hashtag used by social media activists to criticize Netflix says it all: “Egypt for Egyptians.” Egyptians are growing increasingly frustrated with what they perceive as imperialist agendas and attempts to separate them from what is rightfully theirs: their cherished heritage. Western cultural appropriation of ancient Egyptian civilization is a pattern that has persisted since the colonialist era, and Egyptians are now responding with the same nationalist slogan used during the Urabi revolt which demanded an end to British and French hegemony over their country. It is their way of saying, “Enough is enough.”

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on Twitter @sherryamin13.

The post Egyptians aren’t racist. They’re frustrated with Western appropriation of their ancient history. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Maximizing US foreign aid for strategic competition

Patrick Quirk, Caitlin Dearing Scott — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 14:30:00 +0000

Introduction

The United States has reshaped how it uses military and economic tools to compete with China, Russia, and other adversaries. The United States is increasingly adept at deploying military assets, as well as a range of financial sanctions or trade deals, to weaken China or Russia’s position and advance its own. Yet, the United States has not calibrated all statecraft tools for this competition. This includes how and where it uses foreign aid.

For more than fifty years, foreign aid has been a core form of US engagement in the developing world. To advance its interests, the United States has provided loans, technical assistance, and direct budget support to developing nations to promote economic growth and more representative forms of governance.

A fully developed strategy for using foreign aid across all sectors—economic, education, security assistance, and democracy support—can provide critical reinforcement to the military and economic pillars of strategic competition. To be sure, the United States has reorganized parts of its bureaucracy and launched new initiatives to enhance how it uses foreign aid to compete with China. The US Department of State recently launched a new Office of China Coordination, informally known as China House, to coordinate China policy. The Biden administration announced a flagship Group of Seven Plus (G7+) initiative for the advancement of strategic, values-driven, and high-standard infrastructure and investment in low- and middle-income countries. Congress initiated foreign-aid funds dedicated to countering Chinese malign influence in foreign political systems.¹ New embassies in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and Tonga, among other potential locations, are welcome developments that will provide the sustained presence necessary to engage governments and push back against Beijing’s influence, as well as help identify ways to use foreign aid to compete.

These changes are necessary, but far from sufficient to maximize the impact of foreign aid to compete with China and Russia. The power of foreign aid as a tool of US influence is not lost on its adversaries. The most prevalent example is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has spent hundreds of billions of dollars for years to expand its influence in developing nations. Recently, China has increased BRI spending and shifted from its original focus on infrastructure megaprojects to the less capital-intensive, but still impactful, fields of governance (e.g., training elected officials in Beijing’s governance model); funding for academic departments to promote pro-Chinese narratives; green-energy projects; and funding for pro-China media outlets.² Under the BRI umbrella, China uses foreign aid in these and other sectors to promote policies and politicians favorable to PRC interests. The United States is, therefore, compelled to play a game of catchup.

Fully harnessing the potential of US foreign aid in this struggle requires fundamental reforms to the congressional processes involved in overseeing aid allocations and earmarks; reforms to bureaucratic agencies tasked with spending foreign aid; improvements to US modes for delivering this assistance; and a narrowing of scope to areas most critical for advancing US interests. Needed reforms include the following.

Realign spending to focus on allies and countries strategically important to US competition with China and Russia, including reconsidering assistance mechanisms based solely on income level, with an aim of investing in allies and partners that advance US interests.
Make delivering for allies and shoring up democracy core pillars guiding how the United States uses foreign aid to compete with China and Russia. Investments in strong democratic institutions—such as political parties, independent legislators, independent media, and civil society—will yield dividends in countering foreign authoritarian influence.
Invest to empower pro-democracy elements in backsliding or authoritarian countries. The United States must respond asymmetrically in countries with pervasive authoritarian capture, using foreign assistance in ways that empower individuals and institutions to expose and put pressure on the regime elements that perpetuate corruption and enable foreign influence.
Congress should pass legislation (the Non-Kinetic Competition Act) requiring the executive to submit multiyear plans outlining the US approach—harnessing all nonmilitary statecraft tools, including foreign aid—to competing with China in select priority countries.
Focus on geography and interests, rather than sectors, to ensure maximum flexibility, strategies rooted in country-specific needs, and longer-term planning.
Increase spending to expand partner-nation resilience to Beijing and Moscow coercion and cooptation. Strong democratic institutions increase a country’s ability to detect, prevent, and mitigate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence operations. Priorities should include support for independent media, parliamentary diplomacy, and educational and technical exchanges, all of which have proven effective at building democratic resilience to foreign authoritarian influence.
Empower the State Department’s Office of Foreign Assistance Resources to fulfill its mandate of aligning foreign aid with policy goals and maximizing impact. Enabling the Department of State to take the lead on foreign policy and control aid allocations will ensure that aid is appropriately leveraged to advance specific foreign policy objectives.
Lengthen the time horizon for US foreign-aid programs and objectives from a single year to ten. Democracy, rights, and governance programming—as well as initiatives in other sectors germane to competition—requires longer-term investment to develop strong and resilient institutions, political parties, and processes. US agencies and implementing partners need longer project times to maximize impact.
Limit branding waivers. The United States benefits from populations and governments knowing who provides aid, and its marketing needs to reflect as much.
Focus on advancing interests, rather than “localization” targets. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) and State Department should pursue partnership approaches best positioned to achieve US interests in the target country. In most, if not all, cases, this will involve working through international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that collaborate with and, as needed, build the capacity of local partners.

With the aim of encouraging the United States to more strategically use foreign assistance to advance its policy objectives, this paper outlines why the threat posed by China and Russia requires more than a kinetic solution, and why and how foreign aid is essential to winning this competition; the current US approach to foreign assistance—where it spends, on what, and via which bureaucratic mechanisms—and its strengths and shortcomings; historical lessons from using US foreign aid for strategic competition, principally during the Cold War, that are applicable today; and recommendations for reforming the US foreign-aid infrastructure, regulations, and approach to better position the United States to compete.

I. The authoritarian threat has no purely military solution

China and Russia are often portrayed as purely military threats that warrant entirely kinetic solutions. To be sure, US military deterrence through a strong Army, Navy, and Air Force—with nuclear capabilities as a foundation—will remain essential to strategic competition. Kinetic options are necessary, but not sufficient. Competition with China and Russia is playing out not only in the sea lanes of the Indo-Pacific or Ukraine’s battlefields, but in the halls of parliaments in developing nations, in efforts to influence the post-conflict political systems of war-torn countries, and at the United Nations (UN), where both China and Russia endeavor to reshape the liberal world order.

China’s primary threat to the United States is undoubtedly a military one. It is amassing weapons sufficient to invade Taiwan, and has expanded its blue-water navy with an eye toward rivaling, if not supplanting, US capabilities. Yet, the PRC is also using political and economic tools to expand its influence in developing states at the expense of US objectives.

The CCP is increasingly using economic leverage and elite capture to exert political influence, deploying information operations, party-to-party ties, and, in some cases, export of its authoritarian governance model to create favorable conditions in other countries that enable the PRC to advance its local and global interests. This includes extracting natural resources critical to its domestic production and economic growth, expanding military basing essential to Chinese military deterrence and expanded control, and coopting politicians who serve these ends and can be counted on to vote with China at the UN on issues ranging from criticism of human-rights violations in Xinjiang to the future of the International Telecommunications Union and global internet governance. Together, these tactics are corroding democratic governance and popularizing authoritarian governance in countries the world over.

The BRI has been the crown jewel in the CCP’s global influence campaign. Nearly one hundred and fifty countries from every region of the world have signed on to the BRI, presenting a significant opportunity for the PRC to exert economic and political influence on a regional and global scale.³ According to research conducted by the International Republican Institute looking at PRC influence across country contexts, “growing trade, financial, and business ties are the foundation of the PRC’s efforts to build influence in other countries’ politics.”⁴ The CCP strategically deploys economic dependence, leverage, and coercion, in addition to elite capture, to develop pro-PRC constituencies in partner countries and advance pro-PRC policies. Thus, the BRI fits into the CCP’s broader efforts to create a world safe for the party and its interests, which Chinese leader Xi Jinping proposes achieving via three initiatives that collectively articulate the CCP’s vision for the globe, titled the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative.⁵

The Global Development Initiative (GDI) seeks to expand the BRI to advance “people-centered” development, China’s catchphrase for its model of development that prioritizes economic advancement at the expense of human rights. The GDI—and PRC promotion of it—is explicit in its rejection of “Western” definitions of development, which incorporate human rights as a core tenet.⁶ China has been rallying countries to join the GDI, with vague promises of PRC support to help them achieve their Sustainable Development Goals for 2030, with a focus on poverty and hunger alleviation and increased access to clean energy. The PRC has established a group of “Friends of the Global Development Initiative” at the UN, which counts some sixty members.⁷ The Global Security Initiative (GSI) is the CCP’s vision for building a new global “security architecture” rooted in the CCP’s definition—and model—of security and stability.⁸ With aims to increase CCP influence at the UN through increased funding and diplomatic engagement, the expansion of PRC training programs to military and police, and an expanded role serving as an arbiter in international conflicts, the GSI signals China’s intent to return to its self-avowed rightful place at “the center for the world stage.”⁹ Without naming the United States and Europe, the CCP through GSI makes clear that it seeks to provide an alternative model of alliances or “circle of friends” to counter US interests, with a particular focus on the developing world in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Pacific islands.¹⁰

The Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) is the PRC’s new framework for promoting its governance model globally, building on the foundational work of the International Liaison Department supporting political parties around the world. Whereas such party-to-party exchanges once sought to build the legitimacy of the CCP, they are now focused on advertising the value of the PRC’s system of governance more generally. The GCI formalizes this recent trend, emphasizing the need for respect for a plurality of governance models. Speaking at the World Political Parties’ Conference, organized by the CCP in March 2023, General Secretary Xi Jinping extolled the PRC’s model of “a better social system,” noting that China’s experience has broken the myth that “modernization=Westernization.”¹¹ Implicit in the GCI, with its calls for understanding “different civilizations’ understanding of values” and models, is an attempt to popularize the CCP’s model of governance and help it realize its vision of a revised global order with a CCP-led China as the central node of globalization and global governance in the decades to come.

Collectively, these three initiatives are part of China’s overall strategy to promote authoritarian solutions to the mounting challenges facing developing democracies. They have the potential to undermine the principles of liberal democracy that buttress the extant rules-based world order. For many developing countries, PRC investment and trade are an economic necessity. They are, however, never free of conditions, despite PRC claims to the contrary. Whether the terms mandate that PRC-financed infrastructure be awarded to PRC-based companies, eschew existing environmental standards, or subvert transparency and accountability disclosure terms on the contractual arrangements, PRC entities’ business and negotiating practices often have adverse effects on the recipient countries’ finances and political systems.¹²

From a security standpoint, China’s promotion of the concept of “indivisible security,” used to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and its “aims to reshape norms of international security to be favorable to China and other authoritarian regimes while delegitimizing traditional military alliances,” as the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has noted, are deeply worrying.¹³ Moreover, its proclivity to export repression beyond its borders poses a serious threat to developed and developing nations alike.

China has utilized “public security” as an entry point for establishing overseas police stations in fifty-three countries around the world, providing an entry point for PRC law enforcement to engage in transnational repression and crack down on dissent and political expression among the Chinese diaspora.¹⁴ In countries with large diaspora populations, the CCP has also relied upon triads, or crime syndicates, to intimidate its critics and further its objectives at the local level. Moreover, politically, China’s promotion of its authoritarian governance model undermines good governance globally, fueling democratic backsliding and legitimizing the rise of authoritarian actors from El Salvador to Belarus.

All of this has the potential to undermine US interests on everything from internet governance to human rights, while undermining US global leadership. These tactics have dire consequences for the United States, yet the United States cannot effectively address them with purely military or trade/sanctions solutions. Military responses, whether ship deployments or arms transfers, do not help strengthen the institutions and civil society needed for countries to be resilient to PRC influence operations, or to build an alliance of democracies to counter a growing autocratic threat.

Like China, Russia poses a threat to US interests that cannot be countered with armaments or economic tools alone. Russia is squarely focused on winning its illegal war with Ukraine. Even so, we can expect Vladimir Putin’s regime will continue using a range of non-kinetic means to advance its interests in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The Kremlin’s principal goal is to foster instability and undermine alliances that counter its influence regionally and globally. It deploys a mix of political, economic, and military tactics to divide and rule.¹⁵

In the political arena, the Kremlin directly interferes in other countries’ political and electoral processes. Russia tries to influence the political playing field to be more amenable to its interests, and to inject the Kremlin’s point of view into the political discourse. The Kremlin and its affiliated entities provide financial and other incentives to political parties and politicians willing to represent and advance favorable policies in national parliaments or international institutions. Such support can include legal and illicit campaign contributions, often made by organizations set up by Russia’s agents of influence, individuals linked to Russia and Russian businesses, or Russian organizations directly. According to a recent report by the US State Department, Russia has covertly given at least $300 million to officials and politicians in more than two dozen countries since 2014, with plans to transfer more.¹⁶

Russia also targets electoral processes. Russian hackers have been accused of interfering in many elections and electoral campaigns around the world. In the 2018 presidential election in Mexico, they were reportedly involved in the spread of false information aimed at discrediting candidates to stir up divisions and polarization among voters.¹⁷ Russia similarly deploys cyberattacks, internet trolling, social media campaigns, and intrusions into state voter-registration systems to undermine political and electoral processes and create confusion as people head to the polls.¹⁸

Economically, the Kremlin employs strategic corruption to coopt elites and create pro-Kremlin proxies in media, politics, and business to push its agenda. This strategy aims to influence debates, gain support, and shape legislation in the Kremlin’s favor. This tactic is particularly effective in countries with favorable views of Russia. It helps galvanize public support and weakens alliances that conflict with the Kremlin’s interests. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), a group of investigative journalists, recently revealed an expansive Kremlin operation to bribe politicians and businesspeople in Europe.¹⁹ The International Agency for Current Policy, an informal group connected to Moscow, is behind the bribes, arranged payments, and all-expenses-paid trips to luxury resorts for numerous European politicians and investors to encourage pro-Russian political and economic actions.

Militarily, the Kremlin is deploying proxy forces like the Wagner Group to support authoritarian governments or provoke low-scale conflict across Africa, including in Mali and the Central African Republic.²⁰ Wagner Group security deployments across the continent have been at the forefront of Russian efforts to influence African politics, and have been accompanied by disinformation campaigns to advance Russia’s political and security influence.²¹ The Wagner Group has also led Kremlin efforts to develop a pro-Russia infrastructure across Africa. This infrastructure includes the Internet Research Agency troll farm to conduct disinformation campaigns, captured antidemocratic political elites, coopted companies that exploit Africa’s natural resources, and front companies posing as nongovernmental organizations.

Russia’s influence efforts around the world are supported by wide-scale propaganda and disinformation campaigns to delegitimize independent, expert journalism—and the very concept of truth—in the eyes of consumers, exploit fissures in democratic societies and exacerbate polarization in conflicted ones, undermine support for democracy and the West, and advance pro-Kremlin narratives and policies. One approach Moscow deploys are Russian-funded media outlets like RT and Sputnik. RT, formerly Russia Today, is part of a state-sponsored propaganda corporation that masquerades as a legitimate, Western-looking news and opinion-making outlet that produces content in seven languages.²² With almost $400 million coming from Russian state subsidies in 2022 alone, the company has hired Western journalists to mislead its viewers, and to make its false content seem credible to legitimate media outlets around the world. Another tactic Russia uses is fake media outlets and social media accounts to dilute legitimate media reporting and inject messaging that serves Russia’s strategic objectives. Social media have been a particularly powerful tool for Russia, whose agents have been creating tailored content to influence the beliefs of groups of voters and sway them away from anti-Russia political forces.

The contours of this challenge—from Beijing and Moscow—make clear that military and economic tools are not enough for the United States to compete and win. Kinetic efforts cannot bolster partner countries against the malign influence of the CCP and Kremlin and the associated cooptation of elites. Military tools, either security assistance or indirect effects of deterrence, cannot shape the politics and development trajectories of partner countries so that they take forms more favorable to the prosperity of their own people and US interests.

Economic-statecraft tools are more amenable to these ends—and complementary to foreign aid—but still not sufficient. Trade deals can increase US economic competitiveness vis-à-vis China by bolstering the US industrial base through opening markets to US citizens and businesses. The United States can use trade deals as an incentive for potential allies to align with US interests over those of the PRC or Kremlin and to help countries reduce their economic dependence on China and Russia. The United States can use economic sanctions to punish countries or individuals for a range of behaviors—from repressing their citizens, as in Belarus, to invading Ukraine, as with Russia—with the aim of stopping said targets from continuing these actions. Moreover, the United States can use economic measures to build a collective economic defense against economic coercion, and to deter PRC and Kremlin economic aggression.

Foreign aid is a necessary complement to kinetic and economic tools. It cannot single-handedly address all challenges listed above, but can help lead to changes—like making a country’s governance systems more resilient to foreign interference—that benefit the United States at the expense of its rivals.

II. US foreign aid: Effective tool, dated toolbox

The United States has utilized foreign assistance to advance its geopolitical interests since the end of World War II, and introduced the Marshall Plan to secure Europe’s (and Japan’s) social and economic foundations in the face of Soviet expansionism and restive communist factions.²³ The United States continued to use foreign aid as part of its strategy of containment over the next four decades, providing valuable lessons for advancing US interests in a new age of competition.

Foreign aid (interchangeably referred to as “foreign assistance”) consists of money, technical assistance, or commodities the United States provides to another country to advance a common objective. US foreign assistance can be organized into three overarching categories based on intent of spending: economic and development assistance that addresses political, economic, and development needs; humanitarian assistance that supports disaster relief and emergency operations to alleviate suffering and save lives; and security assistance, which strengthens the capacity of the military and law enforcement in other countries.²⁴

Across these three categories, foreign-aid-funded initiatives can include training rural farmers in more sustainable harvesting techniques, helping construct roadways linking peripheral towns to urban centers, or deploying specialists to advise government ministries on economic or political reform options.

The throughline connecting the three foreign-aid types—and the variation therein—is that US taxpayer dollars spent to fund these initiatives help lead to changes in the target country that benefit US interests. For instance, spending to increase the capacity and independence of government institutions can enhance transparency and provide more favorable investment conditions for US companies.

Yet, the United States spends less than 1 percent of its discretionary budget on foreign assistance, which for fiscal year (FY) 2022 amounted to$52.76 billion.²⁵ Comparatively speaking, this is a small portion of the federal budget. For the sake of contrast, it is 7 percent of the military’s FY22 $777.7-billion budget, and is nearly the exact amount the Department of Defense paid for fewer than one hundred new aircraft in FY22.²⁶

Illustrating the overall downward trend in foreign-aid spending, the United States spends roughly 50 percent less on foreign aid today, as a portion of gross domestic product (GDP), than it did during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. The similarities in the challenges the United States faced in the 1980s and today—and the disparity in resources it is marshalling to address those threats—is stark.

The United States allocates foreign aid through several departments and agencies, with the main entities being USAID and the Department of State. President John F. Kennedy established USAID in 1961 to lead the implementation of US foreign aid. Through the 1970s, USAID provided emergency food assistance that helped avert famines and helped newly independent countries establish basic governing structures. In the 1980s, USAID assistance guided economic reforms across Latin America and other regions around the world, helping stabilize economies in the face of currency and debt crises. After the Soviet Union’s fall, USAID helped new countries transition from autocracies to nascent democracies. From 2000 onward, USAID has played a central role in combatting HIV/AIDS, addressing violent extremism in fragile states, and solidifying democratic gains from the immediate post-Cold War era. In 2004, the United States expanded the agencies responsible for allocating foreign aid by establishing the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and, in 2019, the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).²⁷ These changes that foreign aid helped enable or cause have, directly or indirectly, benefited US security and economic prosperity.

What the United States has gained in scope and scale through this range of foreign-aid entities, it has lost in not having them unified by a common directive and mission for spending. The George W. Bush administration worked to address this drift by disbanding USAID policy offices, and transferred those associated oversight and policy responsibilities to a new Office of Foreign Assistance Resources at the Department of State. This change aimed to further align foreign-aid spending with foreign policymaking, which is the State Department’s purview (USAID, per a 1988 law, reports to the secretary of state). Despite this change, the United States continues to struggle with developing comprehensive strategies for issues and countries—and harnessing all elements of US foreign assistance (in tandem with other statecraft tools, like diplomacy and economic engagement) toward a common end. Some feel USAID operates too independently, and its spending is insufficiently aligned with US foreign policy objectives.

Why foreign aid is critical to strategic competition

A solid base of rigorous research shows that foreign aid is effective across a range of sectors in contributing to changes in recipient countries that favor the United States and advantage it in its competition with China, Russia, and other rivals.

Foreign aid can lead to three primary types of impact that are beneficial to strategic competition: economic development that opens markets to US businesses, which increases US economic competitiveness with China and Russia; stronger governance and political institutions, which can serve as a robust check on Russian and Chinese attempts to undermine or coopt allies or potential partners; and more favorable views of the United States by a government and/or its people, which the United States can then leverage for cooperation on mutually beneficial interests or against China and Russia.

Foreign aid supports US economic competitiveness by helping develop new economies for US businesses and trade. It does so by promoting a country’s overall development, as well as sound, transparent regulation.²⁸ Foreign assistance increases economic potential within a state, especially when developing basic industry, improving basic infrastructure, or rebuilding an area after conflict. Today, for example, eleven of the United States’ top fifteen trade partners are previous recipients of foreign aid. Access to overseas markets matters for people at home; roughly one in five US jobs is linked to international trade, and one in three US manufacturing jobs is linked to exporting US products overseas. When considering investments overseas, US businesses need predictable regulations managed by independent institutions, which, collectively, minimize risk of loss of capital. By fostering foreign markets for US goods and businesses, foreign aid can help bolster the United States’ industrial base.

Foreign aid also helps strengthen governance and democracy in countries around the world. A study of US foreign assistance focused on “democracy promotion” programs from 1990 to 2003 found that democracy assistance had “clear and consistent impacts” on overall democratization—as well as civil society, judicial and electoral processes, and media independence.²⁹ Despite a global democratic recession from 2012 to 2022, eight countries that were autocracies actually bounced back and are now democracies in 2023—with international democracy support and protection being an important factor in securing these gains.³⁰ The benefits of these changes, enabled by foreign aid, are clear. The world is safer and more secure with more—not fewer—democracies. Democracies do not launch wars against other democracies, are more reliable allies to the United States, and are far less prone to intrastate civil conflict.³¹ By strengthening independent institutions and civil-society oversight, foreign aid can help make countries more resilient to interference from foreign rivals like China and Russia. Robust institutions and vibrant civil society make it difficult for China and Russia to exert influence and coopt elites.

Finally, foreign aid can help improve citizens’ and governments’ views of the United States, often at the expense of its principal rivals. The long-term aspect is important here. Chinese and Russian foreign-assistance programs tend to favor physical projects that advance their economic interests and solidify partnerships with authoritarian actors.³² Populations, genuinely appreciative and benefiting from such investments, look favorably upon these efforts in the short term. Over time, there is growing evidence that these projects eventually begin to erode local support for Beijing and Moscow.³³ In the case of China, this is partially due to shoddy construction work, a feeling of Chinese neocolonialism and loss of sovereignty, and discomfort with authoritarian moves by parties in power. While there is much reporting on China’s BRI and Russia’s recent use of Wagner Group mercenaries in Africa, both countries’ programs lack transparency—increasingly alienating potential local partners as long-term consequences become more apparent.³⁴

By contrast, US foreign-assistance spending is transparent, involves clear conditions guiding where and how funds are to be used, and favors working with local partners to identify real needs and inform project design and implementation.³⁵ Well-implemented, effective, and large-scale initiatives focused on addressing pressing needs of populations—like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—solve problems for local populations and generate positive perceptions of the aid provider, the United States. Several studies find that US investments in PEPFAR foreign assistance (as one example) are strongly associated with improved perceptions of the United States across the globe.³⁶ A potent mix of project transparency, exposure to US government institutional practices and customs, and an earnest desire to help recipient countries prosper underpins US foreign aid’s impact and success.³⁷

III. Looking back to chart a path forward: Lessons from the Cold War

Today’s threat landscape is not analogous to the Cold War for several reasons: China and the United States are far more intertwined economically than the United States and Soviet Union; technological advances have minimized geographical advantages; and states and citizens are more connected, with a magnitude of information access that was unthinkable in the immediate post-World War II era.

Despite these differences, the period in which the United States was grappling with a seemingly mighty Soviet Union and today’s competition with China share some similarities. Today, like then, the United States faces an array of threats across military, social, economic, and political domains from a formidable power that kinetic tools alone cannot address; as a result, the United States is looking to harness all statecraft tools to its advantage. Three key lessons from how the United States used foreign aid during the Cold War can help inform how it uses this non-kinetic tool for strategic competition today.

To maximize foreign aid’s impact, strategic patience is essential. Foreign aid can produce meaningful outcomes, but changes can take years to occur.³⁸ It took a decade for the Marshall Plan and associated US foreign assistance to transform Western European nations into the staunch democratic-minded, market-oriented partners that they are today. While US foreign aid that began in 1948 helped prevent socialist uprisings across Europe, NATO integration and rearmament took the 1950s to accomplish.³⁹ The European Economic Community only truly began to develop in the 1960s.⁴⁰ And the dismantling of European colonial empires and the move toward the US view of the liberal order took until the 1970s to be fully realized.⁴¹

Beyond Europe, US foreign assistance to African and Latin American governments highlights how approaching regions with a longer-term perspective and approach provides opportunities to augment engagement when conditions become more favorable.⁴² Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, US work in both regions haphazardly shifted between supporting anticommunist militarism, encouraging economic liberalization and development, and improving living conditions.⁴³ Moreover, post-colonial struggles in Africa and regional interference from the Cubans and Soviets in Latin America limited the overall effectiveness of US foreign-assistance programs until the 1980s.⁴⁴ Previous US engagement then allowed it to become a preferred partner as the Soviet Union began to withdraw from the “third world” and the global financial order introduced new requirements for integration and development.⁴⁵

Just as foreign assistance takes time to generate outcomes, assistance strategies should have flexibility to adapt to changes in the country or region over the lifetime of a given initiative. Identifying an end state, and methodically working toward it over the course of years or decades, allows second- and third-order effects of investments to occur.

Second, policymakers need to be realistic about what foreign aid can achieve—and avoid overpromising and under-delivering. More often than not, success has been achieved when US policymakers used foreign assistance to secure practical and realistic outcomes. While often criticized for partnering with autocrats over the course of the Cold War, the United States’ incremental investments slowly eroded the Soviet Union’s theory of victory and allowed the United States to encourage democratic progress over time.⁴⁶ US foreign assistance supported strategic aims that ultimately led to a more peaceful, prosperous, and representative world.

A final lesson is that foreign assistance works best when it is part of a broader whole-of-government strategy.⁴⁷ When the United States synchronizes foreign-aid interventions, these efforts tend to build on each other to promote long-term cultural change and alignment with US interests and policy.⁴⁸ Some clear examples of whole-of-government success are Western Europe, Colombia, South Korea, and Chile.⁴⁹ Each of these examples shares a US assistance approach and series of programs that combined security guarantees with cooperation and reform programs; economic-development packages that paired investment monies with revitalization of key industries; social initiatives intended to soften cultural cleavages while improving social determinants of health; and incentives for local governments to improve their capacity, resiliency, and responsiveness. When foreign-assistance efforts remained siloed between agencies, efforts fell short and minimized impact of taxpayer dollars.

IV. Recommendations: Maximizing US foreign aid to compete

The United States has the infrastructure and expertise to re-elevate foreign aid as a tool of statecraft and use it to help compete with China, Russia, and other adversaries. Doing so will require making changes to where the United States spends foreign assistance and on what, and reforming structures within the US government that dictate how said funds are allocated. These changes are based on lessons from the past, as well as a sober assessment of today’s threat landscape and the need to position the United States for today’s challenges.

1. Where the United States allocates foreign aid and on what

The United States should realign spending to focus on allies and countries strategically important to competition with China and Russia. Foreign aid can help lead to changes in countries that advantage the United States in that competition (e.g., by making a country’s political system more resilient to Chinese or Russian influence), as well as address other pressing challenges (e.g., by addressing causes of migration in Central America to curb flows of people into the United States). Foreign aid can also be used to help US allies or countries of strategic importance in ways that maintain or cement extant alignment of interests (e.g., via infrastructure development that benefits the government in power) or help move a country that is on the fence between cooperating with China and the United States (e.g., Pacific islands).

The current approach to, and regulations governing, allocating foreign aid is not set up to enable the United States to use funds in ways that directly and efficiently advance US interests. It forces the United States to center spending in many aid sectors on predominantly low-income countries (where the perceived greatest development needs are) and disincentivizes spending on middle-income nations (with some plans in place to phase out spending in middle-income states), disregarding how important these nations, despite their income level, might be to the United States.

The Trump administration explored realigning how the United States uses foreign assistance of all stripes—from economic aid to health assistance—to make competing with China the primary objective. This realignment did not gain traction. However, the review elements that called for revisiting stipulations to spend based on a country’s income level—and instead center decisions around a country’s importance to the United States—are welcome and worth revisiting.

The United States should make delivering for allies and shoring up democracy core pillars guiding how it uses foreign aid to compete with China and Russia. The United States has rightfully increased funding for infrastructure projects in developing nations—along and through multilateral forums—to offer an alternative to China’s BRI. These projects, from highways to hospitals, help the United States compete with China because they buy goodwill with recipient governments and—given the transparent way in which they are managed—provide important investment to support countries’ development needs. But they only address one part of the China challenge, and do not address the root causes enabling Chinese interference and influence—weak governance and political institutions.

Strong democratic institutions are the most reliable form of defense against Russian, Chinese, and other external efforts to shape a country’s domestic politics to the benefit of the external actor. Political parties channel citizens’ views into policy and law. Independent legislatures and capable executives craft and enforce legislation that makes markets favorable to foreign (and US) investment, and inhibit the type of opaque deals favored by the PRC. Independent media play a crucial role in identifying and exposing harmful authoritarian influence, while civil-society organizations (CSOs) work to push governments to take corrective action. Across borders, a diverse group of activists, media figures, religious leaders, researchers, and policymakers is collaborating to confront the challenge of foreign authoritarian influence, forming a strong and growing network of likeminded individuals committed to building democratic resilience worldwide. This network is using innovative methods to uncover and bring attention to the harmful influence of authoritarian actors, such as the PRC and Kremlin. They are devising advocacy and policy solutions tailored to the individual needs of local communities, with the goal of promoting lasting change and ensuring accountability from domestic and foreign authoritarian actors. They need US support.

Invest to empower pro-democracy elements in backsliding or authoritarian countries. In democratically backsliding or authoritarian countries, the scope and scale of elite capture by the PRC or the Kremlin—and conditions on US foreign assistance over human-rights concerns and corruption—limit the potential for political change to build democratic resilience to foreign authoritarian influence. In such contexts, it is extremely challenging to compete symmetrically with the PRC or the Kremlin, which do not impose conditions related to human rights or democracy, and routinely end up worsening both. The United States must respond asymmetrically, using foreign assistance in ways that empower individuals and institutions to expose and put pressure on the regime elements that perpetuate corruption and enable foreign influence. Ongoing investments in media, civil society, and small “d” democratic political parties and opposition movements can sustain important pro-democracy elements to effectively push back against authoritarian influence, in closed and closing countries.

2. Congressional action

Given its constitutional role of oversight and resource appropriation, Congress has an important role to play in ensuring the United States maximizes use and impact of foreign aid in its competition with China and Russia.

Congress should pass legislation (the Non-Kinetic Competition Act) requiring the executive to submit multiyear plans outlining the US approach—harnessing all nonmilitary statecraft tools, including foreign aid—to compete with China in select priority countries. Absent congressional requirements or oversight, it is unclear if the executive branch will be able to swiftly make the needed changes outlined above to where and how the United States spends aid, including ensuring whether it is part of a broader strategy for each country. To accelerate these efforts, Congress could pass legislation requiring the executive to deliver plans for select priority countries, outlining how it intends to use all aspects of US power and resources—including foreign aid, linked to diplomacy—to compete with China. The strategies should include a clearly defined goal, as well as a theory of the case. The legislation could be modeled on the Global Fragility Act (GFA), which requires the executive to deliver a strategy for preventing violent conflict and promoting stability globally, and ten-year plans for achieving these aims in select priority countries. Unlike the GFA, however, the legislation proposed here need not require the executive to publicly release plans, given the sensitive nature of the content.

Focus on geography and interests, rather than sectors. US foreign aid is largely organized around sectors (e.g., health, education) and driven by congressional earmarks. This makes it exceedingly difficult for the United States to craft geography-specific strategies (e.g., for sub-Saharan Africa) with a single source of foreign aid as an available resource. Ideally, the United States would craft a competition strategy for a given region that clearly identifies an end state, theory of the case, and associated inputs required to realize it (kinetic and non-kinetic, including foreign aid). Instead, the current system predetermines (via earmarks) how the United States spends a significant portion of foreign aid (with some exceptions), forcing planners to use aid in suboptimal ways that seldom advance country-specific strategies.

Congress, considering its increased attention to position the United States to prevail against China, should review extant earmarks, do away with as many as feasible, help the executive conduct longer-term planning, and provide greater flexibility in using foreign aid to compete. The legislation cited below could help set parameters and ensure funds are spent on the highest priorities.

Increase spending to expand partner-nation resilience to Beijing and Moscow coercion and cooptation. Strong democratic institutions increase a country’s ability to detect, prevent, and mitigate CCP influence operations, but must be coupled with other work focused squarely on detecting, preventing, and countering CCP and Kremlin interference—whether attempts by the PRC to train political parties in Kenya on the China “model” or direct Kremlin funding to political parties to influence electoral outcomes and ensure pro-Kremlin voices are voted into office. Foreign assistance in this category can fund a range of programming, from technical assistance to countries negotiating BRI deals to support for independent media in countries vulnerable to foreign influence. Priorities should include the following types of democracy, rights, and governance programming, which have proven effective in building democratic resilience to foreign authoritarian influence.

Supporting independent media: Supporting independent journalism can be a powerful tool in countering the influence of the PRC and Kremlin in the Global South. It is a wise investment of limited US resources to empower well-trained journalists in vulnerable countries, who can provide free and unbiased reporting to expose the impact of foreign authoritarian influence. Every dollar spent in this direction can make a significant difference.
Legislative dialogues: In legislatures throughout the world, a growing number of elected officials are committed to democratic resilience. From engaging with partners like Taiwan and Ukraine to exposing concerns around the domestic impacts of deepened political and economic engagement with China and Russia, these officials have been successful in advocating for measures to counteract foreign influence and building global democratic unity to confront it. Facilitating and supporting such dialogues, by both the US Congress and parliaments globally, is a critical and effective means to counter PRC and Kremlin influence.
People-to-people exchanges: China is making a significant investment in people-to-people exchanges, sponsoring fellowships, scholarships, and exchanges to showcase the China model across the Global South. This soft-power initiative is an area in which the United States has a strategic advantage; it just needs to leverage it. The exchange programs sponsored by the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs are an effective mechanism for engaging youth, students, educators, artists, athletes, and rising leaders to promote US interests—and democracy. More than 99 percent of participants in the bureau’s Sports Visitors exchange program come away expressing positive views of the United States, while its exchange programs have brought almost seven hundred officials who would go on to run their countries’ governments to the United States. However, only forty thousand international participants engage in such programming annually, given the bureau’s $777.5-million annual budget for exchanges. By comparison, in 2018, the PRC provided scholarships to sixty-three thousand students to study in China, a figure that doesn’t include party-to-party exchanges run by the International Liaison Department or journalist and parliamentary exchanges. Additional investment in this area would be a cost-effective win-win.

The United States spends a paltry amount combatting Russian and Chinese malign influence around the world, despite this being the foremost challenge of the time. The United States spends less than $325 million a year countering Chinese influence and $300 million countering Russian influence via foreign aid. In fact, the $625 million the United State spends annually on this threat from China and Russia is less than the Defense Department spends on printing each year.⁵⁰

US policymakers argue that prevailing against China is a national imperative, but have only appropriately resourced its kinetic toolkit. Foreign-aid spending focused on this aim needs to increase fourfold, to $1 billion annually. It should center on countries already exposed to CCP and Kremlin interference, at the cusp of such interventions, or likely to experience them moving forward.

3. Intra-US government structural changes

Several changes to intra-US government processes and structure would help better align foreign-aid spending with core national security interests and increase its impact in the competition with China and Russia.

Empower the State Department’s Office of Foreign Assistance Resources to fulfill its mandate of aligning foreign aid with policy goals and maximizing impact. US foreign-aid spending should directly align with, and advance, US interests in priority states, competing with China and Russia chief among them. This means enabling the Department of State to take the lead on foreign policy and control aid allocations in a way that concretely advances specific foreign policy objectives, rather than a development goal that might be tangentially related to US interests. The secretary of state should empower the Office of Foreign Assistance Resources to truly lead on foreign-aid coordination and alignment, deputizing its director to ensure aid spending aligns with policy goals. The USAID administrator should continue reporting to the secretary. The United States needs to maximize the impact of foreign aid for immediate political wins and incorporate foreign aid into longer-term planning.

Lengthen the time horizon for US foreign-aid programs and objectives from a single year to ten. The United States used foreign aid to significant effect during the Cold War. Flexibility in what and how to spend, as well as the time horizon on which success was measured (noting the struggle with the Soviet Union was the central objective) were extremely important. In the last 15–20 years, and in line with shorter-term goals (e.g., health), the time horizon for gauging success has shortened to 1–2 years. This is counterproductive. Democracy, rights, and governance programming—as well as initiatives in other sectors germane to competition—requires longer-term investment to develop strong and resilient institutions, political parties, and processes. US agencies and implementing partners need longer project times to maximize impact.

Limit branding waivers. Projects or initiatives funded by US foreign aid typically are branded as “from the American people,” and include the funding agency’s logo (e.g., that of USAID) to enable attribution for the work to the United States. Yet, the United States often allows organizations implementing foreign-aid projects to forego this branding requirement—thereby granting a waiver—on security or other grounds. For example, an NGO offering training to local farmers in an area contested by militias known to have anti-American views might request a waiver citing potential risk to personnel from said armed groups. Similar exceptions are granted for construction or other projects in areas perceived to be contested or at risk. Meanwhile, there are hospitals, schools, trainings, and so on in the same areas with “from China” branding readily visible. The United States benefits from populations and governments knowing who provides aid, and its marketing needs to reflect as much. The United States should only issue waivers when said branding could pose harm to implementers or beneficiaries, or when it is counterproductive to achieving results.

Focus on advancing interests, rather than “localization” targets. Under current Administrator Samantha Power’s leadership, USAID has articulated a commitment to the localization of US foreign assistance. This includes, but is not limited to, channeling a greater portion of US foreign assistance to local partners and taking additional steps to ensure US-funded projects build sustainable capacity of these local organizations. The United States has considered requiring international nongovernmental organizations that receive the “primary” grant from USAID to allocate a set percentage—up to 20 percent—to go directly to local partners. The rationale for this change, which the Barack Obama administration shared, is that US foreign assistance should help build local capacity to address needs. The intent is noble, but this arguably detracts from US foreign assistance achieving its actual and main intent—advancing US interests.

Rather than set aside an arbitrary amount of foreign aid for channeling to local NGOs, USAID and the State Department should pursue partnership approaches best positioned to achieve US interests in the target country. In most, if not all, cases, this will involve working through international NGOs that collaborate with—and, as needed, build the capacity of—local partners. Foreign aid should focus on building capacity and localizing aid, insofar as doing so advances US interests.

Conclusion

The United States’ overall approach to statecraft—how it forms strategy and uses tools to execute that strategy—has not caught up to the state of the world today. The current approach too often places bureaucratic prerogatives above policy priorities. The United States needs to be on high alert, shaping all aspects of government work toward its competition with China.

Patrick Quirk, PhD, is vice president for strategy, innovation, and impact at the International Republican Institute (IRI) and nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Caitlin Dearing Scott is the director for countering foreign authoritarian influence at the International Republican Institute.

The authors would like to thank Owen Myers for his research assistance.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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1 See, for example: the Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1157/text?format=txt&overview=closed.

2 Matt Schrader and J. Michael Cole, “China Hasn’t Given up on the Belt and Road,” Foreign Affairs, February 7, 2023.

3 “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative,” Green Finance and Development Center, last visited April 3, 2023, https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/?cookie-state-change=1678461024145.

4 David Shulman, ed., “A World Safe for the Party: China’s Authoritarian Influence and the Democratic Response,” International Republican Institute, February 2021, https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/bridge-ii_fullreport-r7-021221.pdf; Caitlin Dearing Scott and Matt Schrader, eds., “Coercion, Capture, and Censorship: Case Studies on the CCP’s Quest for Global Influence,” International Republican Institute, September 2022, https://www.iri.org/resources/coercion-capture-and-censorship-case-studies-on-the-ccps-quest-for-global-influence/.

5 Jonathan Cheng, “China Is Starting to Act Like a Global Power,” Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-has-a-new-vision-for-itself-global-power-da8dc559.

6 “China’s Global Development Initiative Is Not as Innocent as It Sounds,” Economist, June 9, 2022, https://www.economist.com/china/2022/06/09/chinas-global-development-initiative-is-not-as-innocent-as-it-sounds.

7 Ibid.

8 Caitlin Dearing Scott and Isabella Mekker, “How China Exacerbates Global Fragility and What Can be Done to Bolster Democratic Resilience to Confront It,” Modern Diplomacy, September 18, 2021, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/18/how-china-exacerbates-global-fragility-and-what-can-be-done-to-bolster-democratic-resilience-to-confront-it/.

9 Alice Ekman, “China’s Global Security Initiative,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, March 2023, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_5_China%27s%20Global%20Security%20Initiative.pdf; “China’s Paper on Ukraine and Next Steps for Xi’s Global Security Initiative,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 7, 2023, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/Chinas_Paper_on_Ukraine_and_Next_Steps_for_Xis_Global_Security_Initiative.pdf; “Xi Jinping: Time for China to Take Centre Stage,” BBC, October 18, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41647872.

10 Ekman, “China’s Global Security Initiative.”; “China’s Paper on Ukraine and Next Steps for Xi’s Global Security Initiative.”

11 Bill Bishop, “Xi Proposes a “Global Civilization Initiative; PBoC; Missing Bond Date; Guo Wengui,” Sinocism, March 15, 2023, https://www.sinocism.com/p/xi-proposes-a-global-civilization.

12 Shulman, “A World Safe for the Party.”

13 “China’s Paper on Ukraine and Next Steps for Xi’s Global Security Initiative.”

14 “Patrol and Persuade,” Safeguard Defenders, December 2022, https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Patrol%20and%20Persuade%20v2.pdf.

15 See, for example: Paul Stronski, “The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 14, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/14/return-of-global-russia-analytical-framework-pub-75003.

16 Edward Wong, “Russia Secretly Gave $300 Million to Political Parties and Officials Worldwide, U.S. Says,” New York Times, September 13, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/13/us/politics/russia-election-interference.html.

17 David Alere Garcia and Noe Torres, “Russia Meddling in Mexican Election: White House Aide McMaster,” Reuters, January 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-russia-usa/russia-meddling-in-mexican-election-white-house-aide-mcmaster-idUSKBN1EW0UD.

18 See, for example: “Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem,” Global Engagement Center, August 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf; “Disinformation: A Primer on Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns,” Select Committee of Intelligence of the United States Senate, March 30, 2017, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg25362.htm.

19 Cecilia Anesi, Lorenzo Bagnole, and Martin Laine, “Italian Politicians and Big Business Bought into Russian Occupation of Crimea,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, February 3, 2023, https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/italian-politicians-and-big-business-bought-into-russian-occupation-of-crimea.

20 Paul Stronski, “Russia’s Growing Military Footprint in Africa’s Sahel Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 28, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135.

21 “Wagner Group, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and Russia’s Disinformation in Africa,” Global Engagement Center, May 24, 2022, https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/wagner-group-yevgeniy-prigozhin-and-russias-disinformation-in-africa/.

22 “About RT,” RT, last visited April 7, 2023, https://www.rt.com/about-us/.

23 James P. Grant, “Perspectives on Development Aid: World War II to Today and Beyond,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 442 (1979), 1–12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1043475.

24 For an overview of US foreign-assistance categories, purposes, and spending, see: “About Us,” US Office of Foreign Assistance Resources, last visited June 8, 2023, https://www.state.gov/about-us-office-of-foreign-assistance.

25 Cory R. Gill, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern, “Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2022 Budget and Appropriations,”Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47070.

26 “Summary of the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act,”US Senate Armed Services Committee, last visited June 8, 2023, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY22%20NDAA%20Agreement%20Summary.pdf;“Program Acquisition Cost by Weapons System,” US Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, June 8, 2023, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Weapons.pdf.

27 DFC was authorized in October 2018 and officially created in 2019. Authorized by the BUILD act, DFC was formed by merging the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Development Credit Authority (DCA) of USAID.

28 “The Case for Democracy: Does Democracy Cause Economic Growth, Stability, and Work for the Poor?” Varieties of Democracy Institute, May 11, 2021, https://v-dem.net/media/publications/c4d_1_final_2.pdf.

29 Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003,” World Politics 59, 3 (2007), https://www.jstor.org/stable/40060164.

30 “Democracy Report 2023: Defiance in the Face of Autocratization,” Varieties of Democracy Institute, 2023, https://www.v-dem.net.

31 “The Case for Democracy.”

32 Kristen A. Cordell, “Chinese Development Assistance: A New Approach or More of the Same?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/23/chinese-development-assistance-new-approach-or-more-of-same-pub-84141; Gerda Asmus, Andreas Fuchs, and Angelika Müller, “BRICS and Foreign Aid,” AIDDATA, August 1, 2017, https://www.aiddata.org/publications/brics-and-foreign-aid; Axel Dreher, et al., “African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance,” Journal of Development Economics 140 (2019), 44-71, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.04.003.

33 Robert A. Blair, Robert Marty, and Philip Roessler, “Foreign Aid and Soft Power: Great Power Competition in Africa in the Early Twenty-First Century,” British Journal of Political Science 52, 3 (2022), 1355–1376, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/foreign-aid-and-soft-power-great-power-competition-in-africa-in-the-early-twentyfirst-century/55AECCCE48807135072DCB453ED492F1 .

34 Pierre Mandon and Martha T. Woldemichael, “Has Chinese Aid Benefited Recipient Countries? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis,” International Monetary Fund, February 25, 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/02/25/Has-Chinese-Aid-Benefited-Recipient-Countries-Evidence-from-a-Meta-Regression-Analysis-513160; Paul Stronski, “Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 16, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/16/late-to-party-russia-s-return-to-africa-pub-80056; Rosana Himaz, “Challenges Associated with the BRI: a Review of Recent Economics Literature,” Service Industries Journal 41 (2021), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02642069.2019.1584193.

35 Michael J. Mazar, et al., “Stabilizing Great-Power Rivalries,” RAND, 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA456-1.html.

36 See, for example: Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Yusaku Horiuchi, and Terence Wood, “Doing Well by Doing Good: the Impact of Foreign Aid on Foreign Public Opinion,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, December 1, 2013, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361691.

37 Daniel F. Runde, “US Foreign Assistance in the Age of Strategic Competition,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 14, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-foreign-assistance-age-strategic-competition.

38 Andrew S. Natsios, “Foreign Aid in an Era of Great Power Competition,” Prisms 8, 4 (2020), 101–119, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2217683/foreign-aid-in-an-era-of-great-power-competition/.

39 Curt Tarnoff, “The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Significance,”Congressional Research Service, January 18, 2018, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45079.pdf; Hal Brands, “Forging a Strategy” in The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022), 13–29, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv270kvpm.5.

40 Najam Rafique, “US Foreign Assistance: A Study of Aid Mechanism,” Strategic Studies 12, 1 (1988), 55–77, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45182762.

41 Brands, “Forging a Strategy.”

42 Hal Brands, “Contesting the Periphery” in The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022), 76–102, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv270kvpm.8.

43 “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations,”Congressional Research Service, March 31, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R47028.pdf; Keith Griffin, “Foreign Aid after the Cold War,” Studies in Globalization and Economic Transitions (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230372139_3.

44 Feraidoon Shams B., “American Policy: Arms and Aid in Africa,” Current History 77, 448 (1979), 9–13. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45314708.

45 Mark Webber, “The Third World and the Dissolution of the USSR,” Third World Quarterly 13, 4 (1992), 691–713, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992384.Ibid, Brands 2022.

46 Alexander R. Alexeev, “The New Soviet Strategy in the Third World,”RAND, 1983; Hal Brands, “American Grand Strategy: Lessons from the Cold War,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 25, 2016, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/08/american-grand-strategy-lessons-from-the-cold-war/.

47 Susan B. Epstein and Matthew C. Weed, “Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations,” Congressional Research Service, July 28, 2009, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R40102.pdf.

48 Ibid.

49 Forrest Hylton, “Plan Colombia: The Measure of Success,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 17, 1 (2010), 99–115, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24590760.

50 “Document Services: DOD Should Take Actions to Achieve Further Efficiencies,”Government Accountability Office, October 2018, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-71.pdf. Printing costs have continued to rise in the service-branch budget through FY23, based on analysis of Department of Defense budget-justification documents.

The post Maximizing US foreign aid for strategic competition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wagner drama drags Belarus deeper into Russia’s wartime turbulence

Hanna Liubakova — Wed, 28 Jun 2023 22:06:15 +0000

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka appears eager to take full credit for his role in countering Russia’s short-lived but hugely significant recent Wagner rebellion. Speaking on June 27 just days after the uprising came to an abrupt end, Lukashenka provided a detailed and highly flattering account of negotiations with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin that contrasted his own strong leadership with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin’s apparent indecisiveness.

This was a bold move by Lukashenka, who has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival ever since Russia intervened to prop up his regime during a wave of Belarusian pro-democracy protests in the second half of 2020. Clearly, Lukashenka feels emboldened by Putin’s apparent weakness and sees the Wagner affair as an opportunity to burnish his own credentials as both a wise ruler and a skilled negotiator.

Lukashenka’s version of events is certainly convenient but may not be entirely accurate. In reality, he is more likely to have served as a messenger for Putin. The Russian dictator had good reason to avoid any direct talks with rebel leader Prigozhin, who he had publicly branded as a traitor. It is also probably no coincidence that Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rather than Lukashenka announced news of Prigozhin’s subsequent departure for Belarus. This has reinforced perceptions of Belarus as a vassal state of Russia that serves as a place of exile for disgraced members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, Putin himself went even further and offered thousands of Wagner troops who participated in the rebellion the choice of relocating to Belarus if they wish.

It is not yet clear whether significant numbers of Wagner fighters will accept Putin’s invitation and move to Belarus. For now, Lukashenka claims to have offered Wagner the use of an abandoned military base. He has hinted that Wagner troops may serve in a training capacity for his own military, praising their performance in Ukraine and hailing them as “the most prepared unit in the Russian army.”

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Many ordinary Belarusians do not share Lukashenka’s enthusiasm and worry that the potential arrival of Wagner fighters will drag Belarus further into the turmoil engulfing Putin’s Russia. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, research has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose any involvement in the war. Belarusian railway workers and other activists have sabotaged the movement of Russian troops and military equipment across the country, while Belarusian military volunteers have joined the fight against Russia inside Ukraine.

News that Belarus may now serve as a place of exile for large numbers of Wagner fighters is certain to deepen existing concerns over the country’s role as a junior partner in Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka granted Putin permission to use Belarus as a springboard for an attempt to seize Kyiv during the initial stages of the war in early 2022. He continues to supply Russia with military equipment and ammunition, while also allowing Russian troops to train at Belarusian bases. Most recently, Belarus has reportedly begun the process of receiving Russian nuclear weapons.

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The delivery of Russian nukes and the proposal to host Wagner forces underscore the significance of Belarus in Putin’s regional strategy. The continued presence of Lukashenka in Minsk gives Moscow options in its confrontation with the West and enables the Kremlin to enhance its influence in the wider region. This appears to suit Lukashenka, who knows the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon him as long as he remains indispensable to the Russian war effort.

The outlook for Belarus as a whole is less promising. If large numbers of Wagner troops begin arriving in the country, this will dramatically increase Russia’s overall military presence and spark renewed speculation over a possible fresh Russian offensive from Belarusian territory to capture the Ukrainian capital. This would force Ukraine to strengthen its defenses along the country’s northern border and could potentially make Belarus a target.

The stationing of Wagner units in Belarus would also cause alarm bells to ring in nearby European Union and NATO member states such as Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Many of these countries have already taken steps to increase border security with Belarus. The arrival of Russia’s most effective and battle-hardened military units in the country would likely lead to a new iron curtain and the further isolation of the Belarusian population from their European neighbors.

In all likelihood, Lukashenka probably had very little say in the decision to use Belarus as a place of exile for mutinous Wagner forces. At the same time, he may view these troops as a means of protecting himself against any form of domestic opposition. Lukashenka remains vulnerable to the kind of widespread anti-regime protests that swept the country in 2020, and is well aware that his decision to involve Belarus in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is deeply unpopular. Having thousands of Wagner fighters on hand might be the perfect insurance against an uprising aiming to topple his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Wagner forces in these areas have many incentives to be uncooperative. Those in the Middle East and Africa might be especially resistant in order to protect the income they generate from “protecting” governments and warlords. Wagner mercenaries in both the Middle East and Africa also fear redeployment to Ukraine, where, in May, Prigozhin claimed that twenty thousand Wagner fighters died in the 2023 battle over Bakhmut alone.

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Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad might be sympathetic to any effort by Russian President Putin to assert control over the Wagner forces stationed in his country. Centralized dictatorial control is, after all, a principle he seeks to apply in his own country. Assad, though, will not want to see a conflict between regular Russian armed forces and Wagner forces, as this could encourage Assad’s many opponents to revive their opposition to his regime. Perhaps he will try to imitate Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko by attempting to mediate between rival Russian forces.

By contrast, General Khalifa Haftar in Libya and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—also known as Hemedti—in Sudan are much more reliant on support from Wagner. In April, CNN revealed that Wagner has been arming Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces in its war against Sudan’s military leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, with whom Moscow maintains good relations, through Haftar-controlled territory in neighboring Libya. Anything that weakens or diminishes Wagner’s ability to support Haftar and Hemedti would be most unwelcome, especially since they have no assurance that the Russian MOD will pick up where Wagner forces left off. Of course, since the Wagner Group may not be dependent on financing from Moscow in many places—due to local sources of income, such as some degree of control over natural resources—Wagner-protected governments or opposition leaders controlling parts of countries may be able to continue collaborating with local Wagner bosses without involving a Moscow that is distracted by issues closer to home.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the recent Wagner crisis affects not just those Middle Eastern countries with a Wagner presence, but all Middle Eastern countries cooperating with Russia—which is basically all Middle Eastern governments. To begin with, the rebellion of security forces whom Putin had strongly relied upon is not something that the Middle East’s many authoritarian leaders want to see repeated in their own countries. Additionally, for all those Middle Eastern governments that came to see Russia as an effective security partner—partly based on Russia’s successful intervention in Syria compared to America’s unsuccessful ones in Iraq and Afghanistan—the Wagner rebellion raises questions about Putin’s capability to act outside of Russia, as internal matters are necessarily his immediate focus.

For some, of course, this might offer opportunities. Turkey, for example, might take this as a chance to exercise greater freedom in places where Russia and Turkey have backed opposing sides (e.g. Syria, Libya, and the Armenia–Azerbaijan territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh).

Iran might see the possibility of declining Russian focus on Syria as more than just an opportunity to increase its activity in Syria. Tehran may even regard it as necessary to do so out of fear that the Assad regime might start to unravel otherwise. Increased Iranian activity there would heighten Israel’s already strong concerns about Iranian activity in Syria and could lead to a clash between them.

Elsewhere, Putin’s focus on internal affairs and the war in Ukraine may accelerate the trend among Middle Eastern governments—including those in the oil-rich Gulf—of viewing China, and not Russia, as a counterbalance to the United States.

Perhaps more than anything else, the Wagner rebellion will force Middle Eastern governments to lower their expectations about what Putin’s Russia can do for them, and adjust their foreign policies accordingly.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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Kroenig quoted in RND on Machiavelli’s view of democracies

Atlantic Council — Tue, 27 Jun 2023 18:15:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 27, Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland on how Niccolò Machiavelli favored democracies for their efficiency rather than believing they were morally superior.

Machiavelli promoted republics with strong institutions instead of systems in which power-hungry autocrats end up enriching themselves.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Deputy Director of Foresight, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

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What’s driving Central and Eastern Europe’s growing ties with Taiwan?

Petr Tůma — Tue, 27 Jun 2023 15:34:31 +0000

In recent months, a number of Western European leaders and officials have trekked east. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Beijing last November, followed by German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock in April. French President Emmanuel Macron also went to China in April, along with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez traveled there earlier, in March. But there was another notable yet underreported visit in the opposite direction. This month, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu traveled west to visit Poland, Czechia, Italy, and Brussels. He held numerous meetings, including with lawmakers. In Prague, he spoke with the speakers of both chambers of the parliament and appeared right after Czech President Petr Pavel at the podium of a conference organized by the European Values Center for Security Policy, which is so far the only European Union (EU)-based think tank with an office in Taiwan.

Wu’s visit demonstrates a developing trend. In recent years, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have established themselves as some of the closest friends of Taiwan. A handful of CEE capitals are now working to raise the Taiwan question higher on the EU agenda amid the bloc’s ongoing search for new relations with China, even as much of Western Europe exhibits more caution in reshaping its geopolitical and economic relations with Beijing.

CEE countries’ approach to Taiwan is in large part a function of their China policies. Taiwan has come to the forefront of their attention mainly because of frustration with Beijing. There are several reasons for this development. First, former Soviet satellites can, given their history, be more sensitive to the threats stemming from authoritarian regimes. With Beijing apparently trying to help Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine, CEE leaders and officials have drawn a parallel there. China is becoming a new Russia, a revisionist power endangering the liberal-democratic world order. Second, CEE countries see how Beijing dealt with the COVID-19 pandemic and how its irresponsible behavior contributed to a major global crisis. Third, Washington’s sharper approach toward Beijing, which the Trump administration rolled out and the Biden administration has doubled down on, has enabled, or at least facilitated, the shift in approach among some CEE countries. Fourth, some CEE leaders are frustrated by unfulfilled Chinese investment promises in the region.

Lithuania should be a wake-up call

As a result of all these factors, China’s “17+1” platform, formed in 2012 to gain further influence in CEE, started to crumble. The first country to drop out was Lithuania in 2021, followed in 2022 by Estonia and Latvia.

In 2021, Lithuania allowed the opening of a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. This angered China, as it made Lithuania the first EU member state to use the name of Taiwan instead of Taipei for its economic and cultural office. Beijing said it was a breach of its “one China principle” and responded by downgrading diplomatic relations with Lithuania, recalling its ambassador from Vilnius, and ordering the country’s envoy to leave China. Beijing also launched harsh economic sanctions, blocking most of its trade with Lithuania and later also pressuring companies in other EU countries to stop doing business with the Baltic state.

Fortunately, Lithuania’s trade with China was limited, and other European countries and the United States came to Lithuania’s aid with trade support. EU and transatlantic unity proved to be the core of the successful defense against Chinese coercion. Nonetheless, Beijing’s actions should serve as a wake-up call for countries that have extensive business with China. It will be more difficult for allies of larger countries with deeper ties to China’s economy to make a difference with their help compared to what they have easily done in the case of small Lithuania.

How Czechia has engaged with Taiwan

Still, friendlier relations with Taiwan do not necessarily need to mean that ties with China will collapse completely, as illustrated by the case of Czechia and explained to me by Ivana Karásková from the Prague-based Association for International Affairs. Despite considerable changes in Czech rhetoric, major tensions have so far been avoided. This is where it differs from Václav Havel’s essentially idealistic approach in the 1990s, when the defense of Tibet and Taiwan was accompanied by the significant downgrade of bilateral relations with China.

A decade after Havel left Prague Castle in 2003, the foreign policy pendulum in Prague swung to the other side, focusing on business at the expense of human rights concerns. These were the times of social democratic governments and President Miloš Zeman, who once said in Beijing that he was eager to learn “how to increase economic growth and stabilize the society.” To be fair, the restart of relations with China had been launched already, during the government of Petr Nečas, as some in his Civic Democratic party—which now leads the country—were quite critical of what was called “Havel’s Dalai Lamaism.”

At that time, Taiwan became one of the ways for the opposition in Prague to push against Zeman and the government’s open-door China policy. In 2020, Czech Senate Speaker Miloš Vystrčil, the second highest-ranking official in the country, visited Taiwan and met with President Tsai Ing-wen. It was a landmark trip with only a few recent precedents.

Today, with the center-right government of Prime Minister Petr Fiala and especially Pavel, Prague has re-established Czechia as one of Taiwan’s best friends within the EU. It is moving back toward Havel’s legacy on the issue while at the same time trying to keep a solid working relationship with Beijing. However, there are two questions here: How long will China be on board, and is there a strong enough common agenda Beijing and Prague can work on together?

Meanwhile, Prague-Taipei relations are advancing. In March, Lower House Speaker Markéta Pekarová Adamová visited Taiwan, where she was accompanied by 150 business leaders, scientists, and officials, including directors of national counterintelligence and cybersecurity agencies. She met with Tsai and Prime Minister Chen Chien-jen. Several cooperation agreements were signed and there was even speculation about the possibility of Czechia selling arms to Taiwan, but that proved not to be accurate. There’s already ongoing military cooperation in the field of education, as indicated by a memorandum of understanding signed between Czech and Taiwanese defense universities.

Pavel made news for speaking over the phone with Tsai, who called him in January to congratulate him for his election victory. Pavel became the first European head of state to speak with the Taiwanese president. And as mentioned above, he accepted the invitation to speak on June 15 at an event in Prague just before Taiwan’s foreign minister, an unprecedented step for an EU head of state.

Officials I talk with in Prague say the Czech approach toward China and Taiwan has not changed in substance. The country has long had a “one China” policy that offers enough space for some strategic ambiguity on Taiwan. Instead, it’s about different accents, with now more emphasis on values and less of a singular focus on business. Prague is currently finalizing its very first national security strategy, expected any day now, which will be important to watch for how far it goes in calling China a security threat.

A likely path forward

Other CEE countries are moving in the same direction as well. Slovakia is steadily strengthening its ties with the island, having signed an agreement on semiconductor cooperation signed earlier this month. Poland, too, is now becoming more critical on China and more friendly toward Taiwan, despite Polish President Andrzej Duda’s long-term push for open arms toward Beijing. During his speech at an Atlantic Council event in April, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki warned Europeans about the dangers of deepening economic ties with China. He also drew a parallel between Ukraine and Taiwan: “You need to support Ukraine if you want Taiwan to stay as it is. If Ukraine gets conquered, the next day, China can attack Taiwan.” And as recently as June 19, Tsai received a Polish parliamentary delegation in Taipei.

Nevertheless, the tide is slow. Recent research from the European Council on Foreign Relations showed that European public opinion on China shifted surprisingly little during the past few years. A majority still perceive China as a partner that the EU should work with and don’t appear to buy into a democracy-versus-autocracy narrative. One shouldn’t expect any short- or medium-term diplomatic breakthroughs regarding Taiwan. Instead, greater development of economic and cultural cooperation, accompanied by the intensification of high-level diplomatic contacts, is the likely path forward. Bolder moves may come first from states less economically dependent on China, be they in CEE or in Western Europe.

Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a Czech career diplomat with an expertise on Europe, Middle East, and transatlantic relations. He previously worked at the Czech Embassy in Washington, DC.

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Global Strategy 2023: Winning the tech race with China

Peter Engelke, Emily Weinstein — Tue, 27 Jun 2023 13:00:00 +0000

Strategy Paper Editorial Board
Executive summary
A 2033 What If…
Strategic context
Goals
Major elements of the strategy
Assumptions
Guidelines for implementation
Major risks
Conclusions and recommendations

As strategic competition between the United States and China continues across multiple domains, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security in partnership with the Global China Hub, has spent the past year hosting a series of workshops aimed at developing a coherent strategy for the United States and its allies and partners to compete with China around technology. Based on these workshops and additional research, we developed our strategy for the US to retain its technological advantage over China and compete alongside its allies and partners.

Strategy Paper Editorial board

Executive editors

Frederick Kempe
Alexander V. Mirtchev

Editor-in-chief

Matthew Kroenig

Editorial board members

James L. Jones
Odeh Aburdene
Paula Dobriansky
Stephen J. Hadley
Jane Holl Lute
Ginny Mulberger
Stephanie Murphy
Dan Poneman
Arnold Punaro

Executive summary

The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are engaged in a strategic competition surrounding the development of key technologies. Both countries seek to out-compete the other to achieve first-mover advantage in breakthrough technologies, and to be the best country in terms of the commercial scaling of emerging and existing technologies.

Until recently, the United States was the undisputed leader in the development of breakthrough technologies, and in the innovation and commercial scaling of emerging and existing technologies, while China was a laggard in both categories. That script has changed dramatically. China is now the greatest single challenger to US preeminence in this space.

For the United States, three goals are paramount. The first is to preserve the US advantage in technological development and innovation relative to China. The second is to harmonize US strategy and policy with those of US allies and partners, while gaining favor with nonaligned states. The third is to retain international cooperation around trade in technology and in scientific research and exploration.

The strategy outlined in these pages has three major elements: the promotion of technologically based innovation; the protection of strategically valuable science and technology (S&T) knowhow, processes, machines, and technologies; and the coordination of policies with allies and partners. The shorthand for this triad is “promote, protect, and coordinate.”

On the promotion side, if the United States wishes to remain the leading power in scientific research and in translating that research into transformative technologies, then the US government—in partnership with state and local governments, the private sector, and academia—will need to reposition and recalibrate its policies and investments. On the protect side, a coherent strategy requires mechanisms to protect and defend a country’s S&T knowledge and capabilities from malign actors, including trade controls, sanctions, investment screening, and more. Smartly deploying these tools, however, is exceedingly difficult and requires the United States to hone its instruments in a way that yields only intended results. The coordination side focuses on “tech diplomacy,” given the need to ensure US strategy and policy positively influence as many allies, partners, and even nonaligned states as possible, while continuing to engage China on technology-related issues. The difficulty lies in squaring the interests and priorities of the United States with those of its allies and partners, as well as nonaligned states, and even China itself.

This strategy assumes that China will remain a significant competitor to the United States for years to come. It also assumes that relations between the United States and China will remain strained at best or, at worst, devolve into antagonism or outright hostility. Even if a thaw were to reset bilateral relations entirely, the US interest in maintaining its advantage in technological development would remain.

Any successful long-term strategy will require that the US government pursue policies that are internally well coordinated, are based on solid empirical evidence, and are flexible and nimble in the short run, while being attentive to longer-run trends and uncertainties.

There are two major sets of risks accompanying this strategy. Overreach is one because decoupling to preserve geopolitical advantages can be at odds with economic interests. A second involves harms to global governance including failure to continue cooperation surrounding norms and standards to guide S&T research, and failure to continue international science research cooperation focused on solving global-commons challenges such as pandemics and climate change.

The recommendations that follow from this analysis include the following, all directed at US policymakers.

Restore and sustain public research and development (R&D) funding for scientific and technological advancement.
Improve and sustain STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) education and skills training across K–12, university, community college, and technical schools.
Craft a more diverse tech sector.
Attract and retain highly skilled talent from abroad.
Support whole-of-government strategy development.
Ensure private-sector firms remain at the cutting edge of global competitiveness.
Improve S&T intelligence and counterintelligence.
Ensure calibrated development and application of punitive measures.
Build out and sustain robust multilateral institutions.
Engage with China, as it cannot be avoided.

A 2033 What If…

Imagine that it is the year 2033. Imagine that China has made enormous strides forward in the technology arena at the expense of the United States and its allies and partners. Suppose that this outcome occurred because, between 2023 and 2033, China’s economy not only does not weaken substantially but instead goes from strength to strength, including (importantly) increasing its capabilities in technological development and innovation. Suppose, too, that the US government failed to craft and maintain the kinds of investments and policies that are needed to sustain and enhance its world-leading tech-creation machine—its “innovation ecosystem”—to stay ahead of China. Suppose that the US government also failed to properly calibrate the punitive measures designed to prevent China from acquiring best-in-class technologies from elsewhere in the world—where calibration means the fine-tuning of policies to achieve prescribed objectives without spillover consequence. Finally, suppose that the United States and its allies and partners around the world failed to align with one another in terms of strategies and policies regarding how to engage China and, just as critically, about alignment of their own ends. What might that world look like?

Looking at that world from the year 2033, a first observation is that US scientific and technological (S&T) advantage, a period that lasted from 1945 to the 2020s, has come to an end. In its place is a world where China’s government labs, universities, and firms are often the first to announce breakthrough scientific developments and the first to turn them into valuable technologies.

For the US government and for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, the strategic consequences are severe, as China has not only closed much of the defense spending gap by 2033 but is able to employ weaponry as advanced, and in some cases more advanced, than those of the United States and its allies.¹ Military planners from Washington to New Delhi watch China’s rising capabilities with much anxiety, given the geostrategic leverage that such changes have given Beijing across the region.

Nor is this problem the only headache for the United States and its coalition of partners in 2033. For a variety of reasons, many of China’s tech firms are outcompeting those elsewhere in the world, including some of the United States’ biggest and most important firms. Increasingly, the world looks as much to Shenzhen as to Silicon Valley for the latest tech-infused products and services.

China’s long-standing ambition to give its tech firms an advantage has paid off. The Chinese state has successfully pursued its strategy of commercial engagement with other countries, one that has been well known for decades and is characterized by direct and indirect financial and technical aid for purchases of Chinese hardware and software. This approach, while imperfect, drove adoption of Chinese technology abroad, with much of that adoption happening in the Global South.² Across much of Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, China has grown into the biggest player in the tech space, with its technologies appealing both to consumers and to many governments looking for financial assistance in upgrading their tech infrastructure. Moreover, China’s tech assistance has aided authoritarian governments seeking the means to control access to information, especially online, and the desire to surveil citizens and suppress dissent.³ China’s efforts have been a major reason why the internet has fractured in many countries around the world. The ideal of the internet as an open platform is largely gone, replaced by a system of filtered access to information—in many instances, access that is controlled by authoritarian and illiberal states.

In 2033, even the biggest US-based tech firms struggle to keep pace with Chinese firms, as do tech firms based in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. Although still formidable, Western firms find themselves at a disadvantage in both domestic and foreign markets. China’s unfair trading practices have continued to give its firms an edge, even in markets in mature economies and wealthy countries. China has continued its many unfair trading practices, including massive direct and indirect state subsidies and regulatory support for its firms, suspect acquisition—often outright theft—of intellectual property (IP) from firms abroad, and requiring that foreign firms transfer technology to China in exchange for granting access to its enormous domestic consumer market, in 2033 the biggest in the world.⁴ When added to the real qualitative leaps that China has made in terms of the range and sophistication of its tech-based products and services, foreign firms are often on the back foot even at home. In sector after sector, China is capturing an increasingly large share of global wealth.

Nor is this all. China’s rising influence means that the democratic world has found it impossible to realize its preferences concerning the global governance of technology. This problem extends beyond China’s now significant influence on technical-standards development within the range of international organizations that are responsible for standards.⁵ The problem is much larger than even that. Since the early 2020s, because of decreasing interest in scientific cooperation, the United States, China, and Europe have been unable to agree on the basic norms and principles that should guide the riskiest forms of advanced tech development. As a result, big gaps have appeared in how the major players approach such development. This patchwork, incomplete governance architecture has meant that countries, firms, and even individual labs have forged ahead without common ethical-normative frameworks to guide research and development. In such fields as artificial intelligence (AI), China has increased its implementation of AI-based applications that have eroded individual rights and privacies—for example, AI-driven facial-recognition technologies used by the state to monitor individual activity—not only within China, but in parts of the world where its technologies have been adopted.⁶

Nor is even this long list all that is problematic in the year 2033. Scientific cooperation between the United States and China—and, by extension, China and many US allies and partners—has declined precipitously since 2023. Cross-national collaboration among the world’s scientists has always been a proud hallmark of global scientific research, delivering progress on issues ranging from cancer treatments to breakthrough energy research. Collaboration between China on the one hand, and Western states on the other, used to be a pillar of global science. Now, unfortunately, much of that collaboration has disappeared, given the rising suspicions and antagonism and the resulting policies that were implemented to limit and, in some cases, even block scientific exchange.⁷

From the perspective of developments that led to this point in the year 2033, the United States and its allies and partners failed to pursue a coherent, cooperative, and united strategy vis-à-vis strategic competition with China. Policymakers were unable to articulate, and then implement, policies that were consistent over time and across national context. Various international forums were created for engagement on strategy and policy questions, but they proved of low utility as policy harmonization bodies or tech trade-dispute mechanisms.

Opening session of US-China talks at the Captain Cook Hotel in Anchorage, Alaska, US March 18, 2021. REUTERS/Frederic J. Brown

Strategic context

The above scenario, which sketches a world in 2033 where China has gained the upper hand at the expense of the United States and its allies and partners, is not inevitable. As this strategy paper articulates, there is much that policymakers in the United States and elsewhere can do to ensure that more benign futures, from their perspectives, are possible. However, as this strategy paper also articulates, their success is far from a given.

The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are engaged in a strategic competition surrounding the development of key technologies, including advanced semiconductors (“chips”), AI, advanced computing (including quantum computing), a range of biotechnologies, and much more. Both countries seek to out-compete the other to achieve first-mover advantage in breakthrough technologies, and to be the best country at the commercial scaling of emerging and existing technologies.

These two capabilities—the first to develop breakthrough technologies and the best at tech-based innovation—overlap in important respects, but they are not identical and should not be regarded as the same thing. The first country to build a quantum computer for practical application (such as advanced decryption) is an example of the former capability; the country that is best at innovating on price, design, application, and functionality of electric vehicles (EVs) is an example of the latter capability. The former will give the inventing country a (temporary) strategic and military advantage; the latter will give the more innovative country a significant economic edge, indirectly contributing to strategic and military advantage. The outcome of this competition will go a long way toward determining which country—China or the United States—has the upper hand in the larger geostrategic competition between them in the coming few decades.

For China, the primary goal is to build an all-encompassing indigenous innovation ecosystem, particularly in sectors that Chinese leadership has deemed critical. Beijing views technology as the main arena of competition and rivalry with the United States, with many high-level policies and strategy documents released under Xi Jinping’s tenure emphasizing technology across all aspects of society. Under Xi’s direction, China has intensified its preexisting efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in key technology sectors, centering on indigenous innovation and leapfrogging the United States.

On the US side, the Joe Biden administration and Congress have emphasized the need to maintain leadership in innovation and preserve US technological supremacy. Although there are many similarities between the Donald Trump and Biden administrations’ approaches to competition with China, one of the primary differences has been the Biden administration’s focus on bringing allies and partners onboard and trying to make policies as coordinated and multilateral as possible. While a laudable goal, implementation of a seamless allies-and-partners coordination is proving difficult.

Until recently, the United States was the undisputed leader in the development of breakthrough technologies, and in the innovation and commercial scaling of emerging and existing technologies. Until recently, China was a laggard in both categories, falling well behind the United States and most, if not all, of the world’s advanced economies in both the pace of scientific and technological (S&T) development and the ability to innovate around technologically infused products and services.

That script has changed dramatically as a result of China’s rapid ascension up the S&T ladder, starting with Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the 1970s and 1980s and continuing through Xi Jinping’s tenure.⁸

Although analysts disagree about how best to measure China’s current S&T capabilities and its progress in innovating around tech-based goods and services, there is no dispute that China is now the greatest single challenger to US preeminence in this space. In some respects, China may already have important advantages over the United States and all other countries—for example, in its ability to apply what has been labeled “process knowledge,” rooted in the country’s vast manufacturing base, to improve upon existing tech products and invent new ones.⁹

Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at the military parade marking the 70th founding anniversary of People’s Republic of China, on its National Day in Beijing, China October 1, 2019. REUTERS/Jason Lee

This competition represents a new phase in the two countries’ histories. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the decade that followed saw US leadership seek to include China as a member of the rules-based international order. In a March 2000 speech, President Bill Clinton spoke in favor of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that US support of China’s new permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status was “clearly in our larger national interest” and would “advance the goal America has worked for in China for the past three decades.”¹⁰ China’s leadership returned the favor, with President Jiang Zemin later stating that China “would make good on [China’s] commitments…and further promote [China’s] all-directional openness to the outside world.”¹¹

Despite some US concerns, the period from 2001 through most of the Barack Obama administration saw Sino-American relations at their best.¹² The lure of the Chinese market was strong, with bilateral trade in goods exploding from less than $8 billion in 1986 to more than $578 billion in 2016.¹³ People-to-people exchanges increased dramatically as well, with tourism from China increasing from 270,000 in 2005 to 3.17 million in 2017, and the number of student F-visas granted to PRC students increasing tenfold, from approximately 26,000 in 2000 to nearly 250,000 in 2014.¹⁴ US direct investment in China also grew significantly after 2000, as US companies saw the vast potential of the Chinese market and workforce. Notably, overall US investment in China continued to grow even after the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁵

So what changed? In a 2018 essay titled “The China Reckoning,” China scholars Ely Ratner and Kurt Campbell—now both members of the Biden administration—described how the US plan for China and its role in the international system had not gone as hoped.

Neither carrots nor sticks have swayed China as predicted. Diplomatic and commercial engagement have not brought political and economic openness. Neither US military power nor regional balancing has stopped Beijing from seeking to displace core components of the US-led system. And the liberal international order has failed to lure or bind China as powerfully as expected. China has instead pursued its own course, belying a range of American expectations in the process.
Campbell and Ratner, “The China Reckoning.”

These sentiments were shared by many others in Washington. Many felt like China was taking advantage of the United States as the Obama administration transitioned to its “pivot to Asia.” For example, in 2014 China sent an uninvited electronic-surveillance ship alongside four invited naval vessels to the US-organized Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) military exercises, damaging what had appeared to be improving military-to-military relations.¹⁶ On the economic side, despite the two sides signing an agreement in April 2015 not to engage in industrial cyber espionage, it soon became clear that China did not plan to uphold its side of the bargain. In 2017, the US Department of Justice indicted three Chinese nationals for cyber theft from US firms, including Moody’s Analytics, Siemens AG, and Trimble.¹⁷

Within China, political developments were also driving changes in the relationship. Xi Jinping assumed power in November 2012, and most expected him to continue on his predecessors’ trajectory. However, in 2015 a slew of Chinese policies caught the eye of outside observers, especially the “Made in China 2025” strategy that caused a massive uproar in Washington and other global capitals, given its explicit focus on indigenization of key sectors, including the tech sector.

On the US side, when President Trump was elected in 2017, the bilateral economic relationship came under further fire, sparked by growing concerns surrounding China’s unfair trade practices, IP theft, and the growing trade deficit between the two countries. First the first time, frustration over these issues brought about strong US policy responses, including tariffs on steel, aluminum, soybeans, and more, a Section 301 investigation of Chinese economic practices by the US trade representative, and unprecedented export controls on the Chinese firms Huawei and ZTE. On the Chinese side, a growing emphasis on self-reliance, in conjunction with narratives surrounding the decline of the West, has dominated the conversation at the highest levels of government. In many instances, some of these statements—like China’s relatively unachievable indigenization goals in the semiconductor supply chain—have pushed the US policy agenda closer toward one centering on zero-sum tech competition.

In 2023, the Biden administration continued some Trump-era policies toward China, often reaching for export controls as a means to prevent US-origin technology from making its way to China. The Biden administration is even considering restricting outbound investment into China, stemming from concerns around everything from pharmaceutical supply chains to military modernization. The bottom line is that US-China competition is intense, and is here to stay for the foreseeable future.

Goals

There are three underlying goals for policymakers in the United States to consider when developing a comprehensive strategy.

Preserve the US advantage in technological development and innovation relative to China. Although the United States has historically led the world in the development of cutting-edge technologies, technological expertise, skills, and capabilities have proliferated worldwide and eroded this advantage. Although the United States arguably maintains its first position, it can no longer claim to be the predominant global S&T power across the entire board. As a result, US leadership will have to approach this issue with a clear-eyed understanding of US capabilities and strengths, as well as weaknesses.

Further, it is impractical to believe that the United States alone can lead in all critical technology areas. US policymakers must determine (with the help of the broader scientific community) not only which technologies are critical to national security but also how these technologies are directly relevant in a national security context. This point suggests the need for aligning means with ends—what is the US objective in controlling or promoting a specific technology? Absent strong answers to this question, technology controls or promotion efforts will likely yield unintended results, both good and bad.

Further, it is impractical to believe that the United States alone can lead in all critical technology areas. US policymakers must determine (with the help of the broader scientific community) not only which technologies are critical to national security but also how these technologies are directly relevant in a national security context. This point suggests the need for aligning means with ends—what is the US objective in controlling or promoting a specific technology? Absent strong answers to this question, technology controls or promotion efforts will likely yield unintended results, both good and bad.

Further, the United States’ capacity to transform basic research into applications and commercial products is an invaluable asset that has propelled its innovation ecosystem for decades. In contrast, Chinese leadership is keenly aware of its deficiencies in this area.

First-mover advantage in laboratory scientific research is not the same thing as innovation excellence. A country needs both if it seeks predominance. A country can have outstanding scientific capabilities but poor innovation capacity (or vice versa). Claims that China is surpassing the United States and other advanced countries in critical technology areas are premature, and often fail to consider how metrics to assess innovative capacity interact with one another (highly cited publications, patents, investment trends, market shares, governance, etc.).¹⁸ Assessing a country’s ability to preserve or maintain its technological advantage requires a holistic approach that takes all of these factors into account.
Harmonize strategy and policy with allies and partners, while gaining favor with nonaligned states. With respect to strategic competition vis-a-vis China, the interests of the United States are not always identical to those of its allies and partners. Any strategy designed to compete in the tech space with China needs to align with the strategies and interests of US allies and partners. Simultaneously, US strategy should offer benefits to nonaligned states within the context of this strategic competition with China, so as to curry favor with them.

This goal is especially important, given that the United States relies on and benefits from a network of allies and partners, whereas China aspires to self-sufficiency in S&T development. To preserve the United States’ advantage, US leadership must first recognize that its network is one of the strongest weapons in the US arsenal.

US allies and partners, of which there are many, want to maintain and strengthen their close diplomatic, security, and economic ties to the United States. The problem is that most also have substantial, often critical, economic relationships with China. Hence, they are loath to jeopardize their relationships with either the United States or China.

This strategic dilemma has become a significant one for US allies in both the transpacific and transatlantic arenas. As examples, Japan and South Korea, the two most advanced technology-producing countries in East Asia, are on the front lines of this dilemma. Their challenging situation owes to their geographic proximity to China on the one hand—and, hence, proximity to China’s strategic ambitions in the East and South China Seas, as well as Taiwan—and to their close economic ties to both China and the United States on the other.¹⁹ Although both have been attempting an ever-finer balancing act between the United States and China for years, the challenge is becoming more difficult.²⁰ In January 2023, Japan reportedly joined the United States and the Netherlands to restrict sales of advanced chipmaking lithography machines to China, despite the policy being against its clear economic interests.²¹ In April and May 2023, even before China banned sales of chips from Micron Technology, a US firm, the US government was urging the South Korea government to ensure that Micron’s principal rivals, South Korea’s Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, did not increase their sales in China.²²

For nonaligned states, many of which are in the Global South, their interests are manifold and not easily shoehorned into a US-versus-China bifurcation. Many states in this category have generalized concerns about a world that is dominated by either Washington or Beijing, and, as such, are even more interested in hedging than are the closest US allies and partners. Their governments and business communities seek trade, investment, and access to technologies that can assist with economic development, while their consumers seek affordable and capable tech. Although China has made enormous strides with respect to technological penetration of markets in the Global South, there also is much opportunity for the United States and its allies and partners, especially given widespread popular appetite for Western ideals, messaging, and consumer-facing technologies.²³
Retain cooperation around trade and scientific exploration. One of the risks that is inherent in a fraught Sino-American bilateral relationship is that global public-goods provision will be weakened. Within the context of rising tensions over technological development, there are two big concerns: first, that global trade in technologically based goods and services will be harmed, and second, that global scientific cooperation will shrink.

An open trading system has been an ideal of the rules-based international order since 1945, built on the premise that fair competition within established trading rules is best for global growth and exchange. The US-led reforms at the end of the World War II and early postwar period gave the world the Bretton Woods system, which established the International Monetary Fund (IMF), plus the Marshall Plan and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Together, these reforms enabled unprecedented multi-decade growth in global trade.²⁴ China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, which the US government supported, marked a high point as many read into China’s entry its endorsement of the global trade regime based on liberal principles. However, since then—and for reasons having much to do with disagreements over China’s adherence to WTO trading rules—this global regime has come under significant stress. In 2023, with few signs that the Sino-American trade relationship will improve, there is significant risk of damage to the global trading system writ large.²⁵

Any damage done to the global trading system also risks harm to trade between the two countries, which is significant given its ongoing scale (in 2022, bilateral trade in goods measured a record $691 billion).²⁶. Tech-based trade and investment remain significant for both countries, as illustrated by the February 2023 announcement of a $3.5-billion partnership between Ford Motor Company and Contemporary Amperex Technology Limited (CATL) to build an EV-battery plant in Michigan using CATL-licensed technology.²⁷ A priority for US policymakers should be to preserve trade competition in tech-infused goods and services, at least for those goods and services that are not subject to national security-based restrictions and where China’s trade practices do not result in unfair advantages for its firms.

Beyond trade, there are public-goods benefits resulting from bilateral cooperation in the S&T domain. These benefits extend to scientific research that can hasten solutions to global-commons challenges—for example, climate change. China and the United States are the two most active countries in global science, and are each other’s most important scientific-research partner.²⁸ Any harm done to their bilateral relationship in science is likely to decrease the quality of global scientific output. Further, the benefits from cooperation also extend to creation and enforcement of international norms and ethics surrounding tech development in, for example, AI and biotechnology.

A worker conducts quality-check of a solar module product at a factory of a monocrystalline silicon solar equipment manufacturer LONGi Green Technology Co, in Xian, Shaanxi province, China December 10, 2019. REUTERS/Muyu Xu

Major elements of the strategy

The strategy outlined in these pages has three major elements: the promotion of technologically based innovation, sometimes labeled “running faster”; the protection of strategically valuable S&T knowhow, processes, machines, and technologies; and the coordination of policies with allies and partners. This triad—promote, protect, and coordinate—is also shorthand for the most basic underlying challenge facing strategists in the US government and in the governments of US allies and partners. In the simplest terms, strategists should aim to satisfy the “right balance between openness and protection,” in the words of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.²⁹ This strategic logic holds for both the United States and its allies and partners.

Promote: The United States has been the global leader in science and tech-based innovation since 1945, if not earlier. However, that advantage has eroded, in some areas significantly, in particular since the end of the Cold War. If the United States wishes to remain the leading power in scientific research and in translating that research into transformative technologies (for military and civilian application), then the US government, in partnership with state and local governments, the private sector, and academia, will have to reposition and recalibrate its policies and investments.

The preeminence of America’s postwar innovation ecosystem resulted from several factors, including: prewar strengths across several major industries; massive wartime investments in science, industry, and manufacturing; and even larger investments made by the US government in the decades after the war to boost US scientific and technological capabilities. The 1940s through 1960s were especially important, owing to the whole-of-society effort behind prosecuting World War II and then the Cold War. The US government established many iconic S&T-focused institutions, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), most of the country’s national laboratories (e.g., Sandia National Laboratories and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories), and dramatically boosted funding for science education, public-health research, and academic scientific research.³⁰

This system, and the enormous investments made by the US government to support it, spurred widespread and systematized cooperation among government, academic science, and the private sector. This cooperation led directly to a long list of breakthrough technologies for military and civilian purposes, and to formation of the United States’ world-leading tech hubs, Silicon Valley most prominent among them.³¹

The trouble is that after the Cold War ended, “policymakers [in the US government] no longer felt an urgency and presided over the gradual and inexorable shrinking of this once preeminent system,” in particular through allowing federal spending on research and development (R&D) and education to flatline or even atrophy.³² From a peak of around 2.2 percent of national gross domestic product (GDP) in the early 1960s, federal R&D spending has declined since, reaching a low of 0.66 percent in 2017 before rebounding slightly to 0.76 percent in 2023.³³

Today, US competitors, including China, have figured out the secrets to growing their own innovation ecosystems (including the cultural dimensions that historically have been key to separating the United States from its competition) and are investing the necessary funding to do so. For example, several countries, especially China, have outpaced the United States in R&D spending. Between 1995 and 2018, China’s R&D spending grew at an astonishing 15 percent per annum, about double that of the next-fastest country, South Korea, and about five times that of the United States. By 2018, China’s total R&D spending (from public and private sources) was in second place behind the United States and had surpassed the total for the entire European Union.³⁴ From the US perspective, other metrics are equally concerning. A 2021 study by Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) projected that China will produce nearly twice as many STEM PhDs as the United States by 2025 (if counting only US citizens graduating with a PhD in STEM, that figure would be three times as much). This projection is based, in part, on China’s government doubling its investment in STEM higher education during the 2010s.³⁵

The United States retains numerous strengths, including the depth and breadth of its scientific establishment, number and sizes of its Big Tech firms, robust startup economy and venture capital to support it, numerous world-class educational institutions, dedication to protection of intellectual property, relatively open migration system for high-skilled workers, diverse and massive consumer base, and its still-significant R&D investments from public and private sources.³⁶

In addition, over the past few years there have been encouraging signs of a shift in thinking among policymakers, away from allowing the innovation model that won the Cold War to further erode and toward increased bipartisan recognition that the federal government has a critical role to play in updating that system. As was the case with the Soviet Union, this newfound interest in strengthening the US innovation ecosystem owes much to a recognition that China is a serious strategic competitor to the United States in the technology arena.³⁷ The Biden administration’s passage of several landmark pieces of legislation, including the CHIPS and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), increased the amount of federal government spending on S&T, STEM education and skills training, and various forms of infrastructure (digital and physical), all of which are concrete evidence of the degree to which this administration and much of Congress recognize the stiff challenge from China.
Protect: A coherent strategy requires mechanisms to protect and defend a country’s S&T knowledge and capabilities from malign actors. Policy documents and statements from US officials over the past decade have called out the many ways in which the Chinese state orchestrates technology transfer through licit and illicit means, ranging from talent-recruitment programs and strategic mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to outright industrial espionage via cyber intrusion and other tactics.³⁸

On the protect side, tools include trade controls, sanctions, investment screening, and more. On the export-control side, both the Trump and Biden administrations have relied on dual-use export-control authorities to both restrict China’s access to priority technologies and prevent specific Chinese actors (those deemed problematic by the US government) from accessing US-origin technology and components.³⁹ Investment screening has also been a popular tool; in 2018, Congress passed the bipartisan Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) that strengthened and modernized the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)—an interagency body led by the Treasury Department that reviews inbound foreign investment for national security risks.⁴⁰ Under the Biden administration, a new emphasis on the national security concerns associated with US outbound investment into China has arisen, with an executive order focused on screening outbound tech investments in the works for almost a year.⁴¹ On sanctions, although the United States has so far been wary of deploying them against China, the Biden administration has, in conjunction with thirty-eight other countries, imposed a harsh sanctions regime on Russia and Belarus following Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.⁴²

Trade controls can be effective tools, but they need to be approached with a clear alignment between means and ends. For decades, an array of export controls and other regulations have worked to prevent rivals from accessing key technologies. However, historical experience (such as that of the US satellite industry) shows that, with a clear alignment between means and ends, trade controls can have massive implications for the competitiveness of US industries and, by extension, US national security.⁴³

Before deploying these tools, it is critical for policymakers to first identify what China is doing—both within and outside its borders—in its attempts to acquire foreign technology, an evaluation that should allow the United States to hone more targeted controls that can yield intended results. Trade controls that are too broad and ambiguous tend to backfire, as they create massive uncertainties that lead to overcompliance on the part of industry, in turn causing unintended downside consequences for economic competitiveness.

Understanding China’s strategy for purposes of creating effective trade controls is not as difficult as it once appeared. For instance, a 2022 report from CSET compiled and reviewed thirty-five articles on China’s technological import dependencies.⁴⁴ This series of open-source articles, published in Chinese in 2018, provides specific and concrete examples of Chinese S&T vulnerabilities that can be used by policymakers to assess where and how to apply trade controls. Other similar resources exist. Although the Chinese government appears to be systematically tracking and removing these as they receive attention, there are ways for US government analysts and scholars to continue making use of these materials that preserve the original sources.
Coordinate: The final strategy pillar is outward facing, focused on building and sustaining relationships with other countries in and around the tech strategy and policy space. This pillar might be labeled “tech diplomacy,” given the need to ensure US strategy and policy positively influences as many allies, partners, and even nonaligned states as possible, while continuing to engage China on technology-related issues. As with the other two pillars, this pillar is simple to state as a priority, but difficult to realize in practice.

In a May 2022 speech, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the administration’s shorthand formula is to “invest, align, [and] compete” vis-a-vis China.⁴⁵ Here, he meant “invest” to refer to large public investments in US competitiveness, “align” to closer coordination with allies and partners on tech-related strategy and policy, and “compete” largely to geostrategic competition with China over Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, and other areas.

Blinken’s remarks underscore the Biden administration’s priority for allies and partners to view the United States as a trusted interlocutor. When it comes to technology policy on China, the trouble lies in the execution—in particular, overcoming the tensions inherent within the “invest, align, compete” formula. After Blinken’s speech, for example, the IRA became law, which triggered a firestorm of protest among the United States’ closest transpacific and transatlantic allies. Viewing the IRA’s ample support for domestic production and manufacturing of electric vehicles and renewable-energy technologies—designed to boost the US economy and tackle climate change while taking on China’s advantages in these areas—the protectionist European Union (EU) went so far as to formulate a Green Deal Industrial Plan, widely seen as an industrial policy response to the IRA.⁴⁶ Much of the row over the IRA resulted from the perception—real or not—that the United States had failed to properly consider allies’ and partners’ interests while formulating the legislation. In the words of one observer, “amid the difficult negotiations at home on the CHIPS Act and the IRA, allies and partners were not consulted, resulting in largely unintended negative consequences for these countries.”⁴⁷

Long-term investment by US policymakers in multilateral institutions focused on technology will be a critical aspect of any potential victory. The Biden administration is already making strides on this front through several multilateral arrangements, including the resurrection of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) and the establishment of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) and AUKUS trilateral pact. All three of these arrangements have dedicated time and resources to specific technological issues in both the military/geopolitical and economic spheres, and all three have the potential to be massively impactful in terms of technology competition.

However, history has shown that these types of arrangements are only effective as long as high-level political leadership remains involved and dedicated to the cause. Cabinet officials and other high-level leaders from all participating countries—especially the United States—will have to demonstrate continued interest in and commitment to these arrangements if they want them to produce more than a handful of documents with broad strategic visions.

Assumptions

The strategy outlined in these pages rests on two plausible assumptions. First, this strategy assumes that China will not follow the Soviet Union into decline, collapse, and disintegration anytime soon, which, in turn, means that China should remain a significant competitor to the United States for a long time to come.

China’s leadership has studied the collapse of the Soviet Union closely and learned from it, placing enormous weight on delivering economic performance through its brand of state capitalism while avoiding the kind of reforms that Mikhail Gorbachev instituted during the 1980s, which included freer information flows, freer political discourse, and ideological diversity within the party and state—all of which Chinese leadership believes to have been key to the Soviet Union’s undoing.⁴⁸ China also does not have analogous centrifugal forces that threaten an internal breakup along geographic lines as did the Soviet Union, which had been constructed from the outset as a federation of republics built upon the contours of the tsarist empire. (The Soviet Union, after all, was a union of Soviet Socialist republics scattered across much of Europe and Asia).⁴⁹

These factors weigh against an assessment that China will soon collapse. Nicholas Burns, the US ambassador to China, has said recently that China is “infinitely stronger” than the Soviet Union ever was, “based on the extraordinary strength of the Chinese economy” including “its science and technology research base [and] innovative capacity.” He concluded that the Chinese challenge to the United States and its allies and partners “is more complex and more deeply rooted [than was the Soviet Union] and a greater test for us going forward.”⁵⁰

A more realistic long-term scenario is one in which the United States and its allies and partners would need to manage a China that will either become stronger or plateau, rather than one that will experience a steep decline. Both variants of this scenario are worrisome, and both underscore the need to hew to the strategy outlined in this paper. A stronger China brings with it obvious challenges. A plateaued China is a more vexing case, owing to the very real possibility that Chinese leadership might conclude that, as economic stagnation portends a future decline and fall, the case for military action (e.g., against Taiwan) is more, rather than less, pressing. The strategist Hal Brands, for example, has suggested that a China that has plateaued will become more dangerous than it is now, requiring a strategy that is militarily firm, economically wise (including maintenance of the West’s advantages in the tech-innovation space), and diplomatically flexible.⁵¹

Second, the strategy outlined here assumes that relations between the United States and China will remain strained at best or, at worst, devolve into antagonism or outright hostility. In 2023, the assumption of ongoing strained relations appears wholly rational, based on a straightforward interpretation of all available diplomatic evidence.

How this strategy should shift if the United States and China were to have a rapprochement would depend greatly on the durability and contours of that shift. Even if a thaw were to reset bilateral relations to where they were at the beginning of the century (an unlikely prospect), the US interest in maintaining a first-mover advantage in technological development would remain. As reviewed in this paper, there was a long period during which the United States and China traded technologically based goods and services in a more open-ended trading regime than is currently the case. During that period, the United States operated on two presumptions: that China’s S&T capabilities were nowhere near as developed as its own, and that the US system could stay ahead owing to its many strengths compared with China’s.

The trouble with returning to this former state is that both presumptions no longer hold. China has become a near-peer competitor in science and technological development, and its innovative capabilities are considerable.

If China and the United States were to thaw their relationship, the policy question would concern the degree to which the United States would reduce its “protect” measures—the import and export restrictions, sanctions, and other policies designed to keep strategic technologies and knowhow from China, while protecting its own assets from espionage, sabotage, and other potential harms.

Guidelines for implementation

As emphasized throughout this paper, any successful long-term strategy will require that the US government pursue policies that are internally well coordinated, are based on solid empirical evidence, and are flexible and nimble in the short run, while being attentive to longer-run trends and uncertainties. The government will need to improve its capabilities in three areas.

Improved intelligence and counterintelligence: The US government will need to reassess, improve, and extend its intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities about tech development. The intelligence community will need to be able to conduct ongoing, comprehensive assessments of tech trends and uncertainties of relevance to the strategic competition with the United States. To properly gauge the full range of relevant and timely information about China’s tech capabilities, the Intelligence Community’s practice of relying on classified materials will need to be augmented by stressing unclassified open-source material. Classified sources, which the Intelligence Community always has prioritized, do not provide a full picture of what is happening in China. Patent filings, venture-capital investment levels and patterns, scientific and technical literature, and other open sources can be rich veins of material for analysts looking to assess where China is making progress, or seeking to make progress, in particular S&T areas. The US government’s prioritization of classified material contrasts with the Chinese government’s approach. For decades, China has employed “massive, multi-layered state support” for the “monitoring and [exploitation] of open-source foreign S&T.”⁵² There is recognition that the US government needs to upgrade its capabilities in this respect. In 2020, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence observed that “open-source intelligence (OSINT) will become increasingly indispensable to the formulation of analytic products” about China.⁵³

An intelligence pillar will need a properly calibrated counterintelligence element to identify where China might be utilizing its means and assets—including legal, illegal, and extralegal ones—to obtain intellectual property in the United States and elsewhere (China has a history of utilizing multiple means, including espionage, to gain IP that is relevant to their S&T development).⁵⁴ Here, “properly calibrated” refers to how counterintelligence programs must ensure that innocent individuals, including Chinese nationals who are studying or researching in the United States, are not brought under undue or illegitimate scrutiny. At the same time, these programs must be able to identify, monitor, and then handle as appropriate those individuals who might be engaging in industrial espionage or other covert activities. The Trump administration’s China Initiative was criticized both for its name (it implied that Chinese nationals and anyone of East Asian descent were suspect) and the perception of too-zealous enforcement (the program resulted in several high-profile cases ending in dismissal or exoneration for the accused). In 2022, the Biden administration shuttered this initiative and replaced it with “a broader strategy aimed at countering espionage, cyberattacks and other threats posed by a range of countries.”⁵⁵
Improved foresight: Strategic-foresight capabilities assist governments in understanding and navigating complex and fast-moving external environments. Foresight offices in government and the private sector systematically examine long-term trends and uncertainties and assess how these will shape alternative futures. These processes often challenge deeply held assumptions about where the world is headed, and can reveal where existing strategies perform well or poorly.

This logic extends to the tech space, where the US government should develop a robust foresight apparatus to inform tech-focused strategies and policies at the highest levels. The purpose of this capability would be to enhance and deepen understanding of where technological development might take the United States and the world. Such a foresight capability within the US government would integrate tech-intelligence assessments, per above, into comprehensive foresight-based scenarios about how the world might unfold in the future. The US government has impressive foresight capabilities already, most famously those provided by the National Intelligence Council (NIC). However, for a variety of reasons, including distance from the center of executive power, neither the NIC nor other foresight offices within the US government currently perform a foresight function described here. The US government should institutionalize a foresight function within or closely adjacent to the White House—for example, within the National Security Council or as a presidentially appointed advisory board. Doing so would give foresight the credibility and mandate to engage the most critical stakeholders from across the entire government and from outside of it, a model followed by leading public foresight offices around the world.⁵⁶ This recommendation is consistent with numerous others put forward by experts over the past decade, which stress how the US government needs to give foresight more capabilities while bringing it closer to the office of the president.⁵⁷
Improved S&T strategy and policy coordination: One of the major challenges facing the US government concerns internal coordination around S&T strategy and policy. As technology is a broad and multidimensional category, the government’s activities are equally broad, covered by numerous statutes, executive orders, and administrative decisions. One of many results is a multiplicity of departments and agencies responsible for administering the many different pieces of the tech equation, from investment to development to monitoring, regulation, and enforcement. In just the area of critical technology oversight and control, for example, numerous departments including Commerce, State, Defense, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Justice, plus agencies from the Intelligence Community, all have responsibilities under various programs.⁵⁸

Moreover, the US government’s approach to tech oversight tends to focus narrowly on control of specific technologies, which leads to an underappreciation of the broader contexts in which technologies are used. A report issued in 2022 by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine argued that the US government’s historic approach to tech-related risks is done through assessing individual critical technologies, defining the risks associated with each, and then attempting to restrict who can access each type of technology. Given that technologies now are “ubiquitous, shared, and multipurpose,” the National Academies asserted, a smarter approach would be to focus on the motives of bad-faith actors to use technologies and then define the accompanying risks.⁵⁹ This approach “requires expertise that goes beyond the nature of the technology to encompass the plans, actions, capabilities, and intentions of US adversaries and other bad actors, thus involving experts from the intelligence, law enforcement, and national defense communities in addition to agency experts in the technology.”⁶⁰

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, June 19, 2023. REUTERS

Major risks

There are two major sets of risks accompanying this strategy, both of which involve the potential damage that might result from failure to keep the strategic competition within acceptable boundaries.

Decoupling run amok: Overreach is one of the biggest risks associated with this strategy. Geopolitical and economic goals contradict, and it can be difficult to determine where to draw the line. As such, reconciling this dilemma will be the hardest part of a coherent and effective competition strategy.

Technology decoupling to preserve geopolitical advantages can be at odds with economic interests, which the United States is currently experiencing in the context of semiconductors. The October 7, 2022, export controls were deemed necessary for geopolitical reasons, as the White House’s official rationale for the policy centered around the use of semiconductors for military modernization and violation of human rights. However, limiting the ability of US companies like Nvidia, Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research to export their products and services to China, in addition to applying complex compliance burdens on these firms, has the potential to affect these firms’ ability to compete in the global semiconductor industry.

In addition, the continued deployment of decoupling tactics like export controls can put allies and partners in a position where they feel forced to choose sides between the United States and China. On the October 7 export controls, it took months to convince the Netherlands and Japan—two critical producer nations in the semiconductor supply chain whose participation is critical to the success of these export controls—to get on board with US policy.⁶¹ Even now, although media reporting says an agreement has been reached, no details of the agreements have been made public, likely due to concerns surrounding Chinese retaliation.

These issues are not exclusive to trade controls or protect measures. On the promote side, the IRA has also put South Korea in a difficult position as it relates to EVs and related components. When first announced, many on the South Korean side argued that the EV provisions of the IRA violated trade rules. At one point in late 2022, the South Korean government considered filing a complaint with the WTO over the issue.⁶² Although things seem to have cooled between Washington and Seoul—and the Netherlands and Japan have officially, albeit privately, agreed to join the US on semiconductor controls—these two instances should be lessons for US policymakers in how to approach technology policies going forward. Policies that push allies and partners too hard to decouple from the Chinese market are likely to be met with resistance, as many (if not all) US allies have deeply woven ties with Chinese industry, and often do not have the same domestic capabilities or resources that the United States has that can insulate us from potential harm. China is acutely aware of this, and will likely continue to take advantage of this narrative to convince US allies to not join in US decoupling efforts. China has historically leveraged economic punishments against countries for a variety of reasons, so US policymakers should be sure to incorporate this reality into their policy planning to ensure that allies are not put in tough positions.

Recently, government officials within the Group of Seven (G7) have been using the term “de-risking ” instead of “decoupling.” The term was first used by a major public official during a speech by Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, in a March 2023 speech where she called for an “open and frank” discussion with China on contentious issues.⁶³ The term was used again in the G7 communique of May 2023: economic security should be “based on diversifying and deepening partnerships and de-risking, not de-coupling.”⁶⁴ This rhetorical shift represents a recognition that full economic decoupling from China is unwise, and perhaps impossible. Moreover, it also is a tacit admission that decoupling sends the wrong signals not only to China, but to the private sector in the West as well.

In the authors’ opinion, de-risking is superior to decoupling as a rhetorical device—but changes in phrasing do not solve the underlying problem for policymakers in the United States, Europe, East Asia, and beyond. That underlying problem is to define and then implement a coherent strategy, coordinated across national capitals, that manages to enable them to stay a step ahead of China in the development of cutting-edge technology while preventing an economically disastrous trade war with China.
Harm to global governance: Another major set of risks involves the harms to global governance should the strategic competition between the United States and China continue on its current trajectory. Although the strategy outlined in these pages emphasizes, under the coordination pillar, maintenance of global governance architecture—the norms, institutions, pathways, laws, good-faith behavior, and so on that guide technology development—there is no guarantee that China and the United States, along with other important state and nonstate actors, will be able to do so given conflicting pressures to reduce or eliminate cooperative behavior.

Tragic outcomes of this strategic competition, therefore, would be: failure to continue cooperation regarding development of norms and standards that should guide S&T research; and failure to continue S&T research cooperation focused on solving global-commons challenges such as pandemics and climate change.

Any reduction in cooperation among the United States, China, and other leading S&T-research countries will harm the ability to establish norms and standards surrounding tech development in sensitive areas—for instance, in AI or biotechnology. As recent global conversations about the risks associated with rapid AI development show, effective governance of these powerful emerging technologies is no idle issue.⁶⁵

Even under the best of circumstances, however, global governance of such technologies is exceedingly difficult. For example, Gigi Kwik Gronvall, an immunologist and professor at Johns Hopkins University, has written that biotechnology development is “inherently international and cannot be controlled by any international command and control system” and that, therefore, “building a web of governance, with multiple institutions and organizations shaping the rules of the road, is the only possibility for [effective] governance.”⁶⁶ By this, she meant that—although a single system of rules for governing the biotechnology development is impossible to create given the speed of biotech research and multiplicity of biotech research actors involved (private and public-sector labs, etc.) around the world—it is possible to support a “web of governance” institutions such as the WHO that set norms and rules. Although this system is imperfect, as she admits, it is much better than the alternative, which is to have no governance web at all. The risk of a weak or nonexistent web becomes much more real if the United States, China, and other S&T leaders fail to cooperate in strengthening it.

Conclusions and recommendations

The arguments advanced in this paper provide an overview of the range and diversity of policy questions that must be taken into consideration when formulating strategies to compete with China in science and technology. This final section offers a set of recommendations that follow from this analysis.

Restore and sustain public R&D funding for scientific and technological advancement. As noted in this paper, public investment in R&D—most critically, federal-government investment in R&D—has been allowed to atrophy since the end of the Cold War. Although private-sector investment was then, and is now, a critical component of the nation’s R&D spending, public funding is also imperative for pure scientific research (versus applied research) and for funneling R&D toward ends that are in the public interest (defense, public health, etc.). Although the CHIPS and Science Act and the IRA both pledge massive increases in the amount of federal R&D investment, there is no guarantee that increased funding will be sustained over time. Less than a year after the CHIPS Act was signed into law, funding levels proposed in Congress and by the White House have fallen well short of amounts specified in the act.⁶⁷
Improve and sustain STEM education and skills training across K–12, university, community college, technical schools. It is widely recognized that the United States has fallen behind peer nations in STEM education and training at all levels, from K–12 through graduate training.⁶⁸ Although the Biden administration’s signature pieces of legislation, including the CHIPS Act, address this problem through increased funding vehicles for STEM education and worker-training programs, the challenge for policymakers will be to sustain interest in, and levels of funding for, such programs well into the future, analogous to the federal R&D spending challenge. Other related problems include the high cost of higher education, driven in part by lower funding by US states, that drives students into long-term indebtedness, and the need to boost participation in (and reduce stigma around) STEM-related training at community colleges and technical schools.⁶⁹ Germany’s well-established, well-funded, and highly respected technical apprenticeship programs are models.⁷⁰
Craft a more diverse tech sector. A closely related challenge is to ensure that the tech sector in the United States reflects the country’s diversity, defined in terms of gender, ethnicity, class, and geography. This is a long-term challenge that has multiple roots and many different pathways to success, including public investment in education, training, and apprenticeship programs, among other things.⁷¹ Among the most challenging problems (with potentially the most beneficial solutions) are those rooted in economic geography—specifically regional imbalances in the knowledge economy, where places like Silicon Valley and Boston steam ahead and many other places fall behind. As in other areas, recent legislation including the IRA, CHIPS Act, and IIJA have called for billions in funding to spread the knowledge economy to a greater number of “tech hubs” around the country. As with other pieces of the investment equation, however, there is no guarantee that billions will be allocated under current legislation.⁷²
Attract and retain high-skilled talent from abroad. One of the United States’ enduring strengths is its ability to attract and retain the world’s best talent, which has been of enormous benefit to its tech sector. A December 2022 survey conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), for example, found that between 1990 and 2016, about 16 percent of all inventors in the United States were immigrants, who, in turn, were responsible for 23 percent of all patents filed during the same period.⁷³ Although the United States is still the top destination for high-skilled migrants, other countries have become more attractive in recent years, owing to foreign countries’ tech-savvy immigration policies and problems related to the US H-1B visa system.⁷⁴
Support whole-of-government strategy development. This paper stresses the need to improve strategic decision-making regarding technology through improving (or relocating) interagency processes and foresight and intelligence capabilities. One recommendation is to follow the suggestion by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and bring a whole-of-government strategic perspective together under the guidance of the White House.⁷⁵ Such a capacity would bring under its purview and/or draw upon a tech-focused foresight capacity, as well as an improved tech-focused intelligence apparatus (see below). The CHIPS Act contains provisions that call for development of quadrennial S&T assessments followed by technology strategy formulation, both to be conducted by the White House’s Office of Science Technology and Policy (OSTP).⁷⁶ A bill that was introduced in June 2022 by Senators Michael Bennet, Ben Sasse, and Mark Warner (and reintroduced in June 2023) would, if passed, create an Office of Global Competition Analysis, the purpose of which would be to “fuse information across the federal government, including classified sources, to help us better understand U.S. competitiveness in technologies critical to our national security and economic prosperity and inform responses that will boost U.S. leadership.”⁷⁷
Ensure private sector firms remain at the cutting edge of global competitiveness. Policymakers will need to strengthen the enabling environment to allow US tech firms to meet and exceed business competition from around the world. Doing so will require constant monitoring of best-practice policy development elsewhere, based on the presumption that other countries are tweaking their own policies to outcompete the United States. Policymakers will need to properly recalibrate, as appropriate and informed by best practices, an array of policy instruments including labor market and immigration policies, types and level of infrastructural investments, competition policies, forms of direct and indirect support, and more. An Office of Global Competition Analysis, as referred to above, might be an appropriate mechanism to conduct the horizon scanning tasks necessary to support this recommendation.
Improve S&T intelligence and counterintelligence. Consistent with the observations about shortcomings in the US Intelligence Community regarding S&T collection, analysis, and dissemination, some analysts have floated creation of an S&T intelligence capability outside the Intelligence Community itself. This capability would be independent of other agencies and departments within the government and would focus on collection and analysis of S&T intelligence for stakeholders within and outside of the US government, as appropriate.⁷⁸
Ensure calibrated development and application of punitive measures. As this paper has stressed at multiple points, although the US government has powerful protect measures at its disposal, implementing those measures often comes with a price, including friction with allies and partners. The US government should create an office within the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Commerce Department to monitor the economic impact (intended and unintended) of its export-control policies on global supply chains before they are implemented (including impacts on allied and partner economies).⁷⁹ This office would have a function that is similar in intent to the Sanctions Economic Analysis Unit, recently established at the US Treasury to “research the collateral damage of sanctions before they’re imposed, and after they’ve been put in place to see if they should be adjusted.”⁸⁰
Build out and sustain robust multilateral institutions. This paper has stressed that any effort by the United States to succeed in its tech-focused competition with China will require that it successfully engage allies and partners in multilateral settings such as the EU-TTC, Quad, and others. As with so many other recommendations on this list, success will be determined by the degree to which senior policymakers can stay focused over the long run (i.e., across administrations) on this priority and in these multilateral forums. In addition, US policymakers might consider updating multilateral forums based on new realities. For example, some analysts have called for the creation of a new multilateral export-control regime that would have the world’s “techno-democracies…identify together the commodities, software, technologies, end uses, and end users that warrant control to address shared national security, economic security, and human rights issues.”⁸¹
Engagement with China cannot be avoided. The downturn in bilateral relations between the United States and China should not obscure the need to continue engaging China on S&T as appropriate, and as opportunities arise. There are zero-sum tradeoffs involved in the strategic competition with China over technology. At the same time, there are also positive-sum elements within that competition that need to be preserved or even strengthened. As the Ford-CATL Michigan battery-plant example underscores, trade in nonstrategic technologies (EVs, batteries, etc.) benefits both countries, assuming trade occurs on a level playing field. The same is true of science cooperation, where the risk is of global scientific research on climate change and disease prevention shrinking if Sino-American scientific exchange falls dramatically. Policymakers in the United States will need to accept some amount of S&T collaboration risk with China. They will need to decide what is (and is not) of highest risk and communicate that effectively to US allies and partners around the world, the scientific community, and the general public.

The authors would like to thank Noah Stein for his research assistance with this report.

Report authors

Staff

Peter Engelke

Global Energy Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Technology & Innovation Europe & Eurasia

Fellow

Emily Weinstein

Nonresident Fellow

Global China Hub

China Technology & Innovation

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1 Although China likely will not close the spending gap with the United States by the mid-2030s, current spending trajectories strongly suggest that China will have narrowed the gap considerably. See the US-China bilateral comparison in: “Asia Power Index 2023,” Lowy Institute, last visited June 13, 2023, https://power.lowyinstitute.org; “China v America: How Xi Jinping Plans to Narrow the Military Gap,” Economist, May 8, 2023, https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/08/china-v-america-how-xi-jinping-plans-to-narrow-the-military-gap.

2 See, e.g., the arguments presented by: Bryce Barros, Nathan Kohlenberg, and Etienne Soula, “China and the Digital Information Stack in the Global South,” German Marshall Fund, June 15, 2022, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/china-digital-stack/.

3 For a brief overview of China’s efforts in this regard, see: Bulelani Jili, China’s Surveillance Ecosystem and the Global Spread of Its Tools, Atlantic Council, October 17, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/chinese-surveillance-ecosystem-and-the-global-spread-of-its-tools/.

4 For background to these practices, see: Karen M. Sutter, ““Made in China 2025’ Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, March 10, 2023, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10964.pdf; Gerard DiPippo, Ilaria Mazzocco, and Scott Kennedy, “Red Ink: Estimating Chinese Industrial Policy Spending in Comparative Perspective,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 23, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/red-ink-estimating-chinese-industrial-policy-spending-comparative-perspective; “America Is Struggling to Counter China’s Intellectual Property Theft,” Financial Times, April 18, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/1d13ab71-bffd-4d63-a0bf-9e9bdfc33c39; “USTR Releases Annual Report on China’s WTO Compliance,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, February 16, 2022, press release, 3, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/february/ustr-releases-annual-report-chinas-wto-compliance.

5 On China and technical standards, see: Matt Sheehan, Marjory Blumenthal, and Michael R. Nelson, “Three Takeaways from China’s New Standards Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 28, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/28/three-takeaways-from-china-s-new-standards-strategy-pub-85678.

6 China’s current (2023) AI regulations are generally seen as more developed than those in either Europe or the United States. However, analysts argue that the individual rights and corporate responsibilities to protect them, as outlined in China’s regulations, will be selectively enforced, if at all, by the state. See: Ryan Heath, “China Races Ahead of U.S. on AI Regulation,” Axios, May 8, 2023, https://www.axios.com/2023/05/08/china-ai-regulation-race.

7 The scientific community has warned that this scenario is a real risk, owing to heightened Sino-American tension. James Mitchell Crow, “US–China partnerships bring strength in numbers to big science projects,” Nature, March 9, 2022, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00570-0.

8 Deng Xiaoping’s reforms included pursuit of “Four Modernizations” in agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. In the S&T field, his reforms included massive educational and worker-upskilling programs, large investments in scientific research centers, comprehensive programs to send Chinese STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) students abroad for advanced education and training, experimentation with foreign technologies in manufacturing and other production processes, and upgrading of China’s military to include a focus on development of dual-use technologies. Bernard Z. Keo, “Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Deng Xiaoping in the Making of Modern China,” Education About Asia 25, 2 (2020), 36, https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/crossing-the-river-by-feeling-the-stones-deng-xiaoping-in-the-making-of-modern-china/.

9 Dan Wang, “China’s Hidden Tech Revolution: How Beijing Threatens U.S. Dominance,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-hidden-tech-revolution-how-beijing-threatens-us-dominance-dan-wang.

10 “Full Text of Clinton’s Speech on China Trade Bill,” Federal News Service, March 9, 2000, https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_China_Trade_Bi.htm.

11 “Speech by President Jiang Zemin at George Bush Presidential Library,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, October 24, 2002, https://perma.cc/7NYS-4REZ; G. John Ikenberrgy, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs 87, 1, (2008), https://www.jstor.org/stable/20020265.

12 Elizabeth Economy, “Changing Course on China,” Current History 102, 665, China and East Asia (2003), https://www.jstor.org/stable/45317282; Thomas W. Lippman, “Bush Makes Clinton’s China Policy an Issue,” Washington Post, August 20, 1999, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/campaigns/wh2000/stories/chiwan082099.htm.

13 Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign Affairs, February 18, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning.

14 “Number of Tourist Arrivals in the United States from China from 2005 to 2022 with Forecasts until 2025,” Statista, April 11, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/214813/number-of-visitors-to-the-us-from-china/; and “Visa Statistics,” U.S. Department of State, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics.html.

15 “Direct Investment Position of the United States in China from 2000 to 2021,” Statista, January 26, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/188629/united-states-direct-investments-in-china-since-2000/.

16 Robbie Gramer, “Washington’s China Hawks Take Flight,” Foreign Policy, February 15, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/15/china-us-relations-hawks-engagement-cold-war-taiwan/; Sam LaGrone, “China Sends Uninvited Spy Ship to RIMPAC,” USNI News, July 18, 2014, https://news.usni.org/2014/07/18/china-sends-uninvited-spy-ship-rimpac.

17 “Findings of the Investigations into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF. When asked in November 2018 if China was violating the 2015 cyber-espionage agreement, senior National Security Agency cybersecurity official Rob Joyce said, “it’s clear that they [China] are well beyond the bounds today of the agreement that was forced between our countries.” See: “U.S. Accuses China of Violating Bilateral Anti-Hacking Deal,” Reuters, November 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-cyber/u-s-accuses-china-of-violating-bilateral-anti-hacking-deal-idUSKCN1NE02E.

18 Jacob Feldgoise, et. al, “Studying Tech Competition through Research Output: Some CSET Best Practices,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, April 2023, https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/studying-tech-competition-through-research-output-some-cset-best-practices.

19 The World Intellectual Property Organization’s annual “Global Innovation Index,” considered the gold standard rankings assessment of the world’s tech-producing economies, ranks South Korea sixth and Japan thirteenth in the 2022 edition. “Global Innovation Index 2022. What Is the Future of Innovation-Driven Growth?” World Intellectual Property Organization, 2022, https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator.

20 For a general review of the Japanese case, see: Mireya Solis, “Economic Security: Boon or Bane for the US-Japan Alliance?,” Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, November 5–6, 2022, https://spfusa.org/publications/economic-security-boon-or-bane-for-the-us-japan-alliance/#_ftn19. For the South Korean case, see: Seong-Ho Sheen and Mireya Solis, “How South Korea Sees Technology Competition with China and Export Controls,” Brookings, May 17, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/05/17/how-south-korea-sees-technology-competition-with-china-and-export-controls/.

21 Jeremy Mark and Dexter Tiff Roberts, United States–China Semiconductor Standoff: A Supply Chain under Stress, Atlantic Council, February 23, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/united-states-china-semiconductor-standoff-a-supply-chain-under-stress/.

22 Yang Jie and Megumi Fujikawa, “Tokyo Meeting Highlights Democracies’ Push to Secure Chip Supplies,” Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tokyo-meeting-highlights-democracies-push-to-secure-chip-supplies-54e1173d?mod=article_inline; “US Urges South Korea not to Fill Chip Shortfalls in China if Micron Banned, Financial Times Reports,” Reuters, April 23, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-urges-south-korea-not-fill-china-shortfalls-if-beijing-bans-micron-chips-ft-2023-04-23/.

23 See, e.g., the arguments in: Matias Spektor, “In Defense of the Fence Sitters. What the West Gets Wrong about Hedging,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/global-south-defense-fence-sitters.

24 On the expansion of trade under Bretton Woods during the first postwar decades, see: Tamim Bayoumi, “The Postwar Economic Achievement,” Finance & Development, June 1995, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0032/002/article-A013-en.xml.

25 For a review of the history of the bilateral trade relationship, see: Anshu Siripurapu and Noah Berman, “Backgrounder: The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 5, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship.

26 Eric Martin and Ana Monteiro, “US-China Goods Trade Hits Record Even as Political Split Widens,” Bloomberg, February 7, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-07/us-china-trade-climbs-to-record-in-2022-despite-efforts-to-split?sref=a9fBmPFG#xj4y7vzkg

27 Neal E. Boudette and Keith Bradsher, “Ford Will Build a U.S. Battery Factory with Technology from China,” New York Times, February 13, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/13/business/energy-environment/ford-catl-electric-vehicle-battery.html.

28 “Tracking the Collaborative Networks of Five Leading Science Nations,” Nature 603, S10–S11 (2022), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00571-z.

29 “Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage,” National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2022, 12, https://doi.org/10.17226/26647.

30 Robert W. Seidel, “Science Policy and the Role of the National Laboratories,” Los Alamos Science 21 (1993), 218–226, https://sgp.fas.org/othergov/doe/lanl/pubs/00285712.pdf.

31 The federal government’s hand in creating Silicon Valley is well known. For a short summary, see: W. Patrick McCray, “Silicon Valley: A Region High on Historical Amnesia,” Los Angeles Review of Books, September 19, 2019, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/silicon-valley-a-region-high-on-historical-amnesia/. A forceful defense of the federal government’s role in creating and sustaining Silicon Valley is: Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, “Why Technological Innovation Relies on Government Support,” Atlantic, March 28, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/andy-grove-government-technology/475626/.

32 Robert D. Atkinson, “Understanding the U.S. National Innovation System, 2020,” International Technology & Innovation Foundation, November 2020, 1, https://www2.itif.org/2020-us-innovation-system.pdf.

33 “National Innovation Policies: What Countries Do Best and How They Can Improve,” International Technology & Innovation Foundation, June 13, 2019, 82, https://itif.org/publications/2019/06/13/national-innovation-policies-what-countries-do-best-and-how-they-can-improve/; “Historical Trends in Federal R&D, Federal R&D as a Percent of GDP, 1976-2023,” American Association for the Advancement of Science, last visited June 13, 2023, https://www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/historical-trends-federal-rd.

34 Matt Hourihan, “A Snapshot of U.S. R&D Competitiveness: 2020 Update,” American Association for the Advancement of Science, October 22, 2020, https://www.aaas.org/news/snapshot-us-rd-competitiveness-2020-update.

35 Remco Zwetsloot, et al., “China is Fast Outpacing U.S. STEM PhD Growth,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, August 2021, 2–4, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-is-fast-outpacing-u-s-stem-phd-growth/.

36 As reviewed in: Robert D. Atkinson, “Understanding the U.S. National Innovation System, 2020,” International Technology & Innovation Foundation, November 2020, https://www2.itif.org/2020-us-innovation-system.pdf.

37 See, e.g., the arguments laid out by Frank Lucas, chairman of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee, in: Frank Lucas, “A Next-Generation Strategy for American Science,” Issues in Science and Technology 39, 3, Spring 2023, https://issues.org/strategy-american-science-lucas/.

38 “Findings of the Investigations into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974”; “Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans,” Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Senate, November 2019, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20China’s%20Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans%20Updated2.pdf; Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable A Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), January 2018, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4549143-DIUx-Study-on-China-s-Technology-Transfer.

39 Steven F. Hill, et. al, “Trump Administration Significantly Enhances Export Control Supply Chain Restrictions on Huawei,” K&L Gates, September 2020, https://www.klgates.com/Trump-Administration-Significantly-Enhances-Export-Control-Supply-Chain-Restrictions-on-Huawei-9-2-2020; and “Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification,” Bureau of Industry and Security, US Department of Commerce, October 14, 2022, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/10/13/2022-21658/implementation-of-additional-export-controls-certain-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor.

40 “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,” US Department of the Treasury, last visited June 13, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius.

41 Hans Nichols and Dave Lawler, “Biden’s Next Move to Box China out on Sensitive Tech,” Axios, May 25, 2023, https://www.axios.com/2023/05/25/china-investments-ai-semiconductor-biden-order.

42 “With Over 300 Sanctions, U.S. Targets Russia’s Circumvention and Evasion, Military-Industrial Supply Chains, and Future Energy Revenues,” US Department of the Treasury, press release, May 19, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1494.

43 Tim Hwang and Emily S. Weinstein, “Decoupling in Strategic Technologies: From Satellites to Artificial Intelligence,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, July 2022, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/decoupling-in-strategic-technologies/.

44 The articles were published in China’s state-run newspaper, Science and Technology Daily. Ben Murphy, “Chokepoints: China’s Self-Identified Strategic Technology Import Dependencies,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, May 2022, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chokepoints/.

45 Antony J. Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” US Department of State, May 26, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.

46 “Media Reaction: US Inflation Reduction Act and the Global ‘Clean-Energy Arms Race,’” Carbon Brief, February 3, 2023, https://www.carbonbrief.org/media-reaction-us-inflation-reduction-act-and-the-global-clean-energy-arms-race/; Théophile Pouget-Abadie, Francis Shin, and Jonah Allen, Clean Industrial Policies: A Space for EU-US Collaboration, Atlantic Council, March 10, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/clean-industrial-policies-a-space-for-eu-us-collaboration/.

47 Shannon Tiezzi, “Are US Allies Falling out of ‘Alignment’ on China?” Diplomat, December 19, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/are-us-allies-falling-out-of-alignment-on-china/.

48 “The Fall of Empires Preys on Xi Jinping’s Mind,” Economist, May 11, 2023, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/05/11/the-fall-of-empires-preys-on-xi-jinpings-mind; Kunal Sharma, “What China Learned from the Collapse of the USSR,” Diplomat, December 6, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/what-china-learned-from-the-collapse-of-the-ussr/; Simone McCarthy, “Why Gorbachev’s Legacy Haunts China’s Ruling Communist Party,” CNN, August 31, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/31/china/china-reaction-mikhail-gorbachev-intl-hnk/index.html.

49 For a review of the complex history of the construction and deconstruction of the Soviet Union, see: Serhii Plokhy, “The Empire Returns: Russia, Ukraine and the Long Shadow of the Soviet Union,”Financial Times, January 28, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/0cbbd590-8e48-4687-a302-e74b6f0c905d.

50 Phelim Kine, “China ‘Is Infinitely Stronger than the Soviet Union Ever Was,’” Politico, April 28, 2023, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/global-insider/2023/04/28/china-is-infinitely-stronger-than-the-soviet-union-ever-was-00094266.

51 Hal Brands, “The Dangers of China’s Decline,” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/china-decline-dangers/.

52 Tarun Chhabra, et al., “Open-Source Intelligence for S&T Analysis,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service, September 2020, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/open-source-intelligence-for-st-analysis/.

53 A summary of and link to the committee’s redacted report is in: Tia Sewell, “U.S. Intelligence Community Ill-Prepared to Respond to China, Bipartisan House Report Finds,” Lawfare, September 30, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-intelligence-community-ill-prepared-respond-china-bipartisan-house-report-finds.

54 William Hannas and Huey-Meei Chang, “China’s Access to Foreign AI Technology,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service, September 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chinas-access-to-foreign-ai-technology/.

55 Ellen Nakashima, “Justice Department Shutters China Initiative, Launches Broader Strategy to Counter Nation-State Threats,” Washington Post, February 23, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/02/23/china-initivative-redo/.

56 Tuomo Kuosa, “Strategic Foresight in Government: The Cases of Finland, Singapore, and the European Union,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 43, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/145831/Monograph19.pdf.

57 For a review, including a summary of such recommendations, see: J. Peter Scoblic, “Strategic Foresight in U.S. Agencies. An Analysis of Long-term Anticipatory Thinking in the Federal Government,” New America, December 15, 2021, https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/strategic-foresight-in-us-agencies/.

58 See, for example: Marie A. Mak, “Critical Technologies: Agency Initiatives Address Some Weaknesses, but Additional Interagency Collaboration Is Needed,” General Accounting Office, February 2015, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-288.pdf.

59 “Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage,” 97.

60 Ibid.

61 Toby Sterling, Karen Freifeld, and Alexandra Alper, “Dutch to Restrict Semiconductor Tech Exports to China, Joining US Effort,”Reuters, March 8, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/dutch-responds-us-china-policy-with-plan-curb-semiconductor-tech-exports-2023-03-08/.

62 Troy Stangarone, “Inflation Reduction Act Roils South Korea-US Relations,” Diplomat, September 20, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/inflation-reduction-act-roils-south-korea-us-relations/; “S. Korea in Preparation for Legal Disputes with U.S. over IRA,” Yonhap News Agency, November 3, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221103004500320.

63 “Speech by President von der Leyen on EU-China Relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre,” European Commission, March 30, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_2063.

64 “G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué,” White House, May 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/g7-hiroshima-leaders-communique/.

65 See, e.g.: Kevin Roose, “A.I. Poses ‘Risk of Extinction,’ Industry Leaders Warn,” New York Times, May 30, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/30/technology/ai-threat-warning.html.

66 Gigi Kwik Gronvall, “Managing the Risks of Biotechnology Innovation,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 30, 2023, 7, https://www.cfr.org/report/managing-risks-biotechnology-innovation.

67 Madeleine Ngo, “CHIPS Act Funding for Science and Research Falls Short,” New York Times, May 30, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/30/us/politics/chips-act-science-funding.html; Matt Hourihan, Mark Muro, and Melissa Roberts Chapman, “The Bold Vision of the CHIPS and Science Act Isn’t Getting the Funding It Needs,” Brookings, May 17, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2023/05/17/the-bold-vision-of-the-chips-and-science-act-isnt-getting-the-funding-it-needs/.

68 See, e.g.: Gabrielle Athanasia and Jillian Cota, “The U.S. Should Strengthen STEM Education to Remain Globally Competitive,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 1, 2022, https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/us-should-strengthen-stem-education-remain-globally-competitive.

69 On per-student university funding at state level, see: Mary Ellen Flannery, “State Funding for Higher Education Still Lagging,” NEA Today, October 25, 2022, https://www.nea.org/advocating-for-change/new-from-nea/state-funding-higher-education-still-lagging

70 Matt Fieldman, “5 Things We Learned in Germany,” NIST Manufacturing Innovation Blog, December 14, 2022, https://www.nist.gov/blogs/manufacturing-innovation-blog/5-things-we-learned-germany.

71 For a review, see: Peter Engelke and Robert A. Manning, Keeping America’s Innovative Edge, Atlantic Council, April 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/keeping-america-s-innovative-edge-2/.

72 To date, Congress has allocated only 5 percent of the funds called for in the piece of the CHIPS Act that funds the tech hubs. Madeleine Ngo, “CHIPS Act Funding for Science and Research Falls Short,” New York Times, May 30, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/30/us/politics/chips-act-science-funding.html; Mark Muro, et al., “Breaking Down an $80 Billion Surge in Place-Based Industrial Policy,” Brookings, December 15, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2022/12/15/breaking-down-an-80-billion-surge-in-place-based-industrial-policy/.

73 Shai Bernstein, et al., “The Contribution of High-Skilled Immigrants to Innovation in the United States,” National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2022, 3, https://www.nber.org/papers/w30797.

74 Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg, “America Has an Innovation Problem. The H-1B Visa Backlog Is Making It Worse,” Vox, July 13, 2022, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/23177446/immigrants-tech-companies-united-states-innovation-h1b-visas-immigration.

75 “Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage,” 98–99.

76 Matt Hourihan, “CHIPS And Science Highlights: National Strategy,” Federation of American Scientists, August 9, 2022, https://fas.org/publication/chips-national-strategy/.

77 “Press Release: Bennet, Sasse, Warner Unveil Legislation to Strengthen U.S. Technology Competitiveness,” Office of Michael Bennet, June 9, 2022, https://www.bennet.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2022/6/bennet-sasse-warner-unveil-legislation-to-strengthen-u-s-technology-competitiveness.

78 Tarun Chhabra, et al., “Open-Source Intelligence for S&T Analysis,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET),Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service, September 2020, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/open-source-intelligence-for-st-analysis/.

79 Emily Weinstein, “The Role of Taiwan in the U.S. Semiconductor Supply Chain Strategy,” National Bureau of Asian Research, January 21, 2023, https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-role-of-taiwan-in-the-u-s-semiconductor-supply-chain-strategy/.

80 Daniel Flatley, “US Treasury Hires Economists to Study Consequences of Sanctions,” Bloomberg, May 17, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-18/us-treasury-hires-economists-to-study-consequences-of-sanctions?sref=a9fBmPFG.

81 Kevin Wolf and Emily S. Weinstein, “COCOM’s daughter?” World ECR, May 13, 2022, 25, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/WorldECR-109-pp24-28-Article1-Wolf-Weinstein.pdf.

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Ukrainians have good reason to cheer Russia’s Wagner rebellion

Andriy Zagorodnyuk — Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:38:50 +0000

As the Wagner mutiny unfolded in Russia over the weekend, Ukrainian social media was flooded with memes about popcorn as millions of Ukrainians settled down to enjoy the spectacle. This gleeful reaction was perhaps predictable, given the unimaginable horror and suffering Russia has brought to Ukraine over the past sixteen months, but there may also be a number of good practical reasons for Ukrainians to cheer Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived revolt. The exact terms of the deal that caused the Wagner warlord to call off his mutiny are not entirely clear and may still be subject to revision, but it is already safe to say that the affair has left Russia weakened and demoralized in ways that favor Ukraine.

The first point to note is that the drama is likely to continue. As Russia’s neighbors can all testify, Vladimir Putin does not honor agreements. He is also notorious for never forgiving traitors. Whatever happens next, we will almost certainly witness the end of Wagner as an independent military force. Individual units will either be broken up, exiled to Belarus, or integrated into the regular Russian army. Putin and his military chiefs simply cannot run the risk of allowing the mercenary group to maintain its powerful military potential.

This will have a considerable impact on the invasion of Ukraine. Wagner troops were responsible for virtually all of Russia’s modest advances over the past year, including the much-hyped seizure of Bakhmut. Wagner’s success was largely down to a distinctive and brutal military doctrine heavily dependent on human wave tactics. These shock troops will find life very different in the ranks of the regular Russian military. Russian generals will view all former Wagner fighters with suspicion and will be reluctant to give them prominent offensive roles. This is a sensible security response to recent events, but it will undermine the Russian military’s already extremely limited ability to advance in Ukraine.

With Russia’s most effective troops no longer playing a prominent role in the invasion, this will increase the options for Ukrainian commanders as they look to develop the country’s current summer counteroffensive. This may have particular significance for the frontline sector close to Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, where Wagner units were instrumental in securing earlier Russian gains. Ukrainian forces have already made significant advances to the north and south of Bakhmut, and will now be looking to capitalize on the destabilizing impact of the Wagner rebellion in order to push further.

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Ukraine’s military planners may also be encouraged to expand on earlier incursions into the Russian Federation itself. The Wagner mutiny exposed a shocking lack of military defenses inside Russia, with Russian army officials scrambling to assemble units and gather equipment from across the country. Prigozhin was able to seize the major Russian city of Rostov-on-Don without a fight, including the military headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. His troops then advanced virtually unopposed through the Russian heartlands before unilaterally deciding to end their march on Moscow less than two hundred kilometers from the capital city. In the space of a single day, an apparently defenseless Russia found itself on the brink of either civil war or collapse.

This remarkable state of affairs was possible because Putin has deployed the vast majority of Russia’s military potential to Ukraine. The Wagner revolt demonstrated conclusively that there are no more reserves to draw upon. Putin is already close to the maximum of his capacity and has very limited possibilities to escalate the invasion of Ukraine, even if he wished to do so.

This creates all manner of tempting opportunities for Ukraine, which has so far been careful to limit the scope of its military activities inside Russia, in part due to concerns voiced by Kyiv’s international partners. That may now change. In the weeks prior to the start of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive, Ukrainian-backed Russian militias launched a number of cross-border raids from Ukraine into Russia’s Belgorod region. While these thrusts were largely symbolic, Ukraine could soon become more ambitious. With the Putin regime seemingly unable to defend itself and in no position to escalate, we may witness bolder Ukrainian military operations on Russian territory.

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Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the whole Wagner drama from a Ukrainian perspective was the obvious weakness and division it exposed within Russia. Any country fighting a major war needs unity, and today’s Russia is clearly not united. Members of the public in Rostov-on-Don and elsewhere appear to have enthusiastically backed the rebellion, while others were indifferent. The limited military presence inside Russia made no serious attempts to intervene, while there was little indication of any surge in public support for Putin or condemnation of Prigozhin. This is all a very long way from the propaganda image promoted by the Kremlin of a strong Russian state supported by a proudly patriotic populace.

The situation in Russia is not yet comparable to the mood in 1917 on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, but the Wagner mutiny is an extremely dangerous signal for Russian society. Any infighting is bad for morale, and the spectacle of Russia’s most successful military force turning against the country’s military leaders is particularly demoralizing. This will damage the fighting spirit of Russian troops in Ukraine while also seriously undermining Putin’s personal authority on the home front.

For Ukraine, the outlook is more promising. The Wagner mutiny was a brief affair, but it has led to the sidelining of Russia’s most effective fighting force while also highlighting the weaknesses and limitations of the Putin regime. This could create practical opportunities for Ukraine’s current counteroffensive, and will boost confidence in the country’s ultimate ability to achieve a decisive victory over Russia.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and an advisor to the Ukrainian Government. He previously served as Ukraine’s minister of defense (2019–2020).

The next president’s decision to align with China or maintain relations with Taiwan will reverberate beyond Guatemala’s borders. The outcome could determine whether the Biden administration has a reliable partner for its strategy in Central America—which is designed to help quell the surge of migrants on the US-Mexico border and to combat graft and corruption. And the economic challenges facing the country, including poverty, inequality, and fiscal deficits will require comprehensive policy measures and hard reforms from whoever takes office in 2024. That’s a tall order when considering the two candidates for the August runoff.

Geopolitical implications

Guatemala is host to one of the last two Taiwanese embassies in Central America (the other is in Belize), and one of only seven in Latin America and the Caribbean. The outcome of the runoff election has the potential to tip the region’s balance toward China once and for all, thus shaping the future trajectory of not just Guatemala but also the broader interests of the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. China has been calling on Guatemala to make the “right choice” and has overtly increased its footprint in the region in the last few months—first through Honduras’ decision to break off ties with Taiwan in March and then with reports of late-stage talks for the establishment of a Chinese military training facility in Cuba. Despite this, leading candidate Torres has vowed to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Arevalo’s position is less clear. He has stated that Guatemala’s sovereignty and interests are most important and that there is no reason to “jump trains.” After all, China is Guatemala’s second-biggest commercial partner, behind the United States.

Closer to home, the runoff election results may determine the extent to which the next Guatemalan government is willing to collaborate with the United States to address matters such as irregular migration, corruption, and transnational crime. As a political insider whose party has been embroiled in several corruption investigations, Torres is seen as unlikely to take strong measures against suspected corruption within the party system. On the other hand, Arevalo is known as the anti-corruption congressman. His party—Movimiento Semilla—is all but a symbol of the 2015 “Guatemalan Spring,” which resulted in the resignation and arrest of then-president Otto Perez Molina. Arevalo announced on Monday that if he were to win the election, he would convene former judges and prosecutors to create a national anti-corruption advisory group. With increasingly unreliable allies across the region, the Biden-Harris administration’s ability to carry out its strategy toward Central America hinges upon the election of a trustworthy and dependable leader in Guatemala.

Economic implications

Guatemala is the largest economy in Central America, but with some of the highest rates of poverty and inequality in the region, as well as the lowest rate of tax collection in Latin America. While Torres would likely continue with a more conservative economic agenda focused on macroeconomic stability, market-oriented reforms, attraction of foreign investment, and fiscal discipline, less is known about Arevalo’s plan. The next president will also have to deal with a growing fiscal deficit and continued social demands. The president will need to work with a split Congress to pass budgets—the country failed to do so in 2020 and 2021, when protestors set the Capitol on fire—to support the population’s needs and continue to improve the country’s basic infrastructure. To address the low rates of tax revenue in relation to the size of the economy, the next administration will also have to undertake important reforms on the fiscal front.

Should Torres win in August, she would likely pursue a robust social domestic agenda—she’s already promised bags of basic food items for the most vulnerable and cuts in taxes on basic foods. Meanwhile, Arevalo has floated the idea of a public hospital for cancer treatment and a state-owned enterprise that would create a network of pharmacies with medicines at “fair prices.” But his economic plan, which will need some refinement over the next six weeks, depends on the creation of “jobs, jobs, jobs”—the lack of which is a main driver of migration in Guatemala. Arevalo has laid out plans to bring Guatemala’s citizens into the formal economy while vowing to eradicate poverty and boost quality education. With increasingly few resources to finance the robust social programs these center-left candidates are proposing, breaking ties with Taiwan in favor of China could just make economic sense. This would be especially attractive if a landmark infrastructure project accompanied the announcement. For example, Costa Rica received a national stadium in 2011. More recently, El Salvador received a stadium and a library in 2019, and, following President Xiomara Castro’s announcement of breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan this year, Honduras received a pledge for Chinese investment in a major hydroelectric dam project.

Guatemala’s voters will likely be most concerned with their pocketbooks when they head to the ballot box in August. Urban centers want a leader who will work to root out corruption—which could give Arevalo an edge. But their choice will reverberate far beyond the country’s borders and could reshape the geopolitical map in the hemisphere.

María Fernanda Bozmoski is the deputy director of programs at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Eva Lardizábal is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post As Guatemala’s voters signal a left turn, great powers are watching closely appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nonresident fellow Wen-Ti Sung quoted in CNN, Al-Jazeera, Bloomberg, and Financial Review on Wagner rebellion’s implications for China, Taiwanese reactions to upcoming US elections

sboyle — Mon, 26 Jun 2023 15:44:52 +0000

On June 26, 2023, Nonresident fellow Wen-Ti Sung spoke to CNN, Al-Jazeera, and Bloomberg about the Chinese reaction to the short-lived Wagner rebellion in Russia, suggesting that “China likely fears a domino effect: that if Russia falls, China may be next,” and that Russia’s turmoil will make Beijing “ever more cautious about initiating a Taiwan conflict.”

Fellow

Wen-Ti Sung

Nonresident Fellow

Global China Hub

Australia China

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Shahid in Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs: Navigating the troubled waters: ‘maritimization’ of Bangladesh’s foreign policy

Rubadeh Shahid — Mon, 26 Jun 2023 15:36:19 +0000

The post Shahid in Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs: Navigating the troubled waters: ‘maritimization’ of Bangladesh’s foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig in La Stampa discussing Prigozhin’s revolt

sodal — Mon, 26 Jun 2023 14:55:42 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 25, Scowcroft Vice President and Director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed in La Stampa about scenarios that may arise following Prigozhin’s revolt in Russia.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

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Five steps toward Ukrainian victory and a lasting peace with Russia

Arseniy Yatsenyuk — Mon, 26 Jun 2023 11:07:48 +0000

A few years ago, against the backdrop of a national pro-democracy uprising in Belarus, I called on European leaders to develop a clear strategy for Eastern Europe. This envisaged EU and NATO membership for Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and a free Belarus. Alas, many European politicians preferred to wait and see.

It is admittedly difficult to make historic political decisions, but the price of not doing so is often horrendously high. In this case, the price is obvious: By failing to integrate Ukraine and bring the countries of Eastern Europe out of the geopolitical grey zone, Western leaders set the stage for the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022.

Further mistakes will be just as costly. Thankfully, there is now a growing consensus throughout the West that only Ukrainian victory can end the global security crisis sparked by Russia’s invasion. Nevertheless, there is still a need for greater clarity on what would constitute victory and how Europe can achieve a lasting peace.

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Defeating Russia and securing peace will require a series of interrelated measures that go far beyond the battlefield. I have identified five key elements to a sustainable settlement that will end the current carnage and prevent any repetitions in the years ahead.

The first element is arming Ukraine sufficiently for victory. This process is well underway, but serious issues remain in terms of both quantities and timing. Every single delay in military aid costs Ukrainian lives and emboldens Russia. Ukraine’s Western partners must overcome their misplaced fear of provoking Putin and should instead seek to streamline the delivery of weapons. After all, it is now widely recognized that Russia must be defeated on the battlefield.

The second element is the strategic deterrence of Russia and creation of a new NATO-centered security architecture in Europe. There should now be no illusions: NATO alone can provide Europe with a credible and efficient security system. This means NATO membership for Ukraine. Nothing less will force Moscow to retreat. The upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius should conclude by inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. No bilateral guarantees or other compromise measures can hope to replace NATO’s Article Five or stop Russia.

The third element is Ukrainian membership of the European Union and restoration of the Ukrainian economy in close unison with the wider European economy. There has been significant progress toward this objective since the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale invasion, but overall results remain disappointing and fall far short of the many political statements on the importance of Ukraine’s European integration.

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The fourth key task is undermining Russia’s potential to act aggressively. It is hard to assess how long Russia will remain capable of waging the current war, but financial issues will play an important role in any decision-making process. Last year, official Russian military expenditure amounted to approximately $85 billion. This year, the figure is set to reach at least $108 billion. Unofficially, the total sum spent on the war is likely to be far higher. Clearly, sanctions must continue and need to intensify. Additional steps could include the prevention of dual-purpose goods transit through Russia and the maximum implementation of secondary sanctions.

In parallel, it is also vital to protect and strengthen Ukraine’s economy. Further measures are necessary to facilitate Ukrainian exports. NATO-led naval convoys should break Russia’s Black Sea blockade and enable Ukraine to resume international exports throughout the country’s southern ports. Ukraine’s external debt should undergo restructuring.

The fifth element necessary for a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe is perhaps the most important and at the same time the most intangible. Genuine victory will only be possible when Russian imperialism is no longer a threat to the region.

Once Ukraine is liberated and secure under the collective umbrella of NATO membership, the top priority for the international community will be addressing the imperial ideology that encourages Russians to commit acts of international aggression with impunity and contempt for human life. Russia must bear full legal and financial responsibility for its aggression against Ukraine and for the genocide of the Ukrainian nation. The era of Russian impunity for war crimes must end.

Unless the underlying issue of Russian imperialism is addressed at the international level, the liberation of Ukraine will provide little more than temporary relief. Confronting Russia’s imperial identity is the only way to achieve a lasting peace. This would pave the way for a new global security system and the much-needed reform of international bodies such as the UN Security Council. World peace will remain elusive until Russian imperialism is consigned to the dustbin of history.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk is Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum and former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-16).

Short-lived Wagner mutiny will undermine Russia’s Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Sun, 25 Jun 2023 23:13:23 +0000

As suddenly as it had begun twenty-four hours earlier, Wagner chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s rebellion against Russia’s military leadership came to an abrupt end on Saturday evening. The details of the deal struck between Prigozhin and the Kremlin remain murky, but the Russian warlord appears to have emerged from the drama relatively unscathed, at least for now.

The same cannot be said for Vladimir Putin, who has been very publicly humiliated by the affair and now looks weaker than at any point in his twenty-three-year reign. While the mutiny itself was remarkably brief, the consequences are likely to be profound, with serious repercussions in particular for the already faltering Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The most obvious practical consequence of the Wagner mutiny is a weakening of Russia’s force posture inside Ukraine. More than twenty thousand Wagner troops reportedly withdrew from Ukraine to participate in the revolt, representing around five percent of the entire Russian invasion force. Crucially, these were by far the most effective fighting units in the Russian military and had been responsible for almost all of the advances achieved over the past year.

Depending on the exact nature of the agreement to end the mutiny, many Wagner fighters may well return to the frontlines, possibly integrated into the regular Russian army. However, their non-Wagner comrades and commanders will understandably treat them with extreme suspicion, limiting their impact on the battlefield. Whatever happens next, the days when Wagner troops led the Russian invasion of Ukraine look to be over.

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The revolt also highlighted the relative defenselessness of Russia itself. Wagner troops took almost a year to occupy the small Ukrainian city of Bakhmut but seized the nearly twenty times larger Russian city Rostov-on-Don without a fight in a matter of hours. Indeed, it is worth underlining that Rostov-on-Don is by far the biggest city captured by Russian troops since the start of Putin’s so-called “Special Military Operation” sixteen months ago. Russia’s lack of domestic defenses was further exposed by the unhindered progress of Prigozhin’s armored column, which advanced to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed before deciding to turn back.

While the immediate threat of a march on Moscow is now over, drastic measures are clearly required to bolster Russian domestic security. Putin knows the watching world has noted this vulnerability. He must now urgently take visible steps to prevent another ambitious Russian warlord or Ukrainian army commander from launching a new campaign inside his unprotected borders. Where will Putin find the necessary troops and equipment for this? With the vast majority of Russia’s military currently deployed in Ukraine, the answer to this question is both obvious and awkward. Russia will have no choice but to reduce its invasion force in order to address the country’s serious domestic security issues.

Russia’s vast military and state security apparatus will also now find itself engaged in the hunt for traitors and possible turncoats, which will inevitably distract attention and resources away from the task of defeating Ukraine. Infighting between the various different military clans has been a debilitating factor throughout the Russian invasion of Ukraine; this trend will now intensify as the Russian authorities look to settle scores with the many police chiefs, local officials, and military commanders who either stood aside or discreetly backed the Wagner mutiny.

Meanwhile, the mutiny has raised some fundamental questions over Putin’s continued ability to rule. He was notably absent during the initial hours of the crisis, only appearing the following morning in a brief video address to the nation. He also seems to have been sidelined in negotiations with Prigozhin, allowing Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to take the lead. These are not the actions of a strongman ruler. As Atlantic Council Eurasia Center Senior Director and former US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst noted on CNN, “It’s like Prigozhin is the person who looked behind the screen at the Wizard of Oz and saw the great and terrible Oz was just this little frightened man. Putin has been diminished for all time by this affair.”

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While these factors will all undermine the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the most important impact is likely to be on morale within the ranks of the Russian military. Demoralization was already a major issue for Putin’s invasion force, with a steady stream of video addresses on social media during the first half of 2023 testifying to widespread dissatisfaction among Russian troops over “human wave” attacks and catastrophic losses. These problems will now intensify as Russian troops question the loyalties of their leaders and the entire purpose of the invasion.

On the eve of the mutiny, Prigozhin published an explosive video address in which he accused the Kremlin of deliberately misleading the Russian public over its justifications for the war in Ukraine. The Wagner chief, whom many in Russia see as one of the few credible commentators within the establishment, dismissed key elements of the official Kremlin narrative—including claims that the invasion preempted an imminent NATO-backed Ukrainian offensive against Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine and Crimea. He also directly denied widespread Russian allegations that the Ukrainian military had been bombing eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region for eight years prior to the full-scale invasion. Instead, Prigozhin blamed the war on the personal ambitions of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and individual Russian oligarchs.

Such statements will inevitably undermine fighting spirit among Russian troops and cause many to question exactly what they are fighting for in Ukraine. This has long been an issue for the Russian authorities, who have struggled to articulate their war aims amid lurid but unsubstantiated claims of “Ukrainian Nazis” and “Western imperialists.” Prigozhin’s damning comments exposing the lies used to justify the war have now cast an unforgiving light on the Kremlin’s credibility problems and will further fuel discontent among the Russian troops who are fighting and dying on the frontlines.

The short-lived Wagner mutiny has also exposed deep divides within Russia’s military and security establishment that indicate remarkably low levels of loyalty to the Putin regime. There has been some speculation that Prigozhin received support from within the military when planning and executing his mutiny, given that he was able to capture Rostov-on-Don with such apparent ease despite the fact that the city serves as the headquarters of the entire Ukraine invasion. Prigozhin’s armored column of Wagner troops then travelled hundreds of kilometers through the heart of Russia without encountering any significant military resistance.

The remarkable initial success of the Wagner mutiny in seizing control of a major city and advancing on the capital has sent shock waves through Russia that will also be felt by Putin’s occupation forces in Ukraine. If Russian soldiers and commanders are not prepared to defend their own country, why should troops deployed to Ukraine sacrifice themselves for such an apparently dubious cause? If Prigozhin and his private army can go unpunished for declaring war on the Russian state, why should ordinary mobilized Russians feel obliged to follow suicidal orders in Ukraine?

For obvious reasons, the Kremlin will now attempt to downplay the significance of the short-lived Wagner mutiny. In reality, however, the ramifications of this unprecedented event will reverberate for some time to come and will shape Russia’s future, including the outcome of the war in Ukraine. One year ago, Putin was boasting of returning historically Russian lands and comparing himself to Peter the Great. Today, he looks far more like Czar Nicholas II, whose military failures and weak leadership sparked mutiny and the eventual collapse of the Russian Empire.

The Wagner mutiny is further proof that Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has left Russia divided, demoralized, and weakened. With his own personal authority now rapidly evaporating, the Russian dictator may soon face domestic problems so grave that they will overshadow even the prospect of defeat in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Russia’s preeminence in Eurasia was once taken as a given, but the specter of Russian power may now be waning…

Almost 750 kilometers south of Rostov-on-Don, Georgia’s borders remained open even as President Salome Zourabichvili called on Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili to convene the country’s security council and urged authorities to secure its border crossings with Russia. Garibashvili opted not to call the security council together and appeared to take no measures at all to prepare for any potential ripple effects of instability in Rostov-on-Don and beyond. Both the president and prime minister belong to the anti-Western Georgian Dream (GD) party, which has sought closer ties with Moscow as a means of ensuring “stability” for Georgia. The Prigozhin rebellion undermines some of GD’s talking points as it looks to consolidate power ahead of hotly contested parliamentary elections in October 2024.

Putin’s calls to Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan yielded relatively neutral readouts, though Pashinyan asked to stay apprised of further developments. While Pashinyan has expressed anger at the fecklessness of the CSTO to support Armenia’s defense against Azerbaijan, Russia remains the nominal guarantor of stability in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia’s key backer. A weaker Russia would further strengthen Azerbaijan’s hand in peace negotiations.

While the mutiny was ongoing, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared Ankara’s readiness to play a role ensuring “peace and harmony” in Russia. Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson emphasized support for “rule of law.” Both countries already maintain commercial and military ties with Moscow but don’t depend on the Kremlin for legitimacy or as a power backstop. Each could seek to leverage Kremlin weakness and extract further concessions.

The end of the immediate crisis came via Russia’s closest neighbor and ally: Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka won credibility with Putin for brokering the agreement that halted Prigozhin’s march on Moscow. For years, Putin has financially backed Lukashenka’s grip on power with billions of dollars and more recently has moved to integrate Belarus into a “union state” with Russia. The Prigozhin agreement turned the tables on Putin, making the oft-bumbling Lukashenka look competent, decisive, and more useful to the Kremlin—at least for now.

But Lukashenka may soon face his own problems at home. The Kastus Kalinouski Regiment, which currently fights on the side of the Ukrainian army, issued a call to take up arms against the Lukashenka regime. The democratic forces of Belarus, led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, also reinvigorated opposition efforts to oust the longstanding dictator.

And the war in next-door Ukraine carried on. There, observers watched with glee as Russian authorities squirmed and flailed to try to maintain order in four Russian regions. Ukrainian memes mocked and cheered on Russian infighting, while Ukraine’s armed forces liberated a village that had been under Moscow’s occupation since 2014.

When Prigozhin agreed to halt Wagner’s advance, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took a more serious tone; he acknowledged the chaos but appealed to the West for more support: “Ukrainian soldiers, Ukrainian guns, Ukrainian tanks, Ukrainian missiles are all that protect Europe from such marches as we see today on Russian territory.” Prigozhin’s march toward Moscow began not over Russia’s maximalist goals in Ukraine, but over the methods by which they should achieve them. Kyiv is gearing up for the war to continue, despite turmoil in Russia. Even amid the confusion, Russian forces fired rockets at civilian apartment blocks in Kyiv, killing three people.

Prigozhin’s Wagner insurrection exposed the brittle nature of the Putin regime and the limits to the power it can project even within Russian borders. Russia’s preeminence in Eurasia was once taken as a given, but the specter of Russian power may now be waning, with major implications for the region. Leaders and elites across Eurasia will now be closely tuned in to Moscow for further signs of weakness. Declining Kremlin power could usher in a new era of more independent foreign policies in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, as countries look to grow relations with the US-led West, China, and Turkey.

Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow him on Twitter at @andrew_danieri.

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